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Abstract 
 
The Multidimensional Depth of the Image 
 
Current discourses within cultural studies are re-iterating the limitations of language 
to adequately describe the affective domains of corporeality and materiality in the 
study of cultural artefacts. Within the discourse of graphic design, however, there 
remains an enduring focus placed upon models of language and communication to 
understand the meaning of designed materials. Rather than upholding a focus upon 
language, this thesis undertakes a theoretical investigation to extend the literature 
available to the discourse of graphic design to better understand how visual materials 
‘come to mean’ within the experience of an embodied subject coupled to an affective 
environment. This thesis proposes an ontology of images that is emergent as a part of 
what, within the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, is describes as a mind-body-
world system through which the ‘meaning’ of visual materials should be grounded.  
 
This thesis asks not ‘what’ visual materials mean but rather ‘how’ visual materials 
come to mean in terms of a complex relationship involving the embodied perceptual 
experience of the maker and the viewer that is immersed within an affective 
environment, what the thesis terms the multidimensional depth of the image. A 
phenomenological theory of art is extended to include a range of materials of popular 
visual culture to frame a study of how form and style come to mean qua the gestures 
of an embodied experience as coupled to an environment — a meaning that 
reciprocally emerges through the embodied experience of the work by the viewer. 
The environmental processes of which an embodied subject’s movements are coupled 
are brought into focus through enactive conceptions of mind within the cognitive 
sciences, describing how mind and meaning are emergent within an autopoietic 
organism-environment system. This provides a framework in which the affective 
dimensions of matter can be more fully understood as having a cognitive efficacy. 
Within this context, Material Engagement Theory (an approach within cognitive 
archaeology) is utilized to include a more focussed discussion of the affective 
domains of materials, objects, and artefacts and their role in the emergence of mind 
and meaning.  
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Introduction: 
The multidimensional depth of the image 
 
 
 
Figure 1 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
 
 
Depicted above is a four panel comic portrayal of a kitchen scene, a series of black 
and white lines, forms, shapes and figures that, when read in succession, can come to 
life to express a sensuous, multi-sensory and living kitchen environment. Although 
the scene may appear seemingly complete, when we study the panels more closely, 
the ambiguous nature of the depiction gradually begins to unfold. There is just enough 
contextual detail to express what amounts to a kitchen scene to be recognisable, the 
scene in its entirety is never shown, only close-ups of specific objects, and the 
specific elements of the scene itself remain partially unspecified. It could be any 
kitchen, the cook could be a mother, a daughter, a nanny, or a housekeeper. The 
economy of colour, line, specific details and texture conceals any given identity of 
many of the items, the identity of the scene and its contents remain potential, only 
ever suggested through the use of line and form, requiring the experience of the 
viewer to actualise any meaning. 
The potentiality of the scene becomes more evident in another more 
fundamental way; when we consider that the scene depicted, as is read through our 
own perceptual experience, is not what may be materially presented to our perception 
by the maker. The experience of the scene is lived, multi-sensory, bodily-based, 
subjective and temporal, not wholly of the intentions of the artist, or wholly of the 
experiences of the reader, it appears to express an invitation to fuse with our own 
experiences through the marks and lines themselves. The image (materially) has no 
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sound or taste (other than the taste of ink and paper), yet when the panels are intended 
to be read, the sound of the boiling pot, the chopping of vegetables and the timer, the 
smell of certain kinds of food being cooked may all be perceptually present. 
Regardless of the economy of contextual detail in the panels we may perceive a 
certain kind of kitchen scene, one that is familiar to what our bodies may have 
previously experienced and encountered. The experience of such a visual material has 
a perceptual complexity: as rooted within a bodily-based perceptual experience. One 
that is multi-sensory and guided by the lived history of our experiences, feelings and 
memories of being immersed within many different kinds of kitchen environment(s).  
The reading of the kitchen scene above, in recognizing how such a visual 
material comes to mean in terms of a fuller perceptual experience, requires thinking 
beyond a consensus of current critical literature within graphic design. Graphic 
design’s academic and critical voice has been consumed within the wider concerns of 
‘visual communication’1 since the late twentieth century. Where theories of narrative 
and grammar (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 2006; Van Leeuwen, 2008; Barnard, 2005), 
semiosis (Lupton, 1986; Crow, 2007; Krippendorf, 2006), and rhetoric (Ehes and 
Lupton, 1988; Tyler, 1992; Buchanan, 1992) all describe the meaning of a designed 
work in terms of its consumption embedded in the context of socially and culturally 
constructed theories of language, they are not able to fully appreciate a fuller 
perceptual experience of the bodily-based perceptual experience of the designer or 
viewer immersed in an environment that this thesis argues are important for 
understanding how visual materials come to mean.  
                                            
1 The area of ‘visual communication’ represents, as Barbatsis et al (2005) describes, an intersection of 
thought from many traditions that deal primarily with the study of visual materials. As an academic 
discourse it is a subject that is widely studied across fields such as communication and rhetoric, 
psychology, social science art and design, and film and cinema studies. 
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There is current interest in the recognition of the philosophical tradition of 
phenomenology2 and its implications in re-configuring graphic design history, 
criticism and education. Samantha Lawrie (2008) has called for the inclusion of 
bodily-based experience through a reading of the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty. 
Focussing attention upon the construction of what she calls an ‘embodied’ language 
that is rooted within the kinaesthetic and multi-sensory experience of an ‘embodied’ 
viewer. Julia Moszkowicz (2010) has revealed how phenomenology once played a 
central role in the early studio-based languages of graphic design’s pioneering 
practitioners and theoreticians. Such work suggests the potential to question engrained 
assumptions within the current discourse through bringing to light the importance of 
more fully understanding a bodily-based experience of visual materials. 
The study of visual materials exclusively as a part of a system of language was 
problematized in particular during the later half of the twentieth century within the 
context of art (Bryson, 1989; Gombrich, 1987; Gell, 1998; Krauss, 1993), on the 
ground that such approaches place meaning-making outside of the temporality3 of a 
lived bodily-based experience4, they remove the body through focussing upon a 
culturally relative account of vision5. Within more current critiques in the context of 
cultural studies, language based approaches to the study of human culture are 
                                            
2 Phenomenology, as Mark Johnson (2005) describes, is a philosophical method that analyses the 
origins, structures, and experienced qualities of human bodily-based experience (p. 19), focusing upon 
felt qualities and patterns of our bodily movements and interactions with objects in the environment. 
3 Rosalind Krauss (1993) has argued against the notion of the spatial and temporal act of viewing a 
work as constructed outside of a kinesthetic bodily experience. What Krauss terms an ‘optical 
unconscious’ (ibid), is an unconscious rooting of visual perceptual experience within the visceral 
temporality of a lived body. 
4 Norman Bryson (1989) has taken exception to the notion that vision was fully understandable in 
terms of a coded system of signs (what he terms the Gaze), instead arguing that vision is always rooted 
within the temporality and duration of a lived bodily experience. The study of Western painting, he has 
argued, is often predicated upon the ‘disappearance’ of a deictic reference, the removal of the body of 
the artist and viewer, as a site of meaning (p. 96). 
5 Ernst Gombrich (1987) challenged what he termed the ‘relativity of vision thesis’, the notion that 
vision is culturally and socially constructed, advanced through the rise of semiotics, critical studies, 
and cognitive psychology. Gombrich highlights how such approaches put too much focus upon 
concerns such as race, class, gender, sexual preference, and power structures over that of the 
psychology of perceptual experience. 
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understood to mute not only important bodily-based perceptual and experiential 
processes, but also affective6 processes of the domains of matter and materiality7 
within which the body functions, attesting to the body’s immersion and participation 
with an active and responsive, living, natural world. Karen Barad (2007) in particular 
has written extensively on the limitations of language to adequately represent and 
describe the affective (or agential) domains of matter and materiality (pp. 132-134) as 
well the corporeal dimensions of perceptual experience.8 Such a concern has been 
recognised throughout some contemporary strands of cultural studies9 where the focus 
upon theories of language to understand human activity and cultural artefacts is still 
being understood as reductive. Writers such as Diane Coole and Samantha Frost 
                                            
6 By affect I refer particularly to the Deleuzian use of the term by writers such as Jane Bennett (2007) 
and Diane Coole and Samantha Frost (2009) within contemporary cultural studies to describe the 
ability of objects, matter and things to be implicated within the development of human cognition and 
creative or technical activity. Elizabeth Grosz (2008, pp. 3-4) provides a further reading of the term 
linked to artistic practice, differentiating affects from an exclusively phenomenological body-centric 
framework as a linking of the phenomenological body to outside forces and energies of the 
environment that the body itself experiences. Affects, maintains Grosz, attest to the body’s immersion 
and participation within an active and responsive nature, including cultural artefacts, within chaos and 
materiality, as the non-human becoming’s of the human form. 
7 By materiality I refer to the term drawn as accounted for within material culture studies across 
contemporary cultural anthropology and archaeology, and refers to the domains of things, objects and 
matter; the properties, forces and energies of the materials of the environment, that play an active 
(affective) role in the development of the human cognitive architecture (Malafouris, 2013), as well as 
human creative and technical activity (Ingold, 2000, 2011; Hodder, (2012). Following these thinkers, 
materiality within the thesis is understood as what Gilles Deleuze termed a material-force, as existing 
across multiple dimensions of reality at once, both immaterial and material, across the domains of body 
and extended into the domains of materials, and underpinning human movement and activity. 
8 In Meeting the Universe Halfway (2007) Barad reveals how the recourse to post-structuralist theories 
of language to understand the world around us not only reduces our observations to that of the status of 
representations, but the domains of matter (including the body) that language seeks to represent are 
held off at a distance, “[…] language has been granted too much power. The linguistic turn, the 
semiotic turn, the interpretative turn, the cultural turn: it seems that every turn lately every ‘thing’ -
even materiality- is turned into matter of language or some other cultural representation” (Barad, 2007, 
p. 132). What Barad terms ‘agential realism’ (2007) refers to a living matter, placing the agency of 
matter, its properties, forces and energies, at the centre of a contemporary revision of realism within the 
humanities and cultural studies. 
9 Barrett and Bolt’s Carnal Knowledge: Towards a New Materialism through the Arts (2013) 
investigates the notion of ‘New Materialism’ through the practice of the arts, and explores the material 
dimensions of artistic practice asking how the agency of matter may impact upon human creativity. 
Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter (2009) questions the notions of discourse and knowledge that she claims 
focus too exclusively upon the domain of the human agent. Instead of focusing upon collectives 
conceived primarily of a conglomerate of human design and practices (what she sees as a conventional 
“discourse”), Bennett argues that we must begin to recognize the active role of non-human materials, 
that is, the power of non-human (vibrant) objects to affect human activity that lies at work throughout 
public life. 
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(2009, pp. 2-3) re-iterate that the focus upon the ‘textual’ and ‘linguistic’ approaches 
to understand the world neglect not only the corporeal dimensions of human bodily-
based experience but also the affective dimensions of materiality, treating matter as 
lifeless in its reception of human intentions.  
It is clear that there is still a large amount of attention directed toward the 
hegemony of language, social and cultural determinants, as well as the textual and 
semiotic theories that are derived from language, regarding the study of cultural 
artefacts that have not been embraced as fully within the discourse of graphic design. 
Such hegemony leads to a ‘disappearance’, or a muting, of two important affective 
domains; that of (1) corporeality- the multi-sensory, kinaesthetic, bodily-based 
activity, feeling and experience, and (2) materiality- the affective and responsive 
domains of matter, materials and objects (an environment) amidst which the body is 
immersed. The current theoretical context surveyed here sets the precedent for this 
thesis which addresses the importance of a lived bodily experience and of the 
materiality of matter for a fuller account of how visual materials come to mean within 
an over abundance of communication models within graphic design. Rather than 
focus more attention at the level of language this thesis provides a way to more fully 
understand the implications of the dimensions of a lived bodily experience immersed 
within an affective environment through momentarily suspending the central 
‘communicative’ concerns that underpin graphic design’s critical discourse. In doing 
so the thesis asks how visual materials come to mean as ontologically rooted within 
the lived bodily-based perceptual experience of the maker and viewer, an experience 
that is itself immersed in an affective environment. 
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Thesis Methodology 
The thesis surveys current literature regarding the study of art and painting drawn 
from philosophy (Crowther, 2011, 2012) and philosophy of mind (Johnson, 2005) that 
utilise the phenomenological approach of Merleau-Ponty10 (1962). These 
phenomenological approaches to art and painting are useful for the thesis’ trajectory 
as they begin their study of the meaning of a work qua the gestures and performance 
of the artist as engaged within the world that created them, that is; a mind-body-world 
system. This literature is extended throughout the chapters of this thesis to bear upon 
the study of a range materials from popular visual culture and graphic design, 
bringing into question the theoretical separation of artistic and designed materials. 
Outlined below are several key attributes that a phenomenological method provides 
this thesis’ overall methodological approach. 
A lived experience is of a mind-body-world system. As Jennifer Bullington 
(2013, pp.25-28) recognizes, what Merleau-Ponty (1962) calls a ‘lived body’ attests 
to the unity of the mind-body-world system. The body understood as a lived body is 
both physiological and psychological; they are intertwined, as well as intertwined 
with that of the world. The self, the body and the world of things and others are 
neither separated from each other nor to be confused with each other, but rather can 
be seen as three sectors or levels of a unified field. 
The functioning of the mind within a phenomenological framework is 
‘embodied’, meaning that it does not just comprise what is consciously entertained 
                                            
10 The Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty is utilised within this thesis as his phenomenology differs 
from that of the ‘transcendental’ phenomenology of Heidegger and Husserl in a fundamental way. As 
Vivienne Sobchack (1999, p. 32) describes, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is ‘existential’, it 
recognizes the reversibility of perceptual experience in which the subject and objects of perceptual 
experience respond to each other. Whereas a Husserlian phenomenology describes the phenomena of 
experience as ‘given’ by the world and ‘taken up’ through the act of experiencing, Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology recognizes a reciprocal relationship between subject and object that are both 
‘enworlded’. As Jennifer Bullington (2013, pp. 25-28) recognizes, what Merleau-Ponty (1962) calls the 
‘lived body’ is a lived unity of the mind–body-world system. 
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through ‘higher’ processes11 of mind; it reaches down into a very visceral connection 
with the world. As the philosopher Mark Johnson (2005) describes, every aspect of 
human activity is grounded in specific forms of bodily, sensory-motor engagement 
with the environment, the ‘origins’ of human meaning-making are also embodied. 
The thesis recognizes that what is described as an ‘embodied subject’ (Crowther, 
2011) (whether artist or viewer) is always immersed in a physical world that, although 
not dependent on the subject for its existence, determines the subject’s character, 
while the nature of the physical world (as perceived by the subject) is equally given a 
specific character through the range of cognitive and motor capacities that the subject 
brings to bear on it.  
A phenomenological approach to art is undertaken through bodily-based 
experience, providing a fuller understanding of how visual materials come to mean 
within such an experience. Paul Crowther’s (2011) notion of the ‘phenomenological 
depth’ of painting describes how an artwork’s style embodies a complex reciprocal 
relationship between the painter’s subjectivity and the objects of their perception, 
knowledge and action.12 The study of painting is undertaken in terms of the gestural 
activity in modifying the relation between subject and object of experience – 
recognising the painter’s bodily presence in the way the subject matter is depicted. 
The ‘style’ of a work within a phenomenological framework is not just a way a 
picture looks, it “embodies a way of acting upon the world, through painting or 
sculpture, that changes the character of the subject matter being addressed” 
                                            
11 What Johnson (2005, p. 218) describes as the ‘higher’ processes of mind refer to that of rationality 
and conceptual thought that have, in many dualist accounts of mind within the Western philosophical 
tradition, been separated from ‘lower’ process of bodily functioning, such as kinaesthetic activity, 
feelings, emotions and desire. 
12 For Crowther, the ontological structure of the subject and its objects of experience are reciprocally 
correlated at the experiential level; each is a part of the full definition of the other. Crowther (2011, p. 
3) uses the term ‘phenomenological’ in relation to aspects of this reciprocity, particularly “how the 
relation between subject and object of experience changes character on the basis of different modes of 
perception and action”.  
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(Crowther, 2012, p. 2), studied through such things as the handling of paint, the 
choice of subject matter and compositional strategies. 
How a particular style of a work comes to mean is emergent through a 
complex interplay between the phenomenological depth that the work embodies and 
the direct visual perception of that work by the viewer. The phenomenological notion 
of a “reciprocal interaction and modification” (Crowther, 2012, p. 65) of a work is 
utilised by this thesis to reveal the reciprocity between perceiver and perceived in 
which the work itself, and the viewer’s perceptual experience, are reciprocally 
transformed. Such a position carries the epistemological implication that the 
relationship between the subject and object of experience (the work) is not absolutely 
fixed but constantly transformed by the new circumstances of the viewer’s own 
perceptual experience, the “presence of an always-participating mobile viewer” 
(Crowther, 2012, p. 65). 
The activity of an enquiry (this thesis) is constructive. The perceptual 
experience of the inquirer is reciprocal; the work itself, and any meaning, is always 
read through perceptual experience as an ‘aesthetic disclosure’ (Crowther, 2012). 
Such a disclosure of meaning recognizes the very activity of the enquiry (including its 
historically contingent context) as co-constructive; it always changes the character of 
the subject of enquiry being addressed through the cognitive and motor capacities of 
the viewer. As a consequence this thesis avoids presenting an exhaustive historical 
account of any visual materials, rather its aim is philosophical; to investigate how 
visual materials come to mean through the experience of them. 
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To extend a phenomenological study of art to include the materials of popular 
visual culture this thesis specifically undertakes a study of the human figure13 as is 
depicted across a range of artistic and popular visual and audio-visual materials14. The 
way the human figure is depicted within the materials surveyed will be read as 
revealing a phenomenological depth that is a part of a mind-body-world system, that 
is; to more fully describe how a visual material comes to mean in terms of a lived 
bodily experience (of the artist and viewer) that is always immersed within an 
affective environment of objects, materials and matter. This enquiry culminates in 
what this thesis describes as a ‘multidimensional depth of the image’— an emergent 
relationship between a work, that embodies the phenomenological depth of the artist 
as immersed within an affective environment, that is experienced through a reciprocal 
interaction and modification with the ‘depth’ of the viewer also immersed within an 
affective environment.  
The methodological approach set up within the context of phenomenology 
provides this thesis with a theoretical trajectory that underpins the central narrative of 
the chapters (outlined below) through focussing attention upon a theoretical 
repositioning and thickening of three key concepts that form a mind-body-world 
system: the body, the environment, and the artefact. Through such an investigation 
this thesis takes an opportunity to survey critical literature that will be brought to bear 
                                            
13 Where graphic design has many abstract and unusual forms found within logotypes and typographic 
solutions that can also be studied alongside avant-garde and abstract painting, these are not the focus of 
the current work of the thesis. The thesis’ task is not to attempt an all-encompassing theory of depiction 
for visual communication at this stage, rather to lay the groundwork for a new theoretical trajectory.  
14 As the thesis brings phenomenological theories of art to bear upon the study of popular visual 
culture, the materials studied at the core of the thesis are taken from a range of sources, such as 
advertising and avant-garde filmic materials (primarily sourced from the 1960s and 70s European 
context), painting, advertising matter and experimental film, that have a similar ambiguous, strange and 
unusual formal presentation of human figures and events. These materials are juxtaposed throughout 
the thesis with other visual materials taken from artistic, scientific and popular contexts.  
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upon the study of the materials of popular visual culture from areas outside of the 
critical discourse that surrounds graphic design. 
 
Thesis in outline 
 
‘Form’ and ‘visual style’ have a phenomenological depth  
The thesis begins its investigation through a description of a particular perceptual 
experience of an example of late twentieth century popular culture — Hamlet cigars 
Music Teacher (1968) (advertising film) — that presents figures, context and 
narrative in unusual, minimal and ambiguous ways. This reading is used in Chapter 
One to bring to attention how the critical literature that surrounds the study of such a 
work of popular visual culture, focus the study within a social, cultural and economic 
context (Greenberg, 1939; Hagener, 2007; Spigel, 2010) removing a lived bodily-
based experience of the viewer and the artist from this analysis. 
To re-introduce a lived bodily-based experience Chapter One surveys 
phenomenological approaches to mind that recognise the emergence of mind from 
within an unconscious system of sensory-motor functions, feelings and activity that 
operate below the level of self-referential intentionality (Gallagher, 2005). The mind 
is ‘embodied’ within the organic functioning of what is described as a lived 
‘phenomenological body’15 (Johnson, 2009, p. 274) — the experience of a living, 
moving and feeling body coupled to the environment. Phenomenological, or 
                                            
15 Within the context of Johnson’s work, the body cannot be understood as merely a physiological 
object interacting with other objects — but as an attitude, having a subjective, lived experience of its 
own that directs toward the world. Johnson’s ‘phenomenological body’ is introduced as one of five 
accounts of the body that together provide a fuller account of what Johnson calls a ‘human being’ 
(Johnson, 2005, p. 274), the biological body, the phenomenological body, the ecological body, the 
social body and the cultural body. Neither of these individually can account for the complexity of a 
‘human being’ rather they all must be included in equal measure. Johnson’s biological and 
phenomenological body are most relevant for the trajectory of this thesis, more fully outlined in 
Chapter One. 
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embodied, approaches to art (Johnson, 2009; Crowther, 2011, 2012) begin upon the 
premise that the work is a trace of the movement, gesture and skill of an embodied 
mind coupled to an environment, rather than the study of visual materials in terms of 
‘what’ they mean regarding social and cultural determinants. This literature provides 
Chapter One with a recovery of two central notions: ‘style’ (Crowther, 2012, 2013) 
and ‘form’ (Johnson, 2009), which are extended to allow a deeper discussion of how 
visual materials of popular culture come to mean as rooted within the embodied 
experience of the artist and viewer. 
Mark Johnson (2009) describes how the formal aspects of a visual work, its 
shape, quality of line and colour, always express an embodied meaning rooted within 
the unconscious sensory-motor functioning, feeling and movement of the artist that 
creates the work. For Johnson, the visual arts are exemplary of such an embodied 
meaning as they not fully explainable in terms of intellectual cognitive, or 
propositional statements, instead they are rooted within the sensory-motor functioning 
and feeling of the body of the artist. Paul Crowther (2012) offers a phenomenological 
recovery of visual style in an art historical context. What Crowther (2011, 2012) 
describes as the ‘phenomenological depth’ of visual style of painting is a reading of 
style in terms of how it embodies a complex reciprocal relationship between the 
painter’s subjectivity and the objects of their perception, knowledge and action, as 
read through choices of subject matter, compositional strategies and also through the 
way the artist handles paint. 
Just as with the artist or practitioner, the embodied experience of the viewer 
also plays a constructive role in how visual materials mean, as there is a ‘reciprocal 
interaction and modification’ (Crowther, 2012) between perceiver and perceived in 
which the work itself, and the viewer’s perceptual experience, are reciprocally 
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transformed. Chapter Two investigates this relationship more fully by surveying a 
constructivist model of perception based upon a physiological model of optics 
(Helmholtz, 1924) applied within the psychological study of the visual arts (Gamboni, 
2000; Gombrich, 1960). This literature review reveals that the perceptual experience 
of a work (whether a painting, comic strip or accidental image such as an ink blot) is 
‘in-direct’, that is: always shaped by a projective inference of prior neurological 
structures (Gregory, 1997) as well as the subjective experience and expectation of the 
temperament of the beholder (Gombrich, 1960). A visual or audio-visual work (once 
created) is not entirely understandable in terms of any one particular perceptual 
experience, as it always remains ‘potential’ (Gamboni, 2000), actualized through the 
presence of the projective perceptual experience of the viewer or beholder.  
The complex co-constructive relationship between artist, work and viewer is 
more fully accounted for within literature that takes a phenomenological approach to 
film (Barker, 2009; Marks, 2000; Sobchack, 1999, 2004). This is used by Chapter 
Two to extend the phenomenological depth of images (as outlined in Chapter One) to 
include that of the ‘depth’ of the viewer. Revisiting the phenomenology of Merleau-
Ponty through the work of Vivienne Sobchack (1992) reveals that the experience of a 
film work is itself ‘expressive’; it involves the already expressed perceptual 
experience of the filmmaker (expressed within the work) as is experienced through 
the expressive perceptual experience of the viewer. This experience is also multi-
sensory, or ‘haptic’ (Marks, 2000), a tactile encounter that evokes the memories and 
multi-sensory experience of an embodied spectatorship. Phenomenological film 
theory is utilised in Chapter Two to bring together the work of this first part of the 
thesis: to understand how a work (audio-visual or visual) may come to mean is to 
begin an analysis of the work as an expression of the embodied perceptual experience 
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of the artist (expressed through the work) that is experienced (and modified) within 
the context of an already embodied perceptual experience of the viewer.  
Placing the embodied experience of the artist and viewer at the centre of the 
study of artistic and popular visual materials reveals a flattening of a propositional or 
intellectual categorical treatment of artistic and designed materials (outlined in 
Chapter One), each having a phenomenological depth rooted in the reciprocal 
perceptual experience of the maker and the beholder. Chapter Three takes this 
understanding further by focusing on a method of analysis that can place a 
phenomenological depth at the centre of the study of all kinds of visual materials. In 
this context, the critical literature that surrounds the concept of the ‘image’ in the 
work of the art historian Aby Warburg (1866-1929) within the domains of film 
(Michaud, 2007), architecture (Papapetros, 2012) and art history (Rampley, 2001) 
provides a particularly useful guide as they foreground the study of ‘images’ within 
the movements and gestures of the body, underpinned by imaginary and 
psychological energies.  
Warburg’s notion of ‘image’ is introduced in Chapter Three as different to the 
conventional study of an ‘artwork’ as part of a category of art history (Agamben, 
1999). The ‘image’ is the study of embodied psychological ‘energies’ underpinning 
the movements and gestures of the creator and that are left as a trace within the details 
of human figures depicted within the work. Two key tenets to the notion of the 
‘image’ are outlined in Chapter Three: first, the creation of all visual materials 
(whether of art, science or popular culture) is underpinned by a historically contingent 
‘pathos formula’ (imaginaries, beliefs and experiences) that ‘animate’ the human 
figure depicted in the work; secondly, the work should be studied not in terms of what 
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it means, but how it ‘comes to mean’ as embodied within the historically contingent 
gestures and movements of the maker’s body.  
The reading of Warburg’s notion of the ‘image’, as a historically contingent 
expression of a way of acting in the world, undertaken in Chapter Three is used by the 
remaining chapters of this thesis to reveal the psychological animation within the 
details of the human figures depicted, which is extended through the work of 
Crowther (2012) in order to observe them as part of the phenomenological depth of 
the work itself. 
 
The phenomenological body is also ‘enworlded’ 
The placing of the embodied experience of the artist and viewer at the centre of the 
study of how visual materials mean leads to the second central claim of this thesis: the 
importance of the affective (expressive) role of the environment, its processes and 
conditions, within a mind-body-world system. The phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty 
(1942, 1961, 1962) provides a useful philosophical guide across Chapters Four and 
Five for such an investigation by describing the activity of painting as the process of 
giving a visible existence to what is invisible; to the processes and forces of both a 
lived body and the processes of the environment. For Merleau-Ponty ([1961] 1964, 
pp. 166-167) movement and activity of the phenomenal body of the painter is always 
open to a multi-sensory ‘texture’ in which the environment and its conditions, a 
texture that the body is always immersed. 
Merleau-Ponty’s work is outlined in Chapter Four to frame a discussion of 
the importance of the role of the environment within a perceptual experience that is 
also ‘enworlded’ (Sobchack, 1992). For Merleau-Ponty, perceptual experience does 
not happen to the body, rather the body is always immersed within an existential 
 25 
perceptual experience; it is something that the body acts out through such an 
immersion. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy provides two central points that bear upon 
the focus of how visual materials come to mean as emergent from the movement and 
gesture of a body: (1) painting, as an activity, ‘captures’ the environmental forces that 
impact upon the body, expressed visually through the gestures of the artist; (2) the 
environment (its processes and conditions) is active, alive and responsive to human 
gesture, activity and movement and requires more attention than has been given to it 
for the study of the meaning of visual materials. 
Complimentary to Merleau-Ponty’s thinking, what are termed ‘enactive’ 
approaches to mind and perception within the philosophy of mind (Noë, 2004; 
Thompson, 2007), and cognitive sciences (Maturana and Varela, 1979; Varela et al, 
1993) are surveyed throughout Chapter Four. According to the enactive conception of 
mind (Thompson, 2007; Varela et al., 1993), cognition and perception are grounded 
in the sense-making activity of the organism, which is ‘autopoietically’ (Maturana 
and Varela, 1979) coupled to an environment. The organism both initiates and is 
shaped by the environment; organism and environment are bound together in a 
reciprocal activity of specification and selection. The organism’s perception and the 
‘features’ of the environment are both enacted, ‘brought forth’ through the movement 
and activity of the organism coupled with its environment. Enactive conceptions of 
mind are utilised in Chapter Four to allow a more focused discussion of the 
environmental coupling of the artist. Where the phenomenological depth of the artist 
is rendered visible through the activity of painting, Chapter Five argues that within 
an enactive framework processes of the environment (environmental features) are also 
‘rendered visible’ through movement and gesture. 
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The environment ‘matters’- matter is expressive 
To begin to more fully understand what may be meant by enacted ‘features’ of the 
environment within the development of an enactive conception of mind, Chapter Five 
surveys current literature focussed upon the study of material culture: what is 
understood in anthropology and archaeology as the domains of matter, objects, 
artefacts, materials and ‘inorganic’ structures such as rocks and geological formations 
(Ingold, 2011). ‘Material Engagement Theory’ (MET) (Renfrew and Malafouris, 
2010; Malafouris, 2013), drawn from cognitive archaeology, aims to rebalance the 
cognitive equation by bringing materiality — what is understood as the domain of 
objects, artefacts, things and materials — into the study of the evolutionary 
development of cognition. MET (Malafouris, 2013) attempts to describe the cognitive 
efficacy of past and present material culture, in which plastic brains, bodies and things 
play equal roles in how human cognition develops over time. To talk about the 
development of human cognition in the context of MET is to include the cognitive 
efficacy of the material world of objects and artefacts as active in the shaping of the 
human mind through activity and engagement with materials. 
To recognise the efficacy of the material world as part of cognition itself is to 
recognize the fundamental ‘agency’ of matter and materials shaping human activity. 
Within the study of material cultural across cultural anthropology (Ingold, 2010, 
2013) ‘matter’ is understood as having resistances, forces and tensions, it is ‘alive’ 
and plays an affective role alongside human creative activity in the creation of 
cultural artefacts. Tim Ingold (2011), following the philosophy of Gilbert Simondon 
([1964] 1992), conceives of the material world not as a passive receiver of a pre-
conceived human design, but recognises it as an active, responsive and energetic 
‘material’ (Ingold, 2007b), having resistances, forces and tensions of its own. The 
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study of artefacts such as that of willow baskets (Ingold, 2013) reveal how the final 
form of the artefact, a slightly bent structure, cannot wholly be attributed to a ‘design’ 
in the mind of the maker, but rather emerges as an expression of a total ‘field of 
forces’ set up through the structured movement of the practitioner engaging with the 
tensions and resistances of materials. What Ingold describes as the ‘growth’ of a 
human artefact, such as a woven basket, is seen more as a process of autopoiesis 
([2000] 2010, p. 345): a self-transformation over time of the entire system of relations 
that comprise the organism-environment system in which the artefact comes into 
being and that includes the resistances and forces of the materials being used. 
 
Human history is non-linear 
One of the implications that emerges through recognising the active role of matter and 
materials is that the development of the human body, cognition and human activity is 
not simply a linear trajectory of development upon a passive material world but is 
rather immersed within the processes of an energetic world. As such Chapter Five 
continues by discussing the deeper relation of the development of the human body 
running counterpoint to an active environment that includes the material processes of 
the earth, such as the geological timescale and exchanges of bio-mass. Manuel De 
Landa (2000) has described what he calls a ‘meshwork’ of energy transfer and energy 
flow that reveals the non-linear nature of human social history as embedded amongst 
deep geological and genealogical time-scales. Social systems for De Landa (2000) are 
apart of an emergent ‘stable state’ or hardening of the flow of energy and biomass 
between biological, geological and ecological systems, which he demonstrates 
through weaving together the energy flows and transitions of geological change and 
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uplift and a genealogical history of germs plants and animals together with the 
artefacts of a linguistic history of human society between 1700- 2000 AD.  
Adopting and extending the notion of meshwork to include all other 
constituents of the environment, Tim Ingold (2011) has rethought what it means to 
talk of ‘being’ within the context of an active and energetic world that is always 
becoming. Through utilising the work of the ecologist Jakub von Uexküll (1934), 
Ingold (2011) describes how the organism and environment emerge as ‘counterpoint’ 
to each other, one is necessarily of the other, they are relational. The notion of 
counterpoint is utilised in Chapter Five to extend the notion of meshwork beyond De 
Landa and Ingold’s primary focus of the environment, to include the crucial 
dimensions of ‘energy flow’ and ‘transfer’ that accompany the movement and activity 
of a phenomenological body. What De Landa (2000) terms a ‘non-linear’ and ‘non-
equilibrium’ alternative to the ‘linear’ human history is applied throughout Chapter 
Five to describe the interplay, energy transitions and feedback between biological, 
genealogical, material, phenomenological and social systems within which to situate 
the emergence of visual materials. This description is particularly driven by an 
extended commentary on painting. 
 
Visual materials are not representational 
The theoretical context of a non-linear human history shifts the status of human 
artefacts themselves within the context of this thesis from that of representational of a 
human body, mind and intention to that of relational to and functional within the 
ongoing development of an enactive conception of mind. Chapter Five concludes by 
discussing how human artefacts, understood as ‘traces’ of the development of human 
cognition and activity (Shryock and Smail, 2011) further shape the body and 
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cognition through their use and engagement. In the realm of cognitive archaeology 
(Malafouris, 2013) visual materials, such as Palaeolithic depictions, are understood as 
playing a functional role as a part of the ongoing development of an enacted mind 
(Malafouris, 2010). For Malafouris (2007), before and beyond any representational 
act, the process of depiction brings forth (or enacts) a world at the same time as 
depicting it. Visual materials are studied within contemporary cognitive archaeology 
in terms of ‘how they come to mean’ (Malafouris, 2013) as a part of the development 
of an enacted mind that can be revealed by re-tracing the movement and activity 
underpinning the process of depiction as engaged, immersed, in a material world. This 
synthesis provides the second half of this thesis with an account of depiction that is at 
once a materialisation, or a trace, of the development of an historically contingent 
enactive system, or way of acting within the world, as well as playing a functional 
role for perception and cognition to develop through its experience by the maker and 
viewer. 
 
A new theoretical approach: the ‘multidimensional depth’ of the image 
Chapter Six brings together the archaeological, anthropological and 
phenomenological frameworks surveyed throughout the chapters of this thesis into a 
productive dialogue that constructs a new theoretical approach that bears upon the 
study of how visual materials come to mean. What is termed in Chapter Six as the 
‘multidimensional depth’ of the image is an approach to the study of visual materials 
that puts the lived bodily experience of a maker and viewer (a mind-body-world 
system) at the centre of analysis. The multidimensional depth refers to a highly 
differentiated force-field (of exchange and transfer), a meshwork, from within which 
an image emerges (or is brought forth) and is experienced, by being set up through the 
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movement and gestures of a phenomenological body(s) running counterpoint to an 
active and responsive environment; a force-field that encompasses different 
topologies and causal orders of the phenomenological body (of the maker and 
viewer), environment and matter through which visual materials emerge.  
To demonstrate how a multidimensional depth is readable through visual 
materials, Chapter Six undertakes a reading, through an aesthetic disclosure, of the 
visual and audio-visual materials that are used throughout this thesis through an 
examination of the changes and transformations of the details of the depiction of the 
human figure within them. This reading is undertaken in the spirit of Aby Warburg’s 
Mnemosyne Atlas, a collection and juxtaposition of diverse visual materials (artistic, 
scientific and popular) revealing the many ‘pathos formula’ (or imaginaries) that 
animate the human figures depicted across them. It is through a study of the 
differences and tensions, the blank spaces, between images that Warburg studied what 
Edgar Wind (1983) describes as the ‘lifeblood’ (the metaphysical source) of the 
images. This approach is utilised in Chapter Six as a theoretical tool to juxtapose a 
collection of diverse images of visual culture together that through their study reveal a 
multidimensional depth as is read through the experience of the works themselves; 
through the tensions and resistances between the transformation of the details of the 
human figures that are depicted within them.  
 
Key terminology 
Throughout the thesis certain terminology will be used to describe aspects of the 
multidimensional depth of images, what follows is a small précis of some central 
terms for further clarification within the context of this thesis.  
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The term phenomenological body is used to refer to a lived bodily experience 
of a body within a world (see Chapter One). Taken from the embodied approach to 
mind as described by Mark Johnson (2005) based upon Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) 
phenomenal body. The ‘phenomenological body’ or ‘lived body’ is the lived unity of 
the mind–body-world system. The focus of each chapter of this thesis will introduce 
other kinds of bodies to thicken this lived experience, such as a physiological body 
(Helmholtz, 1924), a biological body (Varela et al, 1993), an ecological body 
(Bateson, 1972) and a body within deep geological time (Shryock and Smail, 2011). 
This synthesis of different accounts of the ‘body’ provides a fuller account of a lived 
bodily-based human experience as immersed within an affective environment. 
Through the survey of phenomenological, embodied and psychological 
accounts of mind, reference will be made to two central aspects of a fuller human 
experience: the corporeal and the immaterial. The use of the term corporeal is in 
reference to the sensory-motor functioning, performance and development of the body 
underpinning perceptual experience. Immaterial makes reference to the subjective 
aspects of experience such as beliefs and imaginaries that underpin, and emerge with, 
the corporeal. Whilst these aspects of experience may be described as separate 
categories within the literature surveyed, they will be treated throughout this thesis as 
co-dependent, neither one having primacy over the other, and both reciprocally 
structuring each other.  
The use of the term style throughout this thesis is described within the context 
of a multidimensional depth of visual materials, as an expression of the gestures, 
movements, temperament and experience of the body of the artist immersed within an 
environment. What style is, or what it may be understood as being, is not the primary 
concern of this thesis — the focus is placed upon how style comes to mean when 
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more fully including a discussion of the bodily-based experience of the artist and 
viewer. The use of the term visual materials refers to a diverse range of materials of 
visual culture such as paintings, film, advertising and illustrations through which style 
and form are read to reveal the body. The focus of this thesis remains within what is 
described as visual culture16, this does not isolate the approach from other artefacts 
such as sculptures, tools and other objects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
16 By visual culture I refer to the academic discourse around what Nicholas Mirzoeff (2002, pp. 3-4) 
describes as the “ visual elements in which information, meaning or pleasure is sought by the consumer 
in an interface with visual technology […] any form of apparatus designed either to be looked at or to 
enhance natural vision, from oil painting to television and the internet” (p. 3).  
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Chapter One  
The ‘Depth’ of the Phenomenological Body 
 
Figure 1a has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
Figure 1a depicts the presentation, in an unusual, ambiguous, undetermined and 
minimal form, of an advertising film for Hamlet cigars: Music Teacher (1968). The 
work as a whole presents the narrative of a bad music lesson, in which the teacher’s 
dismay at the student’s rendition of Bach’s Air on a G-String is soothed when he 
smokes a cigar. The film comprises the ambiguous, strange, minimal presentation of 
detail, character and context; it does not provide a definitive meaning, but instead 
expresses just enough within the work to suggest an overall narrative. 
The context and details of the scene are ambiguous – that is, they are open to 
being wherever, whomsoever and whatever the viewer experiences them as. The 
scene gives very few clues as to the context, just enough to suggest a music lesson – a 
piano, a student, a metronome and a teacher. The setting of the lesson remains 
ambiguous, presented as a blank grey space – it could be taking place anywhere, any 
time. The characters are also presented with as few clues as possible as to their 
identity – a school tie and shirt for the student and a cravat and smoking jacket for the 
teacher – and their movements and gestures, barely noticeable, reveal no concrete 
character traits. The shots themselves are long-drawn-out, with little or no movement, 
and the work is shot in stark, stylistic black and white, opposing student and teacher 
(the teacher could be wearing red, green or black), with both emerging from a grey-
toned background setting. There is little sound within the work; although the 
metronome never clicks we may experience the clicks through the experience of the 
film, the only contextual sound accompanying the scene is an out-of-key run of notes 
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heard over shots of the student frantically stabbing at the keys, followed by a piano 
rendition of Bach’s Air on a G-String.  
The work’s unusual qualities and minimal formal structure mean the viewer is 
not presented with a defined meaning or context; there are few contextual cues or 
details which only suggest an one of many possible reading. The ambiguous 
presentation of the film’s content and narrative events points toward a central focus of 
this chapter: the importance of the multi-sensory, bodily-based, perceptual experience 
of the viewer, which relies on their prior multi-sensory experience of a music lesson 
(or of any lesson in general), an experience that is not materially present in the work. 
The foregoing analysis of such a stylistically ambiguous and strange presentation as 
described within the critical literature that surround such materials, illustrates the 
chapter’s central argument — that an analysis that focuses predominantly on social, 
cultural and economic ‘conceptual’ determinants of a work removes the bodily-based 
experience of the viewer (such as those described above), not to mention those of the 
artist or filmmaker.  
To re-introduce the bodily-based experience of the artist and viewer into how 
materials of visual culture such as the work presented above mean, the chapter 
surveys a selection of embodied and phenomenological approaches to art that provide 
alternative approaches to the study of visual form and style. These approaches 
recognise the ‘presence’ of the bodily experience and activity of the artist as 
embodied within the way they handle the medium, what is described as a 
‘phenomenological depth’ (Crowther, 2013) to how a work means. This 
phenomenological depth, it is argued, also extends to that of the embodied perceptual 
experience of the viewer of the work, the experience of which is a ‘reciprocal 
interaction and modification’ (Crowther, 2013). The ambiguous, awkward and 
 35 
minimal presentation of figures within the example of popular culture, extended 
within a phenomenological context, reveals a complexity of how a visual (and audio-
visual) work means, as an embodiment of a phenomenological perceptual experience 
that is always experienced through a phenomenological perceptual experience of the 
viewer.  
 
1.1 The disappearance of the body 
 
1.1.1 Economic and socio-cultural determinants 
The unusual, ambiguous form and style of materials of popular visual culture, such as 
the advertising film described above, are commonly studied and described (in an 
historical context) in a way that ultimately amounts to an argument concerning the 
economic, social and cultural exploitation of artistic techniques. This exploitation has 
been studied in reference to materials such as advertising posters (Gibbons, 2005),17 
as well as audio-visual materials such as advertising film (Spigel, 2009; Hagener, 
2007) and other promotional filmic materials (Cowen, 2010), and has led to a specific 
reading of this artistic formal style – as it is applied across commercial visual culture 
– that rests on two central points. Firstly, the use of avant-garde formal techniques in 
advertising film is understood as an intellectual and conceptual design with an 
economic agenda – that is, artistic techniques are copied and put to use in the service 
of consumption. Secondly, the focus on the intellectual and conceptual ‘design’ 
history of these techniques, which is primarily based on the study of textual 
documents, disregards the bodily-based skill, temperament and experience of the 
artist and the viewer in relation to such materials. 
                                            
17 Gibbons’ Art and Advertising (2005) describes the use of artistic techniques in popular culture from 
the 1960s to the 1990s, such as that of print advertising, as the utilisation or adoption of techniques 
across disciplinary boundaries to capture audience attention. 
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The extent to which the focus is placed on the intellectual, conceptual and 
design agenda behind the use of artistic techniques in commercial advertising film is 
most transparent in media and film history and theory, in which it remains a 
predominantly socio-cultural and economic story. Malte Hagener (2007) and Michael 
Cowen (2010, 2012) describe the extent to which a socio-cultural collaboration 
between avant-garde filmmakers and commercial film in 1930s Europe resulted in 
artistic techniques permeating the wider film culture. Hagener (2007, p. 42) reveals 
that the 1920s and 1930s European filmic avant-garde acted as a “research and 
development program”, a spearhead for the wider commercial film culture across both 
Europe and the US during this period: the avant-garde, he argues, created tools, 
strategies and models that became common currency in film culture in general, 
particularly in the industrial and commercial film industry of the post-war era. Using 
this economic, socio-cultural framework, Hagener (2007, pp. 45-46) claims that 
hardly any of the European avant-garde films of the 1920s and 1930s could be 
regarded as independent productions – most had some outside funding in the form of 
commissions,18 patrons or the backing of commercial studios – and this explains how 
their formal strategies, styles and models were able to permeate commercial film 
culture. 
Lynn Spigel (2009) describes the specific use of filmic avant-garde 
techniques, such as strange and unusual point-of-view shots, long-drawn-out 
contemplative shots and the minimal presentation of mise-en-scène in 1960s 
American advertising (for napkins and bottled water, for example) as a product of the 
fact that advertising agencies were widening the social and cultural networks that 
                                            
18 Although the result of this funding took different forms, Hagener’s particular focus reveals how the 
work of avant-garde artists and filmmakers, such as Walter Ruttmann, Hans Richter, Joris Ivens and 
Oskar Fischinger, connect the interwar avant-garde across Europe and America, through the making of 
a considerable number of advertising films, as well as public exhibitions and initiatives. 
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extended among artists and filmmakers. Through her extensive archival research in 
trade journals and production notes, Spigel reveals the similarity in form and style of 
American artistic and commercial film practices during this period, which she 
analyses in terms of the material networks and labour relations among graphic 
designers, artists, television producers, network executives, broadcasters and 
advertisers. 
The widening of material social and cultural networks underpinned what 
Spigel identifies as mutual collaboration between these domains, which resulted in the 
adoption of ‘new’ formal techniques in advertising film, copied from the techniques 
of 1930s and 1940s European avant-garde film culture in return for economic gain. 
These techniques, she claims, were used as a tactic in advertising films to help them 
stand out in an over-saturated marketplace (Spigel, 2009, pp. 218-220). Crucially, 
they were ‘adopted’ or ‘copied’ from the context of the artistic, aesthetic inquiry that 
was taking place in the arts,19 to be used as part of the advertisers’ design agenda of 
‘persuasive rhetoric’ (p. 218); they were ‘designed’ to get the attention of the 
audience. 
The extent to which the critical literature regarding the study of televisual 
popular culture focuses on such intellectual material networks rather than the bodily-
based experience of the artist or viewer can be traced to the influence of Clement 
Greenberg, to whom the above writers pay their dues. Although Greenberg’s writing 
                                            
19 Spigel’s work reveals the adoption of the ideas of Russian filmmaker Lev Kuleshov (1899-1970) by 
advertising film agencies and trade journals. Kuleshov’s work, or more specifically the ‘Kuleshov 
Effect’, focused on how a montage of scenes, rather than the individual images themselves, can convey 
meaning in a film (Hensley and Prince, 1992). By interspersing the shot of an expressionless male face 
with various other shots, such as a plate of soup, a girl in a coffin, a woman on a divan, Kulsehov 
demonstrated that the viewer brings their own emotions and experiences to bear on their visual 
experience the montage, investing the face of the actor with their own feelings. 
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on art history may now be of mainly historical concern,20 it is pertinent to this chapter 
to revisit the theoretical underpinnings of his thought as it illustrates the extent to 
which bodily-based experience disappears in more contemporary socio-cultural 
readings of artistic and televisual media forms through focussing upon certain 
‘conceptual’ determinants, particularly in terms of the ambiguous and minimal formal 
artistic techniques used in popular visual culture. 
Greenberg’s ([1988] 1962, p. 132) writing is informed by the central notion 
that “conception is decisive”, over and above artistic skill and performance, in 
understanding the development and meaning of the style of visual works such as 
modernist avant-garde painting. This aspect of Greenberg’s thinking illustrates the 
disappearance of the performance and functioning of the body of the artist and viewer 
(as well as its experiential dimensions) in the analysis of the visual style of both 
artistic and mainstream culture. The attention is placed instead on the study of the 
intellectual and conceptual, including the social, cultural and economic networks of 
artists, filmmakers and viewers. 
 
1.1.2 Conception as decisive in the study of visual style 
Greenberg believed that the similarity in the abstract form and style of the materials 
of modernist21 avant-garde painting and popular visual culture means they should be 
studied as parallel practices – that is, they should be understood in conceptual terms 
within their individual socio-cultural and political networks of development, which he 
                                            
20 The work of art historians such as T.J. Clark (2001), Michael Fried (1982), Gordon Bearne (2000) 
and Rosalind Krauss (1993) has shifted the study of modernist avant-garde painting and art beyond 
Greenberg’s original writings. 
21 Greenberg (1939) describes the works of what he calls ‘modernist’ painters such as Picasso, Braque, 
Mondrian, Miro, Kandinsky, Klee and Cezanne in terms of what he classifies as ‘avant-garde’ during 
the early twentieth century. These painters, for Greenberg, deriving their chief inspiration from the 
medium they work in, rather than within the subject-matter of common experience, arriving at “abstract” 
techniques of depiction in the search for an ‘absolute’ form of art that was not reducible to anything but 
itself. 
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describes in Avant-Garde and Kitsch (1939) as an enterprise that is either political (in 
the avant-garde) or economic (in popular visual culture). Greenberg’s conceptual 
grounding of the style of these materials is formulated on the premise that the 
development of the style of avant-garde abstract art (primarily painting) has nothing 
to do with the individual artist’s bodily skill or performance but has to be understood 
in purely conceptual, scientific terms. As he expresses more fully in After Abstract 
Expressionism (1962), Greenberg believed conception to be the decisive essence of 
‘good’ art: 
 
[T]he worked-out answer appears to be not skill, training, or anything 
else having to do with execution or performance, but conception alone. 
Culture or taste maybe a necessary condition of conception, but 
conception is decisive. (Greenberg, [1993] 1962, p. 132) 
 
Notions of what may constitute ‘good’ or ‘bad’ art are not the concern of this 
chapter; rather, it concentrates on the effects produced by the idea that conception 
alone accounts for the creation of artistic styles. The conceptual grounding of abstract 
avant-garde painting, as well as a later study of modernist painting, underpins 
Greenberg’s earlier study of the abstract and surreal styles shared by works of 
modernist painting and popular visual culture. In Avant-Garde and Kitsch, he sets up 
a stylistic relationship between a modernist painting by Braque and a Saturday 
Evening Post cover that depicts figures in abstract and surreal ways in social and 
economic terms, claiming that each work presents a specific conceptual aesthetic 
experience according to the historical context in which it was created and 
experienced: 
 
It appears to me that it is necessary to examine more closely and with 
more originality than hitherto the relationship between aesthetic 
experience as met by the specific – not the generalized – individual, 
and the social and historical contexts in which that experience takes 
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place. (Greenberg, [1939] 1988, p. 6) 
 
The study of a stylistic similarity between what were considered to be two 
independent cultural forms was, for Greenberg, achieved through a study, not of the 
aesthetic dimensions of individual bodily skill, performance or experience (that is, of 
the more subjective ‘subject matter’22 of human experience), but in terms of the social 
and cultural aesthetic in which the individuals who created and perceived the work 
were always situated.23 According to Greenberg, an analysis of each of the individual 
works’ cultural, social and political networks is required to convincingly account for 
such a stylistic similarity between them, treating each object of study – modernist 
painting and mainstream visual culture – as running in parallel, in their own socio-
cultural networks of development. The focus on the parallel development of each 
work defines what Greenberg ([1939] 1988, p. 17) terms the ‘interval’ or difference 
between these two material products of visual culture, establishing a hierarchy on the 
basis of their political, economic, social and cultural differences.  
Greenberg’s account of the development of avant-garde painting during the 
first half of the twentieth century is widely recognised as following a strongly 
empirical line, as Diarmuid Costello (2008, p. 118-120) outlines. It does so through an 
assumption regarding the role of the individual senses and their relation to the 
individual arts. For Greenberg, the practice of modernist painting during this period 
was ‘scientific’ in its conception, confining itself exclusively to what is apparent 
                                            
22 What Greenberg ([1939] 1986, p. 9) terms “the subject matter of common experience” refers to all 
that is not of an objective, critical, cultural and political nature, but of the subjective, metaphysical and 
emotional – an ‘extroverted experience’ that he claims has to be renounced.  
23 Expanding on this point, Greenberg, in Avant-Garde and Kitsch (1939), gives the example of a 
Russian peasant standing before two paintings, one by Picasso, one by Repin. For Greenberg, the 
abstract technique used to render the shape of a woman in the Picasso is not ‘familiarly’ accessible to 
the ‘real life’ experience of the peasant, whereas he is more likely to recognise his experience in the 
‘realistic’ composition of Repin. The values that a peasant derives from a Repin are, for Greenberg, 
different to those of a Picasso, which is dependent on the cultural background of the viewer. For a 
‘cultivated spectator’ of capitalist culture, he maintains, the reverse is true. 
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through direct logical observation, without reference to any other order of human 
experience, such as bodily, multi-sensory or subjective experience. As Costello (2008, 
p. 119) relates, Greenberg’s notion of modernist painting is built upon a medium 
specificity that attempts to align a notion of cognitively uninflected sensation with the 
specific artistic medium of painting. As such, any sensory impressions made by the 
work of art were to be traced back to, and understood in terms of, the intrinsic 
material properties of the medium of the artwork itself as experienced directly 
through human visual observation. 
In his study of modernist painting, Greenberg declares that the move to the 
abstract and minimal undertaken by avant-garde artists during the early twentieth 
century was a way of discovering the material properties or ‘essence’ of painting. 
Throughout his work Modernist Painting ([1961] 1993) the ambiguous and awkward 
style of the depiction of human (and non-human) figures within modernist art is 
understood as a technique, an attempt by the artist to discover the material essence of 
painting through the avoidance of anything not relating to its material medium – such 
as representational content evoking subjective human experiences – and the removal 
of any recognisable visual content. According to Greenberg, the move to pictorial 
flatness (the reduction of perspective and flattening of planes) and abstraction (the 
reduction of recognisable figures) – which he perceived to be the general route taken 
by modernist painting – represented an attempt to remove the distorting effects of the 
subjective bodily experience of the artist. In painting, in particular, this was achieved 
by removing anything that was not apparent through direct, objective, purely visual 
observation, in order to elicit a more direct communication with the perception of the 
artist (and, conversely, the viewer) by eliminating any suggestion of the bodily 
experiences that underpin such a perception. 
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The wider philosophical context in which Greenberg’s writing emerged during 
the early twentieth century reveals an even greater impetus to remove the bodily-
based ‘metaphysical’ (or subjective) experience from the study of visual materials 
within the context of design. The historian Peter Galison (1990) provides an account 
of the substantial influence of logical positivism on the theory and practice of the 
visual arts during this period, particularly in relation to the turn from expressionism to 
functionalism within the Bauhaus during the late 1930s and 1940s. As Galison (1990, 
pp. 731-732) recounts, logical positivism in the visual arts combined two of the core 
philosophical attitudes of modern science: rationalism (the study of reality through 
logic) and empiricism (the claim that the only way to access knowledge is through 
direct observation). By adopting logical positivism as a philosophical position, both 
the material and visual arts within the Bauhaus in this period aimed to construct a 
‘modern’ era in art and design that understood the world (and the designed artefacts 
produced in this world) through direct empirical observation of its simplest 
observable and measurable elements. According to Galison (1990, pp. 710-711), such 
an empirical approach guaranteed the exclusion of what logical positivism deemed 
unreliable: the metaphysical dimensions of belief, the mythological influence of the 
past and subjective bodily-based experience, as well as the decorative, expressionistic 
and non-functional aspects of the material world.   
The dismissal of the bodily skill, performance and experience of the artist and 
viewer’s perceptual experience, as was purported by Greenberg, shifts his study of 
avant-garde painting to that of the conceptual, purely logical and visually observable. 
This conceptual grounding leads to a distinction between the ‘scientific’ work of the 
avant-garde (attempting to discover the material essence of the pictorial) and the 
‘economic’ mainstream visual culture that copied its artistic effects, each developed 
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in parallel.24 For Greenberg ([1939] 1988, p. 12), the devices, tricks, rules of thumb, 
strategies and themes that the ‘scientific’ avant-garde pioneered in styles such as 
abstraction and surrealism were exploited for economic gain by mainstream culture. 
In his eyes, such work became a ‘mechanical copy’ or a ‘pretender’ to the true 
intellectual and political style of the avant-garde. 
 
1.2 The re-appearance of the body 
The purely conceptual nature of Greenberg’s writing regarding the avant-garde and 
popular visual culture finds its way into the more contemporary approaches of Spigel 
and Hagener in the study of popular visual culture. However, other contemporary 
histories and theories of modernist painting have critiqued Greenberg’s ideas. Krauss 
(1986, 1993), in particular, argues that his formalist account of modernist painting is 
ideological, on the grounds that it neglects the contribution of those artists and 
thinkers in this period whose work focused on what she terms the ‘optical 
unconscious’ – the psychoanalytic, phenomenological and psychological aspects of 
the bodily experience that she recognises always underpins an artist’s visual 
perception of the world (Krauss, 1993, p. 178).25 Krauss’s work is posited on 
Husserlian phenomenology, as developed by poststructuralist thinkers such as Jean-
                                            
24 In this respect, Greenberg maintains a socio-cultural formalist art historical approach, which aims to 
study the history of art through focusing on its development ‘in parallel’ to that of the rest of cultural 
history (Wind, 1985).  
25 Krauss’ (1993, p. 178) alternative account to Greenberg’s modernist project recognises that visual 
phenomena, far from being external to bodily experience, as Greenberg claims, have an ‘unconscious’ 
that is internal to the perceiver. Her notion of the ‘optical unconscious’ maintains that the world of 
visual phenomena, such as clouds, sea, sky and forest, have an unconscious that lies within the body of 
the perceiver. Such a model aims to include the perceiver’s experience and knowledge, which work 
within an order that operates beyond the reach of the purely visual, in the visceral, temporal 
experiences of the body (p. 217). Krauss’ work provides a re-imagining of the modernist project: the 
reduction of recognisable content – surrealism, flatness and abstraction – that Greenberg believed 
removed multi-sensory and subjective experience, as witnessed across an ‘interval’ of discrete 
practices such as advertising and experimental film, is always underpinned by an ‘unconscious’ bodily 
experience. 
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Francois Lyotard, Jacques Derrida and Roland Barthes, and points to an 
‘unconscious’ bodily and experiential structuring of vision that is rooted in the 
visceral, bodily experience of the painter.  
Krauss’s (1993, pp. 178-179) revision of Greenberg’s modernist project aims 
to reconfigure his decisive conceptual account of the style of modernist painting. She 
formulates this revision by means of three simple objections: first, this ‘modernism’ is 
tied to the privileging of a pure opticality; secondly, this opticality creates a hierarchy 
of taste that excludes too much of the unconscious and those artists who invest in it; 
and finally, the latter should be recognised through a re-formulation of modernism – 
one that recognises the contribution of the bodily and visceral unconscious that 
underpins visual perception. For Krauss, the ambiguous and minimal style of much of 
what she considers modernist painting is rooted in the psychoanalytical, psychological 
and phenomenological bodily experience of the artist. 
Although Krauss re-introduces the importance of the visceral, lived body of 
the artist into the study of the style of modernist painting, her re-imagining of 
modernist painting is based on a phenomenological extension of psychoanalytic and 
linguistic analysis. As Crowther (2011, pp. 12-13) recognises, Krauss’s work, as well 
as that of other writers on the history and theory of art such as W.J.T. Mitchell (1993) 
and Norman Bryson (1989), while intending to involve the body (and its visceral, 
phenomenological experiences), idealise its functioning by means of a textual analysis 
of the psychoanalytical meaning of images that derives from a wider semiotic 
reductionism.  
The phenomenological roots of painting have been discussed extensively in 
contemporary studies of art. Joseph D. Parry’s (ed.) Art and Phenomenology (2011), 
in particular, provides a case for art to be understood as philosophically significant 
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through treating it as a kind of phenomenology. The significance of the functioning of 
the body of the artist itself in the study of art and painting has been discussed more 
closely in philosophy and the philosophy of mind, particularly in contemporary 
phenomenological studies of artistic style (Crowther, 2011, 2012), and in embodied 
approaches to the study of the formal elements of the visual arts (Johnson, 2009). 
Phenomenological approaches to the study of art are useful for the present discussion 
as they perceive the meaning of an artwork’s form and style to be ontologically rooted 
in the functioning and experience of the body rather than resting on purely social and 
cultural or semiotic and linguistic grounds. These approaches revise and deepen the 
well-established formalist methods of the study of the history of the visual arts by 
recognising the importance of the body of the artist in shaping the meaning of both 
form and style.  
 
1.3 Visual form and style as an expression of the body 
Mark Johnson’s The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding 
(2005) aims to bring bodily experience and functioning back into the processes of 
mind, perceptual experience and meaning-making as applied to the study of the 
materials of art. Johnson maintains that what can be termed ‘mind’ and ‘body’, 
although usually regarded by Western analytical philosophy as two distinct entities, 
are aspects of one organic process. Meaning-making in such an organic process runs 
much deeper than simply concepts and propositions; it is embodied in the physical 
processes, functioning and experience of the body acting in an environment.  
Johnson (2005, p. 4) traces what he terms a ‘disembodied’ view of the mind to 
the influence of Rene Descartes on the Western philosophical tradition, establishing a 
distinction between body and mind on the basis of the separation of rational ‘thinking’ 
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and bodily ‘feeling’. Such a conception, he argues, leads to a disembodied model of 
mind and meaning-making, in which the bodily processes that underpin the very 
development of mind disappear from the analytical descriptions. According to 
Johnson (2005, p. 7), the disappearance of the body results in a fundamental 
ontological divide between mind and body, cognition and emotion, fact and value, 
knowledge and imagination, and thought and feeling. 
In illustrating the disappearance of the body, Johnson draws our attention to 
the way complex levels of bodily processes and adjustments make perception, 
movement and activity possible in the first instance. Giving the example of visual 
perception, he notes how “seeing would be impossible without those eyes’ existence 
in a body that makes a number of fine adjustments, such as holding the head in a 
certain way, keeping the body erect and pointed in a certain direction, and moving the 
body in ways that ensure a clear line of sight” (p. 5). To suggest how such an 
embodied understanding of mind, perception and meaning-making is passed over, or 
hidden from view, Johnson uses the phenomenology of Shaun Gallagher (2005), who 
distinguishes between the notions of ‘body image’ and ‘body schema’ that play equal 
roles in human experience. Gallagher (2005, p. 24) understands the former as a 
system of perceptions, attitudes and beliefs pertaining to one’s understanding of one’s 
own body, and the latter as a system of sensory-motor functions that operate below 
the level of self-referential intentionality. As Johnson notes, the ‘body schema’ may 
hide from our lived experience even while it makes perception, bodily movement and 
kinaesthetic sensibility possible in the non-conscious, pre-conceptual structuring of 
posture, movement and, ultimately, mind and perception. 
The meaning of the body within an embodied conception of mind, for Johnson 
(pp. 274-275), is not of a body as a thing — an organised collection of skin, bones, 
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blood, organs and fluids interacting together. The body cannot be understood as 
merely a physiological object interacting with other objects- but as an attitude, having 
a subjective, lived experience of its own that directs the body toward the world. What 
Johnson calls a ‘phenomenological body’ is based upon Merleau-Ponty’s 
‘phenomenal body’ or ‘lived body’. As Bullington (2013, pp. 25-28) recognises, what 
Merleau-Ponty ([1962] 2008) calls the lived unity of the mind–body-world system is 
‘the lived- body’. The body understood as a lived body is both material and self-
conscious, it is physiological and psychological, but these terms are not dichotomous, 
there is mind in the body and body in the mind. These realms are understood by 
Merleau-Ponty as levels, intertwined with each other, constituting a unified field. The 
self, the body and the world of things and others are neither separated from each other 
nor to be confused with each other, but rather can be seen as three sectors or levels of 
a unique field (ibid).  
The ‘phenomenological body’ is an important part of what Johnson (2005, pp. 
275-277) describes as five models (or dimensions) of a fuller description of the 
‘human body’- that of the biological, ecological, phenomenological, cultural and 
social, neither of which can fully describe the complexity of the existence of the 
human body by itself. The ‘phenomenological body’ is a body of a lived experience 
within the world, a living, moving and feeling body. Johnson’s phenomenological 
body provides a useful approach to compliment the trajectory of this chapter (and 
thesis) – where Johnson recognises the body of a lived experience is immersed within 
an environment, this chapter, as well as Two and Three focuses upon the bodily 
dimensions of this system. The immersion of the body within an environment is 
described more fully in Chapters Four and Five. 
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1.3.1 Embodied meaning-making 
Within the context of a phenomenological body, bodily movement, Johnson declares, 
is the basis of all human meaning-making, thought and language.26 They emerge from 
the aesthetic dimensions of an embodied experience rooted in the organic functioning 
of the body in its environment. Johnson believes this is particularly exemplified by 
the visual arts; he argues that meaning-making in the arts often takes place outside the 
exclusive purview of language (Johnson, 2005, p. 218). By bringing together the 
pragmatism of John Dewey and the phenomenology of Gallagher and Merleau-Ponty, 
and linking them with contemporary thinking in embodied cognitive science, Johnson 
(2005, p. 1) demonstrates how “all forms of experience, consciousness, thought and 
communication would not exist without the brain operating as an organic part of our 
functioning bodies, which in turn are actively engaged with specific kinds of physical, 
social and cultural environments”.  
Johnson’s notion of the ‘embodied mind’ positions the functioning of the 
‘higher’ processes of mind (such as rationality and conceptual thought) within, or 
developing from, the ‘lower’ processes of the body (kinaesthetic activity, feelings, 
emotions and desire). For Johnson, every aspect of human activity is grounded in 
specific forms of bodily, sensory-motor engagement with the environment, pointing 
to the deep bodily origins of human meaning-making in its visceral connection (or 
coupling) with the world. What Johnson understands as embodied meaning-making in 
turn emphasises his position that all meaning-making is rooted in the organic 
functioning of the body as it interacts with its environment:  
 
 
                                            
26 For a more focused discussion of the embodied mind and its implications for language, see 
Johnson’s work with George Lakoff in Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge 
to Western Thought (1999). 
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An embodied view [of meaning-making] is naturalistic, insofar as it 
situates meaning within a flow of experience that cannot exist without 
a biological organism engaging its environment. Meaning emerges 
‘from the bottom up’ through increasingly complex levels of organic 
activity; they are not the constructions of a disembodied mind. 
(Johnson, 2005, p. 10) 
 
Embodied meaning does not just comprise what is consciously entertained through 
acts of feeling or thought; instead, it reaches deep down into a very corporeal 
encounter with the world (Johnson, 2005, p. 25); the deep-seated bodily sources of 
human meaning go beyond the purely conceptual and propositional to the bodily and 
experiential.  
Johnson sees what he terms ‘embodied meaning-making’ as exemplified in the 
visual arts: the meaning of the form is embodied in the bodily-based, sensory-motor 
processes of the artist who creates it. The embodied processes of the functioning of 
the mind, he claims, have been neglected in the study of materials within the 
discipline of art history, with its exclusive focus upon the form of a work, as situated 
in the socio-cultural networks that give it shape: 
 
Today, we are the inheritors of views about art that were first 
consolidated in Enlightenment Europe. The rise of the sciences of 
human nature during the 17th century prompted philosophers 
interested in the arts to change their focus from the nature of art to an 
almost exclusive concern with how the mind works in aesthetic 
judgment. By focusing primarily upon the faculties of mind that gave 
rise to judgments about beauty – especially the faculties known as 
imagination and feeling – these philosophers ceased to regard art as a 
way of world-making. Even worse, their faculty [of] psychology 
relegated feelings and emotions to the secondary status of non-
cognitive and merely subjective bodily states, unfitted to ground 
genuine understanding and knowledge. (Johnson, 2009, pp. 209-210) 
 
Contrary to an embodied approach to mind, art history’s inherited socio-cultural 
approach to the study of the materials of art maintains an inherent dualism between 
 50 
the domains of mind and body, between concepts (thought and cognition) and feelings 
(the body and subjectivity), in which concepts are conceived of as decisive and 
formal, not intimately related to the body, and feelings as simply perturbations of the 
body, not a fit grounding for concrete knowledge of the world. Such a hard dualism, 
Johnson (2005, p. 216) claims, aligns meaning with that of the cognitive and the 
formal, and unduly dismisses the bodily-based feeling from which cognition emerges.  
In order to re-instate the functioning of the body, its experience and feeling, in 
the study of the materials of art, Johnson (2005, p. 216-217) uses a re-reading of the 
work of gestalt psychologist Rudolf Arnheim (whose work is discussed more fully in 
Chapter Two), pointing to the ability of a simple line to express, through perception, 
the bodily-based meaning and feeling of the artist that underpins its creation. The line 
itself expresses the embodied feeling and meaning of the movements of the artist who 
generated it – feelings such as harshness, calm, anger, happiness and sadness. What is 
important is that the viewer of the line is able to ‘experience’ this bodily-based 
meaning – that is, to grasp the embodied meaning of a particular scene or form with 
no recourse to language or proposition (Johnson, 2005, p. 225). For Johnson, all 
(visual) art is an exemplar of the embodied meaning-making of the artist, and as such 
requires an embodied, rather than a dis-embodied, philosophy of mind. 
Although Johnson’s embodied account of art provides room for discussion of 
the role and experience of the phenomenological body in the study of the visual arts, 
his analysis is brief – by focusing on the corporeal, it does not provide a 
comprehensive account of the more subjective, experiential and phenomenological 
aspects of an artist or viewer’s, embodied mind and perceptual experience. In The 
Phenomenology of the Visual Arts (Even the Frame), Crowther (2011, p.14) offers a 
more comprehensive account of the phenomenological aspects of style in the visual 
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arts, describing what he sees as a disappearance of the body in the reductive socio-
cultural and textual analyses of the meaning of visual images.27 Crowther (2011, p. 
18) builds a phenomenology of the image, drawn from the phenomenology of 
Merleau-Ponty, rather than a history of its social uses and meaning; he does not offer 
a system to replace such reductive approaches, but a phenomenological theory of 
meaning in the visual arts, with implications for both art history and theory (p. 33).  
 
1.3.2 The ‘phenomenological depth’ of painting 
Crowther (2011, pp. 3-7) argues that what is distinctive in the creation and meaning 
of visual style in the arts – its phenomenology – is either repressed or distorted in 
socio-cultural approaches; each work possesses various degrees of what he terms the 
artist’s ‘phenomenological depth’, but this is repressed by the focus on social and 
cultural factors. Crowther’s concept of the phenomenological depth of an image is 
drawn primarily from the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and the philosophy of 
Gilles Deleuze, and centres on the ontological reciprocity of the subjective and 
objective experience of the painter. For Crowther (2011, p. 3), an embodied subject 
(the artist or viewer) is immersed in a physical world that, although not dependent on 
the subject for its existence, determines the subject’s character, while the nature of the 
physical world (as perceived by the subject) is equally given a specific character 
through the range of cognitive and motor capacities that the subject brings to bear on 
it. The ontological structure of the subject and its objects of experience are 
                                            
27 Crowther (2012) recognises that a purely conceptual approach to the style of modern painting, such 
as Greenberg’s, sets the work apart as something external to the painter’s bodily movements and skill. 
Such thinking leads to the idea that a particular work of art could be physically reproduced by someone 
else following a set of instructions (p. 196), and “results in art gradually dismissing, and then shedding 
its sensuous particularity, to end up as a quasi-philosophical statement of a dubious kind” (p. 198). 
Crowther, in the Deleuzian spirit, foregrounds the skill and performance of the artist: he maintains that 
painting does not a material essence unique to it as a specific medium, but “[its] real essence … is to be 
found in the study of the arrangements of paint marks upon a plane surface, and the phenomenological 
processes that underpin such arrangements” (p. 195). 
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reciprocally correlated at the experiential level; each is a part of the full definition of 
the other. Crowther (2011, p. 3) uses the term ‘phenomenological’ in relation to 
aspects of this reciprocity, particularly “how the relation between subject and object 
of experience changes character on the basis of different modes of perception and 
action”.  
Crowther’s (2011, p. 9) notion of phenomenological depth argues that an 
artwork’s visual style embodies or expresses, the complex relation between the 
painter’s subjectivity and the objects of their perception, knowledge and action. Being 
rooted in the performance of the artist’s body, it runs much deeper than the socio-
cultural layer. Regarding the specific phenomenological depth of painting, Crowther 
maintains:  
 
On the one hand, it reveals how [the painting’s] represented subject 
matter comes to be seen and stylized in visual terms through the 
artist’s bodily positioning; and, on the other hand, this revelation is 
made possible by the painting’s auto-disclosure as a specific work, 
composed from this unique configuration of gestures. Through 
painting, the virtual and the physical, the world and the body, are 
shown to inhabit one another simultaneously and inseparably. 
(Crowther, 2011, p. 77) 
 
Recognition of the phenomenological depth of a painting’s style deepens the formal 
socio-cultural study of its meaning by including the physical activity, gestures, of the 
artist and the way they manipulate the work. Crowther (2011, p. 73) aims to “probe 
further and clarify painting’s distinctive role qua gestural activity in modifying the 
relation between subject and object of experience” – that is, to recognise the painter’s 
phenomenological, bodily presence in their way of acting and performing, embodied 
or expressed in the visual style of the artwork. 
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1.3.2 Style embodies a way of acting upon the world 
In The Phenomenology of Modern Art (2012), Crowther applies his phenomenological 
approach to the rescue of the notion of style from what he describes as a reductive, 
socio-cultural art history. Primarily concerned with modernist painting, he re-frames 
the idea of style in terms of how it ‘embodies’ of a particular way of acting upon the 
world, which emerges through the artist’s gestures and movements (Crowther, 2012, 
p. 2). Espousing Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, as extended through the 
philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, he describes how the meaning of a work’s style is 
emergent through both the phenomenological depth of the painting and the viewer’s 
perceptual experience of that depth. He argues that the meaning of visual style is not 
propositional or conceptual, but emerges from, and is immanent within, the 
relationship between the artist’s activity and performance (as embodied in the work) 
and the direct sensory experience of what he terms “the always-participating mobile 
viewer” (Crowther, 2012, p. 65).  
Crowther’s work offers a conceptual revision of visual style (primarily, in the 
study of modernist painting) in an art historical context, which understands the style 
of an artist’s work as the individual way they represent the world, and centres upon 
such things as how they handle the paint and their choice of colour and subject matter, 
as well as their compositional strategies. Crowther (2012, pp. 2-3) believes that the 
aesthetic aspects of the style of a work can be recovered by situating them within the 
wider phenomenological framework emerging during the early twentieth century 
(primarily drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s writings coupled with a phenomenological 
reading of Deleuze) as a way of visually disclosing attitudes towards the world that 
engage with the deepest aspects of phenomenological human experience.  
 54 
For Crowther (2012, p. 2), the point is not just the way a picture looks; the 
picture embodies a way of acting upon the world through painting (and sculpture) that 
always changes the character of the subject matter being addressed in some way. As 
such, a distinctive style should not be understood as created ex nihilo; the artist 
inherits idioms that have been opened up by others and works with or transforms 
these idioms through their own phenomenological, perceptual experience. In this 
sense, there are enough shared characteristics in what Crowther terms ‘modernist 
painting’ (such as pictorial flatness, and the reduction of representational content) to 
enable him to study and discuss a ‘stylistic tendency’28 through analysis of the work 
of many of the artists of this period.  
There is another crucial aspect of Crowther’s work that is important for the 
central focus of this thesis: he maintains that the study of the meaning of style, 
undertaken in a phenomenological framework, comprises an ‘aesthetic disclosure’ 
rather than a discursive exposition. The meaning of style emerges through direct 
visual perception of the work, instead of situating it exclusively in a socio-cultural 
framework. Such a position carries the epistemological implication that the 
relationship between the subject and object (the work itself) of experience is not 
absolutely fixed but constantly transformed by the new circumstances of the viewer’s 
                                            
28 Crowther (2012, pp. 4-5) summarises what he sees as the four stylistic tendencies considered by 
conventional art historical discourse as representing the general route for modernist painting: “(1) The 
overcoming or abandonment of traditional academic notions of ideal form, ‘finish’ and skill in terms of 
the application of paint, and compositional criteria. This overcoming is intended, often, to achieve 
some perceptually more direct … communication with the viewer. (2) An emphasis on subject matter 
that is not constrained by traditional criteria of artistic and moral proprietary. … This involves mainly 
the abandonment of such things as classical or biblical subject matter, and its replacement with scenes 
from everyday domestic and public life. (3) The embodiment of new pictorial codes that represent 
through partially, or entirely, adopting non-figurative means, and which extend, correspondingly, the 
kinds of perceptual relation that can be expressed directly through visual art. (4) An insistently planar 
emphasis (with a correlated diminution or elimination of perspectival accents). Even when Modern 
works have a strong figurative content, they tend, nevertheless, to look flatter than works that present 
such content through conventional perspectival means. … Modernist works declare it more directly – 
as a feature of style.”  
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own perceptual experience, the “presence of an always-participating mobile viewer” 
(Crowther, 2012, p. 65).  
What Crowther (2012, p. 65), employing Merleau-Ponty’s terminology, calls a 
“reciprocal interaction and modification” describes the reciprocity between perceiver 
and perceived in which the work itself, as well as the viewer’s perception, is 
reciprocally transformed through the experience of the work. This view underpins his 
re-reading of the ‘awkward’ and ‘unfinished’ stylistic tendencies of specific works of 
modern painting, principally by approaching them through direct sensory experience. 
The emergent meaning of the work, for Crowther, lies in a reciprocal dialogue 
between the phenomenological depth of the artist as expressed in the work and the 
phenomenological perceptual experience of the viewer. 
Crowther demonstrates his phenomenological approach through an analysis of 
Édouard Manet’s Le Dejeuner sur l’Herbe (1863) (fig. 1b), beginning his reading of 
the work with an analysis of its brushwork and compositional elements. Crowther 
(2012, pp. 63-65) speculates that the painting does not attempt to conceal the 
brushwork used to present the figures and content, but instead reveals the thickness of 
both brush and paint in the execution of the intensely detailed forms, emphasising the 
emergence of the figures from their material ground. In some areas, the painting even 
seems unfinished (the boat and trees in the background, for example), and in this 
sense it presents the characters and scene as more ambiguous, more removed from a 
defined interpretation. He also points to the presence of a strong sense of instability in 
the work, manifest in its spatial inconsistency and oddness – for example, the semi-
clothed woman appears closer to the viewer than her companions, creating a 
condensed, flatter-looking painting by removing any defined perspective or spatial 
markers.  
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Crowther’s phenomenological reading of this example of modernist painting 
provides two points that are key to an understanding of the meaning of ‘awkward’ 
features in the style of a work: first, the phenomenological depth of a painting is an 
embodiment or expression of a way of acting upon the world that is manifest through 
the painter’s skill, which can be read in the brushwork and paint; secondly, such 
stylistic features are always described through the presence of an ‘always 
participating mobile viewer’.  To experience the painting’s phenomenological depth is 
always to do so through the direct visual experience of these features that are always 
modified within the context of that perceptual experience. 
           
Figure 1b has been removed due to Copyright restrictions 
 
1.4 The ‘phenomenological depth’ of visual style and form 
An embodied and phenomenological rereading of form and style in the visual arts, 
which recognises the bodily-based processes of an embodied mind, adds what 
Crowther calls a ‘phenomenological depth’ to the study of the form of a painting or 
artwork. In extending established formalist approaches to the study of art, Johnson’s 
account of the work of Arnheim, and Crowther’s adjustment of Greenberg’s work, 
formulate what could be called an ‘embodied formalism’ that refers to a 
phenomenological depth of form and style, rooted in a bodily-based meaning that 
emerges through the expression of the artist’s movement and performance, embodied 
within the form and style of an artwork, as is perceived through the phenomenological 
perceptual experience of the viewer. 
Crowther’s phenomenological recovery of visual style in an existential 
phenomenological framework provides two important ideas for this chapter. The first 
is that the meaning of the formal style of a work, phenomenologically, lies in the 
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artist’s way of acting in the world through the activity, skill and performance that 
result in the painting’s brushwork, colours and compositional strategy – a 
phenomenology that is rooted in the embodied mind of the artist. The second is that 
the phenomenological depth of the meaning of a work’s style is experienced visually, 
through the perceptual experience of the work, and as such it is conditioned, in part, 
by the circumstances of the viewer’s own perceptual and sensory experience. Yet, 
whereas Crowther’s concept of phenomenological depth provides the presence of the 
body of the artist, he only alludes to the presence of the body of the viewer, focusing 
more attention upon the former in his analysis of visual style. His work does suggest, 
however, that the meaning of an ambiguous, awkward or strange visual style in some 
way requires the perceptual presence, or phenomenological depth, of the viewer to 
provide reciprocal interaction and modification.  
To more fully realize the extent of the reciprocity between an awkward visual 
style (as an expression of phenomenological depth) and the viewer’s perceptual 
experience, focus now returns to the context of audio-visual materials, particularly an 
artistic account of the formal style described within the advertising film the chapter 
began with. The work of Martin Walsh (1981), in the field of film studies, will be 
used to provide an account of what he describes as the ‘estranged’ visual style of the 
film work of experimental filmmakers Jean-Marie Straub and Danielle Hulliet (1975). 
Walsh describes how the particular estranged and unusual ‘Brechtian’ formal 
presentation of figures and context presents everyday events in an unusual way to a 
spectatorship that is active, reflexive and critical. Such an estranged filmic form 
suggests, rather than gives, a possible meaning, and points to a non-hierarchical 
relationship that includes the participatory reflexive perception of the viewer in the 
process of meaning-making.  
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1.5 Reciprocal interaction with the viewer 
Walsh’s work, The Brechtian Aspects of Radical Cinema (1981),29 presents a 
paradigmatic case study of the formal techniques of ‘estrangement’ and ‘epic theatre’, 
drawn from the work of German playwright Bertolt Brecht. These techniques 
permeated the wider film culture throughout Europe during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Walsh begins his reading of Straub and Hulliet’s experimental film work by revealing 
their central focus: he cites a letter written by composer Arnold Schoenberg in 1913 
in response to the proposition that his opera The Lucky Hand could be filmed for a 
cinema audience: 
 
My foremost wish is for something the opposite of what the cinema 
generally aspires to. I want the utmost unreality. The whole thing 
should have the effect (not of a dream) but of chords. Of music. It must 
never suggest symbols, or meaning, or thoughts, but simply the play of 
colours and forms … just as music never drags around a meaning with 
it … so too this should simply be like sounds for the eye. (Arnold 
Schoenberg cited in Walsh, 1981, p. 104) 
 
Schoenberg’s response, which aspires more to a presentation of the ‘utmost unreality’, 
which he perceived as the opposite of narrative cinema, is based on the premise that 
meaning cannot be directly given to an audience through the form of the production 
itself, but only suggested through its presentation. Meaning is formed by, and emerges 
from, the interaction between the work and the audience’s perceptual experience of it. 
Schoenberg recognised that, just as with chords in music, the production of an opera 
never “drags around a meaning”, it can only suggest a meaning to the audience’s 
perception. This is achieved through the unreality of its formal presentation. A work 
never provides a defined meaning; rather, it presents ‘chords’, ‘colours’ or ‘forms’ to 
the audience’s experience as a means by which they can find a meaning. 
                                            
29 Posthumously published by the BFI in 1977. 
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Walsh argues that the unreality stressed by Schoenberg as a way of suggesting a 
possible meaning in his work is also central to Straub and Hulliet’s filmic adaptation 
of his opera Moses and Aaron (1975). Their arrangement of the opera uses a strange, 
ambiguous, ‘unreal’ filmic presentation, in which the material apparatus (the camera) 
is foregrounded over the narrative events. Just as in Schoenberg’s operatic 
performances, a sense of unreality is evoked by the way the events are presented – the 
unusual camera angles, the minimal or sparse presentation of the mise-en-scène and 
context, and the rejection of narrative continuity all work to present the ‘chords’, or 
the apparatus, at work behind the film, rather than any concrete narrative meaning. 
 
1.5.1 The Brechtian aspects of experimental filmic form 
Walsh’s analysis of Straub and Hulliet’s work focuses upon the particular use of the 
Brechtian theatrical techniques of ‘distancing’ and ‘estrangement’, and provides a 
reading of the specific filmic techniques that are used to estrange or distance the work 
from the viewer’s everyday experiences, presenting everyday scenes in unreal ways. 
Walsh exposes how the reflexive perceptual experience of the viewer is particularly 
evoked through the ambiguous or strange scene presentation, which Straub and 
Hulliet achieve by foregrounding the camera (the material apparatus of their 
production), rather than the ideological apparatus of narrative or image.30  Such an 
approach, Walsh recognises, reconfigures the assumption of a hierarchy in the 
meaning of an avant-garde artwork (a work that contains the meaning within its 
intrinsic structural form) and the reception of that meaning by the audience. As Keith 
Griffiths outlines in his introductory remarks to Walsh’s text: 
 
                                            
30 In Straub and Hulliet’s case, Walsh reveals, this was incorporated in a deliberately political fashion 
to question the ideology behind the representation of society by capitalist culture, which they believed 
was reinforced by the dominant paradigm of Hollywood’s narrative techniques. 
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The artist-audience relationship need not be a hierarchical one. For the 
films of this ‘radical strand’ invite the spectator, in various ways, to 
think about, reflect on what s/he sees, and place it against his/her own 
experiences. There are no answers, only questions, and the audience’s 
capacity to engage in a process of discovery of primary importance. 
(Griffiths, in Walsh, 1981, p. 2) 
 
The specific focus on the destruction of a hierarchical relationship between artist (and 
artistic works) and spectator through recognition of the reflexive experience of the 
viewer in ‘estranging’ filmic techniques is exemplified by the presentation of 
ambiguous or unusual content as part of the creation of the meaning of the work. 
Walsh’s suggestion that the participatory reflexive capacity of the spectator is 
central to the creation of meaning in a film work is drawn from Brecht’s writing on 
the theatrical practice he formulated during the 1930s.31 The perceptual experience 
that Brecht foregrounded, as Reinhold Grimm (1997) notes, was the participatory and 
reflexive capacity of the viewer’s individual perception. In particular, Grimm points 
to the distinction Brecht made between the concept of emotion (‘aesthetic empathy’) 
– prevalent in the sort of dramaturgy he sought to overcome – and that of reason, 
which he strove to bring to the fore.32 As Juliet Koss (2006) further outlines, Brecht’s 
work during the 1930s compromised the nineteenth-century aesthetic notion of 
empathy (Einfühlung) in theatre33, on the grounds that its model of spectatorship did 
not promote the audience’s individual critical engagement with the work (Brecht’s 
critique of ‘empathy theory’ is outlined more fully in Chapter Three). Koss (2006, pp. 
145-146) notes how Brecht’s work emerged in the context of twentieth-century 
                                            
31 Brecht’s work was highly influential in the experimental film and video community during the 1960s 
and 1970s across Europe, especially in the work of the London Filmmakers Co-op, Malcolm Le-Grice 
(1995) and video artists such as Stephen Partridge (1992). 
32 Brecht believed that invoking an emotional response in audiences was to treat them as passive 
viewers of a drama that unfolded in front of them, ‘paralysing’ as opposed to intellectually activating 
them (Grimm, 1977, p. 38). 
33 For Brecht, the aesthetic term ‘Einfühlung’ was associated with bourgeois entertainment for the 
masses, which disengaged the viewer’s critical and intellectual perceptual participation in the work.  
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psychology’s physiological conception of perception, which recognised the perceptual 
differences between individual spectators in the process of spectatorship.  
Brecht’s distinction between emotion (empathy) and intellect, as Grimm 
(1997, p. 37) maintains, was not a total rejection of the emotional response of the 
spectator in pursuit of pure reason; rather, it was a “sound reduction and curtailment” 
of emotion and more an argument for ‘intellectual empathy’ which would allow 
experiential reflection by the individual members of the audience. The recognition of 
the reflexive capacity of the theatrical audience resulted in the creation of a specific 
theatrical technique that Brecht termed the ‘V-effect’ (‘Verfremdung’) – a distancing 
or estranging effect. As Frederic Jameson (1982, pp. 43-83) recounts in Brecht and 
Method, the V-effect is a theatrical device in which the reflexive capacity of the 
spectator is recognised as playing a significant participatory role in the creation of the 
meaning of the presentation of the performance itself, resulting in the use of specific 
formal theatrical techniques. These, Jameson says, aimed 
 
[…] to reveal what has been taken to be eternal or natural – the reified 
act, with its unifying name and concept – as merely historical, as a 
kind of institution which has come into being owing to the historical 
and collective actions of people and their societies, and which 
therefore now stands revealed as changeable. What history has 
solidified into an illusion of stability and sustainability can now be 
dissolved again, and reconstituted, replaced, improved. (Jameson, 
1998, p. 47) 
  
The use of specific formal techniques, such the direct address to the audience, was 
one way that Brecht’s ‘epic theatre’ disrupted the staged illusion by generating a 
distancing effect. Other techniques were the estranged presentation of scenes through 
the use of sparse props and decoration, out-of-order narrative scenes, and an 
‘indifferent’, anonymous acting style, in which the actors did not represent 
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immediately recognisable characters.34 The objective of these effects, as Willett 
(1964, p. 92) states, was “to appear strange and even surprising to the audience”, 
removing any empathetic identification with an ideologically presented (complete) 
character, which Brecht believed ‘paralyses’ the audience.35 Such estranging 
techniques aimed to evoke self-reflection in the audience, encouraging them to act as 
participants in the meaning-making of the work. 
Walsh reveals that the self-reflexive relationship between the perceiver (the 
audience) and the perceived (the performance) through the estrangement or distancing 
of the theatrical work also underpinned the experimental work of many filmmakers 
across Europe from the 1920s to the 1970s.36 He shows that such estranging 
techniques were part of a specific political aesthetic enquiry during this period, as 
exemplified by his reading of Straub and Hulliet’s materialist presentation37 of 
Schoenberg’s opera, Moses and Aaron (1975). The following section outlines how 
Walsh’s analysis is illustrative of the way such alienating and distancing techniques 
as minimalism, ambiguity, anonymity and unusual narrative presentation in a filmic 
                                            
34 Brecht’s ‘intellectual empathy’ can also be seen in similar techniques outlined by Russian formalist 
artists such as Viktor Shklovsky (1914), whose literary ‘ostrannenie’ (literally, ‘making strange’) uses 
the same techniques as Brecht’s distancing effect. Such techniques of ‘making strange’ have recently 
been re-invoked in the domain of media and film studies (Van de Oover, 2010). 
35 Brecht’s work focused on the separation of what he called the ‘Veränderung’ (or Aristotelian idea of 
‘fusion’) of the various elements of a work (Jameson, 1998, p 117). Brecht aimed to create a parallel, 
separated work, which would only form  an organic unity by involving the active spectator, as opposed 
to a heterogeneous mechanistic fusion. As John Willett (1964 pp, 37-38) remarks: “[a]s long as the 
expression Gesamtkunstwerk (‘integrated works of art’) means that the integration is a ‘soup’, as long 
as the arts are supposed to be fused together, the various elements will equally be degraded, and each 
will act as a mere ‘cue’ to the rest. The process of fusion extends to the spectator, who also gets thrown 
into the melting pot and becomes a passive (suffering) part of the total work.”  
36 Particularly that of Sergei Eisenstein, Dziga Vertov, Jean-Luc Godard and Jean-Marie Straub (Walsh, 
1981, p. 2) 
37 As Walsh (1981, pp. 95-96) recognises, Straub and Hulliet’s present Moses and Aaron on materialist 
terms; that is, rather than presenting an image as a ‘realistic’ (or rather illusionist) copy of the world, 
they foreground the material apparatus that creates the image – in this case, film. As Walsh notes, 
where in dominant narrative cinema the use of sound, editing and camera placement aims to reinforce 
the authority of the image, in Straub and Hulliet’s work, this is reversed (p. 96). Instead, they present 
the image in a way that emphasises the material apparatus of the camera, and thus aim to escape the 
ideological convention of narrative.  
 63 
context evoke the participatory, reflexive perception of the viewer, actively involving 
their perceptual experience in the creation of the work’s meaning.  
 
1.5.2 The Brechtian aspects of Moses and Aaron 
Walsh finds three particular distancing techniques at work in specific scenes of Straub 
and Hulliet’s Moses and Aaron (1975), which prioritise the spectator’s reflexive 
participation in the meaning of the work: the use of unusual camera angles; the 
reduction of recognisable content and context; and the construction of a filmic form 
that avoids following the content-of-the-image route. These techniques reduce what is 
recognisable by presenting the work in unusual or strange ways, and is primarily 
achieved through breaking the hold of the canonical ideology of narrative devices of 
the sort employed by Hollywood,38 particularly the idea of continuity editing. The 
result is a sparse and unrecognisable mise-en-scène, strange and unusual camera 
angles, and long-drawn-out shots. 
The opening shot of Moses and Aaron, as Walsh describes (1981, pp. 96-97), 
begins with an unusual high-angle, medium close-up of the back of Moses’ head.  
Although he is singing, his face is entirely hidden (fig. 1c).39 Walsh contests that such 
a shot breaks the narrative film ideology that both camera and sound must be directed 
toward re-enforcing the image track; instead, he represents Moses and Aaron as a 
‘sound film’: the camera presents the scene in support of the soundtrack’s content. 
The unusually high angle of the shot also ensures that there is little sense of any 
                                            
38 These devices are also employed in television. 
39 The technique of unusual camera angles can also be seen in Constructivist photography during the 
1930s, specifically in the work of Alexandr Rodchenko. Rodchenko aimed to break conventional 
photography’s illusory presentation of society, what he termed the “Belly Button View”, by presenting 
objects through unusual camera angles. Other futurist artists and writers attempted similar techniques: 
Viktor Skhlovski’s (1911) ‘ostrannenie’ ( ‘making strange’) was a literary technique that aimed to 
present a scene in an ambiguous, strange way by describing the consequences rather than the object, or 
by estranging a scene through presenting it from the point of view of an animal or on-looker. 
 64 
detailed contextual background, which is sparse and ambiguous, revealing only 
Moses’ head and the brown earth that surrounds it. The shot itself is drawn out, 
lasting around eight minutes, during which time the camera remains static, 
maintaining the strangeness of the presentation for as long as possible. 
 
Figure 1c has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
 
The unusual nature of the work also functions at another level in the way the 
filmic space itself is presented: the camera does not support what might be expected, 
or be recognisable, in terms of conventional narrative film, but presents another 
aspect of the event entirely. In the example of another scene depicting a conversation 
between Moses and Aaron, the narrative continuity of filmic space in which the 
spectators would normally find themselves is completely destroyed (Walsh, 1981, pp. 
97-99). Here Walsh reveals how Straub and Hulliet refuse to situate the viewer in the 
world the film represents, in contrast to the classical narrative procedures of shot, 
reverse shot.40 Rather than using the ‘over-the-shoulder’ continuity techniques of 
narrative film, Straub and Hulliet set the camera at a distance, at a severe diagonal 
angle to the performers, and this keeps the viewer at a distance from the scene’s 
events (fig. 1d). 
 
Figure 1d has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
As Walsh reveals, the camera shots do not follow the conventional narrative 
ideology of a ‘conversation’; rather, they distance or estrange the scene by supporting 
                                            
40 These procedures that Walsh points to are that of the shot-reverse-shot technique, which places the 
camera to one side of the eye-line of the characters (over-the-shoulder shots), putting the spectator in 
the space of the narrative.  
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the more ‘un-representable’ relationship between Moses and Aaron (fig. 1e). The 
specific effect of making the filmic space unrecognisable by presenting it through an 
unusual condition (the relationship) makes it almost impossible to mentally 
reconstruct a ‘real’ space in which the actions and meaning occur. Such a distancing 
effect requires the viewer to have recourse to their reflexive experience in order to 
situate themselves in relation to the scene. 
 
Figure 1e has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
 
According to Walsh’s reading of Straub and Hulliet’s experimental film work, 
the use of Brechtian defamiliarising techniques foregrounds a meaning that only 
emerges from the interrelationship between the participatory reflexive perception of 
the viewer and the unusual, strange and minimal presentation of the work. The scenes 
taken from Moses and Aaron illustrate how, through the abstract, sparse and unusual 
presentation of an event and characters, what is seemingly materially absent in the 
work (a defined meaning) is emergent through the involvement of the spectator’s own 
perceptual experience. The techniques of strange and ambiguous camera angles, long-
drawn-out shots, minimalistic presentation of scenes and content, and the destruction 
of filmic space are used to evoke the active participation of the viewer’s reflexive 
perception in such a way that they ‘complete’ the meaning of the work in their own 
terms.  
The interrelationship between the estranged form of an artistic film work and 
the participation of the spectator’s reflexive perceptual experience that results in the 
meaning of the work has implications for the study of other audio-visual materials 
that use such formal techniques. As Walsh shows, the film of Moses and Aaron was 
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made specifically for television,41 suggesting that such a reflexive perceptual 
participation could be directed not only towards an artistic audience, but also a 
televisual one. To illustrate this point, the following analysis of Hamlet Cigars’ 
advertising film, Music Teacher (1968), will focus on the use of three of the 
techniques of estrangement or distancing that Walsh identifies in Moses and Aaron 
which point to the importance of the participation of the reflexive perception of the 
audience in creating the meaning of the work. These are the use of unusual camera 
angles; the reduction of recognisable content and context; and the construction of a 
filmic form that supports not the narrative events of the image track, but the 
relationship between the characters in the scene. These techniques, in the context of 
Walsh’s analysis, reinforce the notion that the meaning of a work is not to be found 
wholly in its material form (in a socio-cultural context), but is emergent, in part, in the 
viewer’s participatory experience of the work.   .  
 
1.5.3 The Brechtian aspects of television’s filmic form 
Hamlet Cigars’ Music Teacher (1968) describes an everyday situation, a piano lesson, 
portraying the teacher’s mounting frustration as he attempts to teach a young boy to 
play the piano. The student persists in hammering the keys, producing an out-of-key 
and out-of-sequence run of notes. The teacher’s anxiety eventually causes him to 
reach for his Hamlet cigar. As he lights up, he is transported into a world of his own, 
accompanied by a soothing rendition of Bach’s Air on a G-String, bringing with it 
calm and tranquillity, banishing the chaotic, noisy reality around him. As in Walsh’s 
analysis of Moses and Aaron (1975), it is the relationship between teacher and pupil, 
                                            
41 Walsh (1981, p. 95) notes how the film was financed by German Television’s Third Channel, as well 
as by contributions from Italian and French sources. This can be seen, in the context of Lynn Spigel’s 
work, which focuses on the US, as consistent with the increasing interest in experimental film 
techniques among commercial institutions during the 1960s and 1970s. 
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and the shift from chaos to calm, that underpins the entire formal structure of the 
work, removing it from immediate recognition of a given narrative by invoking the 
active perception of the viewer. 
The structure of the work, as well as the construction, type and length of its 
shots, and its movements and rhythms, do not support the image track itself, but 
register the aesthetic change from chaotic and noisy to calm and soothing through the 
sparsest possible means, with minimal camera movement. The entire work consists of 
eight shots of only three types (fig. 1g): close-up, extreme close-up and medium, 
maintaining a single repeated pattern of close-up and medium shots throughout. It is 
divided into two halves: one is representative of a chaotic aesthetic, punctuated by the 
student’s out-of-key playing; the other shows a transition to a calm, soothing state, 
with the smoke rising from the Hamlet cigar.  
 
 
Figure 1f has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
 
 68 
 
Fig. 1g. A formal analysis of Hamlet Cigars’ Music Teacher (1968): (left to right) shot type; 
pattern of shot length; pattern of shot length against shot type 
 
The first, ‘chaotic’ half of the film is constructed from a pattern of short and 
medium-length close-ups and medium shots. The flow is broken midway in shot four 
by the introduction of the product (the cigars) through the only extreme close-up of 
the work, heralding the shift to an atmosphere of calm as the teacher begins to smoke 
his cigar, followed in shot five by a piano rendition of Bach’s Air on a G-string. In the 
second ‘calm’ half, the pace of the work changes. It is constructed from long and 
medium-length shots, slowing the work down through a similar use of medium and 
close-up shots which run counter to the student’s continued, chaotic stabbing of the 
keys portrayed in the image track.  
 
 Figure 1h has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
 
The sparse, blank, white backgrounds, the minimal contextual details (in terms 
of the props used to convey the setting of a music lesson), and the characters’ dress 
which is pared down to simple uniforms (fig. 1h) reduce what is experientially 
recognisable, distancing the viewer in order to evoke a perceptual reflexive response. 
The estrangement of the work through sparse mise-en-scène is extended into the 
minimal, anonymous presentation of the actors’ character traits, such as those of the 
music teacher himself.  In Brechtian terms, this reduces the ‘paralysing’ emotional 
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empathy that other ideological presentations of the same character could impose, and 
evokes a further reflexive response in the spectator. The teacher is presented as almost 
indifferent: he engages in the scene through little more than slight hand gestures and 
the subtlest of facial expressions showing his change of mood from disdain to peace. 
Hamlet Cigars’ Music Teacher, like Moses and Aaron, can be understood as a 
‘sound film’ – that is, it is driven by the soundtrack rather than by a narrative 
supported by images. As Walsh’s reading of Moses and Aaron illustrates, the camera 
placement portraying the conversation between Moses and Aaron does not support the 
ideological narrative ‘image’ of a conversation, presented as an ‘event’, but rather the 
relationship between the two characters, thus distancing the scene from conventional 
recognition. In Music Teacher, the length of the shots support the soundtrack, shifting 
from the chaos of out-of-key notes to the calm rendition of Air on a G-string, which 
in itself is representative of the relationship between the teacher and his pupil. The 
Brechtian distancing techniques at work in this example of advertising film estrange 
the work, evoking the participation of the viewer’s reflexive perception in a similar 
way to that which Walsh describes in Moses and Aaron. 
 
 
1.6 The ‘phenomenological depth’ of the viewer  
A Brechtian analysis of estranged filmic forms (in both avant-garde and advertising 
films) recognises the participation of the reflexive ‘intellectual empathy’ of the viewer 
in the production of meaning. This reflexive perception, however, is not the bodily-
based perception described by Crowther as ‘phenomenological’ or Johnson as 
‘embodied’; rather, it is intellectually reflexive, evoked in the service of a political 
and social concern. The bodily-based feeling and subjective processes of the 
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functioning of the spectator’s body are not described, only the spectator’s more 
reflexive, intellectual experience. However, once situated in the context of 
phenomenology, Walsh’s concept is deepened by Crowther’s notion of 
phenomenological depth. It extends the meaning of the awkward style of the work 
into the bodily-based dimensions of both artist and viewer, emphasising the fact that 
the work expresses the embodied perceptual experience of the viewer that experiences 
the phenomenological perceptual experience of the artist through the form and style.  
In the phenomenological context of Crowther’s proposition that the embodied 
visual style of painting embodies or expresses a way of acting upon the world, the 
‘meaning’ of the formal filmic style of estrangement (the ambiguous and unusual 
presentation of figures- human and non-human) outlined by Walsh functions in a 
similar way – that is, it is emergent in the presence of the artist’s bodily experience of 
acting in the world (embodied in the style of the work) as directly perceived by the 
always-participating, mobile, embodied viewer. In Walsh’s terms, it can be argued 
that such an estranged filmic form evokes a bodily-based, reflexive, perceptual 
participation, a reciprocal interaction and modification as Crowther describes, adding 
further phenomenological depth to the work; the depth of the viewer plays as much a 
role in the creation of a work’s meaning as the depth of the artist. 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
In questioning the disappearance of the functioning of the body from what has been 
described as a reductive socio-cultural approach to the study of visual materials of 
popular culture, this chapter provides a revision of the notion of visual style within the 
study of painting that recognises the role of the phenomenological body, a body of a 
lived experience within the world, a living, moving and feeling body. Such a revision 
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perceives that there is a phenomenological depth to form and visual style, which 
extends into the bodily skill, performance and experience of the artist, as well as 
suggesting the importance of the bodily-based perceptual experience of the spectator. 
In recognising this depth this chapter argues for an analysis of the meaning of a work 
of visual culture that is embodied, not held within the work itself or within socio-
cultural frameworks alone, underpinned by a more comprehensive account of the 
bodily functioning and perceptual experience of both artist and viewer.  
Employing the phenomenological approach of Crowther (2011, 2012), the 
chapter argues that to include the body is to study the style of a visual work (in this 
case, an awkward abstract visual style) as an embodiment or expression of a way of 
acting upon the world – read through the artist’s manipulation of the paint – as 
perceived through the perceptual experience of the always-participating mobile 
viewer. Although the work of Crowther and Johnson provide an embodied approach 
to the study of an artist’s bodily performance in the form of an artwork, the bodily 
experience of the viewer (which lends a further phenomenological depth) is somewhat 
marginalised. 
A second point arises from this synthesis of the literature: whereas a socio-
political context retains a hierarchy in the development of the materials of art and 
popular culture, this is blurred when the bodily-based perceptual experience of both 
the artist and viewer are more fully accounted for. However, while Johnson and 
Crowther provide access to the embodied and phenomenological depth of art and 
painting, they only do so by using art as an exemplar of an embodied and 
phenomenological process of meaning-making, other visual materials, such as popular 
culture, are not factored into their work.  
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In order to bring these concerns together to provide a more comprehensive 
account of the participatory, bodily-based perceptual experience of the viewer in the 
study of the style and form of more diverse materials of visual culture, Chapter Two 
focuses attention upon the reciprocal relationship between the embodied perceiver 
and what is perceived, and the role the perceiver plays in the meaning of visual style. 
This is achieved through a survey of ‘constructivist’ accounts of perception of the 
early twentieth century, as applied to the visual arts, drawing primarily on the work of 
Gombrich (1959). Gombrich’s work provides an important trajectory for Chapter 
Two; he applied his recognition of the projective ability of the active perceptual 
experience of the beholder, in the experience of ambiguous and minimal visual 
materials, to the study of a diverse collection of visual materials, including Rorschach 
ink blots, Chinese calligraphy, advertising matter and painting. 
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Chapter Two 
The Expressive Relationship Between Perceiver & Perceived 
 
This chapter focuses more closely on the reciprocal relationship between the 
embodied perceiver and the strange and ambiguous formal style of figures within 
visual and audio-visual materials. This is achieved primarily through a survey of two 
theoretical frameworks drawn from the psychology of perception and the visual arts 
during the 1960s and 1970s, with a particular focus upon the multi-sensory and 
experiential aspects of the perceptual experience of visual materials. The chapter 
juxtaposes, on the one hand, an often-neglected ‘constructivist’ account of perception 
in the visual arts, promoted primarily by Gombrich, and the ‘gestalt’ (formalist) 
approach of Arnheim, on the other. Gombrich recognises the active, constructive 
nature of the projective visual perception of both artist and beholder and its ‘indirect’ 
relationship to the objects of the external world – that is, the artwork is constructed 
via the beholder’s prior experiential knowledge and expectations. In contrast, 
Arnheim’s gestalt account, while recognising the multi-sensory, expressive nature of 
the artist’s perception, upholds the idea of the ‘direct’ perception of the viewer, in 
which the formal elements of a work express the multi-sensory experience of the artist 
directly to the viewer. 
The tension between Gombrich’s and Arnheim’s opposing models of 
perception can be resolved by bringing their work into a more constructive dialogue 
through placing it in the wider philosophical context of contemporary 
phenomenological and haptic film theory. Each approach is recognised as providing 
part of a larger explanation of the process of an embodied spectatorship, which 
includes the artist’s perception as expressed in a film (for example) and the viewer’s 
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perception as expressed in their experience of the film. Thus, rather than representing 
opposing models of perception, the work of Gombrich and Arnheim are treated here 
as describing different aspects of a larger process of embodied, phenomenological, 
perceptual experience. Such a dialogue builds a model of a phenomenological and 
embodied spectatorship that extends Crowther’s theory of the phenomenological 
depth of an embodied visual style in relation to the artist (as outlined in Chapter One) 
to encompass that of the viewer. This enables a more detailed account of the active 
(expressive) role of the embodied, multi-sensory perceptual experience of the viewer, 
on the same terms as the artist and the work, in the study of how visual materials 
‘come to mean’. 
 
2.1 The ‘constructive’ nature of perception 
 
Figure 2 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
In Understanding Comics, Scott McCloud (1993, pp. 88-9) presents a four-panel 
establishing shot of an old-fashioned kitchen scene (fig. 2). Most readers will have no 
trouble perceiving that they are in a kitchen through the scenes depicted in the four 
panels. For McCloud, however, the perception of this scene is constituted not simply 
by what is depicted in the images, but also by what is not depicted, within the panels 
and in between the panels – in what he describes as the “blank ribbon of paper”. 
When perceiving the panels, McCloud suggests, the mind constructs an entire scene 
out of the ‘fragments’ in the frames in a way that requires the co-operation of all of 
the senses. While the comic may appear to be a ‘mono-sensory’ visual medium, 
McCloud (1993, p. 89) maintains that the perception of its subject matter always 
involves the other senses, as well as prior bodily experience: we know what a pot on 
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the boil sounds like, and may hear it in the first panel; we recognise the sound of 
chopping in panel two; and we may recognise a smell of cooking that is familiar from 
our own prior experience, and maybe even the taste of the food. McCloud’s example 
is illustrative of the primary argument of this chapter: the prior multi-sensory, bodily 
experience of the viewer plays a constructive role in the perception of minimal, 
ambiguous and seemingly visual forms.  
McCloud’s description of the viewer’s constructive perceptual experience of 
the comic strip is supported by a theoretical tradition of ‘constructivist perception’, 
formulated during the early twentieth century in line with emerging field of 
physiological optics. Koss (2006) outlines how physiological models of visual 
perception began to emerge, particularly within experimental psychology, amidst a 
marked philosophical shift. The notion that individual perceivers have their own 
distinct, bodily-based, perceptual experience of the external world gradually became a 
central tenet of experimental psychology. German polymath Hermann von Helmholtz 
(182l–1894), in particular, demonstrated that visual perception is underpinned by 
what he termed ‘unconscious inferences’ or ‘unconscious conclusions’ that are not 
received solely through external stimulation.  
Von Helmholtz examined the physiology of the human eye and concluded that 
it was, optically at least, very inefficient. The eye has a number of features that reveal 
its poor functioning in relation to the richly detailed world we assume that we 
perceive visually – there are numerous blind spots, saccade gaps (produced by the 
eye’s constant movement as it changes focus) and the upside-down image projected 
onto the retina. Perception, for von Helmholtz, particularly visual perception, requires 
that an individual makes inferences drawn from their prior knowledge of the world in 
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order to make sense of the eye’s fragmentary sensory signals – a knowledge that is 
basically neurological, linked to the structure of the individual nervous system: 
 
The psychic activities that lead us to infer that there in front of us at a 
certain place there is a certain object of a certain character are 
generally not conscious activities, but unconscious ones. In their result 
they are equivalent to a conclusion, to the extent that the observed 
action on our senses enables us to form an idea as to the possible cause 
of action; although, as a matter of fact, it is invariably the nervous 
stimulations that are perceived directly, that is, the actions, but never 
external objects themselves. (Von Helmholtz, [1962 trs.] 1910, p. 4) 
 
Through bringing empiricism into experimental psychology, von Helmholtz 
demonstrated through the study of images and music that perception is constructive in 
nature (Warren and Warren, 1986). Perception is a process that is always resolved by 
an unconscious inference, drawn from the neurological experience of the individual, 
and has an indirect correspondence to the objects of the external world; these objects 
are perceived via the physiological structure of the body that shapes the neurological 
structure of the individual’s brain.  
As constructivist thinkers in the visual arts such as Richard Gregory (1970, 
1997) have argued, adopting von Helmholtz’s understanding entails a recognition that 
the prior bodily-based, experiential knowledge that shapes the neurological structure 
of the brain42 is necessary for all visual perception because the retinal images 
themselves are inherently ambiguous. Gregory (1970, p. 1121), in particular, 
recognises that many of the perceptual properties vital for human behaviour and 
understanding – such as knowledge of the qualities of texture and weight, heat and 
cold, or whether something is edible or poisonous – cannot be signalled simply by 
                                            
42 What Gregory (1997) means by ‘knowledge’ is analogous with creating and storing ‘potential 
intelligence’ and ‘kinetic intelligence’. “[The] stored-from-the-past potential intelligence of knowledge” 
(Gregory, 1970, p. 1121) is selected by the brain and applied to the solution of current perceptual 
problems by the more active kinetic intelligence. In this sense, perception is first and foremost a 
problem-solving process.  
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means of the eye’s apprehension of direct stimuli; instead, the human being calls on 
their experiential ‘knowledge in perception’. Human apprehension of the present 
world is always indirect; it is partially constructed by a historical brain (functioning 
within a body) that processes the external stimuli via prior experiential knowledge.  
However, the unconscious inferences that underpin the constructivist account 
of perception are more than just neurological, they also extend into other immaterial 
aspects of human experience such as the imagination. Dario Gamboni (2000, pp. 184-
187), in particular, describes how the idea of the constructive power of visual 
perception arose in parallel with the scientific study of ambiguous images in 
psychology during this period, initiating a description of the imaginative projection of 
the viewer’s perceptual experience onto the world. Through the study of twentieth-
century psychological literature, Gamboni reveals how psychologists began to use 
popular images and comics as demonstration materials in the study of the constructive 
nature of human perception.  
Gamboni pays particular attention to the work of American psychologist 
Joseph Jastrow (1901), who reproduced an image from Harpers’ Weekly illustrating 
an article entitled ‘The Mind’s Eye’. This image features either a duck or a rabbit, 
depending on whether we interpret the long shape on the left as a beak or ears, and is 
conceived in such a way as to produce the effect of it oscillating between the two 
readings. Jastrow used the image to demonstrate (psychologically) the role of 
imagination in normal visual perception, connecting it with other phenomena such as 
‘accidental’ images like clouds and shadows. His description of such images is 
interesting, as it fuses imagination with perception: 
 
The whitewashed tree or post that momentarily startles us in the dark 
country lane takes on the guise that expectancy gives it. The mental 
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predisposition here becomes the dominant factor, and the timid see as 
ghosts what their more sturdy companions recognize as whitewashed 
posts. Such experiences we ascribe to the action of suggestion and 
imagination – the cloud “that’s almost in shape like a camel,” or “like 
a weasel,” or “like a whale”. (Jastrow, 1901 cited in Gamboni, 2000, p. 
186) 
 
Gamboni describes such ‘whitewashed’ or ambiguous images as ‘potential images’: 
they hold a potential realisation that is ‘completed’ by the constructive perceptual 
experience of the viewer. Such images particularly reveal how the beholder relies 
upon the ongoing interaction between their perception and imagination: the cycle of 
identifying and examining hypotheses is the basis of all perception (Gamboni, 2000. 
p. 16). Situated in the context of Henri Bergson’s (1859-1941) philosophy, as it was 
applied in the visual arts during the nineteenth century, Gamboni’s ‘potential images’ 
demonstrate how all images, including those produced by the artist or practitioner, are 
fully dependent on the constructive imaginative perception of the viewer for their 
actual realisation. Images always remain potential, hanging partially completed, until 
they are synthesised in the active perceptual experience of the beholder. Potential 
images, as Gamboni understands them, become actual during the creative act of 
contemplation; they can never be pre-determined. As such, they partially elude the 
artist who produces them. 
The imaginative, experiential underpinning of the constructivist account of 
perception in the study of the visual arts has been widely discussed in the work of 
Gombrich (1960, 1979, 1987). Gombrich provides an exhaustive account of the active 
and constructive role of human perception in the creation and perception of the style 
of many kinds of visual materials, from painting to comics and ‘accidental’ images. 
At the centre of his work lies the psychological concept of ‘projection’, as applied to 
the study of the creation and perception of images: 
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[…] in psychology this process is more frequently labelled 
‘projection’. We say we ‘project’ the familiar form of a face into the 
configuration of a car, just as we project familiar images into vaguely 
similar shapes of clouds. It is well known that this propensity of our 
minds is used in modern psychiatry as a diagnostic tool. In the so-
called ‘Rorschach test’, standard inkblots are offered to the subject for 
interpretation. (Gombrich, [1960] 1994, p. 84)  
 
The psychological concept of projection is applied in Gombrich’s work to both artist 
and beholder, and in doing so it deepens (and complicates) the relationship between 
artist, work and viewer in two very important ways. First, the artist or practitioner’s 
own psychological experience and expectations transform the object depicted – what 
they perceive and depict is a motif that is fused with their own experience and 
expectations. Secondly, the beholder’s further perceptual experience of the work 
involves the projection of their own imaginative expectations – the beholder always 
has a perceptual share in the image perceived. The meaning of a visual work is not 
given within the work itself, it is not communicated by the artist to the viewer via the 
work; rather, what the work may mean remains potential and is only actualised 
through the constructive perceptual experience of the beholder. 
Where Gombrich points to the importance of the imagination, prior experience 
and expectation for a constructivist account of perception, there is no body per se 
theorised directly within his work, only the vague use of the term organism drawn 
from the writing of Karl Popper and James Gibson ([1960] 1994, p.15). Gombrich’s 
constructivist approach to the study of the creation and perception of visual style 
does, however, cite the physiological optics of von Helmoltz from which his work 
borrows an in-direct model of physiological perception as underpinned by prior 
experience. As such, Gombrich’s work will be read as sympathetic to von Helmoltz’s 
unconscious inference, whilst adding an experiential dimension to von Helmoltz’s 
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work that is not entirely describable in terms of a materialist analysis of the 
development of the nervous system of the individual.  
 
2.1.1 The experiential dimensions of images 
In Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation (1960), 
Gombrich presents a comprehensive account of the psychological and experiential 
underpinning of the pictorial style of materials studied by mainstream art history. He 
proceeds with a rejection of the modern distinction between conceptual knowledge 
and perceptual experience in art historical discourse,43 which pre-supposes a view of 
human consciousness as a tabula rasa, an organ that passively registers external sense 
impressions. For Gombrich ([1960] 1994, p. 307), there is no such thing as a direct 
correspondence between an external stimulus and an internal experience as there is no 
‘innocent eye’; the eye of the artist and of the beholder is always historical and related 
to the organic functioning, experience and history of the organism – and perceptual 
experience is no different.  
What guides human perceptual experience, Gombrich ([1960] 1994, p. 24) 
believes, is the individual’s prior experience and expectations, the temperament and 
personality of the artist and the beholder, which culminate in the formation of what he 
terms, in the language of experimental psychology, an ‘experiential’ perceptual 
hypothesis based upon a ‘schemata’ of the individual’s lived reality. He demonstrates 
that this psychological schema of prior experience frames a human being’s 
apprehension and perception of the world, always ‘correcting’ what is perceived in 
terms of that experience. This corrective aspect of perception and perceptual 
                                            
43 Gombrich’s particular exception is the approaches to art history built upon the philosophy of Georg 
Hegel, as manifest in the description of the style of an art object as the expression of a transcendental 
supra-individual consciousness, or the “spirit of the time” (Meyer, 1994). Such approaches see the 
foundation of style as a cultural expression – a political, social and cultural aesthetic – neglecting 
individual experience, psychology and unconscious. 
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experience thus plays a vital role in both the creation and perception of the style of 
visual materials.  
 
2.1.2 The artist’s ‘schema’ and ‘correction’ 
Gombrich maintains that human perceptual experience is representational, bound up 
in the constant activity of the organism. It begins as vague and general, but acquires 
greater clarity through experience, becoming progressively more articulated. He 
maintains that the familiarity of the psychological experience or ‘schema’ of the artist 
is always projected onto the unfamiliar (un-experienced) aspects of the external 
world, which, as they are encountered, are ‘corrected’ in perception to match what is 
experientially recognisable. Gombrich ([1960] 1994, pp. 64-65) describes this 
constructive process of perception as a model of ‘schema and correction’, a process 
that underpins the creation of certain details in, and characteristics of, the style of 
visual materials.  
For Gombrich, the artist begins a depiction of the world not by portraying a 
direct visual observation of an external object or motif, but through an impression that 
is fused unconsciously with the artist’s schema of prior experiences. The creation of a 
visual representation always has a starting point (or a standard of comparison) in the 
schematic experience of the creator, and it is through a perceptual process much like 
that of making, matching and remaking that this schema finally becomes embodied in 
the finished image (Gombrich, [1960] 1994, p. 65). The activity of depiction works 
much like a simile: in the process of copying the motif, the concrete object being 
depicted is compared in the artist’s perception to a ‘schematic form’ of prior 
experiences and expectations: 
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The draughtsman tries first to classify the blot and fit it into some sort 
of familiar scheme – he will say, for instance, that it is triangular or 
that it looks like a fish. Having selected such a scheme to fit the form 
approximately, he will proceed to adjust it, noticing for instance that 
the triangle is rounded at the top, or that the fish ends in a pigtail. 
(Gombrich, [1960] 1994, p. 64) 
 
The experiential schema represents the power of perceptual expectation (or 
what is experientially familiar to the artist through prior experience) that Gombrich 
argues moulds and shapes how the artist understands the perceived motif. He 
exemplifies the process of ‘schema and correction’ through a reading of the 
psychological test of ‘serial reproduction’ established by psychologist F. C. Bartlett 
(1920, 1923), in which a series of drawings are produced from memory by a chain of 
individuals, beginning with the first individual’s reproduction of an Egyptian owl. 
The next person reproduces from memory the initial depiction, and so on. The result 
is a series of gradual transformations from the original owl to a cat through the serial 
copying and reproduction from memory,44 a memory that is fused with each 
individual’s expectations of the subject (fig. 2a).  
 
Figure 2a has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
What Bartlett aimed to demonstrate was that the retrieval of images or stories 
from memory always involves a reconstruction of certain salient features or details 
that have been assimilated by the individual’s experiential schema (Oatley, 1999, pp. 
101-102; Butler and McManus, 1998, p. 35).45 By focusing on the development of 
                                            
44 Bartlett used ten subjects in the test. Subject One saw the original image of an Egyptian owl, and was 
asked to reproduce it after half an hour. This reproduction was shown to Subject Two, whose further 
reproduction was shown to Subject Three, and so on. 
45 According to Bartlett (1920, pp. 35-37) familiarisation is a fundamental principle in the reproduction 
of folk stories. He maintains that what frequently occurs when events, incidents or objects become 
unfamiliar is a transformation that relates it to what is familiar. Noting cases in which literary objects 
are preserved through transformation – such as a boats with canoes, bush cats with domestic cats and 
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visual style, Gombrich’s ([1960] 1994, p. 64) analysis of Bartlett’s test reveals that 
there is a moment – around reproduction five (fig. 2a) – when an unfamiliar or 
ambiguous shape (an owl-cat hybrid) appears, one that does not fit any pre-existing 
category in the perceiving subject’s schema of experience. It becomes ‘distorted’, re-
formed and transformed, gradually assuming the more familiar shape of a cat; as the 
image is assimilated by the subject’s experiential schema of expectation, it gradually 
becomes more clearly defined. 
In relation to the process of depiction, and more importantly visual style, 
Gombrich ([1960] 1994, p. 64) reveals that in this test, where a pre-existing category 
(such as in the case of the ambiguous, unrecognisable form of the owl-cat hybrid) is 
lacking, a ‘distortion’, underpinned by the artist’s schema of experiences, takes over 
and is projected onto the developing form so that it is ‘corrected’ by rendering a 
‘copy’ based on that schema. Thus, for Gombrich, the familiarity of the artist’s prior 
experiences will always remain the likely starting point for rendering the unfamiliar, 
un-experienced and unrecognisable stimuli encountered in the world (p. 72). Using 
this premise, Gombrich maintains that an existing representation, based on the artist’s 
experiential schema, will always influence the artist, even when they strive to record 
the ‘truth’ (p. 72) – a constructive process that is unconscious and not entirely 
understandable in terms of socio-cultural relativity. This perceptual process results in 
adaptations of the details of the object depicted, which become distorted 
representations projected onto an external world through a psychological and 
experiential schema.46  
                                                                                                                             
peanuts with acorns – this familiarisation results in a common tendency to change all presented forms 
into a form that can be accepted without uneasiness or question. 
46 The workings of such an approach become explicit in Gombrich’s reading of Albrecht Dürer’s 
woodcut of a rhinoceros from 1577. Dürer had never seen a rhinoceros first-hand. When creating his 
woodcut, he had to rely on descriptions and second-hand evidence: a sketch of the animal that had been 
sent to Rome as a present for Pope Leo X and a Portuguese newsletter that was sent to Nuremberg 
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2.1.3 The ‘beholder’s share’ 
How a visual representation ‘comes to mean’ is not entirely understandable in terms 
of the artist alone. Just as the artist relates to the world, Gombrich argues, the 
beholder too always has their own projected psychological ‘share’ in the image 
depicted, based on their individual experiential schema.  Gombrich’s ([1960] 1994, 
pp. 174-175) concept of ‘the beholder’s share’ demonstrates that the incompleteness 
or ambiguity of a visual stimulus arouses the projection of their experiential schema  
in the beholder’s perception. Demonstrating the concept at work in the perception of 
‘accidental’ shapes such as clouds, Gombrich ([1960] 1994, p. 155) notes: “What we 
read into these accidental shapes depends on our capacity to recognize in them things 
or images we find stored in our minds”. The beholder’s share is posited, once again, 
on the psychological concept of the projection of prior expectations and experiences 
(or schemata) onto the world through perception.  
Gombrich ([1960] 1994, p. 175) maintains this is exemplified most fully in 
what identifies as ‘Eastern art’; he points out that Chinese art, in particular, reveals 
the power of its expression of an image’s invisible features through the very ‘absence’ 
of brush and ink. In such images, the economy of the brushwork, which results in the 
absence of intimate details such as facial features or contextual details, is always just 
expressive enough to suggest what is absent or invisible in the depiction itself, so that 
the beholder can ‘complete’ the picture through their individual perceptual 
experience: 
                                                                                                                             
recounting how the king of Portugal put Pliny the Elder’s stories of the bitter rivalry between the 
elephant and rhinoceros to the test (Batrum, 2002, p. 283). Gombrich ([1960] 1994, pp. 70-71) suggests 
that Dürer put these together in his depiction, and filled in the ‘gaps’ from his own imagination, 
coloured by his experience of rendering exotic beasts and dragons – evident in the details of the image. 
From the Portuguese descriptions of the rhinoceros’s triumphant fight, the creature is given skin like 
plated armour with hard scales covering the legs, a second horn on its back (possibly inherited from the 
stories of Pliny), and a powerful stance. It is this fusion of prior experience/expectation and 
‘information’ from the descriptions of a rhinoceros that, for Gombrich, constructs the artist’s schema 
and subsequent depiction of the animal. 
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Figures, even though painted without eyes, must seem to look; without 
ears, must seem to listen ... There are things which ten hundred 
brushstrokes cannot depict but which can be captured by a few simple 
strokes if they are right. That is truly giving expression to the invisible. 
(Gombrich, [1960] 1994, pp. 174-175) 
 
Gombrich suggests that it is precisely the restricted, minimal, ambiguous and 
economic style of such visual works that encourages the beholder to complete the 
images by projecting their imitative faculty or psychological schema of experience 
onto the work. The empty surface of ‘shining silk’ that surrounds the brush strokes is 
as of much a part of the image as the brush strokes themselves, since it is the empty 
space that provides a screen onto which the beholder’s psychological and experiential 
share in the image can be projected. Gombrich maintains that it is the power of 
expectation – rather than any pure conceptual knowledge – that moulds what is 
perceived, and the expected projected image is structured by the beholder’s own 
temperament, personality and preferences.  
 
 
Figure 2b has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
 
Gombrich finds this perceptual ‘give and take’ between ambiguous or 
restricted images and the active beholder’s perceptual experience also at work in 
advertising matter, such billboards in the 1950s, in which the limits of what is 
recognisable in the presentation of images extend beyond the direct indication of 
natural appearances to involve the beholder’s own experience. A 1953 advertising 
image for Capstan Cigarettes (fig. 2b), for example, presents the minimum of clues 
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with a sufficient boldness to allow the image to turn from a more ambiguous row of 
cigarettes into two flirting faces (Gombrich, [1960] 1994, p. 197). In another example, 
a poster for the Financial Times (1955) (fig. 2b), Gombrich describes how its 
ambiguity invites the viewer to scan the picture and anchor the projection of their 
experience in the image of the chimney with a top hat, accepting it as depicting an 
industrialist: 
 
Where is the face? As soon as we ask, we notice we are scanning the 
poster, looking for indications where to anchor our projection. We find 
It somewhere along the line, and the faintest of phantom images settles 
on the chimney, but it is also a face, according to the way we look at it. 
(Gombrich, [1960] 1994, p. 197) 
 
Images such as these reveal the larger constructive perceptual process in 
which an unusual or ambiguous visual stimulus is embedded, evoking the projection 
of the beholder’s familiar experiential schema to share in the perception of the image 
and thus complete it. They demonstrate how the experience of visual materials gives a 
visual existence to the otherwise invisible, non-material, projected psychological 
perceptual experiences of the beholder. It is important to clarify the terms on which an 
image is understood as ‘ambiguous’, however, as this description can refer to many 
kinds of images: a simple outline of a hand, while not seemingly ambiguous, is 
revealed to be so on further investigation (Gombrich, [1960] 1994, p. 200). The 
analysis of such a drawing reveals an unexpected lack of information: it is impossible 
to tell, for example, whether it is a left hand seen from the front or a right hand seen 
from the back. 
The minimal, unusual, accidental and ambiguous visual forms that Gombrich 
analyses reveal a more complex reciprocal relationship between the perceiver and the 
perceived – that is, between the artist, the work and the beholder. In the context of a 
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constructivist model of perception, Gombrich reveals that not only do the perceptual 
experiences of artist and beholder comprise a co-constructive force in the way the 
style of a visual work ‘comes to mean’, but that this constructive process also 
underpins diverse forms of visual culture, from paintings and Chinese calligraphy 
through to comics, doodles and advertising matter. The hierarchy established between 
high art and popular visual culture by a socio-cultural framework (as outlined in 
Chapter One) begins to dissolve in an active constructivist model of perceptual 
experience.  
Gombrich’s psychological underpinning to the creation and perception of 
visual forms, however, remains within the experiential, personal and familiar. As 
such, it focuses attention upon what is visually experienced and does not fully account 
for other dimensions of embodied perceptual experience, principally that of the multi-
sensory (as illustrated earlier in McCloud’s study of a comic strip). The multi-sensory 
aspects of psychological experience have been discussed in other contemporaneous 
psychological accounts of the visual arts, particularly that of Arnheim (1957, 1969). 
Arnheim’s gestalt approach to the study of art takes a strongly formalist line, which is 
in many ways positioned in opposition to the constructivism of Gombrich. Situated 
within the tradition of gestalt psychology, particularly the work of Max Wertheimer 
and Wolfgang Köhler, Arnheim’s work differs to Gombrich’s constructivism in a 
fundamental way: the notion of the direct perception of the material properties of the 
external world.  
However, Arnheim’s work helps us to more fully appreciate the multi-sensory 
aspects of the creation and perception of visual and audio-visual form, and will be 
read as complementary to Gombrich’s constructivism rather than in opposition to it. 
Arnheim’s work is spelled out more fully in the following section, which 
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contextualises it in terms of both Gombrich’s thinking and more contemporary 
accounts of multi-sensory experience in phenomenological film spectatorship. 
Arnheim reveals that what is assumed to be materially absent in an ambiguous, simple 
visual form (in the case of the multi-sensory experience of the artist, this is the 
kinaesthetic, tactile and olfactory) is always expressed indirectly by the work itself, 
but perceived directly by the multi-sensory perception of the spectator. 
 
2.2 Gestalt psychology and theories of ‘direct’ perception 
Arnheim’s work was influenced by the emergence of gestalt psychology in the early 
twentieth century, and was underpinned by the theory of direct perception, which 
opposed the notion of indirect perception maintained by constructivists such as von 
Helmholtz and Gombrich (outlined earlier in this chapter). As Ian Gordon (1997, 
p.57) illustrates, gestalt psychology focused on the organisation of formal perceptual 
inputs (in distinction to experimental psychology’s idea of introspective, 
psychological sensations) and was associated with ‘nativism’, in which the viewer’s 
perception was understood to be innately determined by the formal patterns of a work. 
According to gestalt psychology, contrary to constructivist accounts, visual perception 
requires no prior psychological and experiential knowledge on the part of the viewer; 
rather, the focus is on the study of the ‘native’ characteristics of perception found 
within the form of the work itself.  
Following the lead of the gestalt psychologists of the early twentieth century, 
Arnheim ([1969] 1977, p. 138) maintains that the perception of an ambiguous visual 
work does not involve the ‘completion’ of that work by the imagination and past 
experience of the viewer, but is made possible by the expression of the form itself 
through the “intense visual dynamics of simplified line and colour”. Far from being a 
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mechanical recording of sensory elements, an artists’ perception is a creative 
apprehension of reality – individual artists and cultures across the world have their 
own characteristics – and this apprehension results in significant structural patterns of 
visual form (Arnheim, [1969] 1977, p. 6). The form of a work of art is itself 
expressive on a multi-sensory level and does not require any discussion regarding the 
psychological account of the viewer.47 Visual abstraction, for Arnheim ([1969] 1977, 
p.137), is not ‘incompleteness’, as Gombrich held, nor is it ‘potential’ (Gamboni, 
2000); it is an expression of a multi-sensory artistic statement about the visual 
qualities of an object. Contrary to Gombrich, he perceives a cartoon or comic at 
exactly the level at which it is drawn (Arnheim ([1969] 1977, pp. 136-137). Any 
‘forceful liveliness’ in a work does not derive from the observer’s contribution, but is 
made possible entirely by the visual dynamics of the simplified form itself; it is 
experienced through the form’s expression of liveliness.  
 
2.3 The multi-sensory aspects of visual form 
Arnheim’s gestalt theory of the visual arts focuses on the dynamics between a multi-
sensory perceptual experience and formal treatments of the visual form. In particular, 
he aimed to demonstrate that human apprehension of the world is always shot through 
with bodily-based feeling, memory and experiences, and that this perception is multi-
sensory and primarily expressive. In his later work, particularly Visual Thinking 
(1969), Arnheim demonstrates how visual perception can be understood as a process 
of cognitive activity in itself, repairing the rupture made by the commitment of 
                                            
47 In Art and Visual Perception, Arnheim (1954, pp. 4-5) makes clear that his concern is with the 
gestalt psychological experience of the artist that he reads in the visual forms they create. He is not 
concerned with the psychology of the consumer or viewer of the works. For him, the meaning of a 
visual form is to be found in its simple patterns, as perceived by the viewer directly. 
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contemporary psychology to tearing the processes of perception from the domain of 
conceptual thinking: 
 
[T]he cognitive operations called thinking are not the privilege of 
mental processes above and beyond perception but the essential 
ingredients of perception itself. I am referring to such operations as 
active exploration, selection, grasping of essentials, simplification, 
correction, comparison, problem solving, as well as combining, 
separating, putting into context. These operations are not the 
prerogative of any one mental function; they are the manner in which 
the minds of both man and animal treat cognitive material at any level. 
(Arnheim, [1969] 1997, p. 13) 
 
Visual perception, for Arnheim, was not the passive reception of external stimuli, but 
an active, ‘performative’, multi-sensory process: 
 
Through that world roams the glance, directed by attention, focusing 
the narrow range of sharpest vision now on this, now on that spot, 
following the flight of a distant sea gull, scanning a tree to explore its 
shape. This eminently active performance is what is truly meant by 
visual perception. (Arnheim, [1969] 1997, p. 14) 
 
In both Visual Thinking (1969) and Art and Visual Perception (1954), Arnheim 
examines the expressive nature of the shape, form, balance, colour and other formal 
features of a work, demonstrating that the creation and expressive capacity of simple 
visual forms such as lines and shapes are shot through with the bodily-based feeling 
of the artist who created them. Such forms are experienced not merely as curved or 
smooth but as calm or harmonious, not merely as jagged or sharp but as angry, rough 
and aggressive (Arnheim, [1969] 1997, pp. 124-125). Human visual perception and 
artistic practice, he says, are expressive – simple shapes and lines are manifestations 
of feelings, such as a sense of weight, which derive from the artist’s multi-sensory 
experience.  
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Arnheim reveals that what is assumed to be materially absent in the perception of 
visual forms (sound, taste, touch, feeling, emotion or other sensory experiences) is 
always presented indirectly to the viewer’s perception through the formal visual 
elements of the work. Arnheim’s earlier work, Film as Art (1957), offers a more 
accessible account of these multi-sensory aspects of perception at work in a visual 
form, which he later applies to the study of the pictorial arts. Just as with art, painting 
and music, Arnheim ([1957] 1997, p. 8) maintains that film should not be seen as a 
mechanical reproduction of an external concrete reality; it engages the perceptual and 
nervous system in the same way as the hand, the brush and the brushstroke of the 
painter does. Film is not simply an imitation or selective duplication of reality, but a 
translation of observed characteristics into the form of a given medium (Arnheim, 
[1969] 1997, p. 3).48 Throughout Film as Art, Arnheim traces the formal techniques 
by which film can be treated on the same terms as art and compared to painting: that 
is, it embodies the multi-sensory experience or ‘prejudice’ of the artist in its 
production, expressing this experience to the spectator through its formal 
characteristics. 
The embodiment of the eye (of both artist and spectator) – the structuring of the 
visual experience of the eye through cooperation with the rest of the body (its kinaes-
thetic, aural, tactile and olfactory senses) – structures the creation and expression of 
the form of a film work. The eye is not merely a passive mechanism, functioning in 
isolation; it is in constant cooperation with the rest of the body’s sensory experiences, 
even when these are assumed to be absent in a visual work. It is this material “absence 
of the non-visual world of the senses” (Arnheim, [1957] 1997, p. 30) that is always 
present perceptually, expressed in the form of the film work. Sensations of smell, 
                                            
48 Arnheim’s work regarding film and media has been revisited by some more recent authors. Scott 
Higgins (2010), in particular, aims to re-assess the importance of his contributions to contemporary 
thinking in media and film studies. 
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equilibrium or touch, although not materially present, are always perceptually present, 
suggested indirectly through the expressive dynamics of visual form. 
2.3.1 The artistic use of the absence of non-visual sense experience 
Arnheim’s contention that what is not materially present in a film work (for example, 
sound, touch, taste and smell) is always indirectly present in its visual form is based 
on the central premise that the eye is in constant cooperation with the rest of bodily 
experience. The other senses structure the very form that the eye’s perception takes 
and the way this is expressed. In foregrounding the multi-sensory aspects of 
perception, Arnheim ([1957] 1997, p. 34) is able to declare that “no one who went 
unprejudiced to watch a silent film missed the noises, which would have been heard if 
the same events had been taking place in real life”. Although the sound of certain 
discrete details in a silent film (feet walking, a clock ticking, leaves rustling) is 
materially absent, it is always perceived indirectly through the presentation and 
formal structure of the film.49 This material absence of non-visual sense experiences 
can be used in film to create surprising artistic techniques. 
For Arnheim, materially absent sounds can be suggested indirectly through the 
form of the image itself by presenting (or paraphrasing) the acoustic qualities of a 
sound as a visual event: the visual event expresses the quality of the acoustic one. 
Demonstrating such a perceptual paraphrase at work in a scene in Josef von 
Sternberg’s The Docks on New York (1929), Arnheim reveals how the absent sound of 
                                            
49 Michel Chion (1994, 1999) gives a further account of the filmic event, where sound plays more of a 
constitutive role in what is perceived visually. Chion demonstrates how sound and image have the 
ability to transform one another in the filmgoer’s perception of the film. This transformation occurs not 
because of any ‘natural harmony’ between the image and sound themselves, but in the ability of the 
perception of both to mutually influence and shape each other. In his work, Audio-Vision (1999), Chion 
shows how the soundtrack of a film can render a visually absent form present in the audience’s 
perception (such as the presence of a murderer in the shadows), or how an accompanying soundtrack 
can influence the ‘feeling’ of a scene. For him, sound or music, ‘adds value’ to the image, causing the 
filmgoer to perceive the image differently; a synergetic relationship between sound and image involves 
the viewer’s active embodied perception. 
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a gunshot is made visible by the sudden flight of a flock of birds (fig. 2c):50 the 
spectator does not simply infer that a shot has been fired, but actually ‘sees’ 
something of the quality of the noise, expressed visually in the form of the film 
(Arnheim, [1957] 1997, p. 108). The abrupt way the birds rise up in flight is an exact 
visual equivalent of the acoustic qualities of the shot. It makes the ‘invisible’ 
(materially absent) qualities of the sound of the gunshot ‘visible’; they are expressed 
through an indirect visual event that the spectator experiences perceptually.  
 
 
Figure 2c has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
 
In another example revealing the multi-sensory aspect of film’s visual form, 
Arnheim ([1957] 1997, p. 30) shows how kinaesthetic experience, which is materially 
absent in both the film and the spectator’s body, which is at rest, can be suggested 
indirectly through the visual form of the film. Although the body remains static, once 
the eye is engaged with the filmic world the result can be surprising: Arnheim 
observes how an feeling of giddiness can be produced by watching a film where the 
camera moves rapidly and violently back and forth. For example, in a scene from 
Dziga Vertov’s Man With a Movie Camera (1929) (fig. 2d), the camera spins rapidly, 
swaying and cutting to close-ups of a fast moving train. Arnheim ([1969] 1997, p. 30) 
reveals how the consequent giddiness evoked in the viewer is caused by the eye’s 
                                            
50 Arnheim (1957, p. 107) notes how such an editing choice is not merely a tactic on the part of the 
director to deal with the silence of the medium (it is enough to see the revolver fire, or see a wounded 
man fall to perceive a murder taking place), but is an artistic paraphrase, an “indirect representation of 
an event that is strange to it”.  
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participation in a different world (the world of the film) to that indicated by the 
kinaesthetic reaction of the resting body. The film’s world goes beyond the material 
state of the work by expressing the kinaesthetic through the form of the film itself. 
 
 
Figure 2d has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
 
The material form of a film work is shaped by, and indirectly expresses, the 
multi-sensory experiences of the artist who creates it – experiences that the viewer 
perceives directly through their own perceptual experience. The form of the work is 
not purely ‘visual’, as the visual elements of the work are themselves co-constructed 
through the multi-sensory experience of their creator. As such, the non-visual sense 
experience is never really absent, it simply appears to be so due to the sole focus on 
the visual aspects. For Arnheim, it is through such an indirect presentation of the 
multi-sensory quality of an event (such as the sound of the gunshot presented 
indirectly by the sudden movement of startled birds) that a materially absent sound is 
always perceptually present, expressed to the multi-sensory experience of the 
spectator regardless of the context of their spectatorship. The perception of the sound 
of walking or shuffling feet or the ticking of a clock, the sense of giddiness caused by 
sudden movement, or the smell of candles burning or food cooking are expressed by 
the work itself. The visual form is in part shaped by these multi-sensory experiences.  
Gombrich and Arnheim, therefore, although adopting apparently opposing 
models of perception, drawn from constructivism and gestalt psychology respectively, 
share a central conviction informed by the physiological models of perception 
developed in the early twentieth century. This conviction is that an artist’s creative 
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work is a concrete measure, or creative apprehension, of the external world (in the 
form of a representation) that reveals some of the world’s characteristics. Whereas 
Arnheim’s use of gestalt psychology in the analysis of film excludes the constructive 
role of elements of the viewer’s multi-sensory perception in the co-construction of the 
visual form from the discussion, more contemporary ‘tactile’ or haptic film theory 
includes the expressive and constructive nature of the viewer’s multi-sensory 
experience. The philosophical context of this literature is surveyed in the next section, 
which provides an account in which the multi-sensory aspects of an active embodied 
spectatorship play a co-constructive role in the experience of an (equally expressive) 
film. In this context, the work of Arnheim and Gombrich is brought into a 
collaborative dialogue rather than an oppositional one. 
 
2.4 The filmic experience as expressive   
What has been termed ‘haptic’ film theory, in particular the work of Laura Marks 
(2000, 2002), recognises a reciprocal relationship between a film work and the 
embodied multi-sensory experience and knowledge of the spectator. In The Skin of the 
Film, Marks (2000, p. 131) describes the experience of an audio-visual work, such as 
an intercultural film, as ‘calling up’ the multi-sensory and mnemonic experiences and 
knowledge of the embodied spectator, which lie beyond what she describes as a 
dominant Cartesian ‘ocular-centrism’. Recognising that the body, especially the sense 
of touch, is capable of storing powerful multi-sensory memories that are lost in a 
purely visual analysis (Marks, 2000, p. 130), she examines how audio-visual media 
evoke the tactile memories of the filmmaker and the viewer’s embodied spectatorship 
through what she calls, after Deleuze, the ‘haptic image’. What Marks (2000, pp. 131-
132) terms ‘haptic visuality’ is posited against an ‘optical visuality’, which conceives 
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of the experience of a film as purely optical and distanced from the body. In contrast, 
haptic visuality is based in the tactile, bodily epistemology of both the filmmaker and 
the viewer and has a relationship with the world of mimesis, a multi-sensory and 
mnemonic experience that lies below the symbolic and cognitive (p. 139). By 
invoking the aesthetic concept of ‘mimesis’ as applied to film analysis, Marks (2000, 
p. 141) shifts the hierarchical relationship between subject and object, “dissolv[ing] 
the dichotomy between the two, such that erstwhile subjects take on the physical, 
material qualities of objects, while objects take on the perceptive and knowledgeable 
qualities of subjects”.  
The reciprocal mimetic relationship between the embodied spectator and the 
film work outlined by Marks has its roots in a wider phenomenological film theory. 
Vivienne Sobchack (1992) uses the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, as opposed to 
the predominant transcendental phenomenology of Husserl that she believes lies at the 
root of much film phenomenology, to argue that spectatorship is not only multi-
sensory and mimetic but also fundamentally expressive. Whereas a Husserlian 
phenomenology describes the phenomena of experience as ‘given’ by the world and 
‘taken up’ through the act of experiencing, Sobchack (1992, p. 32) argues that the 
phenomenological eye is not just embodied in the physiological structures of the 
functioning organism, it is also ‘enworlded’ – that is, it is a part of the material world 
just as much as the body. Following Merleau-Ponty, Sobchack understands film as an 
already-expressed phenomenological experience, but argues that this expression has 
no finality. The experience of a filmic event itself is also expressive, and this includes 
the expression of the audience’s active embodied perception: 
 
What we look at projected on the screen –whether Merleau-Ponty’s 
“the things, the waves, and the forests,” or only abstract lines and 
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colors – addresses us as the expressed perception of an anonymous, yet 
present, “other”. And, as we watch this expressive projection of an 
“other’s” experience, we, too, express our perceptive experience. 
Through the address of our own vision, we speak back to the cinematic 
expression before us, using a visual language that is also tactile, that 
takes hold of and actively grasps the perceptual expression, the seeing, 
the direct experience of that anonymously present, sensing and sentient 
“other”. (Sobchack, 1992, p. 9) 
 
The perceptual experience of the phenomenological embodied spectator is expressive 
and ‘speaks back’ to the cinematic expression the spectator encounter, an expression 
that ‘enworlds’ them. The ‘film experience’, for Sobchack, is the co-constitutive 
process of the already-expressed perception of the film and the expressive perception 
of the viewer. The embodied viewer is active in the co-constitution of the very 
experience of the film – and this experience is tactile, incorporating all of the bodily 
senses. Both the perception of the viewer and the work itself are modified through 
such an expressive process. 
The tactility of the film experience is taken further in the work of Jennifer 
Barker. In The Tactile Eye, Barker (2009, p. 18) extends Sobchack’s 
phenomenological film theory to build a ‘phenomenological film analysis’ that 
focuses neither solely on the formal aspects of the film, nor on the spectator’s 
psychical identification with it, but on the relationship between them. Barker’s 
phenomenological film analysis sees film and viewer as acting together, ‘co-
relationally’, along an axis that constitutes the object of study. She notes that, for 
Merleau-Ponty, both subject and object co-constitute a perceptual experience in which 
the objects of perception actively respond. Merleau-Ponty’s work points to the 
importance of the material, lived world in understanding more fully the perceptual 
structures of experience (Barker, 2009, p. 17). Barker cites Merleau-Ponty as saying 
that perception takes place, “not in something I do, or something that happens to me 
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[…] perception takes place in the world of phenomena” (p. 18); phenomenological 
bodies are immersed in perception, just as they are immersed in the materiality of the 
world. According to Barker, a phenomenological analysis of film recognises the co-
constitutive, reciprocal relationship between the embodied perception of the 
perceiver, immersed in the responsive material (lived) world, and the perceived world 
which ‘touches’ the perceiver back. Both participants, the perceiver’s body and the 
perceived work (as an expression of the artist’s body), play a co-constitutive, mutual 
role in the ‘reversibility’ of perception. 
  
2.5 The perceptual relationship between perceiver and perceived 
Through the course of this chapter the focus has moved from the constructive aspects 
of a physiological perceptual experience of visual forms by the beholder to that of the 
multi-sensory, expressive ability of the visual form itself (gestalt theory), and has 
arrived at the recognition that both accounts of perception are a part of a larger 
dialogue within the process of what Sobchack (1992) calls a phenomenological 
‘enworlded’ perception. Such a dialogue suggests that although the gestalt psychology 
of Arnheim may set itself against the constructivism of Gombrich, they in fact both 
play an important role within a larger process of a phenomenological ‘enworlded’ 
perception. The expressive qualities of Arnheim’s formalism present the already-
expressed perception of the artist to the expressive (projective) perception of 
Gombrich’s beholder. The focus of attention is thus shifted to the study of the 
ongoing, expressive, perceptual experience of the visual work in which the meaning 
(the ‘film experience’, in Sobchack’s words) emerges out of the co-constitutive 
process of the expressive visual work and the multi-sensory experiential perception of 
the embodied viewer. 
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In this context, how a visual or audio-visual work ‘comes to mean’ always 
relates to the play of expressive multi-sensory and experiential phenomenological 
perceptual experiences. As such, meaning remains, as Gamboni (2000) says, 
‘potential’. How particular ambiguous, delimited, estranged and unusual visual and 
audio-visual forms (defined in this chapter by reference to the work of both Arnheim 
and Gombrich) ‘come to mean’ can now be more fully understood in terms of the 
artist’s multi-sensory perceptual experience – or way of acting in the world – that is 
expressed in the work and continually modified, actualised and co-constituted by the 
expression of the perceptual experience of the viewer.  
The example of how a comic strip (such as the one cited at the beginning of 
the chapter) ‘comes to mean’ can now be more fully understood in an existential 
phenomenological framework: the simplified line of the image is expressive of the 
multi-sensory, experiential, embodied perceptual experience of the artist, who is 
expressing this experience to the expressive multi-sensory embodied perception of the 
viewer who experiences the work. The meaning of the work (its actualisation) always 
remains potential, as the viewer’s perceptual experience of this expression (the image) 
is also expressive of their own multi-sensory embodied perception. The lines of a 
comic strip do not embody any particular perceptual experience per se, as was 
suggested through the work of Crowther and Johnson’s in Chapter One, but rather 
embodies an ongoing expressive relationship between the already-expressed 
perception of the artist and the expressive perception of the multitude of viewers who 
experience it. The work always ‘comes to mean’ in the expressive perceptual context 
of the viewer(s), and comprises a complex interplay between that which is expressed 
and that which is always being expressed.  
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To return briefly to the filmic materials drawn from avant-garde film, such as 
Straub and Hulliet’s Moses and Aaron (1975), and television advertising film, such as 
Hamlet Cigars’ Music Teacher (1968) studied in Chapter One (fig. 2e), this 
expressive relationship between perceiver and perceived is demonstrated through the 
analysis of particular stylistic traits that present the human figure in a strange and 
ambiguous way. In both works, the reduction of what is recognisable, the economy of 
depiction, is evident in the use of formal techniques such as minimal, sparse 
presentation, the ‘indifferent’ or anonymous presentation of characters, and the 
minimal use of sound (rather than image) to drive the form of the work. These formal 
stylistic traits can now be understood in terms of the simplification of line and form 
described in the work of Gombrich and Arnheim51 as an expression of a multi-
sensory, perceptual experience, which – in Crowther’s (2013) terminology – possess a 
‘phenomenological depth’, which is rooted in a way of acting upon the world. Such 
ambiguous and simplified traits remain ‘potential’ (Gamboni, 2000) until they are 
actualised through the expressive perceptual experience of the beholder. Extending 
this insight to the phenomenological film theory of Sobchack and Marks, the way 
these works ‘come to mean’ can be understood in terms of their embodiment of an 
ongoing relationship between the expression of the artist’s multi-sensory embodied 
experience (manifest as the work itself) and the beholder’s embodied perceptual 
experience of that expression. 
                                            
51 In his brief essay, ‘A Forecast of Television’, Arnheim ([1957] 1997, pp. 188-198) presents a scheme 
in which the ‘new’ medium of television can be mastered in a way he believes will enrich rather than 
silence the faculties of the human mind. Arnheim recognises that the cultural attitudes of the time 
(1930s) favoured direct accounts of perception, which praised and promoted the educational virtues of 
direct experience through the presentation of an ‘accurate’ and ‘complete’ world in the belief that 
photographs and films possessed the ability to mechanically represent reality ‘as it is’ (p. 195). 
Arnheim contends that this belief is dangerous, on account of the fact that perceiving ‘accurately’ 
(directly) should not be confused with knowing, and such direct experience ‘silences’ the perceptual 
and intellectual experience of the viewer; the mind shrinks. It is the recourse to the senses, Arnheim 
maintains, that allows this ‘silencing’ to cease. In the culture of direct experience, which teaches very 
little, the world does not show its true nature. The contribution of the senses, Arnheim declares, cannot 
be overestimated.  
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Figure 2e has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
The phenomenological depth of visual style described by Crowther (2012, 2013), 
which Chapter One outlined and brought into focus, has been extended through the 
literature drawn from phenomenological film theory in Chapter Two to include both 
the phenomenological depth of the artist and that of the viewer in equal measure. 
Extending Crowther’s work in this way provides a re-assessment of his re-working of 
the notion of visual style as embodying an artist’s way of acting in the world to 
include the phenomenological expressive perception of the viewer’s way of acting in 
the world. In this sense, Crowther’s phenomenological depth of visual style can now 
be understood as embodying not the individual perceptual experience of either the 
artist or the viewer, but as embodying an ongoing expressive relationship between the 
perceiver and the perceived, between the embodied perceptual experience already 
expressed as the visual form and the expressive perception of that form by many 
different viewers. Crucially, this phenomenological depth is not exclusive to works of 
art but underpins all visual materials, as illustrated by the diverse collection of 
materials surveyed in this chapter. 
The phenomenological recovery of visual form and style constructed by the 
last two chapters offers an alternative approach to the study of the phenomenological 
depth of printed materials, popular filmic materials and ‘accidental’ images, one that 
incorporates the phenomenological perceptual experience of the artist, the perceiver 
and the material form of the work itself. Such an approach begins by asking not what 
an image means, in terms of its socio-cultural, material framework or its material 
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form, but rather aims to describe how it ‘comes to mean’ in the embodied and 
phenomenological dimensions of human experience. In questioning how such images 
of visual culture ‘come to mean’, the findings of this chapter (applied to the 
development of different materials of visual culture) requires two theoretical shifts: 
first, an analysis of the materials of visual culture, together with the multi-sensory, 
experiential dimensions of the phenomenological, embodied, perceptual experience of 
both artist and viewer; and secondly a study of the diverse materials of visual culture 
on equal rather than hierarchical terms.  
To facilitate such an approach, Chapter Three undertakes a reading of the 
critical literature that surrounds the art historian Aby Warburg’s (1866-1929) notion 
of the ‘image’ within the context of film (Michaud, 2007), architecture (Papapetros, 
2012) and art history (Rampley, 2001). Through this literature it becomes apparent 
that Warburg aimed to study not what an image means, but how it ‘comes to mean’, 
studied as expressed through the details of the human figure depicted, as embodied in 
the gestures and movements of the body that created it. Crucially, what is understood 
as an ‘image’ within the context of Warburg’s writing will be discussed in Chapter 
Three not purely on visual terms, but rather as a manifestation of movement and 
gesture, it is both conscious and unconscious (Agamben, 1999), underpinned by the 
beliefs, practices, imaginaries and ideas of a particular period (Rampley, 1997) in 
which the practitioner works. The term ‘image’ will thus be read as applying to all 
visual (or textual) materials, whether artistic, economic, scientific or spiritual — 
blurring the hierarchy between artistic and popular visual materials.  
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Chapter Three 
The ‘Image’ as a Measure of the Body 
 
The recognition of the phenomenological depth of the style of ambiguous or unusual 
artistic and popular visual forms, explored and developed over the last two chapters, 
reveals that a complex interplay between the expressive, embodied experiences of 
both artist and viewer is at work in the way such visual materials ‘come to mean’. 
Chapter Three takes this understanding further by focusing on a method of analysis 
that can place a phenomenological depth at the centre of the study of all kinds of 
visual materials. In this context, the critical literature that surrounds the art historian 
Aby Warburg’s (1866-1929) concept of the ‘image’ within the domains of film 
(Michaud, 2007), architecture (Papapetros, 2012) and art history (Rampley, 2001) 
provides a particularly useful guide; foregrounding the study of ‘images’ within the 
movements and gestures of the body, underpinned by imaginary and psychological 
energies.  
The critical literature that accounts for Warburg’s notion of ‘image’ describes 
how it is not the study of an ‘artwork’ as part of a socio-political aesthetic that was 
important, but rather the embodied ‘energies’, such as psychology, beliefs and 
imaginaries, underpinning the movements and gestures of the artist, that are left as a 
trace within the details of the figure depicted within the work. There are two key 
tenets to the notion of the ‘image’ that will be pertinent to the discussion of this 
chapter regarding the study of visual materials: first, the creation of all visual 
materials (whether of art, science or popular culture) is underpinned by embodied 
energies, such as imaginaries, beliefs and experiences, that ‘animate’ the human 
figure depicted in the work; and secondly, the work should be studied not in terms of 
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what it means, but how it ‘comes to mean’ as embodied in the gestures and 
movements of the practitioner’s body. 
The literature that describes Warburg’s notion of the ‘image’, in particular the 
study of the ‘animation’ of the details of the human figure as portrayed in a range of 
diverse images from across visual culture, adds a further dimension to the theory of 
the phenomenological depth of visual style constructed over the last two chapters; the 
study of the details of figures such as weight, posture or windswept hair as a way of 
studying the psychologically rooted imaginary of the artist’s bodily movement that is 
fixed, or expressed, in the image. Warburg undertook such an analysis through the 
analysis of diverse visual materials juxtaposed together, as embodied within his final 
work the Mnemosyne Atlas, which provides this chapter with a methodological 
approach to apply to other visual materials. 
 
3.1 Mimesis and empathy as determinants of visual style 
Many writers concerned with the history of art52 regard the late nineteenth century as 
the period when the study of aesthetics exhibited an increased interest in the 
psychological, mimetic53 and emotional experiences of individual perception; these 
attributes were increasingly recognised as active and productive agents in both the 
                                            
52 Dario Gamboni (2002) presents a re-imaging of the visual arts during 1880-1940 which foregrounds 
the psychological and experiential dimensions of human experience seen in a proliferation of what he 
terms ‘potential images’ from this period. Matthew Rampley (1997, 2002), meanwhile, highlights the 
importance of mimesis and empathy to psychological theories of art, particularly in the work of Aby 
Warburg. Edgar Wind (1985) also presents a case for re-assessing Warburg’s thought in the canon of 
art history, specifically referring to the marginalisation of his work through the legacy of Gombrich’s 
influential studies of the psychology of pictorial style.  
53 The concept of mimesis is considered to be the oldest theory of the Western representational arts, 
which survived well into the twentieth century (Potolsky, 2006; Sorbom, 2002). Established during the 
Classical period in Greece as a means of characterising the epistemological nature of painting, 
sculpture, poetry, music, dance and theatre as ‘art’ (Sorbet, 2002), in complete contrast to other forms 
of human inquiry such as history and science, which were seen as a form of universal truth and reason 
(Potolsky, 2006). In particular, Aristotelian ‘mimesis’, as simulation, draws a dichotomy between 
perception (the sense data of the real world) and imagination (the simulation or representation of the 
sense data of the real world). 
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perception of the world and the creation of artistic visual forms.54 As Chapter One 
outlined briefly, this shift emerged amid a wider philosophical concern with 
‘constructivist’ physiological notions of perception55 (as exemplified by Hermann von 
Helmholtz’s work in experimental psychology) which understood human perception 
as ‘indirect’ – that is, not directly connected to external stimuli but functioning via the 
physiological processes of the body. As Matthew Rampley (2001a, 2001b), in 
particular, highlights in the context of the art history of this period, the concepts of 
mimesis and empathy in the study of aesthetics and the arts took on a much wider role 
than the classical idea of art as rooted in the faculty of imagination,56 re-situating it 
directly in a bodily-based, physiological model of human perception. This shift had 
implications for the study of the formal aspects of art; the visual form was understood 
as the coalescence of bodily-based perception, including psychological, emotional and 
imaginary experiences. The work of Robert Vischer, the theorist of empathy, was key 
to this philosophical shift, and his essay, The Optical Sense of Form: A Contribution 
to Aesthetics (1874), became a central text. 
 
 
 
                                            
54 The nature of the shift in the categorisation of mimesis during this period is more fully outlined in 
this author’s paper, ‘A Monstrous Rhinoceros (as from life): The Epistemological Role of the Enacted 
Pictorial Image’ (see Appendix 4). 
55 Jonathan Crary (1990) surveys the wider philosophical landscape of the late nineteenth century, 
particularly the work of Goethe and Schopenhauer, who focused on the physiological basis of senses. 
For Crary, during the nineteenth century, the corporeal subjectivity of the observer became the basis of 
visual perception – an active producer of visual experiences. Crary argues that vision was no longer 
seen as completely based on an external object, and the primary process of ‘seeing’ was translated into 
the processes of an embodied perception, in which the boundaries between the subject and the object 
blur. Crary argues that the study of visual culture should focus on this type of embodied observer, 
instead of emphasising the role of pre-existing representations. 
56 The understanding of the nature of mimesis during the Classical period rested on the thought of Plato 
and Aristotle. This  defined  an artwork as a ‘copy’, ‘imitation’ or ‘similarity’ of a pre-defined external 
‘real’ world, enabling the distinction between the real (the concrete object) and the mimemata (the 
painting, sculpture, prose work or music), the result of a process of mimesis. Both Plato and Aristotle 
remain faithful to this dichotomy; however, they had differing views on the epistemological nature of 
the imitation itself (Sorbom, 2002; Potolsky, 2006). 
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3.1.1 Nineteenth-century empathy theory  
Vischer’s work is situated in the prolonged late-nineteenth century debate between 
formalist and idealist philosophies in the study of aesthetics. As Charles Harrison 
explains (1998, p. 690), Vischer’s thinking sits between two opposing identifications 
of content: a formalist conception where the objectively given content is directly 
presented to the viewer by the object of contemplation in its own right; and an idealist 
conception foregrounding the subjectively projected content, where the viewer’s 
psychological life is brought into contact with any and every phenomenon capable of 
being grasped aesthetically. In attempting to find a middle ground in this debate, 
Vischer ([1874] 1998, p. 690) employed the psychological concept of ‘empathy’ 
(Einfühlung) that in his opinion exists in both the aesthetic perception of the viewer 
and the artistic formal presentation of the work itself. 
Vischer’s contribution to aesthetics in this period was the introduction of 
empathy theory, which signifies a process of emotional and psychological projection. 
His use of the term ‘Einfühlung’, as Koss (2006, p. 139) illustrates, specifically refers 
to the aesthetic activity of perceptually ‘feeling into’. He used the term (which 
emerged from the overlap between the fields of philosophical aesthetics, optics, 
perceptual psychology, and art and architectural history) as a description of the 
embodied response of the viewer to an image, object or spatial environment; it is a 
perceptual sensation that is physical, psychological and emotional. Vischer’s 
theoretical statement concerning his use of Einfühlung in The Optical Sense of Form 
describes the viewer’s perceptual engagement with the form of a work of art: 
 
I entrust my individual life to the lifeless form, just as I … do with 
another living person. Only ostensibly do I remain the same although 
the object remains the other. I seem merely to adapt and attach myself 
to it as one hand clasps another, and yet I am mysteriously transplanted 
 107 
and magically transformed into this other. (Vischer, cited in Koss, 
2006, p. 139) 
 
 The model of perception that underpins Vischer’s use of Einfühlung is multi-
sensory, physical and emotional, including an understanding of vision as 
simultaneously optical and bodily57 (Koss, 2006, p. 141). As Koss recognises, the 
viewer’s aesthetic experience of an artwork is, for Vischer, a reciprocal one of change 
and transformation created by both viewer and object, simultaneously destabilising 
the identity of the viewer and animating the object perceived. The site of the aesthetic 
‘content’ of an image cannot be wholly understood in either formal or idealistic 
(aesthetic) terms; rather, it comprises an intermingling or coalescence of both. 
According to Vischer, artistic form is a measure of the external world through an 
artistic sensibility; the objects depicted in a painting are understood as the subjective 
bodily experience of the artist fused with, and mediated through, the depicted object 
(Papapetros, 2012, pp. 45-46). The viewer of an artistic form is able to ‘empathise’ 
with the simplest of forms presented to them via bodily perception, and to give 
themselves over to, or be transformed by, the artwork’s formal aspects.  
 Vischer described how, for both artist and viewer, the empathetic perception 
of forms (such as boulders or the moon)58 are capable of arousing and directing 
                                            
57 Vischer’s situating of perception within the body is maintained in the binocular model of perception.  
As Koss (2006, p. 141) recognises, it was this understanding of vision that allowed Vischer to situate 
the body in relation to the image. A monocular vision perceives an image without reference to scale, 
while binocular vision uses bodily-based perception to create a double image that is unified in the 
viewer’s body (ibid.). Thus the viewer, for Vischer, was able to ‘empathise’ into an image via an 
embodied perception. 
58 Giving the example of an artistic presentation of the moon, Vischer ([1874] 1998, p. 692) describes 
how the formal phenomena coalesce with the psychological life of the individual artist in a perception 
that can be empathetically ‘felt’ by the viewer: “The moon, for example, can effect me in a sentimental 
manner through the association of ideas, because it reminds me of certain loved ones who used to 
serenade it or languish before it, or because it is the heavenly body which represents a dreamy and 
passive aspect of our life. If the colour green strikes us as a symbol of hope, this is also through the 
association of ideas: it reminds us of the green flowering meadows in springtime, or the verdant 
blessings of the returning sun, and thus by a natural progression of all kinds of things hoped for or 
desired.” 
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changes in mood and feeling. Vischer ([1874] 1998, p. 691) outlines this more 
discursively in a later essay, The Aesthetic Act of Pure Form, where he says: “It is 
quite possible in the sphere of imagination for purely formal Phenomena to coalesce 
with other essential features of our humanity. This is the work or achievement of our 
representational or imaginative faculty”. Vischer’s use of the term ‘faculty’ was 
crucial for his employment of the concept of ‘empathy’. He described the coalescence 
of formal phenomena with empathetic bodily experience as functioning through the 
three highest faculties of the mind, in which the viewer has, firstly, a direct, formal, 
unilateral relation to the object (for example, light waves emanating from the moon 
are perpetuated in the eye and impact upon the central nervous system); secondly, a 
motor (physiological) relation to the object, following its contours with the movement 
of the eye; and, finally, an emotional relation, whereby the viewer, as a sensible and 
intellectual subject, is ‘transported’ into the inner being of the object (Vischer, 
([1874] 1998, pp. 691-2). It is this third function of ‘transportation’ that contains 
Vischer’s concept of ‘aesthetic empathy’, which comprises the reflexive, emotional 
and intellectual function of the mind – over and above the unilateral and motor 
functions of the body – in which the most meaningful content of the perceived object 
is aroused by a reflexive, intellectual sense of identification.  
The conflation of the higher cognitive functioning with the physiological in 
empathy theory rests upon a distinction, central to Vischer’s work, between ‘seeing’ 
and ‘looking’ (Rampley, 1997, p. 45). As Rampley highlights, the distinction rests on 
the opposition of passive ‘seeing’, a physiological process of stimulus reception, to 
active ‘looking’, analysing forms dialectically to bring them into a relationship with 
the body. In this sense, Vischer’s empathy is a reflexive and cognitive sensibility, 
sitting in-between the body and the perceived phenomenon, being a measure of the 
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two. Vischer believed the world can only become meaningful through a process of 
reflection and analysis, a process that functions as a mimetic impulse, in which “the 
criterion of sensation lies … in the concept of similarity … not so much a harmony 
within the object as a harmony between the object and the subject” (Vischer, cited in 
Rampley, 1997, p. 45). Although Vischer included the physiological basis of 
perception, the body itself, in his theoretical scheme, he did not fully recognise it in 
its entirety in his empathy theory; rather, he contended that the ‘mimetic similarity’ 
between the perceived object and the body of the perceiver is achieved through the 
viewer’s subjective and imaginative capacity to symbolise. 
 
3.1.2 The body as the centre of mimesis 
Framed as a contribution to the notion of aesthetic empathy, extending Vischer’s 
conceptualisation of the concept, Warburg’s doctoral dissertation, Sandro Botticelli’s 
Birth of Venus and Spring: An Examination of Concepts of Antiquity in the Italian 
Early Renaissance (1893), offered a method by which to study the materials of the 
dominant formalist art history of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in 
the context of the emerging discourses of the psychology of perception and aesthetics. 
Warburg applied Vischer’s aesthetic theory of empathy, in particular, to the study of 
drapery in pictorial depictions. His use of the notion of empathy, however, places it 
not, as Vischer did, in the imaginative, intellectual and reflexive functioning of the 
mind as functioning above the physiology of the body, but in the gestures and 
movements of the body itself. Warburg analysed the details depicted in diverse visual 
ephemera in terms of the psychological, emotional and embodied experiences (or 
energies) of the artist’s movements and gestures that coalesced with, and gave 
additional form to, the objects and figures in the painting.  
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As Gombrich (1970, p. 222) re-iterates in his Aby Warburg: An Intellectual 
Autobiography, Warburg primarily asked how human and pictorial expressions 
originate – that is, what are the (conscious or unconscious) feelings or points of view, 
stored in the memory’s archives, that are used when applying the concepts of empathy 
and mimesis to unconsciously animate the gestures and movements of the body itself? 
In doing so, Warburg was able to foreground the projective psychological, 
experiential and expressive dimensions of the practitioner – what Edgar Wind (1985, 
p. 25) describes as the ‘lifeblood’59 of an image – in the creation of all visual forms. 
Crucially, he was able to trace these expressive, bodily-based experiences permeating 
all cultural artefacts, from textual artefacts and religious iconography to figurative art 
and everyday ephemera such as postage stamps, by studying the details of their 
representations of the human figure.  
 
3.2 The ‘image’ as a measure of the movements of the body 
Warburg’s work aimed to explore the corresponding ideas that appear across both art 
and literature which he believed shape the depictions and descriptions of human 
figures and symbols, such as that of the ‘nymph’ (‘nympha’) – an analogy that he 
traced back to an underlying psychological empathy shared by the creators of both 
visual and literary ‘images’. It was through studying the embodied, psychological 
dispositions that underpin the gestures and movements of the artist’s body and result 
in the details of the depicted forms, such as their garments or hair, rather than 
concentrating on the form of the artwork itself, in isolation, that Warburg revealed the 
psychologically projected empathy that he claimed is a determinant of visual style. 
                                            
59 As Warburg himself declares, “any attempt to detach the image from its relation to religion and 
poetry, to cult and drama, is like cutting off its lifeblood” (cited in Wind, 1983, p. 25). His ‘pathos 
formula’ can be understood as distributed among many aspects of a culture, from practices, 
philosophies, beliefs and religions to artistic practices, and across many dimensions of reality, such as 
belief, material practices and art. 
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Crucially, in contrast to the dominant formalist approaches to the study of art history 
at this time, Warburg included the domain of bodily-based human experience – 
psychology, empathy and emotion – in his study of visual style, tracing it across many 
diverse aspects of culture, including literature, painting and everyday visual 
ephemera. 
Warburg saw the predominantly formalist approach to the history of art during 
the nineteenth century as overly limiting in its excessively materialistic approach.60 
As Giorgio Agamben recounts (1999, p. 91), Warburg sought to avoid the 
conventional conception of an artwork as a socio-cultural creation on the grounds that 
this approach failed to grasp the unconscious and psychological necessity of what he 
described as an ‘image’ – that is, as a product poised between religion and art. 
Warburg believed that the traditional notion of an artwork resulted from constructing 
art history on a schema derived from political history and the doctrine of the ‘genius’, 
thus producing a socio-historical and cultural history that neglected the psychological. 
In contrast, he wished to avoid this excessively materialistic approach to the study of 
the image by extending the methodological and theoretical boundaries of art history to 
include the psychological and expressive through the evocation of mimesis and 
empathy. For Warburg, the significance of the ‘image’ as opposed to the ‘artwork’, as 
Agamben shows (1999), was the notion that the image is neither strictly conscious nor 
unconscious,61 but a crystallisation of the projected psychological and emotional 
energies or ‘psychic forces’ of the artist.  
                                            
60 Particularly as maintained in the work of Alois Riegl and Wolfflin (Krauss and Bois, 1997) 
61 Rosalind Krauss’s later project with Yve-Alain Bois (Krauss, 1997), proceeds from George 
Bataille’s belief that the homogeneity of modern (conscious) scientific thought neglects the 
heterogeneity (the unconscious) of culture, a heterogeneity that Bataille points to in the ‘waste’ of a 
culture: the bile, the spit and the faeces. Following suit, David Martin (2012) rethinks the modern 
period through an analysis of its artefacts, foregrounding this heterogeneity, which, after Bataille, he 
refers to as the sacred (or the unconscious) that underpins all modern visual culture. 
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Warburg’s thinking was heavily influenced by the contemporary animal 
psychology of Charles Darwin and anthropological approach of Tito Vignoli.62 
Drawing from these works, his account of the pictorial and literary image was of a 
work that, at some level, always expresses the traumatic relationship between the 
human being and the chaotic external world, presenting a situation in which the 
individual is able to bear the existence of the world’s chaotic power without suffering 
harm (Efal, 2000, p. 221). Adi Efal (2000) provides a summary of Warburg’s reading 
of contemporary art historical literature, particularly as it relates to the 
psychoanalytical discourses that were emerging during his time.63 What Warburg 
termed the ‘image’ is conventionally understood as a symbolic mode that expresses 
the encounter between man and the chaotic world through its mimicry of the world’s 
threatening forces. Efal (2000, pp. 221-222) recognises that Warburg, however, 
believed the fixed image was a memory image, carrying within itself traces of the 
traumatic encounter with external forces – what Rampley (2001b, p. 319) describes as 
an archive of the mental state of the producer, of the cognitive and emotional states 
that imprint themselves in a visual symbol.  
 
3.2.1 ‘Psychic’ energies that crystallise as an image 
As Gombrich (1970, p. 2017-218) describes, Warburg begins his study of the 
psychological history of visual style with the notion, borrowed from the writing of 
Vignoli,64 that the perception of any stimulus, be it visual or auditory, from the 
outside world always involves the projection of a psychologically known and 
                                            
62 Rampley, 1997; Efal, 2000; Papapetros, 2012; Agamben, 1999. 
63 This re-reading of Warburg’s work was instigated primarily by the writing of Matthew Rampley 
(1997), who, by foregrounding the importance of mimesis and empathy in Warburg’s thought, draws 
parallels with the contemporaneous psychoanalytical discourse of the period. 
64 Vignoli’s Myth and Science (1885) has been cited as a great influence on Warburg’s thinking 
regarding the study of visual imagery. 
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previously experienced ‘mental image’ as the cause (or agent) of the stimulus. 
Warburg declared: 
For any stimulus, be it visual or auditory, a biomorphic cause of a 
definite and intelligible nature is projected which enables the mind to 
take defensive measures ... when a door creaks in the wind ... such 
stimuli arouse anxieties among savages or children who may project 
into such sounds the image of a snarling dog. (Warburg cited in 
Gombrich, 1970, p. 217) 
 
The embodiment of the psychological projection of causes for unknown or newly 
experienced events, Warburg declared, is the origin of the creation not only of the 
mental images of the subjective mind, but also of the pictorial images themselves. As 
Edgar Wind (1983, pp. 30-32) shows, Warburg situated empathy and mimesis in the 
expressive gestures of the experiencing body itself, affording the notion that the 
human muscles themselves serve the purpose of the mimetic expression of a 
psychological or embodied experience, which is always associated with the minimum 
of intellectual reflection. Man-made objects and pictorial images are thus seen as 
mimetic in origin, as always expressing in their form a relationship that is similar to 
that of the stimulus of a creaking door evoking the projection of a snarling dog in the 
mind of a child. 
According to Rampley (1997), Warburg based his theory that psychological, 
embodied ‘energies’ underpin the formation of pictorial styles over historical time on 
his belief in the embodiment of mimesis and empathy in the gestures and movements 
of the body. The style of an image represents traces of the shape of the expressive 
gestures and movements made by the artist’s body. For Warburg, the details of figures 
depicted in a visual image (such as weight, posture, gestures or windswept hair or 
garments) are manifestations of the mimetic expressive gestures of the body that 
formed them; they are charged with a psychological and experiential ‘social memory’ 
 114 
or imagination. Warburg used his neologism, the ‘pathos formula’, to describe the 
psychological, emotional and experiential ‘forces’ and ‘energies’ that comprise the 
shared imaginary of the period of which the image-maker is a part. Such an imaginary 
is made up of the philosophies, beliefs and practices of a specific time, and these are 
the very ‘lifeblood’ of an image, what Colleen Becker (2013, p. 10) describes as a 
collective psychological distress.  
The image, for Warburg, as Agamben (1999) illustrates, was “an indissoluble 
intertwining of an emotional charge and an iconographic formula in which it is 
impossible to distinguish between form and content” (p. 90), a crystallisation of 
historically contingent psychic energies and forces, that constitute a specific ‘pathos 
formula’. The study of the image itself was achieved by tracing the psychic energies 
crystallised in the image by the gestures and movements of the creator’s body. 
Agamben (1999, p. 99) maintains that the symbol (or depicted figure) in itself held 
little interest for Warburg; it was only interesting insofar as it made possible (made 
visible) the reconstruction of an individual personality or vision of the world through 
studying the psychic traces found within it. 
In studying these embodied traces, Warburg extended Vischer’s empathy 
theory into the exploration of the psychological energies crystallised in the animation 
of pictorial details, such as the depiction of fabrics, drapery and postures. What 
Warburg termed an ‘animated accessory’ (Rampley, 1997) is a detail of a figure that 
is psychologically animated by the movements and gestures of the artist who created 
it, underpinned by the ‘pathos formula’ of a cultural period that can be read in the 
style in which it is depicted. Warburg saw the subtle changes in the way hair or 
fabrics fluttering in the wind are depicted, or in the weight and posture of figures, as 
indicative of a history of dynamic human perceptual and cognitive experience, 
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embedded in the specific ‘pathos formula’ underpinning their creation. It was by 
studying the concrete object itself (the image), conditioned by the nature of the 
techniques, philosophies and beliefs that constituted it, that Warburg aimed to study 
the nature of the pictorial image as a projection or crystallisation of an embodied 
experience. 
 
3.2.2 A history of the image is a history of transformations 
Based on the theory of the embodiment of human perception, empathy and mimesis in 
the creation of the image, particularly in the gestures and movements of the body, 
Warburg was able to maintain that the course of the history of images (including the 
history of art) should be understood in terms of the history of pre-existing expressive 
values (an image of an external stimuli such as a creaking door) that undergo a 
polarisation or transformation (the projection of the creaking door into the image of a 
snarling dog) corresponding to the psychological and experiential expressive powers 
that refashion them (Gombrich, 1970. p. 26). These embodied expressive powers are 
themselves embedded in a wider ‘pathos formula’ – that is, in the beliefs, 
technologies, philosophies and practices of a given period. As such, for Warburg, a 
specific presentation of the world in an image is always a ‘renewal’ or transformation 
of previous existing traits that are ‘aesthetically sterilised’ 65 or stripped of expressive 
                                            
65 This is a stage in the endurance or re-formation of past forms. Gombrich (1970) reveals that what 
Warburg termed ‘aesthetic sterilisation’ describes stripping any belief and prior aesthetic from an 
‘image’ (mental or pictorial) to allow another aesthetic based on new beliefs to be created in the 
imagination. Gombrich (1970, p. 198) notes how this can be best summarised in the description of the 
process of the ‘ars memoria’ (art of memory) when creating new imaginative images from verbal 
descriptions: “No religion, so long as it is believed, can have that kind of beauty which we find in the 
Gods of Titian, of Botticelli, or of our own romantic poets. To this day you cannot make poetry of that 
sort out of the Christian Heaven and Hell. The Gods must be, as it were, disinfected of belief; the last 
taint of the sacrifice, and of urgent practical interest, the selfish prayer, must be washed away from 
them, before that other divinity can come to light in the imagination.” (C.S Lewis cited in Gombrich, 
1970, p. 198) 
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meaning and value, primarily through verbal descriptions and translations,66 and 
polarised, given new aesthetic value, through the psychological and experiential 
aspects of a dynamic, bodily-based, perceptual experience and ‘pathos formula’.67 
As Rampley describes (2001a, p. 306), Warburg perceived visual culture as a 
dynamic process, rather than a fixed network of connections and progressive 
categories as the formalist accounts of the time maintained. It was this aspect of his 
approach to the study of the materials of art history, Rampley shows, that allowed 
Warburg to discover the psychological embodied energies that underpin human 
representation itself as revealed through his study of the ‘interval’ – that is, of the 
differences and changes observable between the artefacts of two different cultures. He 
conceived of the ‘spirit of the age’ not as a discrete break from any previous period, 
but as “a conscious or unconscious principle of selection informing the artistic 
inheritance preserved in the memory” (Warburg, cited in Rampley, 2001b, p. 306). As 
such, his work was concerned with tracing the preservation of a specific cultural 
symbol, such as the ‘nymph’, through its transformation as it was adopted by 
successive cultures, exploring the embodied and psychological conditions of this 
transformation through the study of the ‘interval’ (or difference) in its depiction.  
 
3.3 An iconology of the ‘interval’ 
Studying the ‘interval’ rather than the symbols or images themselves allowed 
Warburg to access the psychological and emotional underpinnings of their creation 
                                            
66 Warburg was able to trace a clear cycle of development in the image of the Greek hero Perseus, from 
its Greek origin to the distortion or ‘perversion’ of its form in the Oriental and Mediaeval traditions 
(fig. 2) to its restitution in the Renaissance (Gombrich, 1970, p. 194). Warburg suggested that at each 
stage of re-form in these oral cultures, the form of Perseus was ‘sterilised’, stripped of expressive 
meaning, through verbal descriptions and translations (becoming a ‘stimulus’ much like the sound of a 
creaking door) and ‘polarised’ or given new expressive meaning (the projection of a new mental image 
much like the snarling dog) through new cultural imaginations, which ultimately structure and form the 
new visual aesthetic. 
67 What Warburg termed the ‘lifeblood’ of an image comprise the wider philosophies and beliefs of the 
culture that produced the image.  
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through identifying the changes in details, such as weight, posture or fluttering 
garments. What Warburg termed an ‘iconology of the interval’, according to 
Rampley, (2001b) focused attention on the tensions and differences between diverse 
visual ephemera, rather than between the material forms of the artwork itself,68 
studying not the meaning of the symbols, but the interrelationships and embodied 
energies that underlie how an image ‘comes to mean’. Warburg’s approach is useful 
for this thesis in that it deepens the phenomenological reconceptualisation of visual 
style observed in the last two chapters by including, alongside such tendencies as how 
the artist handles the paint, an analysis of the details of the human figures represented 
in images. 
Warburg’s iconographic approach to the study of the details of visual style 
was focused on mapping the historical, embodied dynamics that informed the 
transformation of a specific motif or symbol across cultures and over historical time 
(Rampley, 2001b, p. 306). This was achieved through the study not of the isolated 
individual images themselves, but through the ‘interval’, or changes, between the 
motifs depicted in the images. Gombrich and Rampley both view Warburg’s essay on 
the work of Édouard Manet as a particular exemplar of this method: it traces the 
depiction of the nymph as it is re-formed and polarised in the ‘pathos formula’ of the 
modern period.  
Warburg linked Manet’s The Luncheon on the Grass (c1863) to Marcantonio 
Raimondi’s engraving of the Judgment of Paris (c1510-1520) (fig. 3) by studying the 
transformation of the depiction of a specific motif of a group of river gods and a 
nymph, claiming that the significance of the transformation lay in its appearance as a 
                                            
68 As Matthew Rampley has shown (2001a, 2001b), where the iconology of Erwin Panofsky focuses on 
the conscious artistic use of symbols and conventions, and the social mediation of pictorial meaning, 
Warburg’s ‘iconology of the interval’ focuses rather on the dynamic embodied processes that underpin 
pictorial meaning. 
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microcosm of the more general impact of modernity. It was through the study of the 
‘interval’ between the ‘primitive’ phobias expressed in Raimondi’s The Judgment of 
Paris, fixed in the details of the figures, and the depiction of urban leisure in Manet’s 
painting that Warburg was able to suggest that the transformation in the 
representation of the human figures was underpinned by the historically contingent 
embodied experience (the gestures and movements) of the artists who depicted them 
(Rampley, 2001b, p. 312-313). Gombrich’s Aby Warburg: An Intellectual Biography 
(1970, pp. 276-267) provides additional details of Warburg’s study: he traces the 
reappearance of the nymph in a relief of The Judgement of Paris on a Roman 
sarcophagus from the third century AD, via the Renaissance in Raimondi’s engraving 
of The Judgement of Paris, to its modern depiction in Manet’s The Luncheon on the 
Grass (fig. 3). 
      
Figure 3 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
 
Gombrich, in particular, reveals that by highlighting the transformations of the 
figures depicted in each of these works, noting the changes in details such as in the 
physical weight and postures of the group, Warburg was able to show how the figure 
of the nymph was transformed, or animated, by the underlying ‘pathos formula’ of the 
cultures in which these works were created. A feature of the transformations brought 
about by each formula was the philosophical change in the theory of causation, with 
the gradual ‘archaeological sterilisation’ of the deities during the European 
Renaissance: 
 
Between the ‘Judgement of Paris’ as it is represented on the pagan 
sarcophagus and Manet’s ‘Dejeuner sur l’herbe’ mankind witnessed 
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the decisive change in the theory of causation relating to the basic 
phenomena of nature. The idea of an immanent and impersonal law 
ruling natural events sweeps the whole haggling governing body with 
its all-too-human foibles from the heavens. … the major Olympic 
divinities have ceased to be the subject of active sacrificial rituals since 
they have been archaeologically sterilized. (Warburg, cited in 
Gombrich, 1970, pp. 276-267) 
 
As Gombrich (1970, pp. 275-266) recounts, at each stage, the psychological 
type of the human being depicted is completely transformed; the change in the details 
of the human figure correspond to the change in causality brought about by the 
Renaissance’s neutralisation of the idea of the involvement of the gods in everyday 
life. In the Roman sarcophagi, the group (of river gods and the nymph) is drawn into 
the events happening around Mount Ida (the return of the gods), with the nymph 
raising her hand in awe or surprise. The group, presented in a reclining, almost 
passive posture, are the embodiment of the passivity tied to the ‘pathos formula’ of 
the period, in which the gods held sway over the natural world. This ‘phobic engram’, 
or memory image, manifest in the details of the group, shifts in the later composition 
by Raimondi: the nymph no longer looks toward the gods, but has her head turned 
toward the beholder. Warburg situates this shift in the gradual transformation into the 
pastoral of the early modern period.69 He concludes that this transformation paved the 
way, philosophically, for the group’s subsequent transformation in the work of Manet, 
where nothing is left of the fear of the gods in these figures; the whole psychological 
dynamic of the human representations has been utterly transformed through the 
dynamics of successive embodied ‘pathos formulae’.  
Gombrich’s account of Warburg’s analysis of the transformation of the human 
figures represented in the group of river gods in Manet’s The Luncheon on the Grass 
gives the phenomenological reading of the work by Crowther (2013), introduced in 
                                            
69 Gombrich (1970, p. 276) further reveals this in Warburg’s own analysis of a Dutch seventeenth-
century version of the composition, in which the group is depicted as contemplating a herd of cows.  
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Chapter One, further depth. Where Crowther studies what he terms the ‘stylistic 
tendencies’ of the work – its flatness, awkwardness or ‘unfinished’ elements – in 
terms of the temperament of the artist, Warburg’s iconological approach adds the 
study of the details of the human figures. The inclusion of Warburg’s thinking adds 
the important dimension of the imagination underpinning all visual materials, not just 
artistic materials, to the study of how such artefacts ‘come to mean’, as well as the 
notion of ‘transformation’ as a way of studying the ‘pathos formula’ of the artist that 
is fixed in the details of the human representations over time. 
Where Crowther’s work deepened socio-cultural formalism by including the 
individual artist’s way of acting in the world, Warburg’s work adds further depth by 
including the degree of perceptual, cognitive and imaginary change and 
transformation over time. Recognising that a body (and the psychological, 
phenomenological experience that animates it) is historical and contingent requires an 
alternative approach to the study of how images ‘come to mean’, one that focuses 
upon situating the current ‘style’ of a given motif as a way of acting upon the world 
that transforms what preceded it. Warburg’s work attempted such an analysis, 
culminating in his final work, The Mnemosyne Atlas. This work is described in the 
next section, and provides the chapter with a method by which the study of how 
images ‘come to mean’ can take account of a constantly changing physiology, mind, 
imaginary and perception. 
 
3.4 The Mnemosyne Atlas 
Warburg’s iconographic approach to the study of the transformation of symbols 
across time and cultures, an ‘iconology of the intervals’, involves the study not of the 
meaning of images in themselves, but of the tensions, analogies, contrasts or 
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contradictions between them that result in how they ‘come to mean’. This approach to 
the study of the embodied, psychological and emotional energies underpinning the 
creation of details in images is seen most clearly in Warburg’s final (unfinished) 
project, the Mnemosyne Atlas. It provides a methodological tactic with which to 
investigate and reveal the embodied energies that are crystallised in the details of a 
work’s visual style.  
The Mnemosyne Atlas (fig. 3a) is a collection of panels covered with black 
cloth upon which Warburg juxtaposed diverse cultural images, gathered during his 
research, which he used to reveal the ‘pathos formula’ he found crystallised in them. 
It is through this juxtaposition, and by reading the images collectively through the 
spaces and tensions in-between them, the ‘black intervals’, that Warburg was able to 
study the variations and repetitions that appear in their details. 
 
 
Figure 3a has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
 
 
 
Based on analysis not of the meaning of the individual images themselves but of their 
interrelationships, this arrangement of materials reveals the dynamic changes, 
differences and relationships between the images through analysis of the details of the 
human figures represented in them. As Philippe-Alain Michaud (2007) notes: 
 
The panels covered with black cloth on which Warburg mounted his 
images were made not the be exhibited as such but to be photographed 
in order to form a new, complex entity … One must also see them in 
their material configuration, being attentive to the spaces between the 
images, their variations and their repetitions, the way in which the 
reproductions are concentrated in certain areas of the panels. … With 
Mnemosyne, Warburg established “an iconology of intervals” … 
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involving not objects but the tensions, analogies, contrasts, or 
contradictions among them. (Michaud, 2007, p. 244) 
 
In arranging the images on the black cloth of the panels of his atlas, 
Warburg was attempting to activate dynamic properties that would be 
latent if considered individually … [H]is album of images represents 
the place in which the original expressive energy can be rekindled in 
archaic figures deposited in Modern culture and in which this 
resurgence can take shape (Michaud, 2007, pp. 253-255). 
 
Crucially, it was through this juxtaposition of images taken from different 
sources (Renaissance art, maps, religious iconography and everyday visual ephemera) 
and the study of how the human figure in each was animated through certain details 
that Warburg was able to realise and more fully understand something that none of 
the images studied in isolation could reveal: the period’s mimetic, embodied and 
psychological underpinning, shared by the visual images in the collection. This 
‘pathos formula’ or imaginary of a certain period can only be fully understood when 
diverse images of that period are brought together and studied alongside an analysis 
of the embodied, experiential and perceptual dimensions of the artists, practitioners 
and producers whose gestures and movements, the body itself, animate them, leaving 
its traces. 
 
3.5 The measure of the body of the viewer 
Warburg’s extension of Vischer’s empathy theory and concept of mimesis to the 
gestures and movements of the body in the study of art history focuses attention on 
the body’s pre-reflexive functioning, and its psychological and imaginary 
underpinning, which result in an image’s formal details. However, while Warburg’s 
extension of empathy theory to the movement of the body meets the wider challenges 
presented by experimental psychology’s physiological model of perception 
(particularly the work of von Helmholtz (1924)) during this period, it fails to include 
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the active (constructive) nature of the viewer’s own physiological perception and 
experience (as outlined in the previous chapter). Warburg’s analysis remains within 
the embodied gestures, movements and perceptual experience of the creator of the 
image. 
Koss (2006) provides an insight into how the focus on the primacy of the 
artist’s perceptual experience was theorised within the study of art history during this 
period. She describes how, during the late nineteenth century, theorists of Einfühlung 
(particularly Vischer) tended to describe the aesthetic responses of a viewer by 
extrapolating from their own personal experience. As Koss (2006, p. 145) suggests, 
while it is never explicitly stated, Vischer’s notion of the empathetic viewer was a 
viewer of his own making: “a man of property whose identity was destabilized within 
the confines of a relatively private realm, carefully circumscribed by the laws of 
decorum and propriety”. Vischer’s aesthetic empathy, which finds its way (in part) 
into the later work of Warburg (Rampley, 1997), was based on his own perceptual 
experiences; he addressed an individual (aesthetic and artistic) perception in which 
authority rested with the body of the author or artist, who presented their experiences 
as universal (Koss, 2006, p. 144).  
As Koss (2006, p. 145) reveals, the contemporary experimental psychological 
research of Vischer’s time was not adequately represented in his theoretical work. The 
emergence of the work of experimental psychologists such as von Helmholtz, and the 
subsequent creation of a theoretical lineage of constructivist perception, brought an 
additional challenge to the aesthetic notion of Einfühlung that Warburg’s work does 
not explicitly respond to: the underlying model of the perception of the spectator or 
viewer who was active and projective. Koss (2006, p. 145) describes how 
experimental psychologists and aesthetic theorists during the late nineteenth and early 
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twentieth centuries began to lose interest in the concept of Einfühlung, largely due to 
the discovery of perceptual difference among individuals tested in psychological 
laboratories. Koss points to the work of Edward Bullough, who discovered that, in the 
main: 
[t]he same subject found oblique straight lines sometimes pleasant and 
sometimes unpleasant, occasionally on one and the same day … [N]o 
single one of the explanations championed by different adherents of 
the theory [of Einfühlung] could claim the monopoly of truth” 
(Bullough, cited in Koss, 2006, p. 144).  
 
Contrary to Vischer’s (and Einfuhlung’s) claims of the universal effect of simple 
forms and shapes on a generalised viewer, the findings of experimental psychology 
made it clear that such a universally consistent characterisation could not be 
confidently assigned to even the simplest of visual forms, demonstrating that an active 
spectatorship existed at the level of the physiology of the individual viewer.70  
The wider context of experimental psychology during the early twentieth 
century, in particular the recognition of the importance of the work of von Helmholtz 
to the critique of Einfühlung, provides a constructivist (active) model of the 
physiological perception of both artist and spectator, as outlined more fully in the 
previous chapter. Thus, the critical literature regarding Warburg’s situating of 
empathy and mimesis in the gestures and movements of the artist, in order to study 
the development of images, can be extended to also include the embodied perception 
                                            
70 Koss (2006) situates the psychological critique of empathy in the arrival of a new kind of spectator, a 
cinematic one. As she suggests, with the expansion of middle-class leisure, the explosion of mass 
media, and the unprecedented growth in the audience for culture in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century, the cultivated individual Vischer theoretically constructed became increasingly difficult to 
maintain. Koss notes particularly how “[m]en, women, and children are together in one room, allowed 
to enter after paying a relatively small entrance fee. Rather than owning the work that they view, in 
other words – or emulating this established model of aesthetic perception, as museum visitors do – they 
have gained access to it temporarily by means of a commercial transaction, and the terms of their 
engagement have changed” (p. 145). In highlighting the popularity of cinema among lower- and 
middle-class spectators during the early twentieth century, Koss suggests a different model of a non-
universal spectatorship that, within the context of experimental psychology, is understood as an 
individual and crucially active (constructive) spectatorship not limited to class, gender or age. 
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of an active spectator, who is also a part of the ‘pathos formula’ of the period, and 
whose beliefs, practices and philosophies underpin how the image is received. An 
image ‘comes to mean’, as was argued in the last chapter, not just through the 
expression of an individual artist’s embodied perceptual experience, but also 
necessarily involves the projection (or expression) of the viewer’s own perceptual 
experience. 
 
3.5.1 The excitation of the viewer 
The philosophical importance of the active involvement of the bodily-based 
perceptual experience of the viewer regarding Warburg’s writing has been discussed 
more recently by Michaud (2007) in the context of film theory, Martha Blassnigg 
(2006) in her study of early cinema spectatorship, and Spyros Papapetros (2012) in 
his writing on architecture. Papapetros, in particular, proposes the extension of the 
animating principle of Warburg’s theory of art to one in which the image is 
understood as an ‘excitation’ or animation of the mind of the viewer who perceives it. 
As stated earlier, Warburg’s notion of the ‘animated accessory’ in painting was 
heavily influenced by the writings of Vischer; he saw the rustling of drapery, for 
example, as a manifestation of the synaesthetic operation of the artist linking the 
earthly world of the material and the spiritual one of the immaterial. It is this aspect of 
the animation of details that Papapetros describes as also ‘exciting’ the imagination of 
the viewer. 
As Papapetros (2012, p. 46) recounts, Vischer saw the incidental details of 
drapery as a material threshold between the spiritual and earthly domains, and this 
becomes the most palpable feature of representation, as “a transient body, whose 
rustling movement activates the synesthetic [sic] interface between two [seemingly] 
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remote worlds”. In returning to the writing of Vischer, Papapetros reveals an agential 
aspect to the ‘fluttering fabrics’, which functions in the absence of bodily empathy. 
Quoting Vischer (cited in Papapetros, 2012, p. 45), “the hand of a specific artist or 
member of a school could be distinguished by the idiosyncratic manner in which he 
drew fabric pleats. Garments [or] hair are the critical means of the subjective in 
painting”, Papapetros draws attention to a crucial aspect of the artist’s subjectivity – 
that being expressed through and in an object (such as a painting), subjectivity is 
externalised and contained in the created object, effectively functioning as a ‘cause’ 
or stimulus for the further excitation of the subjectivity and imagination of the viewer.  
Papapetros develops Vischer’s, and in turn Warburg’s, physiological and 
psychological understanding of the fluttering of garments and hair through a closer re-
reading of the animal psychology of both Vignoli and Darwin. This revision of the 
wider literature around Warburg’s thought provides an insight that deepens his theory 
of figuration: the movement depicted in the details of hair and clothing, Warburg’s 
notion of the ‘memory image’, produces a further excitation in the embodied 
perception of the viewer. In support of this insight, Papapetros cites an allegory by 
Vignoli, in which a horse is affected by the fluttering of an ‘agent-less’ handkerchief 
(an echo of the child’s projection of a snarling dog onto an unknown aural stimulus, 
as mentioned earlier in the chapter): 
 
One day I and a friend were out driving with a horse, and I directed a 
man, while we were passing at moderate pace, to wave [a] 
handkerchief, attached to a stick, in such a way that this person on the 
other side of the hedge was invisible. The horse was scared and shied 
violently, even in the stable he could not see the handkerchief without 
trembling.  (Vignoli, cited in Papapetros, 2012, p. 47) 
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Following this line of thought, the rustling of drapery depicted in a Raphael 
painting described by Vischer becomes the threshold to an ongoing ethereal world of 
animation (Papapetros, 2012, p. 45), and the cause of a new excitation in the 
embodied, projective perception of the object in the viewer’s perceptual experience. 
According to Papapetros (2012, p. 47), a close reading of Vischer’s account of 
Raphael’s drapery (which influenced Warburg’s own work), reveals that it represents 
a transition from the embodied empathy of the artist to the embodied empathy of the 
viewer. The inorganic object (the painting itself), when experienced, gains agency as 
an affective excitation (or animation) of the projective perceptual experience of the 
viewer.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The critical literature surveyed within this chapter regarding Warburg’s notion of the 
‘image’ and his study of the materials of visual culture allows a discussion in which 
images are understood as the expression of an historically contingent, embodied, 
perceptual experience (the manifestation, or crystallisation, of movement and gesture, 
underpinned by the imaginaries, beliefs, practices and psychologies of a particular 
period). Crucially, Warburg’s analysis of the gestures and movements that result in an 
image, rather than of the artwork itself, allows a shift in focus from what a work 
means to how a work ‘comes to mean’ – the enquiry that lies at the centre of this 
thesis.  
Three aspects of Warburg’s work are important for the current discussion. 
First, the creation of the image is not separate from the metaphysical and experiential 
dimensions of human bodily experience, but is firmly rooted in it; it is ‘embodied’ 
within the gestures of a body. The study of the image begins in terms of these 
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embodied, psychological energies that are accessible through an analysis of the form 
of the work, rather than a study of the final form itself. Secondly, no art or practice 
has a distinct hierarchy, as all human endeavours, practices and disciplines are 
underpinned by the embodied perception and psychological experiences that are 
energised by a specific ‘pathos formula’, comprising the beliefs, philosophies and 
practices of the period. Finally, the current presentation of the world, as reflected in 
the details of an image, is not distinct from a past presentation; past forms endure or 
are re-formed through a ‘polarisation’ or projection of an embodied experience or 
‘pathos formula’. The differences between the human figures depicted within visual 
materials are the site for the study of the ‘pathos formula’ underpinning this re-
formation, as Warburg demonstrated in his Mnemosyne Atlas. 
Warburg’s focus on the embodiment of the details of images in the gestures 
and movements of the artist’s body finds contemporary support in Crowther’s theory 
of the phenomenological depth of the visual ‘style’ of modernist painting, which 
represents an expression of a way of acting upon the world, as described in Chapter 
One. The phenomenological depth of visual style that Crowther describes through the 
study of works such as Manet’s The Luncheon on the Grass, its flatness, awkwardness 
and ambiguity is ‘thickened’ by including Warburg’s analysis of the details of the 
human figures depicted within the same painting. Not only can the phenomenological 
body be read through the style of the overall presentation, but also through the 
qualities of line, the weight of the forms and the figurative elements.  
In recognising the importance of the phenomenological body of the viewer, 
just as much as the artist, the details that reveal the ‘pathos formula’ of a work are not 
so much ‘discovered’ as co-created through the activity of inquiry itself, a ‘reciprocal 
interaction and modification’ as described by Crowther (2012) in Chapter One. The 
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phenomenological body; its lived multi-sensory and experiential depth of both the 
artist and the viewer, outlined in the last two chapters, is deepened by adding the 
weight of the psychological, mnemonic and imaginary dimensions of a historically 
contingent way of acting upon the world. This historically contingent way of acting 
upon the world be read through a phenomenological analysis of the human figures 
depicted within visual materials, that is itself always read through another historically 
contingent way of acting upon the world, that of the viewer. The meaning of a work, 
how it is experienced, the very details that are analysed, are always co-constructed, 
modified, through the perceptual experience of the viewer. The work itself is always 
in a state of becoming, within the context of a constantly changing perceptual 
experience of the viewer, an idea that will be further explored as a part of the context 
of the work of Chapters Four and Five. 
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Interlude  
An Expression of the Environment (Samuel Beckett’s Film) 
 
The focus over the last three chapters has been to re-introduce the functioning, 
development and experience of the body for the study of how visual materials 
material mean. The locus of study, as has been situated within phenomenological and 
embodied frameworks, has been to more fully recognise and discuss the importance 
of the activity of a bodily-based, multisensory perceptual experience as immersed 
within an environment. Attention now moves to the importance of the environment 
within which the body is immersed within the mind-body-world system of Merleau-
Ponty’s ‘lived body’. To reiterate, as Jennifer Barker (2009) describes in the context 
of film, through Merleau-Ponty, a phenomenological analysis of film recognises film 
and viewer as acting together, ‘correlationally’, along an axis that constitutes an 
object of study in itself. Perceptual experience is co-constituted by both subject and 
object; the object of perception responds to the viewer. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy 
thus points to the importance of the material, lived world of objects – as an active, 
affective and responsive force – to the attempt to better understand the perceptual 
structures of a phenomenological experience. 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology highlights an aspect of a phenomenological 
body that has not been touched upon thus far: the active processes that constitute the 
perception (or perceptual experience), and underpin (or animate) the movements and 
gestures of both artist and viewer that extend into the environmental conditions and 
objects that the body is immersed within. The critical literature writing regarding the 
ideas of Warburg in the last chapter suggests that just such an energetic, animating 
cause of the movements of the body and activity underlies the creation of animated 
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details in images – for example, fluttering garments or heavy, rooted postures. His 
‘pathos formula’, which underpins the movements and gestures of the practitioner, 
can thus be studied through the animation of such details by environmental forces and 
energies such as wind and gravity within which objects are set.  
To begin to get a sense of the correlational relationship between body and 
environment within a lived bodily experience, a description of a philosophical film 
work by Samuel Beckett, Film (1965) illustrates the complexity of a relationship 
between the movements and gestures of the body as it responds to the affective 
aspects of the environment. The result is seen in the specific form the film takes. It 
begins with an extreme close-up of a blinking eye that forcefully directs its gaze 
toward the viewer; the viewer’s gaze in return is locked in an exchange with the eye. 
What follows is a filmic form that is structured by a perceptual game between the 
perceiver and the perceived, as Buster Keaton seeks to escape, to no avail, the 
relentless, mobile perception of the camera that effortlessly and silently stalks his 
every move. The camera and Keaton constantly respond to each other’s movements, 
entangled in an endless choreography or dance (fig. 3b). Beckett’s work is based on 
George Berkeley’s famous dictum, Esse est percepti (that is, ‘To be is to be 
perceived’), and represents the playing out of a kind of ‘theatrical game’, poised 
between the camera’s and Keaton’s perceiving ‘eye’.   
 
 
Figure 3b has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
 
The choreographic relationship between the camera/viewer and Keaton that 
structures the form of Beckett’s Film extends into an additional dimension: the 
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relationship between the affective objects of the environment and Keaton himself. As 
Keaton attempts to escape the perception of the viewer/camera, his movements also 
respond to an all-perceiving environment of objects, animals and images. The direct 
address of a painting of a staring God, his own reflection in a mirror, the gaze of a 
caged bird and the fixed stare of a heavily crafted chair back cause Keaton to recoil 
and cover up or destroy these agents that impact on his movements. The entangled 
relationship that is played out between the movements of Keaton, the always-
perceiving environment and the camera/viewer presents a human figure (that of 
Keaton) whose movement and activities run in counterpoint not only to other human 
figures and visual materials, but to the very forces, tensions and resistances of the 
(affective) material world. In this sense, neither Keaton’s nor the camera’s 
movements are independent, each intimately responds to the other’s activities, which 
in turn respond to the always-perceiving environment, forming a dance or play in 
which the final form the ‘choreography’ takes (the film itself) is part of a dynamic 
system of expression that requires the activity of many partners. 
Beckett’s Film illustrates the focus of the following chapters, particularly the 
notion that perceptual experience is, in part, underpinned by the affective ‘energies’ 
of an active and responsive material world impacting on the body of the artist or 
maker as they move and create – a phenomenological body that is immersed in an 
active and responsive environment. The affective dimensions of the objects of the 
environment are expressed in Keaton’s movements and activities as he responds to 
them, and the activities in turn are expressed in the final form of the film itself. 
Chapters Four and Five will investigate more fully the importance of the inclusion of 
the environment in understanding the movement of the phenomenological body and 
the development of mind. This is primarily undertaken through the phenomenology of 
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Merleau-Ponty, particularly in relation to an understanding of how visual materials 
‘come to mean’. The recognition of the importance of the environment –what will be 
described as the domain of matter, artefacts and objects in Chapter Five– for the study 
of visual materials underpins the trajectory of the second half of this thesis.  
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Chapter Four 
The Body’s Immersion in an Environment 
 
As the analysis of how visual materials (images) ‘come to mean’ has so far focused 
on the gestures, movements and functions of a phenomenological body, so the body’s 
immersion in the active processes and conditions of its environment becomes a 
further important locus of enquiry; a mind-body-world system. In the attempt to 
understand the role and importance of the environment in bodily-based activity, 
creative activity and the creation of visual materials, this chapter undertakes a re-
contextualisation of Warburg’s art historical approach, through the phenomenology of 
Merleau-Ponty (1942, 1961), in order to enlarge the present focus on the 
phenomenological depth of images through the inclusion of active environmental 
processes.  
According to Merleau-Ponty (1942), the artist’s ‘behaviour’ – their bodily 
gestures and movements – lies at the centre of an organism-environment coupling, 
through which the ‘texture’ of the environment (an affective environment made up of 
energetic forces) is made visible through the activity of painting itself. For Merleau-
Ponty (1961), art renders visible the invisible forces and energies that impact on the 
gestures and movements of a phenomenological body, because this body is always 
immersed in the texture of the environment. The very activity of painting itself brings 
into analytical focus the environmental forces that are present within it, below the 
level of consciousness.  
To more fully understand the role and importance of the environmental 
processes Merleau-Ponty refers to, this chapter surveys more contemporary 
conceptions of enacted mind and perception drawn from cognitive science  – for 
example, Noë (2003) and Varela (1993). Such models of mind recognise that mind 
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and perception are emergent properties of an organism-environment system, in which 
the environment, mind and perception are ‘brought forth’ or ‘enacted’ through the 
movement and activity of a phenomenological body entangled with its environment. 
Recognition of the importance of environmental processes in the constitution of mind, 
perception and human activity has implications for the study of how visual materials 
arise, and how their ontology and meaning are emergent within activity and 
movement as functioning within an organism-environment system. Enactive 
conceptions of perception, mind and its relationship to depiction will be used in this 
chapter to enlarge the concept of the phenomenological depth of images that has been 
developed over the last three chapters. To question how images ‘come to mean’, it is 
argued, it is necessary to include the ‘depth’ of the meaning-making process as it 
extends into the active processes of the environment in which the practitioner’s 
movements and activity are immersed. 
 
4.1 The environmental cause of depiction 
Through the study of the animation of details in images – for example, garments, hair 
or posture, animated by wind or gravity – Warburg’s art historical method (outlined in 
Chapter Three) points toward the expression of invisible environmental processes as 
they impact on the painter’s body. Michaud (2007) uses the revelation of these further 
dimensions of depiction to contextualise Warburg’s thinking; his re-reading of 
Warburg’s work takes it beyond the normative iconographic approach adopted by 
many of his followers.71 Michaud recognises that it was in seeking to understand the 
relationships that bind the external reality of the world with the artist’s psychological 
intuition that Warburg, through an exploration of the forces and energies that result in 
                                            
71 In particular, Michaud (2007) points to Erwin Panofsky, Edgar Wind and Fritz Saxl, whose 
iconological approach focused on the interpretation of symbolic material. 
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‘figuration’, aimed to study the metaphysical character of the figures the artist depicts. 
As he highlights, Warburg believed this metaphysical character to be a manifestation 
of an imaginary or ‘pathos formula’ that also has an external cause, one that extends 
into the forces and processes of the environmental conditions of the objects depicted,  
as well as that of the viewer of the work. 
The mythological figures that Warburg analysed, Michaud recognises, are not 
simply the incarnation of an idea in the mind of a single artist, but a manifestation of 
the multiple forces and influences of a ‘pathos formula’ that extends beyond the body 
of the artist who ‘created’ these figures, forces that become evident in their details. 
Warburg studied such external influences through the analysis of figures whose 
clothing and hair are depicted in movement, recognising that this is caused not only 
by their own bodily movements, but also by external factors such as the wind. 
Warburg’s analysis thus encompasses the external causes of objects in their natural 
conditions. Michaud describes the fluttering fabrics that Warburg studied:  
 
As they began to move, the figures became the source of strange 
tension, the product no longer of a single will but of independent and 
multiple forces exercising contradictory influences – that of the artist, 
but also those of the model and of natural conditions, as well as that of 
the viewer looking at them. (Michaud, 2007, p. 83) 
 
As Michaud brings into focus, Warburg believed that the energising processes that 
underlie the creation of an image extend into its environmental conditions – a process 
influenced in part by external causes that impact on the body of the artist, situated in 
the natural environmental conditions of the world. These external causes, energies or 
forces are manifested in the cultural artefact itself (the created image) in which these 
environmental conditions that impact on the gestures and movements of the artist’s 
body become ‘contained’ or crystallised. In this sense, the depicted figures can be 
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understood as more than the incarnation of an idea in the mind of an artist; they are 
expressive of the processes and forces underlying the tensions of the artist’s body, 
immersed in an energetic and active environment.  
As suggested at the end of the previous chapter, by focusing attention on the 
study of the animating environmental forces that result in the details of a painting, 
Michaud’s reading of Warburg’s account of figures bears a resemblance to the model 
of artistic figuration described in the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty (1961), 
particularly his analysis of modern painting. According to Merleau-Ponty, the painter 
does not represent a world, but ‘brings one forth’ through their movement and 
gestural ‘behaviour’ as they paint. Crucially, the artist’s movements and behaviour are 
in part underpinned by environmental forces and conditions, which render themselves 
visible in the painting itself. Merleau-Ponty’s existential and non-representational 
framing of the process of figuration provides a philosophical context in which the 
processes and causes of figuration that extend into the environment, can be studied as 
expressed within the style and details of the figures within images.   
 
4.2 Movement as the centre of existential stimulation 
It is important here to clarify Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of ‘behaviour’, as it 
stands apart from the dominant gestalt theories of the early twentieth century, and 
differs from a ‘behaviourist’ understanding of the term. Merleau-Ponty’s ([1942] 
2011, p. 42) conception of behaviour is built around a central tenet: the physiological 
and the mental cannot be separated into isolated domains. This classical distinction, 
held by the psychological behaviourism of his time, provided Merleau-Ponty with the 
opportunity to re-think the term. Throughout The Structure of Behaviour (1942) he 
describes behaviour not in terms of a classical stimulus-reflex response, a one-way 
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causal chain between external stimulus and physiological response, but as a 
reversible, two-way relationship in which neither has primacy.  
In The Structure of Behaviour, Merleau-Ponty constructs a model of 
‘existential stimulation’ in which there is no one direction of stimulus and response, 
instead both the milieu (the properties of the environment) and the organism’s 
perception are co-constituted or intermingled, and emerge through the movement of 
the organism in its environment: 
 
The properties of the object and the intentions of the subject ... are not 
only intermingled: they constitute a new whole. When the eye and the 
ear follow an animal in flight, it is impossible to say ‘which started 
first’ in the exchange of stimuli and responses. Since all movements of 
the organism are always conditioned by external influences, one can, if 
one wishes, readily treat behaviour as an effect of the milieu. But in the 
same way, since all the stimulations which the organism receives have 
in turn been possible only by its proceeding movements which have 
culminated in exposing the receptor organ to external influences, one 
could also say that behaviour is the first cause of all stimulations. 
(Merleau-Ponty [1942] 2011, p. 13) 
 
According to Merleau-Ponty, the intentions of the subject and the properties of their 
milieu are co-constituted; there is no primacy of either world or perception 
(intention), they are symbiotic and through their intermingling constitute a new 
‘whole’ or reality. As such, Merleau-Ponty declares, the true source of any 
stimulation is not an external excitant but movement or behaviour, which is 
constituted by the co-dependence of the organism (including its perception) and its 
milieu. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology thus provides an account of the mind of the 
practitioner that is not confined to the boundary of their skin, but extends into, and is 
intermingled with, the objects and bodies that constitute the artist’s milieu. 
Merleau-Ponty’s critique of the classical behaviourist conception of a 
stimulus-reflex response, and the consequent separation of the physical and the 
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mental, lies at the centre of his critique of the gestalt account of form. In this respect, 
he reclassifies this conception (of a fully formed excitant or stimulus that invokes a 
response or behaviour in the organism through its physical properties) as taking on the 
intentional properties, or phenomenology, of the subject and the physical properties of 
the world; the external stimuli are ‘chosen’ by the subject through their movement in 
the world. What can be considered the ‘form’ of an excitant is understood as emergent 
in the tension between multiple stimuli extending from both the organism and the 
environment: 
 
The form of the excitant is created by the organism itself, by its proper 
manner of offering itself to actions from the outside. … it must 
encounter a certain number of physical or chemical agents in its 
surroundings. But it is the organism itself – according to the proper 
nature of its receptors, the thresholds of its nerve centers and the 
movements of the organs – which chooses the stimuli in the physical 
world to which it will be sensitive. (Merleau-Ponty, [1942] 2011, p. 
13) 
 
Through invoking the term ‘Umwelt’ (‘environment’), associated primarily 
with the work of von Uexküll, Merleau-Ponty ([1942] 2011, p. 13) clarifies what he 
means by the idea of the organism’s nervous system and movement ‘choosing’ 
stimuli: “The Environment (Umwelt) emerges from the world through the 
actualization or the being of the organism – [given that] an organism can exist only if 
it succeeds in finding in the world an adequate environment”. The world is classified 
as a domain of infinite possibilities for action and movement through which an 
organism moves and ‘chooses’ the environment they live in (that is, the properties of 
the environment) from what is available to them and as delimited by their nervous 
system and abilities. 
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It is in the context of this notion of the environment coupled to the movement 
of the organism that Merleau-Ponty is able to equate his reformulation of the gestalt 
conception of form with the notion of Umwelt, an environment that emerges out of the 
infinite possibilities of the ‘world’ created by the organism’s movements and 
activities. He maintains: 
 
 [T]here is form whenever the properties of a system are modified by 
every change brought about in a single one of its parts and, on the 
contrary, are conserved when they all change while maintaining the 
same relationship among themselves. (Merleau-Ponty, [1942] 2011, p. 
47)  
 
As such, it follows that form: 
 
 […] possesses original properties with regard to those of the parts that 
can be detached from it. Each moment in it is determined by the 
grouping of the other moments, and their respective value depends on 
a state of total equilibrium, the formula of which is an intrinsic 
character of form. (Merleau-Ponty, [1942] 2011, p. 91) 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of form, contrary to the gestalt conception, 
which stems from the classical idea of the stimulus-reflex response, is created through 
(or, rather, emergent in) the organism’s ability to move and act coupled with its 
environment. Form, or more precisely the melding of the properties of both organism 
and environment that come to delimit the form, is emergent in the infinite possibilities 
provided by the world through the organism’s ability to move and act within it. As 
Merleau-Ponty states, the properties of the object and the intentions (actions) of the 
subject are intermingled, constituting a new, emergent whole – that he defines as 
‘form’ – which is not reducible to the sum of any of its constituent parts. This 
existential conception of form is explicated more fully in the study of modernist 
painting in his later work, Eye and Mind (1961). Crucially, for Merleau-Ponty, it is 
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the processes that constitute the emergent form (or the object depicted in a painting) 
that are the focus of analysis, processes that he identifies as crossing both the domain 
of the body of the painter as they paint (their movements and gestures) and that of the 
properties of the object as it is perceived and depicted.  
 
4.3 The painter does not ‘represent’ but ‘brings forth’ 
In placing movement and behaviour at the centre of his theory of existential 
‘stimulation’, Merleau-Ponty conceives of the task or work of painting as not to 
represent or evoke, but to ‘bring forth’. In Eye and Mind (Merleau-Ponty, [1961] 
1964, pp. 166-167), painting is seen as the process of giving a visible existence to 
what a profane vision believes is invisible: the wider processes and forces of both the 
multi-sensory body and the properties of the environment. The visual, for Merleau-
Ponty, is always open to a ‘texture of being’ that extends beyond the physical body, 
and in which the body’s discrete sensory stimulations are the punctuation point 
between those of the much wider invisible texture of the world. He declares that there 
really is an ‘inspiration’ and ‘expiration’ of being, as the creation of an artwork is a 
process of respiration in which it is impossible to distinguish between who paints and 
what is painted (Merleau-Ponty, [1961] 1964, p. 167). 
Merleau-Ponty does not conceive of the painter’s vision as a ‘physical-optical’ 
view of the outside world; the world does not appear before the artist through a 
process of representation. Rather, it is the painter to whom the things of the world 
give birth through a sort of concentration or ‘coming-to-itself’ in the visible. Through 
the activity of painting (Merleau-Ponty, [1961] 1964, pp. 179-181), a ‘coming-to-
itself’ is born in the movements and gestures of the artist as they paint. In the context 
of phenomenology, the activity of painting is portrayed in the writings of modern 
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artists such as Paul Klee and Paul Cezanne72 as rendering visible the invisible forces 
that constitute the artist’s ‘extended mind’ – that is, the forces and processes of mind 
that extend into the properties of the environment.73 
 
4.3.1 The environmental causation of painting 
Merleau-Ponty’s account of the emergent nature of depiction underpins his study of 
modern painting and is derived from his phenomenology. As such, it provides two 
key theoretical points that enable a fuller recognition of the environmental causes 
expressed in the style of other visual materials: firstly, the movement and behaviour 
of the body of the artist acts as a centre of stimulation, whose conditions are 
distributed among the wider co-dependent system comprising the body and the world; 
secondly, as a consequence, what is depicted is not a representation, but rather the 
making visible of the invisible forces and processes of a mind-body-world coupling, a 
‘bringing forth’ or the expression of a reality through the movements that generate the 
depiction of figures.  
Most importantly, this emergent conception of depiction is not limited to 
specific types of figurative art but is relevant to all artistic practices, as they are all 
                                            
 
72 For Merleau-Ponty, modernist painters were sensitive to such a situation in which the processes and 
activity of painting are caught up in the processes taking place between the body and the world. In 
citing the artist Andre Marchand, Merleau-Ponty (1964, p. 167) notes that the painter is always 
penetrated by the universe as he paints, is always buried by the world he paints, through feelings, sights 
and sounds. The mind of the painter does not lie within the boundary of the body; it is distributed: “The 
painter lives in fascination”. Such fascination seems to emanate from the things themselves. For the 
modern painter, the very gestures most proper to him seem to also emanate from the things themselves; 
they are not confined to his body, but are a part of the world itself. Merleau-Ponty cites Marchand 
(echoing Klee): “In a forest, I have felt many times over that it was not I who looked at the forest. 
Some days I felt that the trees were looking at me, were speaking to me … I was there, listening … I 
think that the painter must be penetrated by the universe and not want to penetrate it … I expect to be 
inwardly submerged, buried.” (Marchand cited in Merleau-Ponty, [1961]1964, pp. 167-168).  
73 In Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, the mind of the painter flows like air between the body and the 
world, between the subject and the object, beginning and residing in neither, as mind cannot be 
attributed to a single body, but is relational between all bodies. As he declares, the mind of the artist 
goes out beyond the body to wander among objects themselves (Merleau-Ponty, [1961] 1964, p. 166). 
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rooted in an ontology of becoming. In this sense, Merleau-Ponty focuses attention 
upon the dilemma frequently encountered in the opposition of figurative to non-
figurative art. The question, he declares, is wrongly posed – ontologically, both 
figurative and abstract art can be understood as the ‘bringing forth’ of a ‘silent being’, 
in which “[v]ision is the meeting, as at a crossroads, of all aspects of being” (Merleau-
Ponty, [1961] 1964, p. 147). An artist’s expression is always existential. Both 
figurative and non-figurative art74 (as well as any other kind of depiction), regardless 
of their socio-cultural framing the subject-matter being addressed, are ontologically 
similar, rooted in the gestures and movements of the body of the painter. 
Merleau-Ponty’s existential (non-representational) account of figuration, read 
through the work and writing of modern painters, offers an account of the activity of 
painting or figuration in which aspects (or processes) of perceptual experience can be 
traced to an external cause; they emerge from the wider processes and forces of the 
environment that the painter is immersed within in and depicting. The forces or 
causes themselves become fixed in the object depicted. Merleau-Ponty’s description 
of the environmental causes that, in part, underpin the gestures and movements of the 
painter deepens the explanation of the animation of fluttering fabrics and hair that is 
foregrounded in Michaud’s reading of Warburg’s work through the recognition that 
their depiction is in some way animated by the very environmental conditions (such 
as the wind) that are fixed in the image.  
In the wider existential phenomenological context of Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy, the animation of the fabrics and hair by the wind and other environmental 
                                            
74 In describing both abstract and figurative art, Merleau-Ponty ([1961] 1964, p. 147) declares: “[I]t is 
at once true and contradictory that no grape was ever what it is in the most figurative painting and that 
no painting, no matter how abstract, can get away from Being, that even Caravaggio’s grape is the 
grape itself”. In this respect, both figurative and non-figurative art are more in line with Warburg’s 
notion of the ‘image’ (outlined in Chapter Three); that is, as an embodiment of a way of acting within 
the world. 
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factors is understood not as the artist’s representation, but rather as the ‘making 
visible’ of the invisible environmental forces that impact on the artist’s gestures. 
Merleau-Ponty’s thinking provides a philosophical framework in which to recognise 
more fully the co-dependence of the organism (the practitioner) and the environment 
as they ‘bring forth’ a world through movement. This understanding, it is argued, has 
implications for the study of phenomenological depth in the style of a painting75 (the 
focus of the previous chapters) and of other visual materials. Crucially, Merleau-
Ponty adds to the embodied and psychological models of mind and perception 
introduced in the first three chapters – which placed the body in the context of the 
functioning of mind, perception and creative activity – the environmental conditions 
of objects and things with which the gestures of the painter or practitioner are 
intermingled.  
 
4.4 ‘Extended’ and ‘enacted’ approaches to mind 
The extended processes of mind as coupled to the environment has been widely 
discussed in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science in terms of ‘extended’ and 
‘enactive’ conceptions of mind. Whereas both these concepts recognise the 
importance of the role of the environment in the development of cognition, they differ 
in their interpretations of the body and the environment. These differences will be 
spelled out briefly in the following section, focusing on two main conditions that arise 
from such thinking: namely, (1) what constitutes the ‘mental’ – perception and 
cognition – extends beyond the boundary of both the body and, as such, the mind, and 
                                            
75 A focus that Merleau-Ponty himself adopted, particularly in his writing on the existential perceptual 
significance of the style of artists such as Cezanne and Picasso, underpinned by his earlier The 
Phenomenology of Perception (1962), and as suggested in his later study of Cezanne, Eye and Mind 
(1964). 
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thus it follows that (2) perception cannot be understood as representational (in the 
classical sense) but as emergent, ‘brought forth’ through movement and activity. 
 
4.4.1 The mind extends beyond the boundary of the skin 
Gregory Bateson ([1972] 2000), a biologist working in the field of anthropology, 
recognised in the 1970s that the boundary that is conventionally assumed to exist 
between organism and environment – that is, between an external ‘physical’ world 
and an internal ‘mental’ one – is not so absolute. According to Bateson ([1972] 2000, 
p. 460), “the world of information processing is not limited to the skin”, and in some 
cases can be regarded as an extension of a wider system of relations and processes that 
includes the material world. Drawing on ideas of epistemology and ontology put 
forward by the ‘systems theory’ of cybernetics,76 current in the mid-to-late twentieth 
century, Bateson sought to explain the behaviour and mind of man (or of any other 
organism) in terms of the totality of the larger system in which it is a part; in other 
words, “the mental characteristics of the system are immanent, not in part, but in the 
system as a whole” (Bateson, ([1972] 2000, p. 316).  
For Bateson, the mind is seen as immanent or emergent in a larger system of 
information processing which comprises an organism engaged with its environment. 
He maintains that understanding the development of the mind entails regarding the 
practitioner as a part of the larger system of relations and activity, feedback and 
response in which they work – an ‘ecology of the mind’.77 This is exemplified in his 
                                            
76 Andrew Pickering (2011) provides a survey of the ontological claims of early cybernetics, within 
which Bateson’s work is situated, revealing what he terms a ‘performative’ account of the human mind 
as opposed to the conventional cognitive model informed by the rise of cognitive science, which 
brought about a move from cybernetics to artificial intelligence. Pickering (2011, p. 25) offers a 
‘performative ontology’ for re-conceiving the human and reality, in which we can come to think of 
“[c]ybernetics as staging for us a performative epistemology, directly engaged with its performative 
ontology – a vision of knowledge as part of performance rather than as an external controller of it”. 
77 Bateson (2011, p. 25) believes the totality of the system is conventionally eschewed in the commonly 
understood notion of ‘self’. A person may believe, he claims, that “I cut down the tree”, that they are 
the delimited agent who performed an act upon a delimited object. However, he contends that this 
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explanation of the system of processes that constitute the activity of a man felling a 
tree with an axe: 
 
Consider a man felling a tree with an axe. Each stroke of the axe is 
modified or corrected, according to the shape of the cut face of the tree 
left by the previous stroke. This self-corrective (i.e., mental) process is 
brought about by a total system, tree-eyes-brain-muscles-axe-stroke-
tree; and it is this total system that has the characteristics of immanent 
mind. (Bateson, [1972] 2000, p. 317) 
 
The processes involved in the mind of a practitioner, such as perception and 
cognition, are therefore immanent in a total system of relations (or wider network of 
processes) involving the organism and the material world. As such, Bateson declares, 
the mind should not be defined as an information processor that exists solely within 
the boundary of a practitioner’s head, but rather as partially constituted by processes 
that extend into the material world by way of the organism’s engagement with its 
environment. Bateson (1972] 2000, p. 317) designates the organism as comprising the 
processes of a “person plus environment”. The organism is part of an organism-
environment system, maintained through the movement and feedback of information 
that occurs throughout the system as a holistic entity, triggering the organism’s ‘self 
corrective’ (or mental) processes that are ‘brought forth’ through such an engagement.  
The later work of the philosopher Andy Clark (1997, 1998, 2008) is 
influenced by the systems approach; he further extrapolates from Bateson’s notion of 
‘person plus environment’. Under the umbrella term of the ‘extended mind’, Clark 
and Chalmers’ ([1998] 2010, pp. 30-31) hypothesis describes the active processes of 
mind and cognition as external to the material functioning of the body engaged with 
the environment. Focusing on bringing the functioning of brain, body and world 
                                                                                                                             
belief is misleading; it maintains the false separation of the internal mental processes from the physical 
external world. This ‘false belief’ is outlined further by contemporary anthropology (Malafouris, 2008), 
which perceives it as a conflation of agency and ownership. 
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together, they foreground the unconscious information processes of mind and 
cognition as extending into the environment through situated actions, giving the 
example of a fish as a ‘swimming device’: 
 
The extraordinary efficiency of the fish as a swimming device is partly 
due, it now seems, to an evolved capacity to couple its swimming 
behaviors to the pools of external kinetic energy found as swirls, 
eddies, and vortices in its watery environment … These vortices 
include both naturally occurring ones (e.g., where water hits a rock) 
and self-induced ones (created by well-timed tail flaps). The fish 
swims by building these externally occurring processes into the very 
heart of its locomotion routines. The fish and surrounding vortices 
together constitute a unified and remarkably efficient swimming 
machine. (Clark and Chalmers, [1998] 2010, p. 32) 
 
What Clark and Chalmers term ‘active externalism’ describes how an 
organism functionally ‘exploits’ external processes (both naturally occurring and 
induced through movement) in its (semi-autonomous) routines and functioning; the 
processes of its mind extend into the environment from the central point of an 
exploitative brain that assimilates the environment according its needs. By treating the 
brain as a dynamic system, Clark (2008, p. 102) situates it in a complex coupling, that 
includes complementary bodily and environmental processes, to arrive at a 
computational understanding of the mind. Expanding on this description of the human 
mind, he illustrates how the organism uses objects in the external environment 
(including language) as cognitive extensions; the plastic brain develops in a way that 
is complementary to the external structures that play a functional role in a unified and 
densely coupled ‘information-processing’ system (Clark, 2008, p. 32).  
The coupling of the development of cognition (the plastic brain) with the 
external structures of the environment gives the body a specific role as a tool through 
which the environmental structures themselves are assimilated (though feedback 
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loops in the flow of information) into the functioning of cognition. For Clark and 
Chalmers, the environment constitutes part of cognition when it is coupled to the 
plastic brain, via the instrument of the body, in the right way for the organism’s 
activities. In this sense, it acts as an extension of the information-processing functions 
of higher-level cognition: 
 
The body is the primary tool for the intelligent use of the 
environmental structures … and acts as the mobile bridge that allows 
us to use the external world in ways that simplify and transform 
internal problem-solving. The body is thus the go-between linking 
these two different (internal and external) sets of key information-
processing resources. The body’s role in such cases is that of an 
instrument enabling the emergence of a new kind of information-
processing organization (Clark, 2008, p. 23) 
 
Clark and Chalmers’ model of extended cognition, derived from systems 
theory, describes a functional, higher-level information-processing system that 
assimilates the environment through identifying with the body at a purely functional 
level. However, this focus on higher-level functioning and information-processing not 
only idealises the phenomenological aspects of the body, neglecting crucial bodily-
based, multi-sensory processes, such as those described in the first three chapters, but 
also idealises the environment. As described earlier, in relation to Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology, the environment speaks through the phenomenology of the body – 
properties are ‘brought forth’ not by the organism for it to assimilate, but together 
with the organism through its movement in, and engagement with, the world. The 
environment does not stand before the organism, waiting to be assimilated; it emerges 
along with the organism’s own activities. 
In the field of the philosophy of mind, Stapleton and Thompson (2008), in 
particular, question the functionalism of Clark’s extended mind theory, aligning it 
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with traditional (disembodied) cognitive science in the way that it separates the 
phenomenological body from the processes of cognition. Stewart, Gapenne and Di 
Paolo (2010) approach Clark’s contention head on, describing the articulation 
between ‘low-level’ embodiments (such as emotion) and ‘high-level’ cognitive 
processes through a reformulation of the paradigm of the first generation of cognitive 
scientists in terms of the philosophical theories of phenomenology and ‘enactive 
models’ of cognition and mind. Enactive models of mind are useful for the 
development of the current discussion in two crucial respects: not only do they 
recognise the importance of the phenomenological body in the study of cognition, but 
they also understand the role the environment plays as emerging alongside (and 
actively shaping) cognition and mind, as opposed to comprising a separate, purely 
functional domain of information that is assimilated by the organism. 
 
4.4.2 The enactive mind 
Enactive approaches to mind (Hutchins, 2010; Thompson, 2007; Varela et al., 1993) 
follow the philosophical lineage of thought that begins with the work of cellular 
biologists Francisco Varela and Humberto Maturana (1979). This approach does not 
start from the question of whether cognitive processes extend beyond the boundary of 
the brain or the body (as active externalism suggests), but from the question of how a 
system is organised to sustain its own activity and ‘bring forth’ its own cognitive 
domain (Stapleton and Thompson, 2008). There is no hard and fast dividing line 
between internal and external per se; there is, rather, a self-sustaining system of 
relations. According to the enactive conception of mind in cognitive science, 
cognition and perception are grounded in the sense-making (phenomenological) 
activity of autonomous agents, which are ‘autopoietically’ coupled to an environment, 
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and which actively generate and sustain themselves as part of a larger system of 
relations, enacting (or ‘bringing forth’) their own domains of meaning and value 
(Thompson, 2007; Varela et al., 1991).  
According to Stapleton and Thompson’s (2008) summary of Valera’s position, 
an autonomous system comprises an organism and its environment, which are 
recursively dependent on each other for their generation and realisation as a network; 
furthermore, this network constitutes a system that both acts as a unit in whatever 
domain it exists and determines its domain of possible interactions with the world. 
Varela’s collaborative work with Maturana (1979) in cognitive science during the late 
twentieth century led him to the premise that an organism’s mind is an emergent 
property that is relational, being situated in a wider system involving both the 
organism and the environment. In such a system of relations, cognition, perception 
and environment emerge together, reciprocally, through the movement of the 
organism coupled to the environment. Varela’s enacted conception of mind (Varela et 
al., 1993) is founded on the notion of a cellular autopoietic system (Maturana and 
Varela, 1979) that is defined not by its individual components (as separate ontological 
or epistemological entities) but by the processes and relations between its 
components.  
It is within the wider processes (or relations) of the autopoietic system that 
both the properties of the environment – what Varela calls ‘features’ – and the mind 
of the organism emerge together through the movement and activity of the organism: 
 
An autopoietic system is organized (defined as a unity) as a network of 
processes of production (transformation and destruction) of 
components that through their interactions and transformations 
continuously regenerate and realise the network of processes 
(relations) that produce them; and constitute it (the machine) as a 
concrete unity in the space in which they exist by specifying the 
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topological domain of its realization as such a network. (Maturana and 
Varela, [1979] 1980, p. 13) 
 
Valera understands an autopoietic system as a network of components and processes 
that reciprocally constitute each other through the constant self-organisation of the 
system as a whole (fig. 4). Raised to the level of a multi-cellular organism, what this 
system is able to do is structured by the abilities of the organism and its nervous 
system. The properties or features of the environment emerge – or as Varela terms it, 
are ‘enacted’ – out of the infinite possibilities for action that comprise the organism’s 
world; they are brought into being through its actions, and are also de-limited by the 
scope of its innate abilities. The enacted features of the environment, in turn, limit the 
(further) possible movements and actions of the organism, restructuring the 
organism’s possibilities for action, and thus the system continues to self-organise. For 
Maturana and Varela, an organism’s actions, abilities and mind, together with the 
properties of the environment, emerge or are enacted reciprocally, as a part of the 
self-organising autopoietic system. Crucially, neither the organism nor the features of 
the organism’s environment can exist outside of this reciprocity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. An autopoietic system (Maturana and Varela, 1998 p. 180) 
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Notions of the extended mind (Clark, 2008; Clark and Chalmers, 1998) point 
to the importance of aspects of the environment only in as much as they can be 
functionally assimilated into the cognitive architecture of the organism; this 
environment is perceived to comprise the external processes that are part of a 
cognitive process that is rooted (primarily) in the plasticity of the brain. In contrast, 
enactive approaches, as Stapleton and Thompson (2008) illustrate, do not see 
cognition as an event that first happens inside an organism’s head before extending 
outwards, but as a relational process that emerges from the relations between the 
organism as a whole and its environment. Crucially, rather than being assimilated into 
a cognitive system, the features of the environment are enacted along with cognition 
as part of an autopoietic system through the movement of the organism (in a 
phenomenological sense) coupled with the environment. Cognition, action and 
environment thus emerge reciprocally – the features of the environment, in this sense, 
are always in a reciprocal enaction of the mind.  
 
4.4.3 Non-representational or enactive perception 
The enactive account of mind has implications for the understanding of perception, 
which is also positioned as emergent in a self-organising organism-environment 
coupling. The enactive approach shows that the embodied perceiving subject does not 
simply represent the world they see as they stand before it, nor is their perception 
‘extended’, in Clark and Chalmers’ (2008) sense. Perception is ‘enacted’: it emerges 
through movement and activity and is, crucially, non-representational. In situating the 
development of mind in the relational processes of a self-organising autopoietic 
system, Varela (1993) proposes a model of ‘enactive perception’ that is underpinned 
by the movement of the organism coupled, autopoietically, with the ongoing 
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development (or enaction) of the environment. Varela’s model of enactive perception 
is philosophically grounded in Merleau-Ponty’s account of existential stimulation78 
outlined earlier. Varela (1993, pp. 173-174) speculates that perception, cognition and 
environment emerge together, reciprocally, through the movement and action of the 
organism; they are ‘brought forth’ in the relational processes and components that 
constitute the autonomous or autopoietic system. 
Varela (1993, p. 174) maintains that perception is not embedded in, or 
constrained by, the surrounding world; rather, it contributes to the very enactment of 
the surrounding world. The organism both initiates and is shaped by the environment; 
they are bound together in a reciprocal activity of specification and selection. The 
organism’s perception and the environment are both enacted, ‘brought forth’ through 
the movement and activity of the organism coupled with its environment. Varela’s 
concept of enactive perception consists of two central points: perception consists of 
perceptually guided action, and cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent 
sensory-motor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided.79 The movement 
of the body in the world structures and guides both perception and cognition, which 
enact the environment through their interaction with it. In this sense, environmental 
features, perception and mind are enacted (or emerge) together, and the features or 
                                            
78 Varela cites Merleau-Ponty ([1942] 2011, p. 13) as follows: “The properties of the object and the 
intentions of the subject ... are not only intermingled: they constitute a new whole. When the eye and 
the ear follow an animal in flight, it is impossible to say ‘which started first’ in the exchange of stimuli 
and responses. Since all movements of the organism are always conditioned by external influences, one 
can, if one wishes, readily treat behaviour as an effect of the milieu.”   
79 Varela demonstrates ‘perceptual guidance by action’ in his discussion of Held and Hein’s kitten 
study, in which: “[they] raised kittens in the dark and exposed them to light only under controlled 
conditions. A first group of animals were allowed to move around normally, but each of them was 
harnessed to a simple carriage and basket that contained a number of the second group of animals. The 
two groups therefore shared the same visual experience, but the second group was entirely passive. 
When the animals were released after a few weeks of this treatment, the first group of kittens behaved 
normally, but those who had been carried around behaved as if they were blind: they bumped into 
objects and fell over edges” (Varela et al., 1993, p. 175). 
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properties of the (infinitely possible) world are ‘brought forth’ or enacted through the 
perceptual guidance of action.  
Reframing Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical insights in biological terms, Varela 
recognises that all ‘stimulations’ (sensory-motor patterns) are only possible through 
the movement of the phenomenological body as autopoietically coupled with the 
environment. As such, what is termed ‘visual’ perception can be more fully 
understood as perceptually guided by the action and movement of the entire body 
coupled with the emerging world – that is, it is embodied, and this body is itself 
coupled with the environment. Varela’s work provides a vital, ‘non-representational’ 
account of enactive visual perception, as opposed to the ‘representational’ 
psychological accounts of Gombrich and Arnheim outlined in Chapter Two. As 
Varela (1993, p. 175) says, “objects are not seen through the process of a visual 
extraction of features of a pre-existing world, but rather as (virtual) ‘features’ of the 
world which are enacted by the perceptual guidance of action”. What is perceived is 
not ‘recovered’ or ‘retrieved’ from an external world, but is emergent; it is structured 
and guided by the actions and movements of a body that is reciprocally coupled with 
the environment.  
The emergent or enactive character of visual perception is described at length 
in the work of the philosopher Alva Noë (Noë and Thompson, 2010; Noë, 2004), who 
describes the sensory-motor action of the body as functioning within visual perception 
itself. For Noë (2004, p. 1), perception is not “something that happens to us, or in us. 
It is something we do … The world makes itself available to the perceiver through 
physical movement and interaction … we enact our perceptual experience; we act it 
out”. Noë focuses on visual perception, arguing that vision is rooted in the sensory-
motor contingencies underpinning the body’s ability to act, and it is through these 
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contingencies that what is perceived in the world is enacted. Noë’s enactive account 
of perception draws on a number of traditions in the fields of philosophy (Merleau-
Ponty, 1948, 1962), psychology (Gibson, 1979) and cognitive science (Varela et al. 
1991), which emphasise perception as an activity and focus on the touch-like 
(sensory-motor) character of vision. 
Working within the domain of neuroscience, Noë (2004, pp. 36-40) recognises 
the limited capacity of the physical structure of the eye to experience the richness and 
detail of the world: the eye’s ‘saccade’ motion (shifting focus two or three times a 
second), the blood vessels and nerves positioned in front of the retina’s receptors, 
colour blindness in the parafoveal region and numerous blind spots are all inhibiting 
factors. For Noë (2004, pp. 117-118), visual perception is therefore dependent on the 
sensory-motor knowledge of the entire body acting in the world – a knowledge that is 
practical, based on what it is possible to do, rather than purely propositional. The 
unattended or occluded details of our visual experience are ‘perceptually present’ 
exactly because we have a sensory-motor experience of the environment around us. 
Giving the example of a cat sitting behind a fence, Noë (2004, p. 60) asks: “You have 
a sense of the presence of the cat even though, strictly speaking, you only see those 
parts of the cat that show through the fence. How is it that we can in this way enjoy a 
perceptual experience of the whole cat?” Rather than giving the conventional answer 
to the question, according to a science of the image, that the brain fills in the gaps, 
Noë argues that such perceptually rich detail in the experience of the world is 
‘perceptually present’ precisely because of the sensory-motor abilities and knowledge 
of an enacted perception: 
 
The detail is present – the perceptual world is present – in the sense 
that we have a special kind of access to the detail, an access controlled 
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by patterns of sensory-motor dependence with which we are familiar. 
(Noë, 2004, p. 67) 
 
The details or content of perceptual experience, according to Noë, are 
‘virtual’, by which he means that the unseen environmental details (such as the far 
side of a tomato, the occluded portions of a cat behind a fence, those parts of the 
world that are hidden to the eye by its blind spots) are present virtually, in the sense 
that they are experienced through a skill-based sensory-motor perception that goes 
beyond visual stimuli alone. As these features are present through a sensory-motor 
experience, they have a perceptual presence as being ‘available’ rather than 
represented or ‘filled in’ by the processes of the brain.  
The enactive conceptions of mind and perception surveyed above have 
implications for an understanding of how visual materials such as a painting ‘come to 
mean’ within a non-representational ontology. An enactive approach to mind sees the 
relationship of the movement of the embodied artist with the development of the 
image, not as a matter of ‘distributed’ or ‘extended’ causes, but rather what Warburg 
calls the ‘image’ is itself enacted along with the mind, perception and environment as 
the painter paints, ‘bringing forth’ a world through the very activity of painting. 
Returning briefly to Merleau-Ponty (1964), we can see that when an artist depicts a 
figure (or form), they are ‘making visible’ the invisible forces between their multi-
sensory body and the wider texture of the environment as they paint – an 
intermingling of bodily intentions (actions) and environmental properties. In this 
respect, it cannot be maintained that the image is purely the result of a representation 
of the world in the mind of the artist who stands before it, assimilating it into the 
mind’s functioning, but as a measure or trace of the movement and activity that 
‘brings forth’ the emergence or enaction of an entire multi-sensory reality, 
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intermingled with the (reciprocally emergent) properties or features of the 
environment.  
 
4.5 The ‘enactive image’ 
The study of how an image’s meaning is held in the traces of the bodily and 
environmental processes that underpin its creation is well represented in the domains 
of anthropology and cognitive archaeology. In contemporary social and cultural 
anthropology, Ingold ([2000] 2010), for example, has questioned the inherent 
ideology underpinning modern Western thinking80 regarding the study of images, 
rejecting the notion held across many academic disciplines81 that depictions are the 
product of a symbolic (representational) reflection expressed in painting.82 For Ingold, 
who espouses the writing of thinkers such as Bateson (1979), Merleau-Ponty (1961) 
and Deleuze (1981), human creative activity is not separate from the natural 
environment; there is no division between the ‘ecology’ of the environment and the 
‘art’ of a practitioner, they are intertwined.83 Ingold ([2000] 2010, p. 130) argues that 
                                            
80 Ingold’s reference to what he terms ‘modern thought’, situated in his wider thinking, follows the 
tradition of ‘actor-network theory’, which is more fully explained by a survey of the work of Bruno 
Latour. In We Have Never Been Modern (1992), Latour reveals how modernity arises directly out of a 
bifurcation of nature, which he defines as the two great divides of modern thinking: (1) the absolute 
separation of human culture from non-human nature, and (2) the absolute separation of present 
(modern man) from past (primitive man). This bifurcation Latour believes forms the ‘constitution’ of 
modern thought. According to Latour, this ‘modern constitution’ arises primarily out of the sense of the 
sharp separation of nature and (human) culture, and out of the forms of knowledge they produce: 
nature gives rise to science, the knowledge of how things are in themselves; culture produces the social 
sciences and the discourses of morality, politics, psychology, etc. (Connor, 2004, p. 7). This modern 
split thus carves the world up into distinct human subjects and non-human mechanical objects (Harmon, 
2010, p. 62). 
81 This conventional view is seen in the disciplines of archaeology, anthropology and art history and 
theory (Ingold, [2000] 2010, p. 111). 
82 This belief is maintained through the maintenance of the axiom of the separation of nature and 
culture that finds its source in Western modernity (Ingold [2000] 2010, p. 111). 
83 Alfred North Whitehead refers to the ‘bifurcation of nature’ when speaking of such a division 
between nature and culture – that is, the separation of an internal metaphysical world from an external 
physical world. This was the philosophical and scientific landscape during the modern period, which 
demanded that nature be understood in terms of two systems of reality (Whitehead, [1920] 2004, pp. 
30-1). One comprised entities such as electrons, which are the subjects of physical science, a reality 
that is there to ‘know’. The other was the reality of the mind, which produces the awareness of physical 
nature, its metaphysical representation. The meeting point of these two realities was the mind. This 
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the axiomatic division of human activity and environment, held across many 
discourses in the humanities, rests upon a dualism between culture and nature, which 
in turn rests upon the modern conviction that a work of art is proof of a uniquely 
human capacity for expression and creativity. 
Ingold ([2000] 2010, p. 112) maintains that once the axiomatic views of 
Western modernity – in particular the reliance on representational models of 
perception, cognition and artefacts – are challenged, ‘representational art’ can “be 
understood as ways not of representing the world of immediate experience on a 
higher, more ‘symbolic’ plane, but of probing more deeply into it and of discovering 
the significance that lies therein”. Drawing, carving, painting and depicting are, for 
Ingold, not a matter of representing a world, but a process of perceptually ‘thinking’ a 
world through the very activity of depiction itself, as part of a wider developmental 
system involving practitioner, materials and environment. As such, Ingold describes a 
depiction as an emerging understanding between body, perception and the world that 
is acquired through an ongoing developmental practice that is interwoven with the 
environment. The depiction cannot be separated from the environmentally embedded 
developmental practice through which it is produced. 
The study of a depiction as emergent within an environmentally embedded 
developmental practice takes us to the heart of what has been termed ‘material 
engagement theory’ (MET) (Knappett and Malafouris, 2008; Malafouris, 2007, 2010, 
2013) in contemporary cognitive archaeology. This theory aims to “provide an 
integrated archaeological perspective concerned with the interactions through time 
between cognition and material culture” (Malafouris, 2013, p. 35). It attempts to re-
                                                                                                                             
bifurcation separates facts of knowledge (concerning external nature) discovered by science from 
subjective internal representations caused by the facts of external nature: for example, the perception of 
a fire’s colour and warmth, on the one hand, and the molecules and electrons that caused the feeling, on 
the other (p. 32). 
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introduce the material aspects of the development of human cognition, specifically 
movement and activity in the material world, into the study of the development of the 
human mind. Malafouris’ approach is of particular importance in this regard as it is 
underpinned by two central theoretical tenets concerning human cognition and 
creative activity: the incorporation of enactive models of mind and cognition into the 
study of archaeological artefacts, and the recognition of the agency of materials (the 
material properties of rock, clay and cultural artefacts) in the development of 
cognition through movement and activity. 
Applying MET to the study of symbolic depictions (such as Palaeolithic 
imagery), Malafouris (2007, 2013) posits that before and beyond any 
‘representational’ act, the activity of depiction itself (as a developmental practice) 
‘brings forth’ a world at the same time as perceptually thinking it. Critically, in 
moving beyond a representational model of depiction and incorporating enacted 
models of mind drawn from contemporary cognitive science and the philosophy of 
mind,84 Malafouris focuses on two aspects in the study of an enacted depiction. First, 
the very activity of creating cultural artefacts both precedes and follows the ‘bringing 
forth’ of a new way of perceiving, thinking and acting.85 Secondly, this ‘performative’ 
ontology of the image or depiction should be understood as a ‘platform’ for 
perception and cognition to reflect and gradually come to terms with themselves. 
Malafouris (2007, 2013) terms the processes that underpin an enacted conception of 
depiction – how such a depiction ‘comes to mean’ – as ‘enactive signification’.  
 
                                            
84 In particular, the work of Francisco Varela (1979, 1993), Alva Noë (2004) and Rodney Brooks 
(1991)  
85 Malafouris utilises the thinking of Daniel Dennett. His notion of ‘active visual thinking’ proceeds 
from the concept of a two-way ontological process of tool use and intelligence provided by Dennett. 
Tool use is a two-way sign of intelligence – not only does it require intelligence to recognise and 
maintain a tool (let alone fabricate one), but a tool confers intelligence on those lucky enough to be 
given one (Dennett cited in Malafouris, 2007, pp. 99-100). 
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4.5.1 Enactive signification 
It is important to clarify that Malafouris’ (2010) enacted conception of a depiction 
takes a neuro-archaeological approach,86 studying a depiction in terms of the traces of 
the development of neurological, biological and cognitive structures, and the abilities 
of the plastic brain that leaves its ‘signature’ in the archaeological object under 
investigation. This neuro-archaeological approach underpins Malafouris’ model of 
‘enactive signification’, and allows him to suggest that the activity of drawing or 
painting should be seen more as an active ‘probing’ or ‘bringing forth’ of a world, 
which emerges (or is enacted) through the very activity of probing, and which 
includes the material world. 
Within such an enactive framework, depictions are understood, not as 
representing a world of immediate experience to be read on a ‘higher-level’ symbolic 
plane of cognition, but as ‘bringing forth’ a world through an emergent sensory-motor 
engagement with it, leading to the emergence of a symbol – an activity of ‘perceptual 
learning’. By foregrounding the processes of dynamic sensory-motor engagement in 
the study of depictions (in reference to Palaeolithic images), Malafouris is able to 
declare that before and beyond any representational act (the fixing of an image as a 
symbolic artefact) there is the ‘bringing forth’ of a way of acting and being in the 
world that is simultaneous with thinking about it: 
 
[B]efore and beyond representation, they first ‘bring forth’ a new 
process of acting within this world and at the same time as thinking 
                                            
86 Malafouris (2010) describes how the emerging field of ‘neuroarchaeology’ has taken the recent 
developments in brain and cognitive sciences and applied them to the study of human artefacts in 
archaeology, recognising that they provide a better understanding of the visible traces and signatures of 
the development of biological and neurological structures found within such artefacts. Malafouris’ 
(2010, p. 49) approach, in particular, focuses on “questions and problems that emerge at the interface 
between brain and culture over the long-term developmental trajectories of human becoming. 
Neuroarchaeology aims at constructing an analytical bridge between brain and culture by putting 
material culture, embodiment, time and long-term change at center stage in the study of mind.”  
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about it. This thinking however, should not be understood – at least not 
in the first instance- as that of ‘higher level’ abstract symbolic type. 
This thinking should be understood in the more basic ‘lower’ sense, 
namely as a new form of active sensory-motor engagement. … It 
should be understood as a new form of perceptual learning on a par 
with the ‘bringing forth’ or ‘bringing out’ of a figure by embellishing 
the natural formation of the rock. Or, alternatively, a practice-induced 
change in the human ability to perform certain ‘unnatural’ perceptual 
tasks. (Malafouris, 2007, p. 295) 
 
In moving beyond the privileging of a symbolic ‘higher’ level, in the first instance, to 
a ‘lower’ level of sensory-motor engagement (as theorised by Noë), Malafouris (2007, 
p. 295) reveals two important implications for the study of how depictions such as 
those of Palaeolithic imagery ‘come to mean’: firstly, seeing and perceiving are a 
form of skilful active engagement, of acting in and ‘bringing forth’ a world, and 
secondly, the role of a depiction is that of a “continuous prosthetic part of this probing 
mechanism and thus a cultural extension of the visual brain”.  
To demonstrate the study of a depiction as a ‘signature’ or trace of the 
development of ongoing biological, neurological and cognitive abilities, Malafouris 
provides a reading of a selection of Palaeolithic imagery – depictions of a rhinoceros 
from the caves of Chauvin and Lascaux (fig. 4a) – demonstrating how these images 
can be understood as a prosthetic part or a ‘signature’ of the ‘bringing forth’ of a 
world. The depiction itself provides a ‘scaffolding device’ to enable human cognition 
and perception to gradually become aware of themselves – that is, to think 
perceptually through sensory-motor engagement. Malafouris demonstrates the 
capacity of a depiction to be both a trace of the development of human cognition and 
a ‘platform’ for the ongoing development of cognition through tracing the basic 
gestalt patterns, such as similarity and proximity, found in early cave art (fig. 4a). The 
presence of these visual gestalts in images of this kind can be understood, from a 
neuroarchaeological standpoint, as a ‘signature’ of the development of the underlying 
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mechanisms of a dynamic and emergent model of human perception and cognition 
during that period, a ‘signature’ that gradually becomes transformed into an object for 
perception and contemplation through the process or activity of depiction itself – what 
Malafouris sees as a process of ‘active visual thinking’.  
  
         
Figure 4a has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
 
The revelation of these gestalt patterns in Palaeolithic imagery requires a shift in 
focus from the representational conception of what the image means symbolically to 
that of the ‘activity of imaging’ itself, asking how it ‘comes to mean’. Malafouris 
(2007, p. 299) studies the processes that underlie how an image ‘comes to mean’ 
through tracing the images’ most salient perceptual and cognitive features or gestalts, 
providing new epistemic access to the development of the perceptual and cognitive 
architecture, the material extension, of the visual brain.  
Malafouris believes what he calls ‘enactive signification’ is part of the 
ongoing development of the system of neurological, biological and cognitive abilities. 
This theoretical understanding provides a contemporary enacted approach to depiction 
that moves beyond its study as a symbolic representation to a fuller recognition of an 
image as the emergence of the salient features, in visual form, of distributed ongoing 
and developmental processes that extend across an organism-environment system. 
Malafouris’ enactive signification provides a strategy – an enacted model of mind and 
perception that focuses on tracing the processes that underlie a depiction’s 
development – by which to understand a depiction as ‘coming to mean’. Crucially, 
Malafouris’ (2007, pp. 298-289) enacted approach focuses attention on how an image 
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‘comes to mean’ (prior to becoming a symbol), rather than what it means on a ‘higher’ 
symbolic level, thus revealing the processes or stages of an image’s emergence within 
a wider enacted developmental system.  
 Malafouris’ (2007, 2013) theory of the enactive development of depictions 
has four key stages that are particularly pertinent for the rest of this thesis:  
 (1) Formation: a dynamic form of active sensory-motor engagement (including the 
agency of the environment) that emerges through the very activity of depiction itself, 
which becomes ‘fixed’ in the image produced. 
 (2) Reception: the image created as an object (or ‘platform’) for perceptual 
contemplation to become aware of itself by experiencing its salient gestalt features 
through its dissemination in the wider culture. 
 (3) Extension: the emergence of a new enacted visual intelligence, a new way of 
acting in the world, built upon this ‘platform’ through the experience and perceptual 
contemplation of the image. 
 (4) Further extension: the new way of acting in the world becomes ‘fixed’ in a new 
activity of formation (in images), built upon the new (enacted) visual intelligence. 
 The cycle then repeats itself. 
 
4.5.2 Enactive depiction 
The anthropological and archaeological perspectives of Ingold and Malafouris 
provide an enactive account of depiction that analyses more fully how a depiction 
‘comes to mean’ in the activities of the practitioner coupled with the environment. 
There are two points for reflection that can be derived from these approaches that are 
particular pertinent to the current study, which, while allowing for a more focused 
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discussion of the role of the phenomenological body and the environment in the study 
of the creation of images and other visual materials, require further attention.  
First, Malafouris’ concept of enacted signification provides a valuable 
approach for the further study of a depiction as emergent within, and impacting on, 
the development of the enacted cognition of the artist or practitioner who, coupled 
with the emergent properties or features of the environment, creates the work. This 
approach also enables a discussion, central to this thesis, in which the depiction 
created is also experienced by, and implicated in the development of, other enacted 
minds. In this respect, the enacted account of depiction offered by Malafouris can also 
be extended to include an ‘active’ perceiver of the depiction (as argued in the first 
three chapters) as a reciprocal interaction and modification. In this sense, the 
depiction is studied as a part of a self-organising enactive system that always includes 
other enactive minds, including that of the inquirer who co-constructs what is being 
studied, bringing to bear a historically contingent way of acting within the world that 
re-shapes what is being experienced. 
Secondly, enactive signification provides a framework in which other 
important dimensions of the phenomenological body, which this thesis argues 
underpin the processes of figuration, can be investigated: the multi-sensory, 
imaginary and experiential. As Varela’s (1993) account of perceptual guidance by 
action shows, visual perception can be understood in such a framework as enacted in 
the movement of the body. However, Varela (1993, p. 175) describes enacted 
perception primarily in terms of a visual bias, declaring: “Objects are not seen 
through the process of a visual extraction of features of a pre-existing world, but 
rather as (virtual) ‘features’ of the world which are enacted by the perceptual 
guidance of action”. Although Malafouris’ work uses an enacted model of mind 
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drawn from contemporary cognitive science (primarily, the work of Varela and Noë), 
it does inherits the visual hegemony of cognitive science. Its focus on the movement 
of the body as underpinning the development of human cognition, however, 
highlights the importance of a multi-sensory enacted experience, and this is the 
subject of the remainder of the chapter. 
 
4.6 The multi-sensory ‘enactive figure’  
As argued earlier in this chapter, Merleau-Ponty ([1961] 1964, p. 164) demonstrates 
in his work, Eye and Mind, that he fully recognises the ideological recourse to the 
visual: for him, the word ‘image’ is tainted by the modern belief that a drawing is a 
tracing or copy, and that the image behind such a drawing belongs among the artist’s 
private mental ‘bric-a-brac’. According to Merleau-Ponty, the painter’s activities give 
a visible existence to what is believed to be invisible: sound, touch, taste, gravity, 
energy and air. He declares that the eye lives in the multi-dimensional, multi-sensory 
‘texture’ of reality (p.166), in which no one sense modality can be privileged. In this 
view, painting is a making visible of multi-sensory and multi-dimensional invisible 
environmental energies.87 The ‘mental image’, argues Merleau-Ponty, is of the same 
order: it too must be multi-sensory, making visible the wider texture of the existential 
and multi-sensory human experience that constitutes it. 
Highlighting this element of Merleau-Ponty’s writings adds an overlooked 
multi-sensory aspect to Varela’s (1993, p. 175) ‘perceptual guidance by action’, itself 
inspired by Merleau-Ponty. By maintaining that all stimulations are only possible 
                                            
87 Merleau-Ponty’s Eye and Mind can be seen as an extension of his earlier work The Visible and the 
Invisible, in which he builds an ontology of being that was inspired by the philosophy of Henri Bergson 
(1911). In this ontology, matter is seen as neither wholly physical nor wholly metaphysical, neither 
mind nor substance. Instead, Merleau-Ponty speaks of the visible as being the manifestation of 
everything that is invisible, a removal from the metaphysics of substance to the metaphysics of process 
and force. This idea became the central focus of Deleuze’s (2004) process-orientated ‘material-force’ 
ontology, which was also inspired by Bergson’s writing. 
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through the movement of the body, Varela’s concept of enacted perception can be 
rethought: visual perception is always guided and supported by the action and 
movement of the whole multi-sensory body coupled with the world. If perception is 
guided and structured by the movement of the body coupled with the world, then 
visual perception is also structured by the rest of the multi-sensory body – that is, by 
the entire multi-sensory enacted dimension of experience. Such a re-working of 
Varela’s thinking, situated in a re-reading of Merleau-Ponty, provides a wider 
philosophical context for his enacted model of perception, in which ‘objects’ can be 
understood as perceived, not through the visual extraction of features of a pre-existing 
world, but through features of the world that are enacted by the multi-sensory 
perceptual guidance of action. 
 
4.6.1: From figuration to the ‘figural’ 
Merleau-Ponty’s work has been extended in the writing of Deleuze ([1981] 2003), in 
particular. Developing Merleau-Ponty’s survey of modernist art, Deleuze suggests 
that the act of painting for artists such as Millet, Cezanne, Bacon and Van Gogh was, 
in some respects, the process of capturing ‘energetic’ forces. This represents, for 
Deleuze, the elementary task of painting itself: to render visible invisible forces (pp. 
56-57). Painting, for Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty, is not the visual extraction of 
features that pre-exist within the environment, but the rendering visible of invisible, 
multi-sensory features that emerges through the very process of painting. For 
Deleuze, painting is not a representational act, it does not narrate or illustrate, it is a 
process of multi-sensory and multi-dimensional becoming. 
Deleuze’s formulation of modern painting leads to a rejection of 
representational notions of figuration, found primarily within the study of art history, 
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that remain within the realms of the illustrative and narrative. As Daniel W. Smith 
(1997, pp. 41-42) makes clear, the term figuration tends toward the relating of the 
image either to an object that it supposedly illustrates, focusing upon what is 
recognizable losing the immediacy of sensation that is expressed within, or to the 
images relation with other images in the painting, revealing narrative links between 
images. Deleuze ([1981] 2003, p. 3-5) instead insists on the concept of the ‘figural’, 
following Francis Bacon, based upon the premise that the painting is always a 
sensation, an affective expression of an environment as expressed through a 
phenomenological body rendered visible through movement. The ‘figural’ is not a 
representation of an object, narratively or illustratively, as an extraction from the 
environment, but rather an expression, or capturing, a bringing forth of certain forces 
of the object itself rendered visible within the figure. The figurative functions at the 
level of that which is already known, the ‘figural’ is the production of worlds 
(O’Sullivan, 2010, p. 255). 
Deleuze’s concept of the ‘figural’ involves not the study of figures with other 
figures but the multi-sensory becoming of the figure captured within the paint, a study 
of what can be done with paint on its own terms. Deleuze reveals the visible rendering 
of forces within painting as not exclusively of the visual; within the writing of 
Cézanne, painting has the task of “rendering visible the folding force of the 
mountains, the germinating force of the seed, the thermal force of the landscape” (p. 
57), and as he saw with Van Gogh, it was even a matter of inventing forces to be 
rendered, such as the forces of the germination of a seed. Where Deleuze suggests 
that ‘figural’ is most evident within more abstract painting (particularly that of 
Francis Bacon) ([1981], 2004, p. 11), he reveals how more classical painting can also 
be read on similar terms through the works of painters such as Giotto and El Greco. 
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Particularly within the work of Millet, Deleuze (ibid) finds that what was important 
for the artist was not the depiction of the figurative content itself – the peasant 
carrying a sack of potatoes or a pile of brushwood (fig. 4b) – but the more profound, 
invisible force of the weight of those objects.88 
 
 
Figure 4b has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s and Deleuze’s examination of environmental forces such as 
gravity, thermal forces, germination and weight, as made manifest in the details of the 
work of some modernist artists, provides not only a non-representational concept of 
the ‘figural’ to substitute for the representational figurative, but also provides a multi-
sensory extension to the ‘salient features’ of the enacted models of depiction 
described by Malafouris (2007, 2013). In this respect, by adopting the 
phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and enacted accounts of depiction, the reading of 
Warburg’s ‘animated accessory’ (the details of which are animated in part by bodily 
experiences immersed in environmental conditions and causes, such as the wind89) 
undertaken in the previous chapter can now be read as ‘figural’, that is, reframed as an 
‘enactive accessory’.  
                                            
88 As Deleuze reveals ([1981] 2003, pp. 56-57) that when Millet was criticised for painting peasants 
who were carrying a sack of potatoes or wheelbarrow of manure in a style classically reserved for the 
Gods, the artist responded by saying that the weight common to the two objects was more profound 
than any figurative distinction. According to Deleuze, Millet, as a modernist painter, just like Cézanne 
and Van Gogh, was striving not to represent the world, but to render visible the ‘distributed forces’ that 
culminate in sensations such as gravity and weight in the details of the painting itself. 
 
89 Warburg’s dissertation on Botticelli is widely cited as the primary example of his notion of 
‘animated incidental detail’ (Rampley, 1997, p. 42-3). His study of the Birth of Venus focused on the 
analysis of Venus’s flowing, windswept hair, which he compares to similar details in the Primavera, in 
the dress of the nymph Flora. For Warburg, this incidental detail was a manifestation of the ‘pathos 
formula’ that fashioned it, and which accounted for the way the depiction of these scenes differed from 
earlier renderings.  
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4.6.1 The ‘enactive accessory’ 
In the context of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and Deleuze’s concept of the 
becoming of the ‘figural’, Warburg’s ‘animated accessory’ can be understood as 
rendering visible the invisible, multi-sensory, existential forces, such as wind and 
gravity, as well as the traces of the philosophies, beliefs, practices and desires that 
underpin an historically contingent ‘pathos formula’. The environmental processes 
revealed in these details can be analysed in terms of the ‘salient features’ of 
Malfouris’ (2007, 2013) enactive account of depiction – that is, as ‘signatures’ of the 
ongoing development of the ‘material engagement’ that underpins the development of 
an enacted cognition. This ‘signature’, however, is more than just the material 
extension of a visual brain. If placed in the context of Merleau-Ponty’s thinking, it 
can be seen as a material trace of the enactment of an entire multi-sensory reality, 
which includes, following Warburg, the philosophies, beliefs and practices of a 
specific period.  
The figure or depiction – as a trace or expression of the self-organising 
processes underpinning movement and activity that extend throughout the body, the 
environment and other bodies in the environment – can be viewed as a stage or 
‘platform’ in a larger dynamic process of enactive signification, or the making visible 
(‘bringing forth’) of a moment in the larger ongoing process of the constant enactment 
of multi-sensory reality. Crucially, this enactive signification includes a ‘material 
engagement’ with the emergent properties or features of the environment that are 
‘brought forth’ through, and made visible in, the depiction by the practitioner’s 
movements. The details of the figure depicted, its ‘salient features’, play an active, 
constructive role, not only in the emergence of the mind and perception of the 
practitioner who creates them, but also (as argued in Chapters Two and Three) in the 
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ongoing development of the enacted mind(s) of the perceiver(s) of the image, who 
play a reciprocal co-constitutive role through the inquiry itself. Such accessories do 
not pre-exist to be discovered per se they are, rather, brought forth through the very 
activity of looking for them. 
What is now understood as an ‘enacted accessory’ will be used to re-read 
Gombrich’s reading of Warburg’s analysis of the details of Manet’s The Luncheon on 
the Grass to reveal how environmental processes are expressed in its depiction of 
human figures, and how the images ‘comes to mean’ through this expression. This re-
reading is illustrative of an enactive account of the ‘animated accessory’, revealing 
the enactive processes of mind, perception and depiction that extend into the 
organism-environment coupling. Within the context of the co-constructive inquiry of 
the viewer, the expressive role of the environment (the focus of this chapter) is 
foregrounded and is revealed (or rather brought forth) within the work as emerging 
alongside the enacted mind of the artist, ‘animating’ the figures depicted. 
 
4.7 The ‘enactive accessories’ of The Luncheon on the Grass 
As Gombrich (1970) describes, Warburg’s study of the development and the 
endurance of a specific depiction of a group of river gods and a nymph, from a relief 
of The Judgement of Paris on a Roman sarcophagi (in the third century AD) via the 
Renaissance (The Judgement of Paris by Marcantonio Raimondi) to its modern 
depiction in Manet’s The Luncheon on the Grass (c.1863), revealed a set of stylistic 
transformations in the details of the figures, in which he was able to trace the 
development of a historically contingent human perception and imagination. As seen 
in Chapter Three, Warburg was able to show – through his study of the figures’ 
details as animated by ‘energies’ such as weight and confidence – that in each re-
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formulation of the group, the whole psychological dynamic of the human type 
represented is utterly transformed.  
The change in the physical weight and confidence of the figures’ postures, as 
well as their gaze – the human figures in Manet’s depiction attend to the pastoral, the 
personal and the viewer rather than the divine goings-on of the gods on Mount 
Olympus – are animated by a dynamic ‘pathos formula’ tied to the wider philosophies 
and beliefs of the period (fig. 4c). Warburg understood the ‘pathos formula’ 
underpinning the figures depicted in Manet’s The Luncheon on the Grass as a way of 
acting upon the world, particular to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The 
Olympic divinities had ceased to be regarded as the primary cause of natural events. It 
is this shift in causality to a secular view of the world that suggests the larger role the 
natural environment plays in the animation of the details of the figures, and provides 
an example of how the environment is expressed in such a work. 
The importance of the role of the environment in shaping the human figures 
depicted, as part of the pathos formula, is present in the experience of the painting 
through the very absence of environmental detail (fig. 4d). The human figures’ details 
appear to be animated, in part, by the environment, through their grounded postures 
and their weight, suggesting comfort and ease, yet the environment itself is 
ambiguous, flat, ‘unfinished’, not entirely defined. The ambiguous, awkward and 
‘unfinished’ treatment of the work, and the broad brushstrokes which reduce the 
contextual detail of the environmental objects that surround the figures (as outlined in 
Chapter One), take on a different character in an enacted model of perception. In this 
context, the image does not represent the world as it stands before the artist, but is 
concerned with making visible the invisible, multi-sensory texture of the 
environment, through the very activity of depicting it, to the perception of both artist 
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and viewer. Such details can be seen as a trace of the activity of ‘bringing forth’ a 
world through painting. 
 
Figure 4c has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
       
 
 
Figure 4b has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
 
 
What Gombrich (1970) suggests Warburg calls the ‘sterilised’ aspects of the 
environmental context depicted by the painter were described in Chapter Three as an 
‘aesthetic sterilisation’, resulting in an ambiguous, strange or unusual form; that is, 
they comprise a stage or moment in the ongoing transformation of the details of an 
image (in this case, the environment) within an emerging ‘pathos formula’. In 
Merleau-Ponty’s terms, the very depiction of the environment in such an ‘unfinished’ 
way always makes visible the invisible environmental conditions that impact on the 
gestures of the artist as they paint; it is a way of coming to understand how reality 
itself ‘becomes’. The ‘sterilisation’ of the details of the environment in the painting 
comes to express or reveal the active and energetic texture of the environment as part 
of the emergence of reality for both the artist’s and the viewer’s perception as 
together they participate in the same ‘pathos formula’ or way of acting in the world. 
Adopting Noë’s (2004) enactive conception of perception, the depiction of the 
environment, although seemingly ambiguous and unfinished- almost absent, can be 
seen as perceptually present in the experience of the work. The environment is 
expressed through its very absence in the enacted perceptual experience of the viewer, 
who is equally part of the organism-environment system. Such details (or lack of) 
thus ‘come to mean’ as an expression of the ongoing self-transformation of an enacted 
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reality that includes the artist, the viewer’s perceptual experience and the active and 
responsive environment. 
Whereas Gombrich’s reading of Warburg’s analysis of Manet’s painting 
points to the depiction of the human figure as representing a ‘coming to terms with’ a 
secular reality (the gradual ‘sterilisation’ of the role of divinities by the rise of the 
natural sciences), such details, as part of an enacted human mind, ‘come to mean’ not 
through a process of representation, but as a part of a much larger and deeper process 
of enactive signification (a sensory-motor process) through the very activity of 
depiction, which is a way of acting or engaging with the world. As such, this 
transformation of the details of the figures cannot be wholly attributed to the idea of 
secularisation alone, rather this idea of secularisation is itself enacted within a larger 
process of self-organisation or way of acting in the world. The idea of secularisation 
is a reminder of the immersion of the human body within an active and responsive 
environment.  
The details, style and formal aspects of the figures (human and non-human) 
depicted are, in this sense, an expression of the conditions through which the notion 
of secularisation is able to emerge, part of an ongoing, changing engagement with the 
environment. As the features or properties of the environment are enacted or ‘brought 
forth’, together with mind and perception, through movement, they co-constitute the 
enaction of human mind and perception. The very ‘pathos formula’ that sterilises the 
agency of the gods, through allowing the natural sciences and secularisation to exist, 
is itself an emergent property, part of an organism-environment system or way of 
acting in the world that ‘brings forth’ the environment at the same time as the 
activities of contemplating and depicting it. 
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4.8 Conclusion 
To recognise how images ‘come to mean’ in the activity and movement of a 
phenomenological body is to also recognise that the phenomenological body is itself 
open to, and immersed in, an active and responsive environment. Whereas the thesis 
thus far has investigated the phenomenological depth in how images ‘come to mean’, 
there is a further depth to the phenomenological body itself that extends into the 
active and responsive texture of the environmental conditions that underpin the 
movement of the practitioner. These environmental conditions constitute a necessary 
part of an historically contingent organism-environment system, in which the 
phenomenological body’s movement, perception and cognition emerge or are enacted. 
In such a framework, the environment matters for an understanding of how images 
‘come to mean’. 
The study of how images ‘come to mean’ in an enacted model of perception 
entails treating visual materials as non-representational; that is, in the terminology of 
the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, not as rendering the visible world as it stands 
before the artist, but as rendering visible (or give a visible expression to) the invisible, 
multi-sensory, mnemonic, imaginative and environmental forces that underpin human 
activity. The details of the style of visual materials are an expression not of a way of 
acting upon the world, as Crowther (2012) described, but a way of acting within the 
world; they express this multi-dimensional activity. In the context of anthropological 
and archaeological approaches to the study of enactive images such as Palaeolithic 
imagery, such an approach begins by asking not what an image means (symbolically) 
but how an image ‘comes to mean’: what does the phenomenological, bodily and 
environmental processes allow a work to symbolise as emergent in an organism-
environment coupling? 
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Although the features or properties of the environment that co-constitute an 
enactive conception of mind and perception are invoked in the work of scholars such 
as Varela (1993) and Noë (2004), they remain somewhat idealised. While Valera 
(1993), in particular, recognises that the features of the environment are enacted 
alongside perception and cognition, he does not consider the properties or features in 
themselves; he focuses on human phenomenology, movement and engagement. As far 
as Varela is concerned, environmental processes matter in the enaction of mind and 
perception, but the environment itself is forgotten.  
In this respect, Malafouris’ (2013) work in cognitive archaeology provides a 
useful bridge, enabling a discussion of such features or properties through 
foregrounding what he terms the ‘material agency’ of the artefacts and materials that 
shape human activity through movement. Malafouris recognises the importance of the 
material dimensions of matter underpinning human creative activity in his study of 
the development of cognition, such materials manifest an agency that shapes 
cognition through engagement; clay, wood, rock and other materials have properties 
and resistances that play an active role in the emergence of mind and creative activity.  
As Varela (1993) and Merleau-Ponty (1942) both suggest, the features or 
properties of the environment are also enacted out of what is made possible for the 
organism through their movement and activity. As they are enacted along with mind 
and perception through movement, they are inherently ‘unstable’, because, as part of a 
self-regulating autopoietic system of relations, they frequently change in character. In 
this sense, the material agency of the environment (the resistances of clay, wood, and 
rock) is also enacted (‘brought forth’) as features of the environment by means of 
movement and activity that are historically contingent to the developing autopoietic 
system. The final chapter in the main body of this thesis proceeds from this insight, 
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drawn from the foregoing synthesis of thought, and argues that just as images ‘come 
to mean’ an expression of the phenomenological body of the artist and viewer, the 
expressive nature of an image also extends to the affective domains of the matter, 
materials and ‘features’ of the environment in which the phenomenological body is 
immersed, develops and functions. 
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Chapter Five   
The ‘Affective’ Dimensions of Materials and Matter  
 
The enactive accounts of mind and depiction surveyed in the previous chapter focused 
primarily on the human dimensions of an organism-environment system as expressed 
in depictions and paintings. However, as the chapter showed, this exclusive focus 
neglected the active role that the properties or features of the environment play in this 
expression. The following chapter (the final one in the main body of the thesis) 
extends the speculative argument further by investigating more fully the expressive 
qualities of the active, responsive dimensions of matter in the development and 
activity of the phenomenological body, enhancing our understanding of the way 
visual materials ‘come to mean’ as emergent in an active, responsive, material world. 
In order to recognise the immersion of the phenomenological body in the 
active and responsive world, the chapter reflects on eighteenth and nineteenth-century 
philosophy, which places the development of the human body and mind and the 
creation of artefacts within the active self-regulating system of the Earth, seen from 
the perspective of deep geological time. Philosopher Manuel De Landa’s (2000) non-
linear approach to the study of human linguistic history provides a starting point for 
the study of human activity, not as a linear progress, taking place on an inert and 
passive planet, but as part and parcel of a meshwork of exchanges and energy flows 
between geological, genealogical, biomaterial and social structures.  
The chapter analyses the development and activity of the phenomenological 
body, immersed in the processes and energy flows of an active, responsive material 
world, by focusing on the ‘affective’ domains of objects, artefacts and materials, and 
their active role in the development and activity of the phenomenological body. Such 
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a conception of the human body and human activity, taken from cultural anthropology 
(Ingold, 2000, 2011, 2013), shapes how human artefacts are understood: as emergent 
or ‘growing’ within the field of forces created by the engagement between the 
practitioner and the active, responsive, material world, rather than springing from a 
design conceived in the practitioner’s mind and imposed upon inert matter. Human 
artefacts come into existence and ‘come to mean’, not only through the actions of the 
phenomenological body, but also through the resistances and forces of the materials 
as they express themselves in the form of such artefacts. The chapter uses the 
conception of matter and materials as active and energetic to deepen the theory of the 
phenomenological depth of images (and other artefacts) constructed in this thesis 
through the inclusion of their ‘energetic depth’ (or expression). 
 
5.1 ‘Deep human history’  
In his meditation on human history, De Landa (2000) describes what he calls the 
‘non-linear’ dynamics of the history of human society, not told simply from the 
perspective of a progressively more sophisticated process of human evolution, but 
including other, much older and deeper non-human and inorganic historical 
perspectives. The thin rocky crust of the planet is a hardening of the greater, ongoing 
system of underground geological lava flows which organise themselves 
(momentarily) into structures that result in the surface of the Earth. This process can 
happen directly through volcanic activity or indirectly through the collision of 
continental plates; it is a self-organising activity through which many geological 
forms are created. This process also extends to the development of the body and its 
genetic components, wherein the flow of biomass in complex food webs, and of genes 
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through generations, shape and harden (again momentarily) to form the body of the 
organism (De Landa, 2000, pp. 257-258). 
This flow of materials, biomass and energy, which forms both geological 
structures and bodies, does not exclusively refer to the flows of lava, biomass and 
genes, but also, De Landa reveals, to the flow of ‘information’, such as memes, 
norms, money and other processes of human society. He recognises that biological 
and physical materials (geological and organic) have an energetic potential as a part 
of a self-organising system of energy flows that impacts on the development of the 
more recent layer of human society and its products. This recognition, for De Landa, 
deepens the discussion of human history by including the flow of energy, processes 
and information of the geological, environmental and genealogical developmental 
histories within which human societies emerge and ‘become’. 
At the core of De Landa’s work lies the observation that the simple forms of 
matter and energy, such as geological formations and biological structures, work 
according to the laws of non-equilibrium thermodynamics – a thermodynamics of 
‘becoming’, with no fixed state. He emphasises the materiality of ‘becoming’: the 
flows and processes of energy, biomass and information that are continually at work, 
mixing and ‘hardening’ to form human societies. Inorganic matter is much more 
energetic, variable and creative than traditional studies of human society 
acknowledge. De Landa (2000, p.16) argues that the contemporary materialist 
philosophies underpinning the social sciences need to embrace a fuller recognition of 
this creativity.  
De Landa builds what he terms a ‘non-linear’ history of energy transfer and 
self-organisation that aims to move away from the orthodox approach to human 
history – that is, as a history of textual documents, ideologies and human intentions. 
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He weaves the energy flows and transitions of geological change and uplift, and a 
genealogical history of germs, plants and animals, between 1000 and 1700 AD 
together with the linguistic history of human society between 1700 and 2000 AD. 
This non-linear, ‘non-equilibrium’ alternative to the linear form of history dominant 
in the social sciences traces the interplay of energy transitions between biological, 
genealogical, material and social systems, informed by the systems approaches of the 
biological and physical sciences (De Landa, 2000, pp. 14-15). Social systems are thus 
part of an emergent ‘stable state’ or hardening of the flow of energy and biomass 
between biological, geological and ecological systems. Their history is not entirely 
understandable in terms of equilibriums, nor can it be told entirely as the linear 
trajectory of human progression upon the Earth; it is part of a larger self-organising 
(emergent) system of mutual interactions and feedback which includes matter, 
animals and plant-life.  
De Landa’s theories provide the impetus for the primary work of this chapter: 
that is, the recognition that a human practitioner and the creation of human artefacts 
always works or take place in an active and responsive environment – the Earth – 
which includes matter and energy flows that run much deeper than the top layer of 
human society. However, whereas De Landa’s work focuses upon deepening 
linguistic history, the focus here is on an artefact of a different kind, the visual 
artefact. The emerging field of what is termed ‘deep history’ (Shryock and Smail, 
2011) in the study of pre-human history provides a similar philosophical meditation 
of a particular moment during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which 
developed in the context of the emerging concept of ‘deep geological time’, with the 
emphasis on the study not of linguistic but of material artefacts and their importance 
to a renewed sense of human history. 
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The following section will introduce the nineteenth-century notion of deep 
geological time more fully, following the trajectory of a non-linear human history 
suggested by De Landa through the inclusion of the work of Andrew Shryock and 
Daniel Lord Smail (2011) as an illustration of the importance of the concept at work 
for further reflection upon the history of all human activity. This excursion into the 
implications of deep geological time will provide the three main points underpinning 
the chapter’s trajectory: firstly, the development of human body and mind is 
embedded in active and responsive matter which constitutes the self-organising 
system of the Earth; secondly, to understand the body, and its activity as well as the 
product of such activity, is to understand that it is always immersed amongst the 
material artefacts of an environment; and thirdly, human artefacts can be understood 
as an ‘historical’ document of the development of the body in an active and 
responsive world. 
 
5.1.1 Humanity’s deep geological time 
During the turn of the 18th and 19th century the immersion of the development and 
activity of the human body with an active and responsive geological conception of the 
earth can be seen to manifest within the geological sciences. This immersion, and it’s 
non-linear and non-equilibrium self-organising nature, as described by De Landa 
(2000), underpins a gradual sterilization of the concept of a biblical human history, as 
an emergent stable-state of the energy flow and transfer of the entire system. The 
Reverend and Geologist William Stukeley’s Philosophy of Earthquakes (1759) 
particularly describes the Earth as a living animal in which springs and natural 
fountains have pipes and canals running within the Earth, just like arteries and glands 
within the animal body. The Earth for Stukeley was an animal body whose ‘animating 
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soul’ is an electrical fire or ether (p. 49), through which a constant balancing of 
energy between the atmosphere and the earth caused uncontrollable ‘disasters’ such as 
earthquakes. This animating energy, or ether, for Stukeley has a divine cause, being 
that of the wrath or judgement of god, a melding of geological and biblical human 
histories. 
  The notion in the geological sciences that the Earth was older than previously 
believed (from the biblical accounts) became a core topic in the academies; it began 
to offer a different account of human development, one that extended the origins of 
human history into geological deep time. The suspicion that human history was 
dwarfed by a pre-human geological and archaeological history slowly grew into near 
certainty among naturalists studying the topography of the Earth’s surface (Rudwick, 
1992, p. 27). As media archaeologist Siegfried Zielinski (2006, pp. 4-5) reminds us, 
James Hutton’s Theory of the Earth (1778) described the history of its development in 
terms that were free of theological dogma; it was conceived not in terms of a linear 
progression of development but as a dynamic cycle of erosion, deposition, 
consolidation and uplift. As Zielinski describes, Hutton saw that the Earth’s history 
ran much deeper than that of its upper crust and extended into the sub-strata below the 
granite, and this sub-strata was involved in the formation of the upper layer; his 
conception of the Earth was of a cyclic, self-renewing machine, without beginning or 
end, which was constituted by matter and energy flows – a machine in which 
humanity was implicated. 
The growing suspicion that geological history dwarfed the biblical history of 
the world was not confined to the geological and scientific imaginary of the period. 
As geologist Martin Rudwick (1992) demonstrates, it manifested itself not only in 
geological etchings and depictions, but in artistic etchings and paintings. Rudwick 
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interprets John Martin’s 1828 mezzotint, The Deluge90 (fig. 5), which depicts the 
human figure engulfed by overpowering geological structures, as portraying the 
eclipse of the biblical or divine history of humanity by geological and deep human 
history.91  
 
 
Figure 5 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
 
 
A contemporary re-evaluation of the importance of the ‘deep geological time’ 
to the earth during the late 18th and 19th century within the study of human history is 
revising a largely human-centred understanding of the development of the human 
body and its activity institutionalised since that time. In a contemporary revision of 
human historiography Andrew Shryock and Daniel Lord Smail (2011) re-evaluate the 
importance of the emergence of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species by Means 
of Natural Selection (1859) during the late 19th century, which brought about a drastic 
change in the sense of the scale and the role of the human within the universe (pp. 26-
27). Darwin’s work is seen by Shryock and Smail as a part of the larger ‘time 
revolution’ of the 19th century, stated within the development of geological ‘deep 
time’ in which Darwin himself offers a link between the relatively new histories of 
humanity and the much older deep time history of the geological timescale, unifying 
both geological and biological time.  
                                            
90 A depiction of the biblical narrative in which a great flood is sent by God to destroy civilisation in an 
act of divine retribution. 
91 Rudwick (1993) traces the use of the depiction of the biblical scene of the Deluge in the geological 
sciences from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He reveals how the scene was revisited at key 
moments when the origins of the human form came under scrutiny, particularly noting that as the 
biblical account of human history gradually lost its grip in the natural sciences, the emphasis of the 
scene came to increasingly dwell on the geological rock formations. 
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The evolutionary approach of Darwin, Shryock and Smail (2011) suggest, 
results in a renewed sense of human history that was not fully accounted for during 
the nineteenth century itself, which focussed rather upon a socially and politically 
driven human history, a history of the state92, that was decidedly progressive and 
separate from nature as a passive substrate93. The human’s role was no longer seen as 
essential and permanent, the human body itself has a deep time: a deeper relation to 
the deep geological time of the environment in which they are situated. To recognise 
the development of the human body within this ‘deep time’ is in turn to recognise that 
the development of the human body during this period (as with any other period) as a 
part of a larger system of geological uplift and environmental conditions that is not 
entirely understandable in terms of human political society and genetics alone. 
 
5.1.2 The ‘distributed’ human body 
Shryock and Smail’s (2011) work recognises that the human body is shaped over time 
by tools, food, clothes, social relations and other elements of culture in unintended 
                                            
92 Shryock and Smail’s (2011) work stems from a critique of from the influence of the philosophy of 
Georg Hagel during the 1830s, who believed that human evolution and progression is built upon the 
natural environment- and situated the study of human history and natural history on opposite sides of a 
great divide. Nature, was considered to be the realm of necessity who’s only modes of change are 
cyclical; it reproduces itself without change — a self-organising cyclic system that grows, dies, grows 
again. Human History, on the other hand, was considered a realm in which creative human agents, 
conscious of what they are doing, make progressive change upon the natural world — they do not 
reproduce without change, they progress, the evolve and better themselves. This progressive 
understanding of human history was a history of politics and society, within which everything that 
humans built upon nature, especially the nations and states of a nineteenth century Europe, could be 
treated as historical artifacts precisely because they were beyond nature. At the heart of human history 
lay the State, lay power, the social and cultural and political, very human centered historical documents 
were understood as texts, words and illustrations- things that are made by human beings. 
93 For Shryock and Smail, a Hegalian human history is centered on the idea of the conquest of nature 
and the birth of a human political society. The French historian Jules Michelet (1912) reveals such a 
focus, written around the turn of the twentieth century: “When the world was born there began a war 
that will last until the worlds end, and this is the war of man against nature, of the spirit against the 
flesh, of liberty against determinism. History is nothing but the story of the endless conflict” […] 
“Barbaric man is called a child of Nature with full reason. He must accept what Nature offers. But 
civilized man is the child grown to adult stature, and able in manner to control, to dominate - if you 
please to conquer - the parent” (Jules Michelet (1912) The Conquest of Nature, cited in Shryock and 
Smail, (2011) p. 9). 
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ways. The gradual modification of the body and the reshaping of its physical 
muscular structure through the use of clothing is exemplified by the changes in the 
bone structure of the foot once it is encased in a shoe, leading to the development of a 
striding gait rather than the gliding one characteristic of the unshod, splayed foot 
(Shryock and Smail, 2011, pp. 74-75). The human brain and body are plastic; the 
human phenotype is thus continuously moulded by the environment and by cultural 
artefacts (p. 16). In this sense, the body does not exclusively follow the laws of 
physiology and genetics, but is changed, in part, by the exchange and use of cultural 
artefacts, objects and instruments, and in this sense its development is ‘distributed’. 
To account for the development of the human body, Shryock and Smail 
suggest, is to realise that its ontogenesis is ‘distributed’ among the material elements 
and artefacts of a culture. They re-invoke the view of the body illustrated by the 
earlier thirteenth-century Ebstorf Mappa Mundi (fig. 5a), in which every aspect of a 
culture is depicted as the vast body of Christ, with his body, hands, feet and head 
placed at the map’s extremities. This phenotypical plasticity, extended by the use of 
cultural artefacts, provides the ground for a discussion of the human nervous system 
(itself moulded through social exchanges and the use of cultural objects and artefacts), 
in which the human body and the form its artefacts both comprise part of an objective 
and subjective system, an historical trace of an ongoing, dynamic historical project.  
 
 
Figure 5a has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
  
An important implication for the study of human history arises out of Shryock 
and Smail’s (2011, pp. 30-31) archaeological approach: for this deeper relationship 
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between the body and the environment to figure more fully in an account of human 
history, new methods and narratives are needed that can triangulate between human 
agents and geological materials – methods that could not be fully supported in the 
models of human cognition stressing the rational rather than relational that were 
prevalent in the conventional human-centred history of the late nineteenth century. 
Shryock and Smail argue, similar to De Landa (2000), that the maintenance of a 
materialist and human-centred account of human history through the study of textual 
documents (relating to the persons and objects of a certain period) is unable to fully 
support the implications of the deep geological aspects of human activity – that is, the 
relational aspects and deep-time processes that impact on humanity and human 
creative activity, shaping both over time. 
Shryock and Smail suggest that a fuller understanding of the implications of 
the distributed development of the human body requires a shift away from exclusively 
textual historical documents to take into account a distributed and relational model of 
human cognition that extends into materials and artefacts:  
 
Our history is a material history, not just a succession of things or 
speech acts. … [W]e need narratives that can triangulate between 
agents and materials. This shift in focus brings into play a model of 
cognition that differs from the one … which stresses the rational 
appreciation of evidence rather than a relational understanding. A mind 
distributed in social relationships and physical materials takes 
cognition outside the head, beyond the skin and into the world. 
(Shryock and Smail, 2011, pp. 30-31) 
 
Deep history attempts to re-instate pre-history, before the written word, through 
archaeological methods: studying the traces of human consciousness left in man-made 
artefacts, which are themselves containers of meaning and social relations. Such 
materials, Shryock and Smail insist, contain – just as much as the written word – 
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traces of human kinship relations and exchanges. Seen in fossils, tools, pictures, 
household items, ecological change and genetic variation, these traces ‘document’ a 
deep history of the development of the human body, activity and mind that extends 
into the objects and materials of the environment.  
Shryock and Smail’s distributed nature of cognition and consciousness 
resembles a ‘distributed person’ as described within Alfred Gell’s (1998) 
anthropological approach to art, which focuses upon the realm of visual artefacts. For 
Gell (pp. 222-232) bodies and minds are spatially and temporally ‘distributed’ 
amongst objects and artefacts. There is isomorphy of structure between an ‘internally’ 
experienced consciousness and ‘externally’ experienced spatio-temporal artefactual 
realms. The structures of the artefactual realm, in Gell’s case the artefacts of art 
history, demonstrate an externalized and collective cognitive process of the artist. For 
Gell  ‘inner’ consciousness and ‘outer’ artefactual worlds are always relative- the 
mind extends into physical objects, which become agents within social systems of use 
and experience relative to the consciousness that has been externalised.  
Importantly for Gell (p. 223), the mind is not just ‘distributed’ within images 
of the artefactual realm (the object and/or person being distributed in time and space), 
an image has an agency, images of something (what they represent) are considered as 
parts of that thing (a distributed object) which diffuse into the ambiance and are 
incorporated by the onlooker through the process of perception that underpin the 
social use of the artefacts. Through considering the distributed nature of mind, and the 
agency of the objectified consciousness within images, Gell recognises that: 
 
[…] that ‘mind’ can exist objectively as well as subjectively; that is, as 
a pattern of transactable objects - indexes of personhood, in this 
instance, arm-shells, and necklaces - as well as a fleeting succession 
of’ thoughts’, ‘ intentions’, ‘mental states’, etc. […] a form of 
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cognition which takes place outside the body, which is diffused in 
space and time, and which is carried on through the medium of 
physical indexes and transactions involving them. (1998, p. 232)  
 
A ‘person’, for Gell, when studied within the realm of anthropology, is not a bounded 
biological organism; rather they are always relative to all objects and/or events in the 
milieu within which they exist. A person, or more precisely- a person’s mind, is not 
confined to particular spatio-temporal coordinates, but consists of a spread a 
biographical events and memories of events, and a dispersed category of material 
objects, traces and learnings.  
Both Shryock and Smail and Gell’s descriptions of a ‘distributed human’ or 
‘person’, reveal the importance of an ‘agency’ of the artefactual realm of objects and 
materials for the study of the emergence of human cognition and perception. Both 
accounts, however, remain predominately human centred, the phenotypical and 
cognitive plasticity that Shryock and Smail alert us to is distributed among social 
exchanges and the use of artefacts, which are ‘containers’ of traces left by the 
development of human cognition. Although Gell attributes an agency to artefacts this 
agency is always relational within the context of the social appropriation of the 
artefacts- they only have agency when used by humans (1998, p. 22), otherwise they 
remain inert. The primary focus on the social and cultural – that is, on the human 
appropriation of materials – studies the domain of objects, materials and artefacts that 
functions above the active dimensions of matter. Matter has its own energetic process 
of self-organisation that constitutes a dynamic cycle of erosion, deposition, 
consolidation and uplift (Zielinksi, 2006, pp. 4-5). This energised form of matter 
plays a very active role in the development of the human body and human cognition 
that extends below the level of social and cultural exchange; it reaches into the 
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properties, flows and forces of the materials and energy that make up the 
environment. Materials and materiality become important. 
 
5.2 Materials vs materiality 
A corpus of contemporary thinking in anthropology and archaeology recognises that 
the exclusive focus on social processes and exchanges limits an understanding of the 
term ‘materiality’. Anthropologist Ian Hodder (2012, p. 59) contends that most 
contemporary studies of materiality in the domain of anthropology deal primarily with 
the social processes by which the (an apparently separate) material world is revealed 
to human beings. Ingold (2000, 2007b, 2013), in particular, objects to the notion of 
materiality that lies at the centre of many of the approaches to the study of material 
culture, arguing that such an analysis needs to go beyond the ‘social’ appropriation of 
‘brute matter’ to more fully incorporate the ‘material object-ness’ of what he calls 
‘materials’. 
It is important to clarify what Ingold means by ‘materiality’ and ‘materials’, as 
these terms lie at the centre of his philosophy of creativity. Ingold (2013, p. 27) 
believes the way the term ‘materiality’ is employed in the study of material culture 
fails to give any account of the energetic and active role of matter. He reveals the 
Janus-faced nature of the term in this context (primarily in archaeology). It takes on 
two sorts of meaning: as the brute physical properties of matter (the raw physicality of 
the world’s material nature) which shape the way particular pieces of stone are given 
meaning and value in social and historical contexts;94 and socially and culturally, as 
how the material world around us offers possibilities for human agency and is 
appropriated by humanity for its projects.95 In contrast, Ingold’s term ‘materials’ 
                                            
94 Ingold cites the work of Christopher Tilley (2007) and Andrew Jones (2004) in this regard. 
95 Ingold cites the work of Nicole Boivin (2008) and Joshua Pollard (2004) in this regard. 
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signifies the energetic and active responsiveness – the properties and forces – of 
matter, which play an active role in shaping human activity and creativity, and which 
cannot be described through its social and cultural appropriation. 
Ingold’s notion of ‘material’ proceeds from philosopher Gilbert Simondon’s 
(1964) critique of what he describes as the ‘hylomorphic’ (or ‘matter-form’) theory of 
creation, an account of creativity conforming to the notion that the human mind is 
independent from, and works upon, the natural external world – the human agent 
works upon inert, ‘dead’ matter. To follow the hylomorphic model of creativity, 
Simondon argues, is to account for the creative generation of a ‘thing’ in terms of its 
formulation, in advance, in the intellect of a human agent, who then imposes this form 
upon apparently inert, passive matter. Simondon ([1964] 1992, p. 299) argues that in 
privileging such an anthropocentric model of creativity, the very agency of the matter 
itself (its properties, forces and resistances) that play a crucial part in the actual 
processes of an object’s creation (the activity of physically making an object involves 
material forces and processes) are neglected, reduced to a process of “putting forward, 
or putting into effect, the already conceived form, from the mind of the productive 
agent”.  
 According to Simondon, what the hylomorphic theory of creation, as applied 
to the study of human artefacts, ignores by defining form and matter as separate 
domains are the wider processes of continuous modulation – distributed across both 
human bodies and the matter and materials being manipulated – behind the physical 
creation of a form. Simondon recognises that matter is not a simple or homogenous 
substance capable of receiving forms, but is itself made up of intensive and energetic 
traits that not only make the operation possible, but continuously alter the processes 
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of creation. This represents a shift to what Deleuze and Guattari ([1987] 2004, p. 379) 
term not a ‘matter-form’ but a ‘material-force’ relationship.96  
Ingold’s (2013, p. 28) rejection of the term ‘materiality’ as it is conventionally 
used in the study of material culture is based on Simondon’s philosophy, in that it 
recognises that the very ‘becoming’ of materials (that is, their generative or 
regenerative potential) has been replaced by the notion of an already solid world of 
properties. Instead of the term ‘property’, Ingold suggests the use of the term ‘quality’ 
as a way of describing the generative and active potential of materials and the role 
they play in human activity. In moving to an idea of qualities, Ingold challenges the 
notion of a hard or solid materiality, replacing it with one that is emergent and 
morphogenetic, expressing how materials and properties change depending on the 
movement and activity of the organism bound up with them. In this sense, he aligns 
himself with the thinking of Merleau-Ponty, outlined in the last chapter, for whom the 
properties of the environment are emergent, along with the intentions of the subject, 
in their movement, gestures and behaviour. From the point of view of an enactive 
account of reality, as the previous chapter shows, what Varela terms the ‘enacted 
features’ of the environment are an emergent part of a self-organising and autopoietic 
system of relations, with their own trajectories of ‘becoming’. 
 
5.2.1 The human as counterpoint 
A recognition of the active and responsive dimensions of materials in the study of 
human activity has implications for an understanding of the activity of the human 
                                            
96 What Deleuze and Guattari ([1987] 2004, pp. 377-379) term a ‘material-force ontology’ is grounded 
in the rejection of the notions of form and matter, substance and attribute, and a move toward a 
conception of an energetic matter, a material-force – that is, a material that harnesses the forces of the 
cosmos. Following Klee’s dictum that art does not render visible the external world, but renders visible 
non-visible forces, Deleuze and Guattari see painting, in the terms of their material-force ontology, as 
rendering the forces of the cosmos and matter visible, of capturing them. 
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body itself, not as a discrete developmental trajectory separate from the environment, 
but as a trajectory that runs alongside the environment. Following in the footsteps of 
thinkers such as Torben Hagerstrand (1976) and von Uexküll ([1934] 2010), Ingold 
argues that every constituent of the environment – be it human, animal, plant, stone or 
building – is a continuous trajectory or thread of ‘becoming’, always as a counterpoint 
to the rest of the world’s ‘tapestry’.  
Particularly important to Ingold is von Uexküll’s notion of the world as a 
‘tapestry’ or a ‘melody’ of lines and scores, in which the animal and the medium (the 
animal’s environment) are co-constituted and interdependent.97 According to von 
Uexküll, the rules or properties that constitute the environment can be said to shape, 
and in turn be shaped by, the composition of an organism’s cells – a process he 
portrays as an emergent ‘melody’, expressing the development of both environmental 
properties and the organism’s cellular structure, which are both in some way traces of 
the properties of the environment and the organism.98 The organic forms of both are 
contrapuntal and plastic, emerging in multiple semi-independent melodic lines, 
                                            
97 Von Uexkull ([1934] 2010, p. 100) declares that “[n]othing is left to chance in nature. In every 
instance a very intimate meaning rule joins the animal and its medium; they are united in a duet, in 
which the two partners’ properties are contrapuntally made for each other “. 
98 “The rule that governs the properties of sea-water acts upon the composition of the cells of 
protoplasm of the octopus embryo. It shapes the melody of the development of the octopus form to 
express the properties of seawater in a counterpoint; first and foremost, an organ is produced whose 
muscular walls force the water in and out. The rule of meaning that joins point and counterpoint is 
expressed in the action of swimming. The same meaning rule in numerous variations governs the 
development of the living forms of all marine animals: sometimes they swim forwards, sometimes 
backwards, sometimes sideways; sometimes they propel themselves with wave-like movements of the 
tail, sometimes by fins, and sometimes by legs through the water; but the characteristics of the 
organism bear the same relationship to the properties of the water as point to counterpoint. In each 
case, the composition that has a common meaning can be proven. The same applies to all the various 
circles of the physical medium, whether the animal lives in water, on the land, or in the air. In every 
case the effector organs for running, jumping, climbing, fluttering, flying, or soaring are formed 
contrapuntally to the properties of the respective medium. In the case of many insects that live in the 
water when they are young and in the air when they are older, one can ascertain in the second larval 
stage how easily the constitution-rule of the new medium causes the initial organs to disappear and new 
ones to emerge. Inspection of the relationship between the subject’s receptors and the medium teaches 
the same lesson. A sensory organ formed as a counterpoint is always present when a subject meets an 
obstacle: in the case of light it is the eye, and of darkness, tactile organs or the ear. From the very 
beginning the bat, like the swallow, is equipped with different means to perceive obstacles in its path of 
flight” (von Uexkull, [1934] 2010, pp. 100-101). 
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always as a counterpoint to the entire composition, which itself emerges from what is 
of interest to the organism(s) involved. 
To illustrate such a ‘composition’, von Uexküll ([1934] 2010, pp. 122-123) 
describes the processes underlying the creation of a spider’s web. He shows how the 
spider spins its web before it has even encountered a physical fly. Thus the web 
cannot be a representation of any particular fly; rather, it represents a ‘primal image’ 
(what can be understood as an ‘imaginary’) of the fly, which is not physically present. 
Von Uexküll does not end here, for there is also a ‘primal score’ (or a way of acting) 
for the fly, just as there is for the spider. The primal score of the fly (which is also 
affected by its own primal image of the spider, as well as other aspects of the 
environment) affects the spider’s primal image of the fly. In this way, the form of the 
web can be called ‘fly-like’, as the ‘fly-likeness’ of the web is constructed in 
counterpoint to the entire tapestry of the metaphysical and physical dimensions that 
constitute the reality that is created between spider and fly. 
 Ingold foregrounds von Uexküll’s notion of counterpoint to re-think the 
boundary that is conventionally assumed to exist between the organism and the 
environment by conceiving of the human organism itself as a counterpoint; the human 
being is not a bounded entity but what Deleuze ([1987] 2004) describes as ‘a line of 
becoming’, whose very being includes that which is counterpoint to the trajectory (or 
‘becoming’) of the properties and energies of the environment. Ingold (2011a, pp. 70-
72) argues that the notion of a bounded organism, commonplace in many network and 
systems models across a broad range of disciplines within the humanities,99 is the 
                                            
99 Ingold reveals how network images have become commonplace across a broad spectrum of 
disciplines, embedded in terms such as the ‘web of life’ in ecology, ‘social networks’ in sociology, and 
‘agent-object networks’ in material culture studies. Ingold is particuarly suspicious of the application of 
actor-network theory (ANT) in cultural anthropology, which he suggests reduces the emergent 
trajectories along which life is lived to fixed points or nodes (or paths) within a network. His notion of 
‘Skilled Practice Involves Developmentally Embodied Responsiveness’ (SPIDER) is an attempt to 
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consequence of a ‘logic of inversion’, which maintains a material distinction between 
the world of humanity and that of nature. This logic of inversion, he declares, turns 
the trajectories along which life is lived (the ‘becoming’ of life) into boundaries 
within which life is contained. Life is thus reduced to the internal ‘property’ of a 
bounded organism that occupies a world rather than inhabiting it (Ingold, 2011a, pp. 
70-72).  
Ingold refutes the ‘network model’ of relations by questioning the very need 
for a distinction between the organism or ‘node’ and its lines of connection or 
relation; that is, the need for a distinction between a material component such as an 
organism and the immaterial process or relations that connect material components.100 
He maintains that in a network model there can be: 
 
[…] no mutuality without prior separation of the elements whose 
constitution is at issue. That is to say, the establishment of relations 
between these elements – whether they be organisms, persons or things 
of any other kind – necessarily requires that each is turned in upon 
itself prior to its integration into the network. (Ingold, 2011a, p. 70) 
  
Ingold argues that network models of organisms and environments (including the 
systems theory of Bateson, as well as that of Maturana and Varela, outlined in the 
previous chapter) treat the material node (the organism) separately from its immaterial 
relations with the rest of the network (the processes), and as such they logically entail 
that the organism, and its nervous system, is constituted prior to its engagement with, 
or insertion into, the environment. Ingold argues that by maintaining that the material 
nature of the organism can be distinguished from the immaterial processes of its 
                                                                                                                             
build an alternative to ANT in which the skilled practitioner is more fully understood as one who 
continually attunes their movements to the perturbations of the environment without interrupting the 
flow of action (Ingold, 2011b, pp. 89-94).  
100 As is evident in Maturana and Varela’s ([1979] 1980, p. 7) autopoietic system (see Chapter Four), 
“[t]he organization of the system is not the material properties of its components, but the relations (or 
processes) between the components, the organism is clearly bounded, in a reciprocal relation to the 
environment, a network of components and relations, of separate material and immaterial domains”.  
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relation with the environment, such a logic neglects the diverse and distributed 
counterpoints in the wider tapestry of the world, the energetic and active materials 
(the properties or features) of the environment, which itself is ‘becoming’. 
To undo the inversion between organism and environment in favour of a 
theory of the relational nature of being, Ingold (2011a, pp. 69-70) repudiates the 
distinction between an organism (as matter) and their relations (as processes), 
recognising that they are always constituted in relation to each other. Two key points 
arising from Ingold’s thought echo the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty outlined in 
the previous chapter: the organism should not be specified genotypically as a separate, 
material body prior to its entry into the environment; and the environment, including 
its properties or features, should not be specified as a set of physical constraints in 
advance of the organisms that arrive to fill it (Ingold, 2011a, p. 19). Rather, it should 
be understood as contrapuntal – as emergent.  
This line of thinking leads Ingold to describe an organism not as a bounded 
entity but as a line or trajectory,101 in which it is a trail of growth and movement, with 
a duration or ‘becoming’ that is always running in counterpoint to the trails of the 
trajectories of ‘becoming’ of the other diverse constituents of the environment. 
Crucially, in Ingold’s work, an organism is understood not as a material node in 
relation to a wider network, but as a knot of energetic lines in a tissue of other knots 
and lines (fig. 5b). An organism is thus always enmeshed with other strands, 
                                            
101 Ingold’s notion of the organism takes its inspiration from what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘lines of 
becoming’, or ‘lines of life’: “A line of becoming is not defined by the points it connects, or by the 
points that compose it; on the contrary, it passes between points, it comes up through the middle, it 
runs … transversally to the localized relation to distant or contiguous points. A point is always a point 
of origin. But a line of becoming has neither beginning nor end … only a middle … A becoming is 
always in the middle: one can only get in by the middle. A becoming is neither one nor two, nor the 
relation of the two; it is the in-between” (Deleuze and Guattari, [1987] 2004, p. 323). 
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comprising, not a network of relations, as is held by systems approaches, but rather a 
texture or ‘meshwork’. 
 
Figure 5b has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
 
Ingold’s (2013, pp.132-133) use of the term ‘meshwork’ is taken from 
Deleuze and Guattari (2004) and Henri Leferbve (1991), and is defined by its two 
central differences to a network: first, the lines of a meshwork do not connect one 
static node to another spatially – they are lines of movement, temporal lines of 
duration and ‘becoming’; and secondly, there are not nodes in a meshwork but rather 
knots, where many lines of ‘becoming’ are drawn tightly together through movement 
in the environment. These lines of ‘becoming’ comprising the meshwork are the lines 
of ‘becoming’ of every constituent of the environment, be it animal, plant, earth, rock, 
clay or environmental conditions such as the weather. Thus the meshwork, constituted 
by the trajectory or ‘becoming’ of every organism, object, material and process that is 
encountered through movement, is the texture of the organism’s life-world. The 
activities of the organism also run as a counterpoint within the meshwork, rendering 
partially immaterial the medium through which they move and develop (Ingold, 2013, 
p. 73), and helping create a relational field in which human activity is intricately 
entangled.  
The notion of a meshwork can be made more transparent by juxtaposing it 
with the use of the term in De Landa’s (2000) non-linear history of the exchange of 
geological, genealogical and biomass energies, outlined at the start of the chapter. 
Like Ingold, following the example of Deleuze and Guattari (2004), De Landa uses 
the term to denote the complex interplay of energy transitions between the various 
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parts of a self-organising system. For De Landa, this meshwork refers to a system of 
self-stimulation and self-maintenance, the linking of a series of mutually stimulating 
pairs – of geological flows, geological change and social structures – into a structure 
that reproduces as a whole (De Landa, 2000, p. 62). Each of the histories or strands of 
energy flow comprising the meshwork – the geological, biological and social – are 
always an expression of the larger self-organising reality within which they all co-
exist; each history is in some way an expression of the others, and is also an 
expression of the self-organising system as a whole, which is constantly in flux. De 
Landa’s use of the term ‘meshwork’ aims to chart the energy flows between 
constituents such as geological, genealogical, social and organic materials that 
express themselves, as they harden into fixed forms, as the environment and human 
bodies. This idea of self-expression through ‘hardening’ echoes Ingold’s use of the 
term ‘counterpoint’; it recognises that the development of the human body always 
expresses that which runs in counterpoint to its development within the meshwork in 
which its development and activity is bound. 
 
5.2.2 Human artefacts are not entirely ‘designed’ 
Ingold’s and De Landa’s recognition of the relational character of the human body as 
it runs in counterpoint to the meshwork of materials and forces that constitutes the 
environment in which it works shows that what is called a ‘human artefact’ does not 
entirely equate to the idea of a form imposed by a human agent upon an inert material 
substance, but is developed in the same way as the human body is, in counterpoint to 
the responsive environment. De Landa (2000) understands linguistic artefacts as the 
‘hardening’ of geological, genealogical, biomass and socio-economic energy flows, 
rather than in terms of the linear trajectory of human progression. Similarly, in 
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Ingold’s (2013) thinking, the term ‘artefact’ (that is, material culture such as pots, 
baskets and tools) refers to the processes of growth that ‘harden’ to form the artefact, 
and does not necessarily refer exclusively to a ‘designed’ object made by an 
intellectually agile human practitioner.  
Focusing on the objects of material culture, an artefact’s form is not 
constructed entirely as a design in the mind of the practitioner and then imposed on 
inert matter, but emerges from the play of forces, tensions and resistances amid the 
engagement of the practitioner with an active material in a richly structured 
environment. Describing the processes of the creation of cultural forms, Ingold 
maintains that human artefacts are not to be exclusively understood as ‘made’ (by the 
imposition of a design specification upon a material world); rather, they are ‘grown’, 
generated within a field of forces and resistances that cut across the developing 
interface between the organism, environment and the materials being manipulated. 
Crucially, in Ingold’s terms, the ‘growth’ of an artefact comes to express the strands 
of the meshwork within which it grows. Its form in some way expresses the energy 
flows and transitions through which it is ‘brought forth’. 
 
5.3 The ‘growth’ of form: weaving a basket 
Using the weaving of a basket as a philosophical metaphor for the ‘growth’ of an 
artefact, Ingold ([2000] 2010, p. 341) asks whether it can really be maintained that the 
basket has been created entirely through the imposition of a human design on a raw 
material. His answer is: not exactly. It is important to note that Ingold (2013, p. 22) 
does not deny the notion that there is a pre-conceived idea in the mind of the 
practitioner; however, he argues that it is not entirely the form of this idea that creates 
the artefact, but the practitioner’s engagement with the materials. Basketry, Ingold 
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reminds us, involves the bending and interweaving of fibres that may exert a 
considerable resistance of their own. The basket holds together and assumes a rigid 
form precisely because of its tensile structure (Ingold, ([2000] 2010, p. 342). The 
form of the basket is thus the result of the play of forces, both internal and external to 
the human body and the material it is made of – a form that is ‘grown’ within a 
relational force field, in which the weaver’s movements and activities are caught up in 
a reciprocal dialogue:  
The actual concrete form of the basket … does not issue from an idea. 
It rather comes into being through the gradual unfolding of the field of 
forces set up through the active and sensuous engagement of 
practitioner and material. This field is neither internal to the material 
nor internal to the practitioner (hence external to the material); rather, 
it cuts across the emergent interface between them. Effectively, the 
form of the basket emerges through a pattern of skilled movement, and 
it is the rhythmic repetition of that movement that gives rise to the 
regularity of the form. (Ingold, [2000] 2010, p. 342) 
 
What Ingold refers to as ‘skilled movement’102 is an emergent property of a 
total field of relations constituted by the presence of the organism (the practitioner) in 
a richly structured environment103 (Ingold, ([2000] 2010, p. 353). This skill is always 
situated in the wider developmental history of a system comprising both the 
practitioner’s movements and the properties, resistances and forces of the material, 
running as a counterpoint to that movement,104 an emergent process that cannot be 
reduced to the concept of a single formula imposed upon a material. The ‘growth’ of a 
                                            
102 What Ingold describes as ‘skill’ he maintains is a skilled movement that is emergent (not purely 
implicit, not purely learnt), a product of the entire ‘structural history’ of the engagement of the 
practitioner with the materials. What is possible through this skilled movement is based upon (but not 
entirely determined by) the history of movements and engagements.  
103 Ingold returns to Bateson’s model of the man with an axe  (cited in Chapter Four), in which he 
situates ‘skill’ in a wider system; it is as much mental as physical, a property not of the individual 
human body, but of the total field of relations including axe, man and tree (Ingold, [2000] 2010, pp. 
352-353). 
104 Malafouris (2007) offers a further account of material agency in pottery. Here, the potter’s 
intentionality is seen as emergent in the relationship between the material state of the clay that needs 
moulding, the speed of the wheel being turned, and the pressure the potter needs to exert to pull the pot 
into shape. 
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human artefact, such as a woven basket, is seen more as a process of autopoiesis (p. 
345); that is, a self-transformation over time of the entire system of relations that 
comprise the organism-environment system in which the artefact comes into being. 
Crucially, for Ingold, as the human practitioner is involved in the same system (the 
meshwork or knots of strands) as the material with which they work; their activity 
does not transform the system solely from the outside, but is part and parcel of the 
system’s transformation of itself.  
The processes involved in the creation of a woven basket also extend beyond 
the movements of the body of the practitioner as they respond in counterpoint to the 
material being manipulated into the strands of the meshwork that comprises their 
environmental conditions. In describing the weaving of a willow basket on a beach, 
Ingold (2013, pp. 23-24) reveals that it is not only the play of forces between the 
material and the practitioner that shapes the form, but also the environmental forces. 
The vertical struts that form the template along which the basket’s form is gradually 
woven sway and move with the wind, and this is captured in the weave as the basket 
develops through movements instigated by the practitioner (fig. 5c). This results in 
the completed basket bearing a slight tilt, which follows the trajectory and force of the 
wind, a tilt that is also specific to the individual basket-maker’s engagement with the 
material and their position within a particular climatic environment. 
 
 
Figure 5c has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
 
Ingold’s illustration of the meshwork of forces and resistances that impact on 
the weaving of a basket exemplifies his account of the creation of form, and by 
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extension of human artefacts, which focuses attention on the form-giving processes 
(the flow of energy and resistances) that give rise to the artefact’s form as part of an 
organism working in an active and responsive material world. Four key points arise 
from Ingold’s thinking: (1) the form of an artefact is emergent (or ‘grown’) within a 
meshwork of material and immaterial threads distributed across the practitioner, the 
material and the richly structured environment by their engagement; (2) the form’s 
development is autopoietic, the self-transformation of a system of relations over time, 
with the developing form acting as its own template by building upon what came 
previously – that is, upon the entire dynamic developmental system; (3) the form of 
the artefact is a crystallisation of movement and activity in a dynamic relational field, 
and the regularities of the form embody the regularities of the movement that gave 
rise to it; and (4) the conditions and processes of the form’s development (the wider 
meshwork that includes matter and imagination) become inscribed within the form of 
the created artefact. 
An important implication of the recognition of the active roles played by 
materials and environmental conditions is that ‘true’ agency cannot be attributed to 
either practitioner or material; rather, the practitioner’s agency is one among many 
agencies of varying degrees of authority. The possible site of the developing artefact’s 
agency (or rather ‘becoming’) shifts to the movement that gives rise to the form, a 
movement that plays out in the resistance and tension between practitioner, material 
and environment. These tensions and resistances belong to a matter that is animated 
by energy and force, what Ingold terms, after Deleuze (2004), a ‘material-force’ that 
includes both the body and the materials being used. The creator’s body is energised 
by many immaterial forces, such as temperament, feeling and emotion, and the 
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materials are energised by their own resistances, tensions and qualities, which become 
fixed in some way in the developing form of the basket. 
According to Ingold (2013, pp. 102-104), the process is less about a play of 
agencies and more about a dance of animacy, in which the ‘agents’ act more as 
transducers: they conduct the kinetic quality (the energy) of gestures from one 
register, bodily kinaesthesia, to another, material flux. Equally, movement and 
activity become less about a body interacting with a world in which the parties are 
closed off from one another, only coming together through a bridging operation, and 
more about the correspondence of energy flow between bodily movement and the 
world. This correspondence is “like a relay, in which each participant takes it in turns 
to pick up the baton and carry it forward, while others remain temporarily quiescent, 
awaiting their turn” (Ingold, 2013, p. 105). Movement and activity inform the 
trajectories of correspondences through which human artefacts are created. 
The form of artefacts, in such a system of correspondences, is not a fixed point 
to be analysed from above, but the momentary correspondence of a meshwork of 
form-giving processes, of lines of movement, entangled in lines of energy, force and 
matter. In Ingold’s ([2000] 2010) terms, the origins of man-made tools or artefacts 
should not be traced back from their outcome, through a sequence of antecedent 
conditions, to an idea in the mind of the agent, but forwards, recognising that the 
maker’s role is to ‘bring forth’ form through joining, following, manipulating and 
responding to the forces and flows of materials in a richly structured environment.  
Ingold’s work provides a valuable philosophical reflection on both creativity 
and human artefacts, enabling a fuller account of the active role of materials and the 
environment in the development of cultural artefacts. His use of the concept of 
‘material-force’ as applied not just to the materials but also to the practitioner’s body 
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provides a framework that allows for the inclusion of the dimensions of 
phenomenology and subjectivity, which, this thesis argues, are essential to the study 
of the style of visual materials. However, although Ingold’s discussion of the 
meshwork, and of weaving in particular, focuses on the forces and resistances of 
matter and environmental conditions, together with human movement and 
engagement, he does not attempt to discuss the multi-sensory, experiential and 
imaginary dimensions of this engagement, which underpin the development of visual 
materials. To this end, the wider use of the term ‘meshwork’ that this chapter adopts 
in order to study the development of visual materials, such as painting, is one that 
includes not only materials, geologies, genealogies and environmental conditions, but 
also the multi-sensory, experiential, imaginary forces of the phenomenological body 
that energise the trajectory of the practitioner.  
To ease the transition of Ingold’s ideas regarding the creative process of 
weaving to that of visual materials the literature regarding creativity within the 
context of art and painting provides a similar meditation. The writing of Monroe 
Beardsley (1965) in particular reveals the importance of the creative process within 
the arts and beyond that generates its own direction and momentum. There is no such 
thing, for Beardsley, as a single guiding factor (or a single creative pattern of control) 
that results in a work of art, rather creativity is a self corrective process, both 
conscious and pre-conscious, between the artist and the work, a constant re-direction 
of aims that emerges through the activity of the artist with their materials. Any 
‘control’ of the outcome of the work is neither determined by the ‘means’ or the ‘end’ 
in the mind of the artist, or within the materials being used, rather ‘control’ is internal 
to the process itself. For Beardsley, this process is always an interplay between the 
conscious and pre-conscious and between the maker and the work, as such: 
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[…] once a work is under way the […] creative process is kept going 
by tensions between what has been done and what might have been 
done. At each stage there must be a perception of the deficiencies in 
what now exists, plus the sense of unrealized possibilities of 
improvement (Beardsley, 1965, pp. 298-299).  
 
Beardsley’s writing avoids a discussion of what constitutes the pre-conscious 
and the un-conscious, but does provide the space for a fuller discussion regarding the 
phenomenological experience of the maker in the context of painting. To more fully 
bridge the phenomenological processes and experiences of the body and the wider 
meshwork of materials and resistances through which visual materials emerge, the 
remainder of this chapter will return to the writing of Deleuze (1981) in relation to 
modern painting (surveyed briefly in the previous chapter). In the context of this 
chapter, Deleuze’s analysis of the work of Francis Bacon provides a model of ‘artistic 
sensation’ that he describes as emergent through the activity of a phenomenological 
body immersed within the energetic and active forces of the material world that 
surround it and that it experiences. In this respect, Deleuze’s thinking will be used to 
synthesise the deep-time, material development of the human body, described in the 
work of Shryock and Smail (2011) and De Landa (2000), with that of the 
phenomenology of the practitioner. 
 
5.4 The deep-time aspects of modernist painting 
Deleuze’s work sits alongside that of the group of ‘process’ thinkers and 
philosophers105 that emerged during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
who perceived in modern art the renunciation of representation in favour of the study 
                                            
105 The work of philosopher Henri Bergson (1911), in particular, had a great influence on Deleuze. In 
this context, Deleuze uses the work of Klee (1964), whose treatise, On Modern Art, echoes the themes 
of Bergson’s process philosophy. Merleau-Ponty’s (1964) phenomenological reading of the work of 
modernist painters also follows the writing of Bergson closely. 
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of the conditions and processes leading to representation, which extend across 
multiple dimensions of a plural reality,106 including those of the phenomenological 
body and the active environment. Deleuze’s thoughts on painting aligned him with 
painters such as Klee and Cézanne. He adopted Klee’s dictum that art does not 
reproduce the visible; rather, it renders visible the unseen, invisible forces. 
Significantly, as far as Deleuze was concerned, late nineteenth and early twentieth-
century painting did not aim to produce new, distinct, visible forms, but to present, or 
indeed recognise, the non-visible, affective forces that act behind or beneath the 
visible forms (Smith, 1997, pp. 29-56). Deleuze’s recognition of the intertwined 
phenomenological and material conditions and processes leading to representation 
provides an approach by which to discuss the importance of the multi-sensory, 
experiential and imaginary as they fuse with the invisible dimensions of materials – 
their properties, forces and resistances – made visible in the style of particular 
modernist paintings. 
 Deleuze constructs an analysis of modernist painting that is underpinned by an 
existential and emergent concept of the ‘figural’ (as outlined in chapter four). As 
Crowther notes (2012, p. 23), for Deleuze, the painted figure is emergent, not as a 
body or material thing represented in its organic and natural form, but through its 
genesis; it is rendered as a ‘becoming’, and its very existence always refers back to 
the wider conditions that create the possibility of its emergence (p. 26). In this 
context, Deleuze’s study of modernist painting, particularly his analysis of Bacon’s 
                                            
106 ‘Plurality’ here refers to what William James (1928, pp. 249-252), influenced by the work of 
Bergson, describes as a ‘pluralistic universe’, in which the ruling tradition of rationalism within 
Western philosophy (also termed ‘materialism’) – the belief in the fixed nature of matter, concepts and 
truth – is supplemented by the recognition of what he describes as reality’s pluralistic ‘thickness’. In 
this ‘thickness’ there is no distinction between an ‘inner’ (metaphysical) and ‘outer’ (physical) reality 
(realities of subject and object); rather, the metaphysical and physical are intermingled and 
interdependent; there is no single absolute reality. For James, as for Bergson, what really exists is a 
reality that is always in the making.  
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work in The Logic of Sensation (1981), can be aligned with a more contemporary 
understanding of the nineteenth-century concept of the deep-time geological 
dimensions of the human body (outlined earlier). Deleuze’s reading of a selection of 
modernist painters’ practices begins with the notion that human beings no longer 
experience themselves as an eternal essence, autonomous and separate from the 
environment, but as an organism that is impacted on by distributed forces or 
‘accidents’ not entirely under its control – and the form of painting itself expresses 
these accidents.  
 
5.4.1 A Deleuzian account of sensation 
Deleuze conceives of artistic sensation as an ‘affect’,107 the conditions of which are 
partly distributed among what are assumed to be the ‘non-human’ forces and energies 
of the environment that impact on the body of the artist. For Deleuze, sensation is not 
constrained or contained in the body of the painter,108 but are part of a larger 
existential process of lines of force or energy that penetrate the body. Deleuze 
recognises that all matter possesses energy or forces, such as magnetic and thermal 
forces, and these effect or penetrate the body of the practitioner as they move through 
                                            
107 An ‘affect’ is described  in the preface to Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus (([1987] 
2004, p. xvii), translated by Brian Massumi, as a “prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage 
from one experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in the 
body’s capacity to act. L’affection (Spinoza’s affectio) is each such state considered as an encounter 
between the affected body and a second, affecting, body.” Elizabeth Grosz (2008, pp. 3-4) provides 
further clarity by differentiating ‘affects’ from a transcendental phenomenological tradition linking the 
body to outside forces that it experiences directly. Affects, Grosz states, attest to the body’s immersion 
and participation in nature, in chaos and materiality, as the non-human ‘becomings’ of man. 
108 As argued in Chapter Four, Deleuze finds support for his distributed model of sensation (some 
conditions of which extend beyond the nervous system into the flows and forces of the Earth itself) in 
the work of modernist painters such as Millet, Cézanne, Bacon and van Gogh. He describes how these 
artists illustrate the idea that the act of painting is, in some respects, the process of capturing the 
energetic forces of the world, giving a visible existence to the distributed processes and forces of the 
environment. 
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the world. The nervous system of the artist is thus distributed among the energetic 
and, crucially, non-human forces of the environment:  
 
[F]or a sensation to exist, a force must be exerted on a body, on a point of the 
wave. But the force is the condition of sensation, it is nonetheless not the force 
that is sensed, since the sensation ‘gives’ something completely different from 
the forces that condition it. … It is in this way that music must render non-
sonourous forces sonorous, and painting must render invisible forces visible. 
(Deleuze [1981] 2003, p. 56)  
 
[W]ith one face turned toward the subject (the nervous system, vital 
movement, ‘instinct’, ‘temperament’ – a whole vocabulary common to both 
Naturalism and Cézanne) and one face turned toward the object (the ‘fact’, the 
place, the event)… (Deleuze [1981] 2003, p. 34)  
 
What the artist paints, Deleuze ([1981] 2003, p. 35) maintains, is the ‘face’ of 
their temperament – a phenomenological instinct posited on a sensation that is the 
result of a force impacting upon the body – and their actions as they paint are built on 
this sensation. In this sense, the figure produced by the artist is always a sensible form 
related to the distributed sensation of the artist in an energetic environment (p. 34). 
Deleuze sees the rolling force of the mountains, captured by Cézanne in the form of 
lines or threads, as ‘affects’ which exert themselves upon the body, penetrating it, 
resulting in a sensation which is turned into an action by the temperament of the artist, 
and ‘fixed’ in the created image through the movement generating it. The image thus 
extends into the energies and forces of the environment that always have an impact on 
the movement and action of the painter’s body as they paint. 
In conflating the conventional distinction between the physical nervous system 
of the artist, the energetic forces of the environment and the phenomenological 
dimensions of consciousness, Deleuze (developing Klee’s analysis) sees the artist’s 
nervous system extending into the flows and energies of matter as threads or lines of 
force – that is, as an ‘affect’ that is part of a larger developmental system. Deleuze’s 
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concept of the distributed and extended aspects of sensation is influenced by his 
reading of the vitalist philosopher Henri Bergson (1859-1941), who, in maintaining 
that reality is constructed by matter that is co-constituted by a spiritual, vital 
dimension of its own, recognised that the sense organs were not the limit of human 
perception and mind. Bergson saw a much deeper immaterial extension of perception 
in the energetic matter of the universe as part of a larger developmental system.109  
Crucially, Bergson’s philosophy leads Deleuze ([1981] 2003) to propose an 
alternative conception of the ‘work’ of modernist painting, taking it beyond the 
traditional figurative interpretations and socio-cultural readings outlined in Chapter 
One. In extending the thought of artists such as Klee, Deleuze recognises that painting 
is the process of giving a visible existence to invisible phenomenological and 
environmental forces.110 The move toward abstraction and the figural through the 
reduction of recognisable content is not an attempt to discover the material ‘essences’ 
of a medium,111 but to attain or understand a new emerging model of existential 
sensation. Deleuze ([1981] 2003, p. 43) presents a way of getting closer to the 
creative processes underpinning a way of acting in (and ‘bringing forth’) the world 
directly by exhibiting, giving a visible existence to, the dynamic and affective forces 
and material conditions that underlie the process of depiction itself.  
                                            
109 For process philosophers such as Bergson, the body (including the sense organs and the brain) is not 
an epistemological and ontological domain that is separate from the external world; both body and 
brain constitute the same organism: “ Is it possible to conceive the nervous system as living apart from 
the organism which nourishes it, from the atmosphere in which the organism breathes, from the earth 
which the atmosphere envelopes, from the sun round which the earth revolves? … More generally, 
does not the fiction of an isolated material object imply a kind of absurdity, since this object borrows 
its physical properties from the relations which it maintains with all others?” (Bergson, [1911] 2007, 
p.11).  
110 Klee’s notebooks (1956, 1964) and his treatise, On Modern Art  (1948), reveal his primary focus on 
the study of the environmental processes that result in the form of lines and figures. In doing so, Klee’s 
approach left subjectivity aside in order to more fully understand these environmental processes and 
their role in the creation of visual forms. Although Deleuze cites Klee throughout much of his work, 
his use of Klee’s dictum “not to render the visible, but to render visible the invisible” includes the 
dimensions of phenomenology that Klee’s experiments placed to the side. 
111 A widely held conventional account of the modernist project, underpinned by a formal and 
materialistic conception of its work, which is outlined in Chapter One. 
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Deleuze’s analysis of artistic affective sensation provides an account of the 
environmental material processes of depiction which recognises the fusion of 
phenomenological and material/environmental processes and forces made visible in 
the work. Situating Deleuze’s thinking in De Landa’s (2000) and Shryock and Smail’s 
(2011) recent reconfiguration of the deep-time aspects of the late nineteenth-century 
study of human history gives his conception of painting a contemporary weight. As 
Deleuze describes, the painter experiences him/herself not as an autonomous, eternal 
essence, separate to the Earth, but influenced by distributed forces or ‘accidents’ not 
entirely under their control. These ‘accidents’, in the wider context of deep geological 
time, are understood as the geological and material forces of the environment, which, 
this chapter argues, a painting’s style and details express in some way.  
Deleuze’s existential and philosophical account of painting is, however, both 
hierarchical and teleological, in that it attempts to present the achievements of the 
painters of ‘high art’, such as Cézanne and Bacon, as the apotheosis of modernist 
painting. His account of modern sensation refers to the sensation of the artist,112 and 
unnecessarily treats painting as independent of the wider landscape containing the 
practices and techniques of the period. As Chapters Two and Three show, Warburg’s 
approach to the study of diverse materials of visual culture has allowed a broader 
analysis of how the details of human and non-human figures represented in painting 
(illustrated through his study of the figure of the nymph in the work of Manet) can be 
juxtaposed with the details of other visual materials to reveal the larger shared 
imaginary or ‘pathos formula’ (Rampley, 1997) of the period. In the context of 
Deleuze’s analysis, the ‘pathos formula’, described in the previous chapter as 
‘enactive’, can be further understood by rooting the body of the practitioner(s) in the 
                                            
112 This ‘auteurist’ approach is maintained throughout many of Deleuze’s works, most notably his two 
cinema works, in which his readings of film works are confined to Hollywood cinema, neorealism and 
the avant-garde. 
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wider affective environmental conditions of the period (in deep geological time), and 
as running in counterpoint to the material, environmental and geological processes of 
the self-organising model of the Earth, finding expression in the depiction of the 
human figure. 
 
5.5 The ‘affective’ details of The Luncheon on the Grass 
This chapter has argued that the properties (or features) of the environment are more 
like ‘qualities’ (following Ingold (2013)), taking on the shape of both the imaginary 
of the organism and what is revealed as possible in the constant ‘becoming’ of the 
environment. As the previous two chapters described, via the work of Merleau-Ponty, 
the properties of the environment and the activities and intentions of the organism are 
intermingled, constituting a new whole. In this sense, the discovery of a deep 
geological time does not change how the human being during this period acts and 
understands the world; rather, the notion of deep geological time itself emerges, is 
‘brought forth’, as a ‘hardening’ of the meshwork through a way of acting within the 
world. The notion of deep geological time is, in this sense, a manifestation, trace, 
confirmation or reminder of the always-embedded nature of the functioning and 
development of the human body in an active, responsive environment during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century.  
The ‘qualities’ of deep geological time (the active and responsive forces of 
matter) are not so much discovered as ‘brought forth’ as a part of an ongoing, self-
regulating system, expressed through painting. The movement and activities of the 
human being and the deeper study of geological materials run in counterpoint to each 
other: neither is primary but, rather, a knot within the larger tapestry of the 
environment. As Chapter Four describes, the specific stylistic details that Warburg 
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traced as animating the depiction of a group of river gods in Manet’s The Luncheon 
on the Grass (fig. 5d) reveal the enactive dimensions of the mind and perception of 
the painter coupled to the environment. The chapter highlighted three specific details 
of the transformation of this specific scene from its original depiction in the third 
century AD: their physical weight; the flatness and awkwardness of the composition 
of the image; and the ambiguous and ‘unfinished’ depiction of the environment. In 
this chapter, these ‘enactive accessories’ can now be read in terms of the affective 
dimensions of the energies and forces of deep time that impact upon the painter’s 
body and mind expressed through gesture, thus becoming ‘affective accessories’. 
Their study reveals the expressive nature of the affective dimensions of human 
activity that extends into the active and responsive meshwork, or environment, that 
always runs in counterpoint to the artist’s bodily movements. 
 If Warburg’s analysis of Manet’s The Luncheon on the Grass (fig. 5d) is 
studied in the context of deep time, the details of the human figures depicted can be 
understood as affective, manifesting a trace or reminder of the embedded nature of the 
human body, whose trajectory runs in counterpoint to the meshwork of their 
environment. The details are, in some way, expressive of the meshwork’s forces that 
‘affectively’ penetrate the practitioner’s body through being attended too. The 
depicted figures’ direct address to the viewer, their physical weight and grounded 
postures, their gestures and focus of attention on each other and the viewer, rather 
than on the gods of Olympus (as in the early depiction) are details animated in part by 
a dynamic and emergent distributed ‘pathos formula’ – a way of acting within the 
world that is always immersed within the activity of other organisms, materials and 
objects that make up the environment. The human body is embedded in the 
distributed deep-time aspects of the Earth, firmly situated in the flows and forces of 
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an active nature, and the flatness of the picture’s planes echo this, literally ‘flattening’ 
out the hierarchy between the human figure and their energetic environment, and 
between the ontology of both, situating them as intermingled with each other, a part 
of each other, the form of one a counterpoint to the form of the other. 
The move toward abstraction through the reduction of recognisable content in 
this example of modernist painting can be understood, in Deleuze’s terms, not as an 
attempt to discover the material ‘essence’ of a medium, but to attain (or understand) a 
new emerging model of distributed sensation. The ambiguous presentation of the 
background of the work, the ‘unfinished’ nature of the brush strokes, the thickness of 
the brush strokes used to paint the detailed forms (fig. 5e) present the context of the 
characters in an ambiguous and unreal manner: they evade a definitive interpretation. 
These aspects of the painting represent a ‘sterilisation’ of the context, removing it 
from immediate recognition by the viewer and the artist, promoting a perceptual 
reflection. In the wider context of deep time, the specific stylistic tendencies that 
reduce the context of the scene do so as a reminder that the human body is impacted 
on by the affective, unknown forces rooted in the deep geological time of the late 
nineteenth century, as a way of exhibiting and coming to terms with such forces. 
 
      
Figure 5d has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
 
            
 
Figure 5e has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
The recognition that the phenomenological body’s functions, experiences and 
activities are immersed in an active and responsive material world shows that what 
has been described as a ‘meshwork’ of trajectories and lines of ‘becoming’ is 
fundamental to an understanding not only of the development of the human body, but 
also of creative activity and how visual materials ‘come to mean’. The distinction 
between ‘human’ and ‘non-human’ blurs, as what is understood as being ‘human’ is 
always in counterpoint to what is understood as ‘non-human’, the forces, energies and 
resistances of matter. 
In understanding the mind, perception and creative activity as ‘affectively’ 
rooted within the forces, energies and resistances that impact on the body of the 
practitioner, ‘brought forth’ through movement, such forces can be more fully 
understood as expressed in images through their fusion with the practitioner’s 
phenomenology and temperament. The affective details of Manet’s transformation of 
the human figure (the nymph) illustrate how the transformation of the human figure 
depicted in painting or other visual materials over time reveals the expression of the 
phenomenological and environmental processes (or qualities) that underpin and run 
counterpoint to human gesture, expressed in part through the details of the figures 
depicted within images. 
The reflections upon body, mind and creative practice undertaken in this 
chapter through the study of visual materials from the nineteenth century can be 
extended to all periods of human history, as all human history emerges within a 
meshwork of its own. A depiction is not only an expression of the depth of the 
phenomenological perception of the artist and the expressive perception of the viewer 
(as argued throughout this thesis), but is also expressive of the depth of the affective 
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relationship with the meshwork that runs counterpoint. An accessory is an ‘affective 
accessory’ in two ways: first, as an expression of the affective dimensions of the 
environment, that underpin the gesture of the artist; secondly, as affective in the 
experience of the work — they modify the character of the perception of the viewer 
just as the viewer (affectively) modifies the character of the work (as Chapters One 
and Two have argued).  
Chapter Six will synthesise these aspects which underlie how an image ‘comes 
to mean’ (and continues to become) by exploring what will be termed the 
‘multidimensional depth’ of the image — the ‘bringing forth’ of an image, as well as 
the images’ meaning, through the knotting together of the phenomenological 
dimensions (or depth) of the artist, the phenomenological dimensions of the viewer, 
and the affective dimensions of the environment. 
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Chapter Six   
The ‘Multidimensional Depth’ of the Image: 
Body-Environment-Artefact 
 
 
Figure 6 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
 
The trajectory of this thesis began with an analysis of a four-panel comic strip 
depicting a partially ambiguous kitchen together with a semi-ambiguous human figure 
(fig. 6) as an illustration of its central focus. To re-iterate, the thesis argues that the 
perceptual experience of such a material involves an unavoidable dialogue between 
the artist’s phenomenological lived experience, as expressed in the details of the work 
itself, and the viewer’s expressive, phenomenological experience. Such a dialogue 
results in how a work such as a comic strip begins, and continues, to ‘come to mean’. 
The previous chapters have highlighted how the study of visual materials (such as the 
one above), particularly how they ‘come to mean’, entails a fuller account of the 
work’s phenomenological depth, which reaches into the lived phenomenological 
experience of both artist and viewer that is coupled to the energies and forces of an 
affective and responsive environment.  
In following this trajectory, the work of the chapters of this thesis culminates 
in what is now described as the multidimensional depth of the image, the features of 
which are described in more detail in this chapter. Within what Merleau-Ponty (1962) 
describes as a mind-body-world system, the multidimensional depth refers to a highly 
differentiated force field (of exchange and transfer), a meshwork, from within which 
an image emerges (or is brought forth) and is experienced; that is set up through the 
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movement of a phenomenological body(s) running counterpoint to an active and 
responsive environment. A force field that encompasses different topologies and 
causal orders of the body, environment and matter through which visual materials are 
brought forth and continue to become through different contexts in which they are 
experienced. 
The review of the literature undertaken throughout this thesis has revealed a 
central theme regarding the study of cultural artefacts (visual or otherwise): the 
gradual rejection of an anthropocentric, materialist, socio-cultural formal approach to 
the study of how visual materials mean.113 This came to light particularly in Chapter 
Five, which provided an alternative method of analysis: a non-linear approach to 
human history (De Landa, 2000) recognising that the active processes of the human 
body, mind, and the creation of social and cultural artefacts run in counterpoint to the 
active processes of the environment – the energy flows between geological, biological 
and genealogical materials – a self-organising system that is decisively historical. 
Such a model of human history now provides a wider philosophical and theoretical 
context in which the study of how visual materials come to mean, through a revised 
understanding of three central notions: the body, the environment and the artefact. As 
the central focus of this thesis has been upon how these domains (the body, 
environment and artefact) are intermingled within a larger mind-body-world coupling, 
the description of these domains will not aim to define them separately, rather it will 
explain them through an intermingled discussion — through each other.  
 
                                            
113 As seen at the start of the thesis, many approaches to the study of visual materials within art and 
design history and theory have focused primarily on the consumption of visual materials, using 
linguistic and semantic analysis, or social, cultural and economic network theories. As the work of 
Crowther (2013), among others, has demonstrated, to include the body shifts attention to the processes 
underlying the creation of the work, and includes the dimensions of phenomenology and perception in 
the experience of the works.  
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6.1 Body-environment-artefact 
Within the context of a mind-body-world system, what is understood as an ‘artefact’ 
of culture takes on a specific meaning. Following the work of Ingold (2013) the term 
‘artefact’ (material culture such as pots, baskets, tools) was seen in Chapter Five to 
refer to the processes of growth that ‘hardens’ to form the object, and not necessarily 
referring to a ‘designed artefact’ made by an intellectually agile human practitioner 
imposed upon an inert matter. Ingold’s (2010) thinking is now extended to more fully 
include visual materials, which are not ‘made’ but ‘grown’— brought forth within a 
field of forces and resistances that cut across the developing interface between the 
organism, environment and the materials being manipulated. This ‘growth’ of an 
artefact comes to express the strands of the meshwork within which it grows. Its form 
and style, as read within the depiction of human figures, in some way expresses the 
energy flows and transitions through which it is ‘brought forth’.  
To begin to more fully study the energy flows that are expressed within visual 
materials, this thesis adapts the term ‘image’, accounted for within the critical 
literature that surrounds Aby Warburg’s writing, which refers to the study of a visual 
(or textual) artefact as a trace or crystallisation of the embodied, phenomenological, 
psychological and philosophical energies underpinning the practitioner’s bodily 
movement. In the context of this thesis an image refers to the materialisation of such 
energies; it is an expression of these energies, an expression studied through the 
details of the human figure in diverse cultural materials. As the last two chapters 
highlighted, when the phenomenological body is recognised as coupled to an active 
and responsive environment, the energies expressed in the image can be seen to 
extend beyond the dimensions of the body into the processes and energies (an 
energised matter) of the environment. As such, the term ‘image’ comes to refer to an 
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expression or crystallisation of the embodied and affective environmental energies 
comprising the organism-environment system that underpins the movement expressed 
in the details of the human figures the image depicts. 
De Landa’s (2000) and Ingold’s (2010, 2011, 2013) use of the term 
‘meshwork’ refers to a deeper ecology and geology of the human body that is rooted 
in the geological, genealogical, biomaterial and environmental flows of energy 
transfer and exchange. This meshwork encompasses the trajectories of materials 
charged with forces and energies that are entangled (running counterpoint) to the 
trajectories of phenomenological bodies charged with subjective energies of their 
own. The term meshwork within the context of this thesis — within a mind-body-
world system — refers to a meshwork of forces and energies that flow through an 
entire self-organising organism-environment system, including the phenomenological 
body of the practitioner. The meshwork of energy flow and transition in a self-
organising organism-environment system constitutes the multidimensional depth of an 
image — a phenomenological depth of the artist as coupled to the materials and 
flows of the forces of matter and ecological and environmental energy transfers. The 
image emerges or is ‘grown’ through movement and activity that is animated by the 
processes and energy transfers of and between the phenomenological body and the 
environment. In this respect the image is an expression, in some way, of the meshwork 
of flows of energies and forces constituting a mind-body-world system. 
The meshwork that comprises the multidimensional depth of the image also 
involves the active, expressive, phenomenological depth of the perception of the 
participating viewer, a perception that is expressive of his or her own existential 
phenomenological experiences. The experience of, or encounter with, the image itself 
is an expressive, a ‘reciprocal interaction and modification’ (Crowther, 2012). In this 
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sense, the actualisation of an image is always ‘potential’ (Gamboni, 2000), in that it 
requires the fusion of what is already expressed in the work (the multidimensional 
depth of the image) with the expressive potential in the perception of the viewer — a 
reciprocal encounter that changes the character of both the perception of the viewer 
and the image.  
Artefacts (or more precisely the processes of growth) such as visual materials, 
once grown, continue to become, continue to grow, modified through the expressive 
perceptual experience of the present viewer. They act, as Malafouris (2007, 2013) 
describes, as a platform for cognition and perception to further develop through the 
very experience of them, a ‘signature’ of an ongoing process of becoming. How an 
image means is always emergent, and so too is its historical context and development; 
it is constantly being reconfigured and re-written in the context of the current 
perception and inquiry through which new details, contexts and non-linear histories 
are revealed or rather brought forth through each and every viewing. An image has a 
non-linear history that is always in a constant state of ‘becoming’, as such what it is a 
‘signature’ of is dependent upon how it is experienced. 
How an image ‘comes to mean’ as an expression of multidimensional depth 
becomes particularly visible through its analysis; it is expressed in the style or details 
of the human figure depicted, fixed as a trace of the movement of the artist’s body 
running in counterpoint to the meshwork or environment. Chapter Four has shown 
that the style of an image, seen in its phenomenological framework, is an expression 
of a way of acting within the world, as Crowther (2013) reveals, it has a 
phenomenological depth that can be studied through the way the artist modifies the 
subject-matter through the medium — through their brushwork, compositional 
strategies and application of paint. This becomes visible through the experience of 
 220 
certain features such as the strange, ambiguous and ‘awkward’ style of the human 
figure depicted as well as (following the writing that described Warburg’s art 
historical method) the quality of line, the physical weight of the human figures and 
environmental forms, as well as the brushwork.  
How the particular ‘style’ of an image comes to mean, in terms of its 
multidimensional depth, extends beyond an expression of the bodily-based 
phenomenological depth underpinning the artist’s movements and skill with the work 
(described by Crowther (2011, 2012)), to the expression of the transitions of energy 
flow (or ‘strands’) that comprise the meshwork or the environment in which the 
artist’s body is enmeshed; the geological, biological, material, social, 
phenomenological, multi-sensory, imaginary and experiential. The style of an image 
(the expression of the reciprocal activity of a subjective modification of subject 
matter) within the context of a multidimensional depth is an expression of a 
phenomenological bodily movement that is intimately bound up with, and running in 
counterpoint to, an active and responsive environment that is expressed through the 
movement that renders the style of what is depicted. 
The non-linear model of the development of the human body, mind and 
human artefacts constructed in this thesis is not limited to any particular period in 
history. The nineteenth century discovery and development of the concept of deep 
geological time (described in Chapter Five) can be extended to any period, as the 
phenomenological body is continually moulded and shaped in counterpoint to the 
emerging environment. Such a framework can also cover the creation of all images 
and other cultural artefacts over time, revealing other kinds of multidimensional 
relations through the study of the human figures depicted within them.  
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The multidimensional depth of the image is at once philosophical, artistic, 
perceptual, phenomenological, anthropological, archaeological, genealogical and 
geological, it requires the weaving and threading together of the multiple dimensions 
of a self-organising model of reality that each of these disciplinary approaches brings 
into focus. The study of the multidimensional depth of an image focuses not on what 
an image means, but on how it ‘comes to mean’, by exploring the energy flows and 
transfers that result in, or ‘harden’ into, its form, details and style. Asking how an 
image ‘comes to mean’ in this way reveals the perceptual, cognitive and experiential 
development of a historically contingent and emergent way of acting in the world as 
part of a self-organising meshwork of relations, as revealed in the traces or 
‘expressions’ left in its style and details. 
 
6.2 Tracing the multidimensional depth of the image(s) 
The following section undertakes a reading of the audio-visual and visual materials 
juxtaposed together that have been introduced throughout this thesis to reveal their 
multidimensional depth. These materials are juxtaposed together to study the human 
form presented by each of them, through an analysis of the details. The method 
undertaken thus follows the one undertaken within Aby Warburg’s Mnemosyne Atlas 
— juxtaposing diverse images is used here to study, not the form of the works 
themselves, but the energies and tensions that result in that form – that is: the 
multidimensional depth of the images which is found in the differences, 
contradictions and tensions expressed through the style of the depicted figures. The 
way the Mnemosyne Atlas is used in this reading differs from the descriptions of 
Warburg’s original intention, as described by Michaud (2007) and Rampley (1997, 
2001); a way of studying the embodied ‘pathos formula’ of a period (the bodily-based 
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energies, such as the psychologies, philosophies, beliefs and memories, of that period) 
that is fixed in the image. In contrast, the reading undertaken in this chapter focuses 
on a lived phenomenological experience that is coupled to the energy flows and 
transitions of a meshwork comprising geological, environmental and material forces.  
The reading is undertaken through an ‘aesthetic disclosure’, using Crowther’s 
(2013) phenomenological approach, through the perceptual experience of the 
juxtaposed works themselves. Recognising that such works always continue to ‘come 
to mean’ as part of the expressive perceptual experience of the viewer, the process of 
inquiry within this chapter attempts an analysis that does not intend to be exhaustive; 
rather, it explores the multidimensional depth of the juxtaposed images through 
tracing the possible non-linear histories of their development. This reading does not 
aim to add new knowledge to the histories of any of the works themselves, but rather 
to reveal, as a philosophical experiment, aspects of the multidimensional depth 
underlying how they come to mean. This is done to more fully appreciate these 
dimensions in the context of the study of the materials of visual culture for reflection 
within the discourse of graphic design. This reading does, however, aim to provide a 
new methodological approach to the study of such materials. 
6.2.1 The multidimensional depth of images 
The collection of visual materials used throughout this thesis are assembled and 
juxtaposed here in a Mnemosyne Atlas-style panel (fig. 6a). Visual and audio-visual 
material from between 1960 and 1970, drawn from across Europe and from different 
domains and practices, such as experimental and avant-garde film, advertising film 
and print advertising, each displaying contrasting ways of depicting human figures. 
The human figure, as it is represented across this collection of materials, is an 
‘aesthetically sterilised’ or ‘de-familiarised’, anonymous and unusual form, presented 
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from unusual points of view and in unusual or estranged contexts. The study of the 
animation of the details and style of the human figures reveals the multidimensional 
depth of these materials, a depth that extends into the phenomenology of both artist 
and viewer, as well as the affective dimensions of the environment.  
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Figure 6a has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
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The phenomenological depth (or presence) of the artist or practitioner is 
expressed through what cannot be visually represented: the relationship between the 
characters of the work that animates the depiction of their forms. This relationship is 
observable through the specific treatment of form and the sequence of shots, as in the 
portrayal of a conversation in a scene in the experimental film Moses and Aaron 
(1975) (plate D). The sequence of shots – and the angle of the camera – does not 
support the actual the conversation itself (the image track or narrative event), but 
rather the relationship between Moses and Aaron, which defies visual representation. 
The camera placement, with its extreme and unusually high angles and long shots 
supporting this relationship, paraphrases one event (the conversation) in a 
consequence of the event (the relationship); the resulting work (the unusual 
presentation of the human figure) expresses visually the un-representable 
phenomenological characteristic of the developing relationship between the two 
characters animated by the artist. 
The phenomenological depth of the work – the relationship between the 
characters – that animates the filmic form of Moses and Aaron, also animates the 
formal structure and characters of the advertising film, Music Teacher (1968) (plate 
D). The construction of the shots and the presentation of the mise-en-scène support 
not the narrative events of the image track (the lesson), but the soundtrack of the 
work, which shifts from an out-of-tune run of chaotic notes to the rendition of part of 
Bach’s Air on a G-string, a moment of calm. In this work, the rhythm of the image 
track (the formal sequence of shots) expresses visually a quality that the soundtrack 
expresses acoustically, an aesthetic shift from chaos to calm. The developing 
relationship between the teacher and his student is thus rendered sonorous. 
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The phenomenological relationships that animate the form and characters of 
film works, such as those of advertising and avant-garde cinema, are also of a 
different kind: they extend into the phenomenological depth of the presence of the 
active viewer. The figures’ direct address to the viewer in several of the advertising 
films for cigars and light bulbs (plate C) breaks the illusion of a self-contained filmic 
space by including the viewer within the reality of the work itself. The film is thus 
animated by the viewer’s presence as an active participant in the work – an active 
relationship that extends beyond the material form of the work into the depth of the 
phenomenological, reflexive, experiential and multi-sensory dimensions of the 
viewer.  
This direct address to an active viewer continues throughout the form of 
presentation in the other juxtaposed visual materials. As Chapter Two argued, the 
phenomenological depth of the viewer always shares (Gombrich, 1964) in the 
perception of ambiguous and unusual visual ephemera. Such an image is always a 
potential one (Gamboni, 2000), requiring actualisation through the expressive 
perception of the viewer. What is not expressed materially, through the minimal, 
ambiguous or strange presentation of visual forms, is always present and expressed 
perceptually in the multi-sensory, phenomenological experience of the viewer. The 
materials shown here, drawn from avant-garde film, advertising film (plates D and G) 
and a print advert for Capstan cigarettes (plate E), present the human figure in an 
estranged, anonymous, unusual and ambiguous way, delimiting its details, as well as 
those of the context and mise-en-scène. The presentation of the human figure from an 
unusual point of view or in an ambiguous manner emphasises the extension of the 
work into the expressive, multi-sensory, experiential phenomenological depth (or the 
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familiarity) of the viewer; the work itself always possesses a potential that can be only 
realised through the presence of the viewer.  
Such a reciprocal relationship between perceiver and perceived is illustrated in 
Beckett’s Film (1965) (plates A, B and I), in which the camera (or viewer) plays an 
active part in the choreography that takes place between the perceiver (the camera) 
and perceived (Buster Keaton), resulting in its filmic form. Beckett’s work represents 
a human figure that exists in a constant choreography or ‘theatrical game’, poised 
between the expressive and active perceiving ‘subjects’ of both the camera and 
Keaton. They constantly respond to each other’s movements, entangled in an endless 
choreography or dance of resistance and response (plate I). In this sense, neither 
Keaton’s nor the camera’s movements are independent: both can be seen to intimately 
respond to the other’s activities and movements, in a dance or a play through which 
the final form of the film itself is produced as the material expression of the 
choreography or relationship that plays out between perceiver and perceived.  
 The choreographic relationship between what is expressed (the work) and an 
expressive perception (the perceiver), a phenomenological depth that structures the 
form of Beckett’s Film, extends into another kind of depth, that of the affective 
objects of the environment and Keaton himself. As Keaton attempts to escape the 
perception of the viewer/camera, his movements also respond to an all-perceiving 
environment of objects, animals and images (plate A). A piercing and relentlessly 
direct address from the image of a staring God, Keaton’s reflection in a wall mirror, 
the gaze of a caged bird and the fixed ‘stare’ of the craftsmanship of a chair back all 
cause him to recoil, to try to avoid or cover up these agents that directly impact on his 
movement and activity. This affective relationship that is played out between 
Keaton’s movements, the always-perceiving environment and the camera/viewer is 
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expressed in the human figure, Keaton himself, whose movement and activities run in 
counterpoint, not only to others and visual materials, but to the forces, tensions and 
resistances of the material artefacts of the world; a human figure that is animated by 
an awareness of being impacted on and perceived by, and of responding to, the 
affective and responsive dimensions of the environment. 
The affective relationship(s) between the wider contexts of the environment as 
it impacts on human activity is rendered visible, or expressed, through movement; it 
animates the figures represented in the juxtaposed materials, each displaying a 
different kind emphasis according to the context in which the human figure is 
depicted. The advertising films for Hamlet cigars and Amstel beer (plates D and G) 
de-familiarise the environment (or context), which, in some cases, is not depicted in 
the scene at all. The movement and activity of the figures, such as the music teacher, 
are animated by what is materially absent – the context – which is only hinted at 
through movements such as a gaze directed outside the top right of the frame. In this 
way, the materially absent context is expressed as present in the form of the work as a 
force or energy animating the gestures of the figure from outside the frame.  
The materially absent context or environment is expressed in these works in 
another way. In the advertising films for Hamlet cigars, Amstel beer, Phillips lights 
and Philips portable televisions (plates D and G), a low-angle shot is used in which 
the human figure is estranged through their presentation from a strange and unusual 
viewpoint, along with the context surrounding the figure. The sparse and unusual 
presentation of the mise-en-scène – white space and partially depicted objects – 
‘aesthetically sterilises’ the context, reducing what is recognisable, and priming the 
potentiality of the image for actualisation through the phenomenological depth of the 
viewer. In this regard, the materially absent context, through its delimitation or 
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absence, is perceptually present (Noë, 2005) in the expressive experience of the active 
viewer. The context that surrounds the human figures in these works is de-
familiarised, or ‘made strange’, in order to present to the perception the form-giving 
processes of the environment or context that are expressed in the human figure. Just 
as Merleau-Ponty (1964) declares in relation to the painted figure, the environment is 
given visible expression through the depiction of the human figure, which awaits 
further reflection by the artist, filmmaker and viewer.  
These examples of mid-twentieth century visual culture reveal to perception 
and reflection the embedded nature of the human body, and its movement and 
activity, in an active and responsive material world – that is, in its context or 
environment. The development of the human figure depicted across these works is 
one in which the domains of the human and non-human, the boundaries of the body 
and the environment, begin to blur and cross. The Amstel Bier advert (plate H) begins 
by depicting a silhouetted figure emerging from a background of white space, with 
the boundary of the positive image of the human figure defined by the negative space, 
and vice versa. This symbiosis of the human body and the active affective aspects of 
the environment are also expressed in a print advert for Capstan cigarettes (plate E), 
in which the human figure is de-familiarised by presenting it as a collection of 
cigarettes that take the form of a face smoking a cigarette. The boundary between 
what is smoking and what is being smoked dissolves, the only recognisably human 
features – an eye, eyebrow and mouth – are presented as simple lines and circles 
emerging from a background of white space and smoke.  
The human figures depicted in these diverse visual materials present an 
expression of a multidimensional depth that extends into the phenomenology of the 
artist and the viewer, as well as into the affective depth of the materials, the flows and 
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forces of the objects of the environment. Juxtaposed in this way, these materials each 
reveal an aspect of the multidimensional depth of the meshwork in which they are all 
created, a meshwork of mid-to-late twentieth century Europe that includes the depth 
of the artist, the viewer(s) and the environment. The sterilised and de-familiarised 
style of the image, of both the human figure and its context, that is found in these 
materials is a momentary materialisation or ‘hardening’, to use De Landa’s (2000) 
term, of the ongoing self-organisation of reality; it is a momentary revealing of what 
Ingold (2000) describes as the constant weave of reality. In this respect, these 
juxtaposed works are all a trace or expression of a multidimensional depth, a 
meshwork that extends across the development of the body, mind and perception of 
their artists, filmmakers, illustrators and viewers and into the materials, objects and 
artefacts of their environment. The multidimensional depth of the human body, mind 
and activity is expressed in the material artefacts themselves through their style of 
presentation of the human figure, one in which the domains of the human and the 
material world blur into each other. The materials present, in many ways, a human 
figure that is fragile, malleable, dwarfed by the context of the environment and its 
distributed processes and materials. These works express an imaginary that animates 
their form, one that is shared by the artist, designer or filmmaker who expresses them, 
as well as by the audience or viewer(s) who experiences them. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusions and Further Research 
 
The thesis began by asking how the materials of visual culture, particularly within the 
context of graphic design, come to mean in terms of a complex relationship between 
the embodied experience of the artist and the embodied experience of the viewer as 
coupled to an affective environment. This question was posed so as to ‘thicken’ the 
study of visual materials within a graphic design context by, in the first instance, 
moving away from the framework of established models of communication to one of 
phenomenological expression. In order to make such a shift, visual materials must be 
studied as an embodiment or, more precisely, an expression of a way of acting within 
the world – an analysis in which the work is understood as an expression, not only of 
the phenomenological depth of the body of both the artist and viewer, but also of the 
affective dimensions of the material environment in which the phenomenological 
body is immersed. This expression does not stop at the level of the creation of the 
work, as the viewer’s experience of the work is also expressive. The work is thus 
always ‘becoming’, its meaning reframed by how it is experienced; it ‘comes to 
mean’ through a constant process of co-construction and modification, involving the 
phenomenological perceptual experience (or depth) of the viewer.  
Where graphic design’s study of visual communication adopts 
communicative, linguistic and semantic models of meaning-making to underpin its 
theoretical and academic tradition of analysis, as outlined in the introduction to the 
thesis, it does so at the expense of a fuller understanding and recognition of the 
crucial existential phenomenological dimension of human experience, which extends 
across bodily-based movement and activity to the active and responsive environment 
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in which this experience is immersed. In graphic design theories, the activity and 
experiences of the bodies of the designer and the viewer, and the complex relationship 
between the body, perception and the work, tend to be idealised. Images of popular 
visual culture, within a graphic design context, are more than linguistic, semantic and 
communicative objects, as this thesis demonstrates, they are also ‘expressive objects’ 
— a trace or expression of the movement of a phenomenological body, the 
development of mind and the environment in which the phenomenological body is 
always immersed. Images are an historical trace of the ongoing development of 
reality; they carry weight as historical, archaeological and philosophical objects. 
In focusing primarily on the consumption of visual materials (through 
communicative and semiotic analyses), graphic design’s theory of visual 
communication cannot fully appreciate the ontological integrity of images as a part of 
an organism-environment system. Images of graphic design are more than the 
successful communication of a given message as a part of a design brief. Their vitality 
and ontogenesis runs a lot deeper than that of a semantic process of reconstruction in 
a socially embedded model of consumption. They are an expression of the dynamic 
and ever-changing nature of human perception, cognition, imagination and bodily 
experience that is immersed in an environment that is itself always ‘becoming’. 
Images are an expression of an entire historically contingent and constantly changing 
reality. Rather than communicating messages, as communication theories of language 
maintain, images express the plurality of existing and possible worlds; they represent 
a potential (Gamboni, 2000), providing a platform or space for its actualisation in the 
expressive perceptual experience of them. 
When images carry import as part of a multi-dimensional, relational 
ontogenesis, the responsibility of the creative designer becomes more apparent – not 
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just to fulfil a brief or to communicate messages and meanings, but to more fully 
recognise their active part in the very ‘bringing forth’ of a reality. Whereas design 
focuses attention on social change and the co-construction of meaning through the 
consumption of designed artefacts (Barnard, 2005; Krippendorff, 2006), a far deeper 
process lies under its social surface, one that has a hand in the much larger process of 
world-making. Graphic design would benefit from the ideas of philosophers, media 
archaeologists, archaeologists and anthropologists to give depth to the ideas of its 
theoreticians and practitioners, not necessarily in the service of how design is 
currently comprehended, but to re-think what it means to ‘design’. Graphic design 
requires the existence of the speculative and the philosophical, the radical, the 
potential and the possible, alongside the practical and commercial. 
This deepening of graphic design theory would begin outside the inherited 
socio-cultural art and design history that seeks to describe designed materials in terms 
of design agendas or socio-political frameworks (Meggs and Purvis, 2006; Lupton 
and Miller, 1993). An orthodox history of art and design is a materialist, textual and 
human-centred history – one that, as Shryock and Smail’s  (2011) concept of ‘deep 
human history’ maintains, cannot describe the relational aspects of human activity 
immersed in an environment. The very artefacts of culture themselves are historical 
documents that contain the potential to reveal the deeper relations of human 
experience, mind and history – a history that is relational and non-linear (De Landa, 
2000) and, at one and the same time, archaeological (Malafouris, 2013), 
phenomenological (Crowther, 2013), geological (Shryock and Smail, 2011), 
genealogical and philosophical. Designed artefacts, specifically visual materials, are a 
crucial historical ‘document’ for the study of a non-linear human history, and give 
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current archaeological and anthropological approaches to the study of human history a 
fundamental depth and weight. 
A non-linear, deep history of design would begin by juxtaposing its theoretical 
materials with those of art history, archaeological history, genealogical history, the 
history of the mind and perception, and the history of painting and aesthetics, as well 
as geological history. This non-linear history would also be non-hierarchical, with no 
one discourse claiming priority over the others; rather, each ‘layer’ of reality that is 
described by each discourse is one among many layers that rely on each other and 
together constitute a plural reality. Such a non-linear history would not, however, 
discard linguistic, social and cultural histories, but rather, as in De Landa’s (2000) 
work, lend them added depth by giving them a place as part of a larger meshwork of 
other histories of geological change, biological transfer and genealogical shifts. In this 
meshwork’s processes and energy transfers, the social, cultural and political histories 
that underpin art and design would be re-configured through the inclusion of the 
micro-histories of the body, phenomenology, and matter, materials and the 
environment. 
More recent contemporary strands of cultural studies, such as Coole and Frost’s 
New Materialisms (2009), as well as the broader literature within which they are 
situated,114 provide a revised notion of the political and cultural that takes into 
account the domains of the corporeal and the material in the constitution of human 
artefacts, and by extension the human institutions in which they are created. In this 
context, Nigel Thrift’s Non-Representational Theory: Space, Politics, Affect (2008), 
provides a non-representational approach to the study of the humanities that proceeds 
from the process philosophy of Deleuze, resituating the conventional notions of 
                                            
114 Particularly the work of Donna Hardaway (2007), Jane Bennett (2009), and what has been described 
as the ‘post-humanities’ movement in the Minnesota Press, pioneered by the work of Isabelle Stengers 
(2010, 2011) 
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representation, perception and human practice (which underpin the discourses of the 
social and political) within the Deleuzian theory of ‘affect’. In the same vein, Jane 
Bennett’s Vibrant Matter (2009) questions the notions of ‘discourse’ and ‘knowledge’ 
that she claims focus too exclusively upon the domain of the human agent. Instead of 
focusing on ‘collectives’, conceived primarily as conglomerates of human designs and 
practices, which she identifies as the conventional meaning of ‘discourse’, Bennett 
argues for recognition of the active role of non-human materials – that is, the power 
of ‘vibrant’, active objects to affect human activity throughout public life.115  
A revised or deeper graphic design history and theory, therefore, would begin 
with the notion of a non-linear history, one that is geological, phenomenological and 
archaeological, in order to re-configure its own theoretical and philosophical heritage 
in wider philosophical and disciplinary contexts, putting the artefacts themselves at 
the centre of analysis rather than the socio-cultural networks in which the artefacts are 
created. Design academics, practitioners and theorists should undertake the task of re-
configuring, or deepening, the received history of design in a way that is 
archaeological, anthropological, geological and phenomenological – reading through 
artefacts rather than about them. In this way, design history and theory could, as 
Alesina and Lupton (2010) demand, begin to take account of the active dimensions of 
materials and materiality in the properties of stone, wood, metal, paint, paper and clay 
as they intermingle with the activity of the practitioner’s body. 
                                            
115 These approaches also echo, and utilise, the influential scholarship in the social sciences drawn from 
actor-network theory (ANT), primarily the work of Bruno Latour. Latour’s Re-assembling the Social 
(2007) and We Have Never Been Modern (1993) underpin many of the approaches in contemporary 
humanities that seek to redress the balance between human and non-human, society and science, and 
nature and culture. Such literature offers a renewed sense of the geographical and theoretical 
boundaries of the ‘political’ and ‘social’ – complementary to the idea of the ‘multidimensional depth’ 
of images put forward in this thesis – with which to reintroduce the political and social dimensions 
underlying the development of the materials of art and advertising. 
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The literature ranging across cultural anthropology and the ‘material 
engagement theory’ of archaeology provides rich ground on which to situate the 
domain of materiality in order to study crucial aspects of the development of the 
human mind and creative human activity. In particular, Christopher Tilly’s The 
Materiality of Stone (2004) provides an account of the phenomenological relationship 
between the practitioner and the materiality of stone in the creation of historical 
objects in the landscape, such as Neolithic monuments. Ian Hodder’s Entangled: An 
Archaeology of the Relationship Between Humans and Things (2012), meanwhile, 
provides a revision of the relationships between objects and humans, as well as 
between objects themselves, and reveals how the very materiality of everyday objects 
‘catches’ a human practitioner in an entanglement of immaterial dependencies which 
impact on the development of the human mind and activity. 
Situating the study of the development of visual materials within this corpus 
of literature would shift its focus to the multidimensional relationships between 
practitioner and materials that underpin an artefact’s creation: the materiality of paint 
in the activity of painting; the materiality of clay, putty and other malleable 
substances; or the materiality of pen, charcoal, paper and ink.116 James Elkins’ What 
Painting Is (2000) provides a vocabulary with which to describe the artist’s intimate 
relationship with the material of paint: he describes this relationship as an ‘alchemy’, 
bringing the chemical structure, smell and thickness of the substances used by the 
painter to the fore in the study of an artwork. More recently, some studies in the 
discipline of design have attempted to understand the active dimensions of the 
properties of matter and the materials used in creative practice, and how they affect 
                                            
116 It is also important not to overlook the wealth of literature in film studies and film theory which 
foreground the materiality of film in the practice and study of film form. Experimental and structural 
filmmakers such as Malcolm Le-Grice and Peter Gidal, as well as the Brechtian lineage of 
experimental filmmaking surveyed briefly in this thesis, provide a useful lens through which to study 
other creative practices. 
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human cognition, creativity and intuitive ‘designerly’ practice (Lupton, 2008). The 
author of this thesis has taken a philosophical step in this direction with a paper 
entitled, ‘Being Through Painting and Weaving: A Brief Commentary on Intuition’ 
(see Appendix 3), which uses the writings of Klee (mentioned briefly in this thesis) to 
propose a philosophical approach that would enable a more nuanced discussion of the 
active energies of matter, materials and the wider cosmos underpinning the human 
activity and movement involved in the creation of lines, images and material artefacts.  
Just as deep human history, cognitive archaeology, anthropology and 
phenomenology put the emphasis on the domains of artefacts and materials, regarding 
them as part of the cognitive and perceptual evolution of the human mind, so too 
should design. Just as phenomenology recognises the experiential, multi-sensory, 
subjective aspects of human experience as playing a co-constructive role in the 
creation of visual materials, so too should design. Just as anthropology recognises that 
human activity is not human-centred, that intention, design and creative activity is a 
more complex process, so to should design. Just as phenomenological film theory 
recognises the experience of works as expressive, so too should design. Just as 
Warburg recognised that images are a trace, or crystallisation, of a historically 
contingent way of being in the world, so too should design. Whereas film and 
painting have amassed a strong critical and theoretical grounding, graphic design’s 
critical and academic voice is still in its infancy – it was called into action during the 
1990s (Bierut et al., 1995) and has remained primarily rooted within post-structuralist 
discourses (Lupton and Miller, 1999). Design has a chance to begin to mature by 
shedding the hegemony of language and re-thinking its theoretical and philosophical 
heritage through deepening the understanding of what it means to do design. In order 
to do so, it should begin by asking more fundamental ontological questions about the 
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nature of the practice, asking not what design may mean but rather how design has 
and continues to ‘come to mean’.  
Graphic design would benefit from a mutual collaboration with other 
discourses, such as those of archaeology, anthropology and art history, as a way of 
deepening its own intellectual heritage. Where this undertaking may already be taking 
place, the mutual collaboration would not simply focus on the incorporation or 
adoption of other methods and techniques in order to expand its own agenda, but 
would provide the opportunity to reflect on the inherited axioms of the history of 
design itself. Archaeological notions akin to ‘material engagement theory’ 
(Malafouris, 2013) and revised historical approaches such as that of deep history 
(Shryock and Smail, 2011) provide a contemporary archaeological approach that can 
be brought to bear on the study of the history and theory of design. The result would 
be a ‘deep history’ of design that reconfigures the inherited nineteenth-century 
philosophy by placing the domain of materials at the centre of analysis through a 
renewed scientific and philosophical approach to design. In turn, design and the visual 
arts could offer a renewed voice to archaeology through the inclusion of subjectivity, 
the concept of the imaginary and the multi-sensory realms of experience.  
The archaeological and geological approaches to human history and creative 
activity point to the importance of widening the theoretical and philosophical heritage 
of the late nineteenth century, and particularly to recognition of the plurality of 
‘modernisms’ that arose during this period. Gamboni (2000) brings a psychological 
and experiential depth to the visual arts, while Shryock and Smail (2011) provide a 
geological and archaeological revision of history; both shift attention away from 
rational human history to a history of the relational and environmental. The work of 
De Landa (2000) and Ingold (2011) provide anthropological and non-linear 
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approaches to this task. In this context, Rosalind Krauss and Yve-Alain Bois in their 
work of art history, Formless: A User’s Guide (1997) and David L. Martin’s Curious 
Visions of Modernity: Enchantment, Magic and the Sacred (2011) attempt to reclaim 
the visual from the postulates of a scientific modernism in the study of cultural 
artefacts by appealing to the unconscious, magical and phenomenological. 
Both the works of Krauss and Martin take their methodological lead from the 
literary theorist George Bataille’s notion of the ‘formless’,117 described in his 
Documents 1 (1929), which presents the study of artistic and cultural artefacts in 
terms of the heterogeneous aspects of culture – that of the spiritual, unconscious, 
magical, enchanting and sacred – that are belittled, forgotten or repressed by a 
homology of rational and scientific thinking. Krauss’ and Bois’s, and Martin’s, use of 
the term ‘formless’ shifts the focus from the exclusive study of form to the tracing of 
the formless: that is, the heterogeneous, unconscious and metaphysical processes that 
result in form and that are not reducible to socio-cultural or scientific analyses. The 
inclusion of the writing of Klee in the later chapters of this thesis provides the thread 
by which the study of the metaphysical, formless approaches of Krauss and Bois, and 
Martin, can be woven into the context of graphic design.  
The extent of Klee’s metaphysical and process-orientated account of the 
human and human creative activity during the late modern period, revealed through 
the writing of Deleuze (1981) and Merleau-Ponty (1964), which support Klee’s 
writing, teaching and work, is not fully accounted for in graphic design studies and 
                                            
117 “A dictionary begins when it no longer gives the meaning of words, but their tasks. Thus formless is 
not only an adjective having a given meaning, but a term that serves to bring things down in the world, 
generally requiring that each thing have its form. What it designates has no rights in any sense and gets 
itself squashed everywhere, like a spider or an earthworm. In fact, for academic men to be happy, the 
universe would have to take shape. All of philosophy has no other goal: it is a matter of giving a frock 
coat to what is, a mathematical frock coat. On the other hand, affirming that the universe resembles 
nothing and is only formless amounts to saying that the universe is something like a spider or spit.” 
(Bataille, [1929] 1985, p. 31) 
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history. Although Klee’s famous dictum (art does not render the visible, but renders 
visible the invisible, energetic processes of the body, atmosphere, environment and 
matter that give rise to form) is found within his teaching notes during his time within 
the Bauhaus ([1956] 1961, p. 76) his contribution to the history of design is 
conventionally situated in the ideology of the functionalist turn of the Bauhaus 
(Lupton and Miller, 1993, 1999) imposing an ideological frame onto his visual 
experiments. The deepening and widening of the geographical and theoretical 
boundaries of the early twentieth century provided by this thesis facilitates a re-
reading of the thought of artists and designers such as Klee in their own terms, in 
ways that underpin many aspects of the history and theory of design, including that of 
graphic design and visual communication.  
Applying a more focused re-reading of Klee’s writing in the wider 
philosophical and theoretical context of the early twentieth century would illuminate 
an aspect of the deeper history and development of the discourses of design during 
this period – as entangled across other discourses, philosophies and practices. An 
archaeological, anthropological and philosophical design history that proceeds not 
solely from the intentions of a design agenda as found in the written documents of its 
practitioners and thinkers (for example, the positivist history of design found in the 
functionalist turn of the Bauhaus), but from a study of created objects and images that 
traces within them the multidimensional depth of the human mind (as Shryock and 
Smail (2011) do in their revision of historiography).  
The approach to the study of the materials of visual culture provided by this 
thesis allows for a fuller discussion of the multidimensional image. In the same way 
as the work of Klee provided an impetus for this thesis, such a revision would begin 
to take seriously the multidimensional depth of the human body, mind and creative 
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activity as an object of study, as well as the visual materials created within the 
multidimensional depth that underpin the development of design history and theory. 
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Coda 
On the Line: A Philosophy of Design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Point is cosmic, a primordial element. Things on earth are 
obstructed in their movement; they require an impetus. The primordial 
movement, the agent, is a point that sets itself in motion (genesis of 
form). A line comes into being. … [The] active line develops freely. It 
goes for a walk, so to speak, aimlessly for the sake of the walk. (Klee, 
[1964] 1970, p. 105) 
 
Klee, in his notebooks, describes the process – which begins shortly after the 
application of a pencil or, indeed, any other pointed tool – of a line coming into being. 
From the point to a line requires dynamic movement from point A to point B. All 
things on earth are obstructed in their movements. Each force or movement always 
requires an opposing force; these resistances, tensions and impetuses are the 
oppositions that beget dynamic movement. By musing on a simple line, a multi-
dimensional and ‘formless’ understanding of reality opens up to the artist.  
 Movement requires impetuses or forces from both within and without. Klee 
conceived of the growth of a line as analogous to the growth of a seed, in which the 
impetus to grow is not confined to the boundary of the organism’s skin, but is also 
external – an impetus that arises from the organism’s relationship with the earth and 
the atmosphere (Klee, [1964] 1970, p. 29). The nervous system of a seed has 
extensions into the air and space and deep into the soil: seed, air, space and soil are 
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interdependent. In the same way, in developed organisms, the functions of nutrition 
and respiration are interdependent. A broader nutritional base gives rise to large 
respiratory organs, while greater breathing space enlarges the nutritional organs (p. 
31). The nutritional value of the environment allows the organism’s structure to grow 
and enlarge, and this growth, in turn, requires greater nutrition, relying upon new 
sources of nutritional value. The impetus to grow is thus neither exclusively internal 
nor external; it is both. 
The line develops in its own time, through the processes that give it form: the 
line goes for a walk, for the sake of the walk. In reading, the eyes follow the same 
path. The line’s ‘walk’ emerges through dimensions so numerous and of such 
importance that a line, mark or image is not wholly a construction, it is a rather a 
composition (Klee, [1948] 1964, p. 43) – a composition of multi-dimensional form-
giving processes bearing down on the movement that ‘brings forth’ the line. Art, lines 
and images, for Klee, do not render the external visible word, but rather render visible 
the multi-dimensional form-giving processes, and the oppositions, resistances and 
tensions, emanating from both the body and the material world, within which 
movement is entangled. An insistence upon the study of form in isolation severs its 
vital connection to the multi-dimensional form-giving processes that gave rise to it.  
Lines are metaphysical and physical, cosmic and environmental, physical and 
gestural; they are an expression of form-giving processes that are contextually and 
historically contingent. The line, just as the seed, is ‘grown’ through energetic and 
metaphysical processes simultaneously belonging to different and multiple 
dimensions: the dimensions of the optical, physical and cosmic; of the body, mind, 
pencil and canvas; of the air and atmosphere. The thickness of the paper or canvas, 
the brittleness of the pencil, the temperature of the room, the ambient sounds, the 
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temperament or fatigue/energy of the body – all these are a meshwork of 
metaphysical ‘desires’ or energetic forces, a composition of energetic potentials, a 
weaving together of lines of ‘becoming’ (Deleuze, 1981). Klee places value in these 
form-giving processes or entanglements of lines that take the nervous system beyond 
the boundary of the body and across the multiple dimensions of reality.  
 
 
Figure 7 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
 
 
For Klee ([1964] 1970, p.53), the artist (or organism) is so immersed in a 
meshwork of energetic lines of force and power that a representation of the artist as 
they really are would result in such a “bewildering confusion of line” the depiction 
would be almost beyond recognition. The processes of the body, cosmos, air, water 
and soil extend the nervous system of the artist, and their movement, activity and 
creativity, along invisible lines that cross multiple dimensions. The Ph of the human 
nervous system (fig. 7) – a mixture of chemicals that resolve into a stable solution – is 
one among many mixtures of processes that exist in multiple dimensions, flowing 
beyond the confines of the skin and the skull, beyond even the confines of the image 
as it attempts to capture them. Such a bewildering confusion of lines, or entanglement 
of form-giving processes, is so complex that pure elementary representation cannot do 
its complexity justice.  
Klee’s bewildering confusion of lines is a non-linear account of the human 
body, a body that ‘becomes’ out of an entanglement of many dimensions of reality – 
the metaphysical processes of the body, the environment, the atmosphere and the 
cosmos. A history of the line is also non-linear. According to Klee (1948, p. 45), the 
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artist, creator or practitioner is a philosopher, not a realist critic who places intense 
importance upon the critique of the final form or on the study of the ‘best’ possible 
world, the ‘best’ possible representation of nature or natural forms. The artist places 
value instead on the powers that do the forming, holding this world to be but one 
among many possible ones – a world that undergoes ‘Genesis eternal’, never 
complete, ‘always becoming’ (p. 45). On other stars, creation – as a form-giving 
process – may have produced different results. Creativity itself produces many 
worlds. So too do artists. 
Klee ([1964] 1970, p. 269) constructs an “elementary theory of creativity”, in 
which human subjectivity is but one of many impetuses that form the creative process 
of the painter or practitioner. Bodily subjectivity is immersed in the active and 
responsive processes of the environment. Klee focuses not on the final form of a 
work, but on the very creative processes of ‘form-giving’, which include energies and 
forces that are seemingly external to the human body, yet, also penetrate it. The 
body’s movement and growth, and those movements that result in depiction, are open 
to penetrating and form-giving forces that are not of the body, in much the same way 
as the complex forms of Klee’s ‘sand figures’ emerge from the process of running 
sound waves through layers of sand.  
The designer – as a creator, philosopher and artist – should also place value on 
the processes that give rise to form. Design, as an activity, as movement put into 
motion, is not simply a process of imposing a form, an idea, upon matter, nor does it 
comprise the communication of a message ‘contained’ within the form. The 
movements that result in the designed form require many impetuses, encounter many 
resistances and frictions, and have multiple extensions into the air, soil, atmosphere 
and cosmos. The act of a designed creation is thus a lot more complex and 
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unpredictable than is conventionally assumed. The creation of a design is not wholly 
about form, but about the form-giving processes that result in the form; and within the 
form itself, the form-giving processes continue to meet the processes through other 
perceptions, other bodies and other environments. For Klee, the modern insistence 
upon the study of pure form severs it from the vital and metaphysical form-giving 
processes that give rise to it, as well as those that continue to animate it – the 
processes, resistances and forces of dimensions that are not wholly of the body, but of 
the environment, the soil, the atmosphere and the cosmos.  
 
For Klee, the study of form is death. The study of form-giving is life. 
 
Life for Klee is formless.  
 
So is creativity. 
 
As is design. 
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A BRIEF HISTORY AND THEORY OF NOT LOOKING: 
TOWARD A FIELD THEORY OF THE AUDIOVISUAL 
Martyn Woodward 
martyn.woodward@plymouth.ac.uk 
During the 1960s, the constructivist approach to vision and visuality 
broke free from the dominant culturally and historically relative 
models (as championed within Semiotics and Feminist theory) to 
involve the human agency of the body thus proposing a biological 
model of vision. The Biological framing of vision attempted to discard 
a culturally and historically relative model of vision in favour of 
models which involved the body as a site of meaning, thus bringing 
the body back into the framing of vision, taken away by the previous 
linguistic turn. Within this biological framework, it is the whole body 
that supports and maintains the spectacle of vision. However, within 
Ecological and Enactive approaches to perception, it is argued that 
perception is not embedded in or constrained by either the body or the 
surrounding world, but together in a reciprocal, emergent specification 
and selection. A biological model of vision then must move beyond 
the body or the environment to involve an enactive approach to vision, 
that neither privileges the body or the environment. This paper 
addresses the authors’ insight into the implications of an enacted 
cognition (and visions role within such a system) on traditional views 
of vision from constructivist, biological and phenomenological 
standpoint and its implications to the visual arts. It traces the 
conceptions of vision historically from a linguistically defined 
culturally relative model of the early 1960s, through a constructivist 
biological model of the late 1960s, which focussed on the body as the 
site of meaning, to Recent enacted models of perception, that privilege 
neither the body or the environment as a site of meaning. The Enacted 
model is unpacked and a model of perception in which the role of 
vision, and thus its very nature, is questioned and established.  
Introduction
This paper addresses the author’s insight into the implications of an enacted 
model of perception and cognition, in particular the role of ‘vision’ within 
such a system, on traditional views of vision, and how the term ‘visual’ is to 
be understood in light of such enacted models. It is argued that in light of the 
enacted models of perception, models of vision (or looking) that have existed 
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prior to enacted models, such as culturally relative (Mulvey 1975) and 
biological (Bryson 1989, Gombrich 1960) privileging either a linguistic 
cultural layer or the body as a site of meaning, respectively, lack a 
fundamental move toward an enacted model of perception and vision which 
privileges neither. This paper’s focus is to outline a model of enacted 
‘looking’ that it argues opens our eyes to the ways that have prevented us 
from looking for so long. Drawing from constructivist, biological and 
phenomenological standpoints, it traces the conceptions of vision historically, 
starting from the linguistically defined, culturally relative models of the early 
1960`s, in which culturally defined models of vision and the visual, such as 
Laura Mulvey’s male gaze (Mulvey 1975), assume a model of vision and 
visual perception to be constructed from social/cultural codes and signs, such 
as feminine sexuality, shaping perceptions and representations of reality. The 
culturally relative models are later denounced by a constructivist view of 
vision, in which a biological framing of vision was proposed (championed by 
Ernst Gombrich and Norman Bryson), focussed on bringing the body back in 
the frame as the site of meaning in itself, which was disembodied and 
forgotten through focus on language of the cultural relative models. With 
support by phenomenological models of vision drawn from the 
phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty during the late 1960s, the biological 
models took vision away from the objective clutches of the cultural and 
social theorists, that had shaped perception and vision to this point, and re-
instated the body as an active site of meaning in the structuring of visual 
representation. The focus then shifts to recent enacted models of perception, 
(such as Varela 2001) in which it is maintained that within human perception 
we cannot privilege either the body or the environment as an independent site 
of meaning, but must attend to both as a reciprocal specification. The enacted 
models present an intriguing model for the visual arts, in which the role of 
vision itself, and its very nature within such a system, needs to be questioned 
and rethought to move beyond the biological framing proposed by the 
constructivists. As such, this paper insights a move from the ‘visual’ as 
known through current models of vision, toward a theoretical enacted model, 
in the process reclassifying the notion of the ‘visual’ and the nature of 
‘vision’ within this enacted structure, which will be outlined here as the 
‘audiovisual’. 
Looking and the Visual 
During the 1960s, active constructivist artists and academics set about to 
challenge a rising dominant linguistic model of visual experience and 
visuality that saw perception (specifically models of the visual and visuality) 
as being shaped by socially defined cultural codes. The cultural relativity and 
historicity of vision thesis has become a widely accepted axiom for visual 
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studies and art history since the philosophical Linguistic Turn of the early 
20th Century, championed by the rise of social studies, feminist theories and 
semiotics (Kesner 2009, pp.266-273). Within the culturally relative thesis, 
visual perception is seen to be conventionally, historically and socially 
constructed as part of a linguistic based conception of reality. These relative 
models of vision, such as Laura Mulvey’s Male Gaze (Mulvey 1975) which 
argues that the gender determined Hegemonic Male Gaze of early Hollywood 
cinema is founded through culturally constructed codes of Sex, Femininity 
and spectatorship (Mulvey 1975), shape visual perceptions and 
representations of reality. In such a model, Mulvey argued, the female 
appearance within early cinema was coded in such a way to connote a to-be-
looked-at-ness through strong visual and erotic impact they portray on screen 
(Mulvey 1975), thus moulding a representation of reality in which the female 
appearance plays to the male gaze, placing the spectator in the seat of a 
masculine subject position. Such culturally relative Theories assumed that 
vision and visuality have a culturally defined history; that there exists 
specific culturally and historically constructed modes of perception, that are 
virtually undisputed in disciplines concerned with visual experience (Kesner 
2009). As such, the relative models see visual experience as being 
constructed as part of a set of cultural and historical codes that exist 
independently of direct human perception, shaping human perception and 
representations of reality to be linguistically defined. 
The relativity of vision thesis was strongly contested by constructivist 
theorists such as Ernst Gombrich and Nelson Goodman during the late 
1960`s, at a time when major advancements in the Biological Sciences had 
begun to build Biological models of the mind. Questions began to arise about 
the possibility of a Biological foundation to perception, the arts and 
experience itself. In particular, Ernst Gombrich amassed overwhelming 
evidence to show how the way we see and depict depends upon and varies 
with experience, practice, interests and attitudes (Goodman 1968) Gombrich 
focussed on the intentionality and desire of human nature, and as such, took 
exception to the assumption that we can construct vision independently of 
our own biological `nature`, and championed a biological framing of vision, 
and what he calls human `Nature`, that he argued lies beyond the culturally 
relative thesis. Gombrich maintained that the use and critique of cultural 
codes has shaped our perception of, and representations of, reality through 
vision thus ignoring the Biological foundations of vision, itself rooted within 
our own bodily experiences. (Gombrich 1960) To Gombrich, there can be no 
‘innocent eye’, (Gombrich 1960, p.307) no eye that is merely passive in its 
perception of cultural codes, the eye is always historical and relative to the 
body that it belongs to, to its own biology, and perception is no different. He 
set out to rethink the issue of conventionality and historicity of vision and 
visuality itself from biological foundations, thus moving beyond the 
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Culturally Relative thesis. This notion in subsequent years, however, became 
a target of major criticism and regarded as irrelevant by those who followed 
critical studies, feminism and semiotics that were steadily advancing the case 
for the relativism and social determination of vision. (Kesner 2009) With this 
large advancement in the cultural relative stance, the `natural` biological 
models championed by Gombrich and Bryson, became more and more 
irrelevant as they ignored the fundamental culturally deterministic nature of 
the popular relative models. In the 1990s, Gombrich began to openly 
denounce cultural relativism, which he saw as plaguing humanities and 
cultural studies, in which he begins to openly argue the problem of the 
Relativity of vision in light of a theory of the biological foundation to art; 
Our Biological inheritance consists less of overt traits than of 
dispositions which can be developed or atrophied in the life of the 
community [...] I am convinced that the visual arts rest in similar 
ways to Biological Functions. (Gombrich 1987 pp.695-696; cited 
in Kesnar 2009) 
It is the very question, of the biological rooting of vision, that was a major 
focus of the art historian Norman Bryson in his book ‘Vision and Painting`. 
Bryson too, found issue with the cultural relativity of vision and visuality, 
claiming that the act of vision / visuality or looking, must amount to more 
than the sum of a coded system signs can reveal, it is rooted, supported by 
and contingent to the whole of the body`s experience. In his critique of the 
reductive nature of painting and vision within Western painting, (Bryson 
1989) he sets out a clear division between our mediated way of looking at the 
world through a Gaze, and our `natural`, biological method of the Glance;  
The logic of the Gaze is subject to two great laws. The body (of 
the painter, of the viewer) is reduced to a single point, the macula 
of retinal surface; and the moment of the gaze is placed outside 
duration. Spatially and temporally the act of viewing is constructed 
as a removal of the dimensions of space and time, as a 
disappearance of the body. (Bryson 1989, p.96) 
Bryson sets up the Gaze as his reading of the cultural relativist model, the 
Gaze (a linguistically constrained model) reduces the moment of experience, 
what he calls the Deixis – a carnal form that points back directly to the bodily 
experience of the perceiver (Bryson 1989, p.88), and places it outside of the 
direct bodily experience of space and duration, thus removing the body as a 
site of meaning; 
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Western Painting is predicated on the disavowal of deictic 
reference on the disappearance of the body as site of meaning. 
(Bryson 1989, p.89) 
Bryson argues that this disappearance of the body, and the subsequent 
suppression of Deixis, operates by abstracting from the physical practice of 
painting (and of viewing) to the linguistic code, severing the body from its 
labour; the body is reduced to an optical autonomy. Thus, viewing through 
the Gaze is constructed outside of the viewers / painters own dimensions of 
space and time, it becomes a cultural code, losing its original Deicitc (or 
carnal) references and ignoring the body as a site of meaning in itself. In 
contrast, the concept of the Glance aims to put the body, complete with its 
own dimensions of space and time, back into the picture. In contrast, the 
‘Painting of the Glance addresses vision in the durational temporality of the 
viewing subject, it does not seek to bracket out the process of viewing nor [..] 
does it exclude the traces of the body of labour’ (Bryson 1989, p.94)  
The Glance addresses vision as a part of the durational temporality of the 
subject, and is indistinguishable from it. The Glance is a sideways look from 
an always passing viewer, whose attention is always elsewhere. It is a glance 
at a world thorough a body that is existing in its own space and time, for 
itself, and as such, has its own Deixis, its own reading. Against the Gaze, the 
Glance proposes desire, it proposes the body, in the duration of its practical 
activity (Bryson 1989, p.122), and these are the terms that the tradition of the 
Gaze seeks to suppress. It is the painting/viewing of the Glance, as appose to 
the Gaze, that points to a biological foundation of vision; one that is not 
detached from the body’s duration and temporality, one that is contingent to 
its techniques and does not exclude any trace of its labour.  
Resting upon a relativity of vision thesis, it is clear that from the suggested 
biologically focussed standpoint that vision and the visual lie beyond a 
cultural and historical determination. To focus upon a cultural relative model 
of vision is to deny the body`s own temporality and existence in structuring 
vision. Within this framework, the act of looking becomes akin to tunnel 
vision, a focussing on a subject whilst filtering out the surrounding `goings 
on` of the body`s existence and temporality. In understanding vision in a 
culturally relative framework, the eye becomes dis-embodied, the bodily act 
of the Glance, and the structuring of vision within this bodily act, is reduced 
to that of the Gaze in which the body, with its own temporality and history, 
disappears. We cannot, then, understand the complex sense we have of our 
environment purely through the activity of the disembodied eye of cultural 
relativism.  
269
111     A BRIEF HISTORY AND THEORY OF NOT LOOKING       
 
The Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty argues such, that `looking` must be 
fully integrated within the kinaesthetic and tactile dimensions of experience;  
Our own body is in the world as the heart is in the organism; it 
keeps the visible spectacle constantly alive, it breathes life into 
it...and with it forms a system. (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p.235) 
To Merleau-Ponty the body in the world supports and maintains the spectacle 
of vision. Vision cannot be detached from the sensing body in its world as a 
system; as such vision cannot be dis-embodied and understood in isolation 
from the system, as the system itself maintains it. Vision then is more than 
just the visual, it the aural, it is the tactile, it is the kinaesthetic, it is the 
temporal. Vision is supported by the rest of the sensing body; to look is to 
experience with all your being. The body is fundamental to systems of 
`natural` looking, to Glancing. The mediation of our experience through 
culturally relative models of vision, remove the active body from the 
dimension of vision and the visual. To deny the body its role in looking is to 
view the world through a tunnel vision, to detach the eye from its tactile and 
temporal bodily existence.  
The constructivist approach to vision aimed to break from a culturally 
relative model of vision and pull it back to involve human agency involved 
with a biologically rooted model of vision. The biological framing of vision 
(proposed by Gombrich and Bryson) attempted to discard a culturally and 
historically relative model of vision in favour of a triadic model that was 
rooted within the biological nature of human existence which involved the 
body as a site of meaning. Within this framework it is the body that supports 
and maintains the spectacle of vision, a body that constitutes much more than 
the visual – a synaesthtetic model of vision. However, within ecological and 
enactive approaches to perception, (Stoffregen 2003, Varela et al. 1993) it is 
argued that perception is not embedded in or constrained by either the body 
or the surrounding world, but together in a reciprocal, emergent specification 
and selection. A biological model of vision, then, must move beyond the 
body to involve an enactive approach to vision, that neither privileges the 
body or the environment. 
Looking beyond the Visual 
The enactive approach to perception (Varela et al. 1993) maintains that 
perception and action (sensory and motor processes of the whole body) are 
fundamentally inseparable within lived cognition, the action of the whole 
body in the environment structures perception and cognition. Its roots can be 
traced back to the Aristolean notion of ‘Aisthesis’, in which it is argued that a 
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‘more balanced attention be paid to all our corporeal sensorial sensations in 
daily life, not merely the (audio-) visual’ (Verrips 2006, p 29). Such models 
of perception do not privilege any of the sense faculties over any other; 
instead, the individual senses are re-categorised and put on the same plane of 
importance, forming an indivisible whole in which they are all considered 
equal. Re-considered from the point of view of their interplay, the sensation 
of touch is considered to be the most fundamental of the ‘senseations’, 
(Aristotle 1986, p.183) as it not only forms the conditions of our survival 
(reproduction and defence), but can also be traced to be associated with all 
the other senses1. Jojada Verrips (2006) recognises the tactile nature of 
perception as a whole, taking this notion of Aisthesis in its original form to 
argue that if we were to pay attention to our entire sense experience rather 
than the Western dominance of the (audio-)visual, we would discover that 
our experience is predominately tactile in nature, that our whole sense 
experience is reducible to tactility (Verrips 2006). The Enactive approach to 
perception, resting upon similar ground, recognises this tactility of the body 
and also incorporates the subsequent external influences of the environment 
upon the tactile body. This approach consists of two main points: (1) that 
Perception consists in perceptually guided action and that (2) cognitive 
structures emerge from the recurrent sensi-motor patterns that enable action 
to be perceptually guided (Varela et al. 1993). The action of the tactile body 
in the world guides perception, and this `enaction`, forms our basic cognitive 
structures. The enactive approach to perception is a reciprocal specification 
of organism and environment, the tactility of the environment and the body 
as a whole form this specification, this was a central insight in Merleau-
Ponty`s early works, in which: 
[...] The properties of the object and the intentions of the subject 
[...] are not only intermingled: they constitute a new whole. When 
the eye and the ear follow an animal in flight, it is impossible to 
say `which started first` in the exchange of stimuli and responses. 
Since all movements of the organism are always conditioned by 
external influences, one can, if one wishes, readily treat behaviour 
as an effect of the mileau. But in the same way, since all the 
stimulations which the organism receives have in turn been 
possible only by its proceeding movements which have culminated 
                                                     
1 Aristotle, De-Anima (On the Soul) ‘Hence it is that taste also must be a sort of 
touch, because it is the sense for which is tangible and nutritious’ (Aristotle 1986, 
p.601). ‘I call by the name of special object of this or that sense that which cannot be 
perceived by any other sense than that one and in respect of which no error is 
possible; in this sense colour is the special object of sight, sound of hearing, flavour of 
taste. Touch, indeed, discriminates more than one set of different qualities’ (Aristotle 
1986, p.567) 
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in exposing the receptor organ to external influences, one could 
also say that behaviour is the first cause of all stimulations. Thus 
the form of the excitant is created by the organism itself, by its 
proper manner of offering itself to actions from the outside.[...] 
The environment emerges from the world through the actualisation 
or the being of the organism – [granted that] an organism can only 
exist if it succeeds in finding in the world an adequate 
environment. (Merleau-Ponty 1964, p.13; cited in Varela et al. 
1993, p.174) 
In such an approach, perception is not embedded within and constrained by 
the surrounding world; it also contributes to the enactment of the surrounding 
world. The organism both initiates and is shaped by the environment, 
selecting relevant properties perceptually whilst the world selects the 
structure of the organism through its evolutionary history. Merleau-Ponty 
recognises that we must see the organism and environment as bound together 
in reciprocal specification and selection, what Varela et al. (1993) call 
perceptual guidance by action, we are perceptually guided by the tactile 
action of the whole body (not isolated sense modalities) enacting with the 
world. Varela et al. illustrates perceptual guidance by action through an 
analysis of Held and Heins`s kitten study (Held and Hein 1958): 
Held and Hein raised kittens in the dark and exposed them to light 
only under controlled conditions. A first group of animals were 
allowed to move around normally, but each of them were 
harnessed to a simple carriage and basket that contained a number 
of the second group of animals. The two groups therefore shared 
the same visual experience, but the second group was entirely 
passive. When the animals were released after a few weeks of this 
treatment, the first group of kittens behaved normally, but those 
who had been carried around behaved as if they were blind: they 
bumped into objects and fell over edges. (Varela 1993, p.175) 
This example supports the enactive view that objects are not seen by the 
visual extraction of features but rather by the visual guidance of tactile bodily 
action, we cannot separate perception from action, from perceptually guided 
action, which incorporates the whole organism in the environment. Vision 
then, is much more than merely just the extraction of the visual; it is 
structured and supported by the rest of the tactile enactive experience, guided 
or supported by the enaction as a whole. 
The view that vision is supported by other sense modalities is widely 
accepted within psychology and cognitive science. Bahrick and Lickliter 
(2000) proposed an intersensory redundancy hypothesis, which holds that in 
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early infant development, information presented redundantly and in temporal 
synchrony across two sensory modalities selectively recruits infant attention 
and facilitates perceptual learning more effectively than does the same 
information presented unimodally. The same event presented to one sense 
modality alone selectively recruits attention to modality-specific aspects of 
the event and facilitates perceptual learning of those properties at the expense 
of others. In such theories, as long as the ‘redundant’ information is 
‘matched’ or ‘synchronised’ (i.e Audio that corresponds to the visual 
information) it is generally suggested that Audio information would enhance 
learning if it were complimentary to the visual channel. When the two 
channels were concordant, viewers were somewhat able to treat audio visual 
presentation as a single source. Bahrick and Lickliter (2000) recently showed 
that five-month-old infants could differentiate between two five-element 
rhythms (of hammers hitting a surface) when the rhythms were presented bi-
modally, (audio and video) but showed no evidence of differentiating the 
rhythms when they were presented unimodally (video only). These studies all 
agree that Auditory information redundantly supports the visual channel, and 
as such aids in comprehension and learning. 
These studies show quite effectively that it is much more than the visual 
extraction of human experience that is perceived through the visual. Held and 
Heim`s kitten study show us that the visual is guided by the tactility 
(movement and touch) of bodily action, whilst the studies of audio visual 
redundancy maintain that the perception of the visual extraction is 
redundantly supported by the auditory channel. The perception of the visual 
then, within an enacted model of perception, can no longer be understood as a 
mere isolated visual extraction, but as a part of an interrelated whole, 
supported by the rest of the enactive experience.  
Looking beyond the Audio Visual 
Whilst the biological models of vision moved away from the linguistically 
constrained relative models to involve the body as a site of meaning, an 
enactive approach to perception holds that Vision cannot be isolated from the 
enacted whole experience of the body enacting in the environment. As vision 
is shown to be both audibly and tactilely supported by the individual 
enaction, it is the individual enaction (or its history of structural coupling) as 
a whole that in turn supports the perception of the visual. The visual cannot 
be isolated from a subjective, enactive narrative of the perceiver. The visual 
is supported by and is a part of a whole enacted experience; as such the 
perception of visual images must contain elements of the individual’s 
enactive history. To look is to perceive with the whole bodily experience in a 
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reciprocal attachment to the world, which is not just an isolated visual 
extraction.  
Gombrich alluded to such a process by which the Beholder of the image had 
their own share in the visual representations that were depicted within them. 
The Beholder’s Share (Gombrich 1964, pp.174-175) spoke of the 
incompleteness of painting arousing the bodily based Imagination of the 
beholder, what is not depicted within these types of image arouses the 
beholders expectations and experiences, thus ‘completing’ the images 
through the beholders own experience. He believed that Classical forms of art 
understood, better than most, the means of arousing this ‘Imitative Faculty’, 
in particular the art of the Far East had mastered this process of what he 
called ‘giving expression to the invisible’ (Gombrich 1960, p.175), he notes 
how, specifically, Chinese art theory discusses the power of expressing 
through absence of brush and ink. Within such images, intimate details such 
as facial features are absent, but the expressive marks that are present are 
enough to express what is absent from the depiction: 
Figures, even though painted without eyes, must seem to look; 
without ears, must seem to listen [...] There are things which ten 
hundred brushstrokes cannot depict but which can be captured by a 
few simple strokes if they are right. That is truly giving expression 
to the invisible. (Gombrich 1960, pp.174-175) 
Figure 20. Images From the ‘Mustard Seed Garden Manual of Painting’ (from 
Gombrich 1960, p.175).
Gombrich believed that it is precisely the restricted visual language (with 
calligraphic qualities) of Eastern artwork of this period that encouraged the 
beholder to complete the image by arousing their imagination (see figure 20). 
In such a theory the empty surface is as much a part of the image as the 
274
     WOODWARD      116 
 
strokes of the brush, as the empty space arouses the beholders share in the 
perception of the image. 
Such a process is found within the Western Medium of comics, the visual 
activity of `reading` the visual panels is generally accepted to be a process by 
which we combine individual image panels that exist in the same instant to 
create a continuous narrative by adding our own imagination. (McCloud 
1993) Within this field, the dominant concept of Closure (McCloud 1993 et 
al), borrowed from film studies, has been used to describe this process of 
reading comics as the process of ‘observing the parts but perceiving the 
whole.’ (McCloud 1993) In which we observe the images, but perceive a 
whole narrative. Pratt describes the process of closure in relation to comics as 
‘The mental process whereby readers of comics bridge the temporal and 
spatial incompleteness of the diegesis that occurs in the gutters between 
panels, thereby participating in the creation of narrative.’ (Pratt 2009) The 
concept of closure applied to comics, is used to describe our ability to view 
individual images and panels in sequence and to mentally construct or bridge 
together a narrative ourselves within the blank spaces, or gutter, between the 
panels from our own experience;  
In the limbo of the gutter, human imagination takes two separate 
images and transforms them into a single idea. Nothing is seen 
between the two panels, but experience tells you something must 
be there [..] Closure allows us to connect [otherwise unconnected] 
moments and mentally construct a continuous, unified reality. 
(McCloud 1993, p.89) 
It is in the spaces in between the panels that allow the reader to construct the 
narrative out of their own imagination. There is nothing visual in between the 
panels to be read but white space, but our experience joins the panels together 
through a mental construction of a new continuous reality. It is not the 
images in the panels that create the overall narrative; it is the space in-
between the panels (the gutter) that facilitate the creation of narrative by the 
readers own imagination. It is in this space between the pictures that the 
imagination of the reader, an imagination that utilises the rest of the sensory 
apparatus of the reader, supports of the visual images that are perceived 
(McCloud 1993, p.89).
275
117     A BRIEF HISTORY AND THEORY OF NOT LOOKING       
 
Figure 21. Closure demonstrated within the medium of comics. (from McCloud 
1993, p.89).
The visual images in the panels are supported by the `closure` that exists 
within the gutter, that is created by the experience of the reader and 
`soldered` to the visual in the panels. Thus within the context of narrative of 
comics, the visual perception of the panels is supported by the reader’s own 
experience, an experience which as McCloud points out, constitutes more 
than just the visual, as all of the senses are involved. McCloud presents his 
multi-sensory notion of closure by providing an example of being in a 
kitchen environment as a sequence of visual panels. 
In these images (figure 21) we have no problem with perceiving that we are 
in a kitchen. With a high degree of closure we can take these individual 
picture fragments and construct a continuous scene of a kitchen out of them, 
adding our own experience using the rest of the primary senses into the 
narrative mix. McCloud notes how the we can `hear` the boiling pot, not just 
in the first panel, but as the panels change, accompanied by the sound of the 
knife on the chopping board as the second frame is viewed and finished off 
with the ticking of the timer in the last panel. He notes how we can almost 
smell the food being cooked in the kitchen, even feel it or taste it. The visual 
images here are supported by the `closure` that exists within the gutter, that is 
created by the experience of the individual reader and `soldered` to the visual 
in the panels. Thus within the context of narrative of comics, the visual is 
supported by the reader’s experience, which constitutes much more than the 
visual. The assumed mono-sensory (visual) medium of comics (McCloud 
1993) then, is supported by the rest of the sensory experience in between the 
visual panels. When we view these we are aware of the aural, the olfactory, 
the tactile and the kinaesthetic at the same time as the visual. 
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Figure 22. Kitchen scene as constructed through the narrative of a comic (from 
McCloud 1993, p.89).
The sequence of visual panels that constitute a comic, combined with the 
reader’s ability to use closure, conveys far more information than is assumed 
to be present within the visual. The comic’s medium itself does not have any 
sound, music or motion, but these elements are surely perceived through this 
seemingly visual only media. These examples demonstrate that the assumed 
mono-sensory (visual) perceptual nature of the image in fact constitutes much 
more of our enactive experience than we are aware of. The visual in these 
examples is redundantly supported by elements of the rest of the individual 
enaction, be it the audible, tactile or olfactory experience, as such when the 
images are ‘read’ we view the visual individual ‘parts’ but perceive the 
‘enacted whole’ which constitutes much more than the isolated visual, it 
constitutes the collective experience of the whole of the enacted experience. 
Looking and the ‘Audiovisual’ 
As Merleau-Ponty suggested, ‘The properties of the object and the intentions 
of the subject [...] are not only intermingled; they also constitute a new 
whole. When the eye and the ear follow an animal in flight, it is impossible to 
say ‘which started first’ in the exchange of the stimuli and responses.’ 
(Varela el al. 1993, p.175) It is impossible, in an enacted approach to 
perception, to understand vision in isolation from the rest of the enacted 
experience as is assumed within linguistic models. To look through the gaze 
of the culturally relative model of the linguistic turn is to dis-embody vision, 
to cut it off from the very system of enactive experience that defines it and 
supports it. The studies above show, quite subtly, that we can no longer talk 
of the visual, the tactile or the audio as isolated modes. Within the enactive 
view the visual is supported by the rest of the enactive experience, guided or 
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supported by the enaction. It is this guidance by action – action of the whole 
body not reduced to individual sensi-motor modes that guides vision in the 
enactive view. Here, talking of the visual, vision can no longer be isolated 
and privileged over any other part of the whole enaction, as it is a self 
supportive system, to talk of vision or the visual we must involve the rest of 
the enaction. Furthermore, each of the studies above has taken a position of 
the visual being redundantly supported by other modes, (the audio 
redundantly supporting the visual, the ‘imagination’ of the gutter guiding the 
visual panels, action guiding vision) thus privileging the visual over the other 
modes of the enaction as a focus of enquiry. However, to talk of the visual as 
privileged here is to create a further extraction, to detach it from the enaction 
that supports it and which it in turn supports. The evidence of supportive 
redundancy of audio-visual technologies therefore, supports here a much 
broader and subtle argument, that of the possibility of the individual sense 
modalities being redundantly supported by (and dependent upon) the rest of 
the enacted experience, and vice versa as a whole system with equal 
importance, not reducible to any single sense modality. Aristotle’s original 
notion of Aisthesis, whilst not privileging any one modality, may have 
missed a fundamental point; to recognise the synaesthesic quality of the 
senses, but to extract and isolate the senses even further by talking of the 
‘tactile quality’ of experience that underlies all the senses, thus privileging 
the tactile. In a true enactive approach there exists no division of the sense 
experience – experience exists as a supported whole and is only ever 
privileged by a sense through our objectified analysis of it. It is not, then, that 
there exist a number of sense modalities (that may or may not be tactile in 
nature), but that perception cannot be classified in terms of any currently 
known sense modalities. We cannot talk of the tactile nature, or the visual 
nature, or the aural nature, for these are further extractions which misguide an 
analysis. It is my impulse that they all constitute an interconnected whole, a 
self-supported entity existing on a very different plane - a further dimension 
of interrelated experience that supports itself and creates perception. Thus to 
survey this new dimension, a new model of analysis is called for. To begin to 
talk of the audio visual within a true enacted view of perception, we must re-
attach the visual and audio to the enacted roots as a whole, and theorise as a 
whole. The visual and audio are no longer seen as individual sense 
modalities, but rather they must be treated as a single source, symbiotically 
attached to each other and to the rest of the enaction. To begin to survey this 
theoretical ground, to gain a foot hold on this new sensual dimension, we can 
now begin to talk of the constituted wholes that may exist on this new plane. 
To begin to understand what we have called the `visual`, or what we are 
trying to call natural looking, we must forget the dogmatic term visual, 
releasing looking from the grip of the visual, and fashion a new mode of 
reference that exists as a part of this enactive dimension, one that is not 
merely the visual or the aural or even the tactile, but maybe a configuration of 
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them all, one attempt may be to move beyond the visual toward a model of 
experience that may encompass more just the visual, for this we need to 
construct a field theory of the “audiovisual”. 
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Abstract
What is the relationship between fine art / avant-garde practices and domestic television ad-
vertising form? In asking this question, this paper departs from the contemporary literature 
regarding this relationship, which it argues in situating the relationship within late Modernism, 
overprivileges the formal aspects of the interaction, neglecting the very creative nature of human 
experience, perception and agency. This paper thus aims to re-think the relationship between 
the practices of avant-garde and advertising in light of the involvement of the creative nature of 
human experience, perception and agency by recognising the centrality of human perception to 
both endeavours. In doing so the paper can begin to discuss the use of avant-garde techniques, 
such as minimalism and ambiguity, within advertising forms not merely as a formal strategy, 
but as underpinned by a very human creativity.
Introduction
The formal exchanges, convergences and crossovers between early commercial advertising and 
experimental avant-garde practices have been richly discussed (Gibbons, 2005; Spiegel, 2008). 
Contemporary accounts of this relationship describe it as an embracing of each other’s formal 
styles, driven primarily by an economic engine, and one which treats the avant-garde and adver-
tising forms themselves as separate, translatable formal styles (Cowen, 2010). These ‘cross-overs’ 
and ‘convergences’ here are considered in the light of the desire of advertising agencies to apply 
’cutting edge’ cinematic techniques to draw viewers’ attentions during a period of advertising 
saturation in the 1960s (Spiegel, 2009, pp. 214-216), in which avant-garde techniques within 
advertising forms are considered to be a formal strategy employed primarily to stand out and 
to draw viewers’ attention. 
This paper traces this formal view of the relationship between avant-garde and advertising 
to lie within the Modernist ‘autonomy of the arts’ (Greenberg, 1960) during the 1960s, which 
maintained two fundamental conditions regarding the relationship: (1) that avant-garde (or arts 
practice) and advertising are treated as separate endeavours, with different agendas and (2) in 
privileging the formal structure, the literature overlooks the perceptual and experiential dimension 
of human experience, and as such neglects any human agency within the transaction. Current 
research concerning the relationship between avant-garde techniques and advertising film aims 
to compound the formalist approach in highlighting the mutually beneficial exchanges of print 
advertising and art into the practices of audio-visual media, in which the relationship is viewed 
as a complimentary mutual interaction that itself produces a creative synergy.1 This ‘Exchange 
and Flow’ between commercial advertising film and avant-garde art practice treads further new 
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ground by factoring in the perceptual dimensions of the viewers themselves, which has been 
overlooked within the literature. In proceeding from this position, this paper aims to re-think 
the relationship between the practices of avant-garde and advertising in light of the involvement 
of the creative nature of human experience, perception and agency by recognising the centrality 
of human perception to both endeavours. Through a case study revealing the use of the avant-
garde technique such as minimalism within advertising film during the 1960s, through a core 
example of the UK campaign for Hamlet Cigars (1968), this paper focuses upon unravelling the 
perceptual dimensions of the use of minimalism, as recognised by art critics such as Rosalind 
Krauss (Gamboni, 2002; Krauss, 1993; Bearn, 2000) when discussing the pictorial arts, we can 
never fully exclude the domains of human knowledge and experience. This paper uncovers 
this [unseen] structuring of the visual through a focus upon the behavioural, psychological and 
multi-sensory aspects of perceptual experience, drawing upon the work of Ernst Gombrich, 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Rudolf Arnheim, in which ‘visual’ perception is underpinned by the 
very experiences, desires and prejudices of an embodied subject. Within such a model, minimal-
ism will be conceived not as a remove from human knowledge and experience, but as always 
being bound up within, supported by, and invoking the multi-sensory experiences, desires and 
prejudices of the embodied subject. These conditions of the embodied eye, maintaining that the 
familiarity of embodied experience will always remain the starting point, within perception, of 
the ambiguous and unfamiliarity of minimal and ambiguous forms, bring to light the discus-
sion of minimalism at the heart of the Hamlet advertising film form as a condition to actively 
engage the familiarity of the experience of the embodied subject, which is also a tactic is endemic 
of the artistic avant-garde concept of defamiliarization. It is through this interwoven context of 
commercial advertising, avant-garde art practices, psychology of perception, phenomenology 
and film-art practice, that the minimalism and ambiguity of the Hamlet Cigars’ campaign can 
be shown to work not merely as an artistic stylisation or a conscious formal strategy, but as a 
product of a very human creativity.
Prologue
[Happiness is a Cigar called Hamlet]
Cigar smoking is a reward or a reinforcement of other pleasures. Little things in life can 
get you down […]. But on reflection and with a little quiet smoke, you can always rise 
above these petty aggravations. Happiness is a Cigar Called Hamlet. (CDP Account Review 
‘Happiness is a Cigar called Hamlet’, 1995).
The message for the British campaign for Hamlet Cigars was simple: that life’s petty little ag-
gravations can be soothed with a smoke of a Hamlet cigar. The campaign works on the premise 
of enhancing the quality of life of a victim of circumstance, such as a man in a neck brace un-
able to keep up with a fast pace of a tennis match; a sculptor breaking an arm of a piece he is 
working on; a music teacher unable to teach a young boy to play the piano, through a moment 
of calm created through a smoke of a Hamlet cigar. The everyday situations represented within 
the campaign portray a tension between the chaotic of the everyday and the calm created through 
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the smoke of a Hamlet cigar, which itself is always accompanied by Bach’s Air on a G-String. 
Hamlet ‘Music Teacher’ (1968) describes the situation of a teacher’s anxiety attempting to teach 
a young boy to play the piano, unsuccessfully, who persists in hammering the keys creating an 
out-of-key and out-of-time run of random notes. The teacher’s anxiety eventually causes him 
to reach for his Hamlet cigars. As he lights the cigar he is transported into a world of his own, 
punctuated through the soothing sounds of Air on a G-String, of calm and tranquillity, ignoring 
the chaotic and noisy reality around him. The advert finishes with a soothing male voiceover 
proclaiming: ‘Happiness is a Cigar called Hamlet’.
Fig. 1-4. (Top left to bottom right) Hamlet Cigars mise-en-scene analysis.
The work is persistently minimalist in its form, framed by a consistent fixed, straight-on point 
of view (Fig. 1, 2) with a static, minimal camera movement maintained throughout. The mise-
en-scene is stripped to its bare minimum, using specific props to signify the context of a music 
lesson, such as a piano, metronome, boy and teacher, sparingly to punctuate the setting against 
a blank set (Fig. 1). The costumes are bare, the boy wearing a tie and glasses, the teacher a cra-
vat and jacket (Fig. 1). The acting style is stripped down, held back through small gestures and 
minimal movements; the boy’s playing is reduced to a physically tense, focussed and intense 
stabbing of the keys with his pointed fingers, the disdain of the teacher over the boy’s playing 
is realised predominantly through his static posture and facial expression (Fig. 1), the soothing 
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nature of the Hamlet cigar is presented through a gently swaying hand gesture in time to Air on 
a G-string (Fig. 4). The use of sound is restricted to utilising music only, through the out-of-key 
piano notes and Air on a G-string, with no spoken dialogue throughout except with the spoken 
strap line ‘Happiness is a Cigar called Hamlet’ at the end.
 
Fig. 5. ‘Music Teacher’ Formal Analysis
The structure of the work, the construction of its shots, shot types, shot lengths, movements, 
and rhythms, are constructed to describe the change from the chaotic and noisy to the calm 
and soothing through the minimum possible means. The entire advert consists of 8 shots (Fig. 
5) utilising only 3 types of shots: close-up, extreme close-up and medium shot. The work uses a 
single repeated pattern of close-up and medium shots that is maintained throughout the entire 
work (Fig. 6). The work is divided into 2 halves, representative of the chaos of the out-of-key 
playing, and the soothing calm of the Hamlet cigar (Fig. 1). 
 
Fig. 6-8. Shot Length against Shot Type; Pattern of Shot Length; Pattern of Shot Length.
The first, chaotic, half is constructed from a pattern of small and medium length close-up and 
medium shots. The flow is broken by the introduction of the product through the only extreme 
close-up of the work, midway in shot 4, punctuating the shift to the soothing calm as the teacher 
smokes his cigar accompanied by Bach’s Air on a G-string in shot 5. Within the second, calming, 
half the pace of the work changes, and is constructed through long and medium length shots 
through the same use of medium and close-up shots (Fig. 7). The repeated pattern of close-up 
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and medium shots maintains a constant, steady rhythm throughout the work that is interrupted 
by the introduction of the product in shot 4 by an extreme close-up (Fig. 9), punctuating the 
calming shift in which the faster cutting between shots in the first ‘chaotic’ half is broken, and 
slowed down. The accompanying music accompanies the shift through a change from the out-
of-key, and out-of-time, to Air on a G-String during shot 5 (Fig. 9).
The persistent use of minimalism within the form is utilised to set the context and scene, and 
to describe the changing shift from the chaotic to a calm. This minimalism permeates through-
out the whole work, the minimal mise-en-scene, minimal camera movements and use of shot 
types, minimal acting and gestures and the minimal use of sound through music. Within the 
late Modernist landscape of 1960s, in which this work existed, the artistic practice of minimalism 
within the pictorial arts (through avant-garde, expressionist and abstract artworks (Greenberg, 
1960) were critically understood as being a part of the Modernist conception of the ‘autonomy 
of art’, which conceived a specific visual model which was tied to the visual arts which, in the 
following, will be termed the Modernist eye. 
1. The Modernist Eye
The senses are useful when their contribution is not overestimated. In the culture we 
happen to live in they teach us relatively little. The world of our century is a poor actor: 
it does show its variegated outside, but its true nature is not immediately apparent either 
to the eyes or the ears (Arnheim, 1959, p. 196).
As Perceptual Psychologist Rudolf Arnheim claims, the Modernist conceptions of the ‘visual’ 
and in turn of visual perception tied to the pictorial arts, underestimated the contribution of the 
non-visual senses within visual perception. Radically transforming visual models of the Mid-
dle Ages when visual perception was seen as intertwined directly with a human soul, and as a 
sensation through which ’reality announces itself to a perceiving subject’, Modernism’s model 
of the visual aimed instead to escape the domain of human knowledge and experience in order 
to discover the qualities that defined an ‘absolute autonomy’ (from any human experience and 
knowledge) of a pictorial artwork (Krauss, 1981, p. 147). The focus on the ‘absolute autonomy 
of the visual arts’ is widely recognised as a systematic issue during the rise of Modernism 
(Gamboni, 2002; Krauss, 1993; Bearn, 2000). The notion held that the visual, as the only sense 
that a pictorial art can invoke, could be constructed outside of the experience of the rest of the 
experienced body, and defined as an absolute ‘pure’ irreducible ‘essence’ of a pictorial work 
(Greenberg, 1960, p. 86). This ‘autonomy’ of the visual and separation from the experiencing 
subject was theorised within the pictorial arts through a perceived notion that each of the arts 
were to demonstrate that “the kind of experience they provided was valuable in its own right and 
not to be obtained from any other activity” (Greenberg, 1960, p. 88). To Clement Greenberg, 
each art “has to perform this demonstration on its own account” (1960, p. 88). The Modernist 
task was to “eliminate from the specific effects of a visual art any and every effect that might 
conceivably be borrowed from […] any other art.” (1960, p. 88). It is this logic upon which 
Modernism’s concept of the visual is built:
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To achieve this autonomy, painting has had above all to divest itself of everything it might 
share with sculpture, and it is in its effort to do this, and not so much […] to exclude the 
representational or literary, that painting has made itself abstract (Greenberg, 1960, p. 88).
Greenberg argues that in searching for its autonomy, the pictorial arts orientated themselves 
toward flatness, as this was the only condition that painting didn’t share with any other art 
form (1960, p. 87). As such, he argued that representation, or illustration, does not attain the 
uniqueness of pictorial art in the way minimalism could, on the grounds that it is not confined 
to a two dimensional space:
All recognizable entities (including pictures themselves) exist in three-dimensional space, 
and the barest suggestion of a recognizable entity suffices to call up associations of that 
kind of space (Greenberg, 1960 p. 88).
It is through this autonomy, from any other art form, that Greenberg’s Modernism rests upon 
on two key points: (1) insistence on the optical as “the only sense that a completely and quintes-
sentially pictorial art can invoke” (p. 90) and (2) to exclude the domains of non-visual sensory 
experience, and to focus upon the relation to the ‘essence’ of the visual alone. It is through the 
autonomy from representation and recognition, within the pictorial arts, that the abstract and 
the minimal are seen as an artistic effort of painting to divest itself of the sculptural, and of 
subjective recognition. 
Rosalind Krauss argues that such a construction of the visual as autonomous from human 
perception, dis-embodies it from the natural network it exists within, in contrast the visual is 
always “[d]ependent on the connection of the eye to the whole network of the body’s tissue, 
[…] tied to the conditions of nervous life, it is by definition a function of temporality” (1993, p. 
216). Krauss argues that vision is always located within a body, within the network of the body’s 
tissue, and temporality of the body. The Modernist model of vision, she argues, lies outside of 
the temporality of the body: by separating the visual from the rest of the bodily experience it 
excludes the domain of human knowledge endemic to the visual:
To exclude the domain of knowledge […] to rewrite the visual in the realm of a reflexive 
relation to the modality of vision rather than its contents, to savor in and for these quali-
ties like immediacy, vibrancy, simultaneity, effulgence and to experience these qualities 
without objects (Krauss, 1993, p. 147).
She argues instead that visual phenomena, far from being outside and external to multi-sensory 
experience, have an “unconscious” that is internal to the perceiver that houses it (Krauss, 1994, 
p. 178). Her notion of the “optical unconscious”, maintains that “the world of visual phenomena: 
clouds, sea, sky, forest- have an unconscious” (Kraus, 1993, p. 178) that lies within the body of 
the perceiver. Such a model aims to include the entire experience and knowledge of the perceiver, 
that works within “[t]he order that operates beyond the reach of the [ purely] visual, an order that 
works entirely underground, out of sight” (Krauss, 1993, p. 217; author’s inserts and italics). Uti-
lising the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and Husserl her “optical unconscious” lies within:
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[A] [p]rimordial intuition that is not in need of “concepts” in order to grasp the world. 
Nothing comes “before” to shape the aperture that perception opens onto the field of 
experience (Kraus, 1993, p. 217).
To Krauss, Greenberg’s Modernism, tied to the privileging and separation of the optical over 
other sense experiences, dis-embodies vision from the perceiver’s multi-sensory perceptual ex-
perience and undermines the very ‘unconscious’ of where art comes from, that of the perceiver’s 
experience itself. Her ‘optical unconscious’ roots the visual within the ‘unconscious’ of the 
multi-sensory body, aiming to include this ‘forgotten’ ‘unconscious’ underground structuring 
of the body’s temporality and knowledge within Modernist models of the visual. To Krauss, 
the ‘visual’ model of Modernism thus has an occult, unseen, underground structure that lies 
outside of a purely artistic endeavour.
2. The [unseen] Modernist Eye
This occult, unseen structure of the visual can be traced throughout phenomenological posi-
tions and the work of constructivist artists and perceptual psychologists within the visual arts 
during the 1960s. Minimalism and ambiguity take on a different role within the work of Ernst 
Gombrich, Merleau-Ponty and Rudolf Arnheim, who embody visual perception within the 
behavioural, psychological and multi-sensory experience of the body, the synthesis of which 
will outline the conditions of an embodied eye.
For perceptual psychologist Rudolf Arnheim, the “prejudice” (experience) of the multi-sensory 
experiencing body always underlies visual perception. In refuting the argument that film cannot 
be art, as it does nothing but mechanically reproduce reality (1959, p. 8). Arnheim discusses 
the techniques by which film can be treated as an art form through recognising the embodied 
nature of visual perception of the spectator. For Arnheim, film’s relationship with reality re-
sembles that of painting, literature and dance, and as such, as a medium can be used (but isn’t 
necessarily) to produce artistic results (1959, p. 8). Arhneim argues that real life is only ever real 
in the experience of an embodied subject, and that film - cinema as an event - should not be 
considered as merely a mechanical reproduction of reality, but should be recognised as a product 
of the prejudices and experiences of the viewer. To Arnheim, a mechanical approach to film 
denies the true functioning of the eye as embodied within the functioning of the rest of the 
body, and as Krauss, he argues:
Our eyes are not a mechanism functioning independently of the rest of the body. They 
work in constant cooperation with the other sense organs (Arnheim, 1959, p. 30).
Arnheim maintains that it is the cooperation of the rest of the body with the visual, and the 
structuring of the visual experience through the cooperation of the rest of the body (the kines-
thetic, aural, tactile and olfactory) that structures our experiences of a ‘visual’ work.2 The eyes 
are not merely passive mechanisms functioning in isolation; they are in constant cooperation 
with the rest of the bodies’ sensory experiences, even when these sensory experiences are as-
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sumed as absent within a visual work. It is this “absence of the non-visual world of the senses” 
within a visual work, that is always present within the viewers’ perpetual experience, “sensa-
tions of smell, equilibrium, or touch are […] never conveyed in a film through direct stimuli, 
but are suggested indirectly through sight” (Arnheim, 1959, p. 30). Arnheim notes that the very 
absence of the kinesthetic within the visual representation of a film (arising from a body at rest) 
is always suggested indirectly, and is present within the perceptual experience of the spectators 
themselves. Recognising how surprising phenomena result if the eye is engaged and the body 
is static, Arnheim notes how a feeling of “giddiness” is produced when watching a film taken 
in which the camera moves rapidly back and forth. This “giddiness” is produced by “the eye 
participating in a different world from that indicated by the kinesthetic reaction of the body, 
which is at rest” (Arnheim, 1959, p. 30). Our sense of equilibrium within a film is dependent 
upon what the eye reports (in cooperation with the other senses), as the body itself receives no 
kinesthetic stimulation, the experience of equilibrium is absent from the materiality of the film, 
but is perceptually present within the experience of the film.
The absence of the ‘non-visual sense’ of sound is perceived through the visual, in the cooperation 
of all the senses, to construct, within perception, a materially absent sound. Arnheim discusses 
that within the experience of watching a silent film:
No one who went unprejudiced to watch a silent film missed the noises, which would have 
been heard if the same events had been taking place in real life. No one missed the sound 
of walking feet, nor the rustling of leaves, nor the ticking of a clock (Arnheim, 1959, p. 34).
To Arnheim, the absence of the sound in silent film is experienced within the imagination of 
the viewer as it is made visible within the work itself, citing Josef von Sternberg’s The Docks on 
New York, in which a gunshot is made visible by the sudden rising of a flock of birds (1959, p. 
34). Here, the spectator does not infer that the shot has been fired, but actually sees something 
of the quality of the noise (Arnheim, 1959, p. 108). The ‘suddenness, the abruptness of the rising 
birds, gives visually the exact quality that the shot possesses acoustically’ (Arnheim, 1959, p. 
108), making the invisible sound visible through an in-direct event, strengthening the effect, and 
being experienced perceptually by the spectator. For Arnheim, the multi-sensory ‘prejudiced’ 
experience of the body structures vision and the constant cooperation of all the sense organs 
contributes to the entire perceptual experience of the spectator. As such, the minimising of 
the whole sense experience to the visual (through silent film3) will always be structured by the 
‘unseen’ world of the non-visual senses. For Arnheim, the ‘visual’ engagement with minimal 
formal structures, always involves the spectator’s recognitions and expectations.
Such psychological aspects of visual experience - expectations, intentionality, and desire - are 
the focus of the art historian Ernst Gombrich. To Gombrich, since in his view there can be no 
“innocent eye” (1964, p. 307), an eye that is merely passive in its perception of cultural codes, the 
eye is always historical and relative to the body that it belongs to and visual perception is no 
different. As such, Gombrich maintained that the beholder of the visual image had their own 
psychological ‘share’ of the visual representations that were depicted within them. Gombrich’s 
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“beholder’s share” (pp. 174-175) spoke of the incompleteness of painting arousing the bodily 
based imaginative faculty of the beholder; what is not depicted within these types of images 
arouses the beholder’s own experiences and expectations. Discussing the concept at work within 
the perception of ‘accidental’ shapes such as clouds he notes: “What we read into these acci-
dental shapes depends on our capacity to recognize in them things or images we find stored in 
our minds” (p. 155). The beholder’s share relies upon the psychological concept of the ‘projec-
tion’ of our prior expectations and experiences, our schema, onto the world, in which we can 
“’project’ the familiar form of a face onto the configuration of a car just as we project familiar 
images into vaguely similar shapes of clouds” (p. 89). This projection of familiar images onto 
“vaguely similar shapes” is seen within the psychological test of drawing consequences (Fig. 9), 
in which an original image (an Egyptian owl) is copied and re-copied until it eventually takes 
on the form of a ‘pussycat’ (pp. 64-65). Gombrich notes that where a pre-existing category is 
lacking, within the unfamiliar ‘vague’ shapes (at around reproduction 5), a distortion sets in (p. 
64), and the shape takes on a new form dependent upon the perceiver’s schema of experience. 
It is here that “the first approximate, loose category […] is gradually tightened to fit the form 
it is to reproduce” (p. 64). It is on this premise of projection that the beholder’s share rests, 
maintaining that “the familiar will always remain the likely starting point for the rendering of 
the unfamiliar” (p. 72). Exemplified within Eastern artwork, Gombrich points to how Chinese 
art theory discusses the power of expressing the “invisible” through the absence of brush and 
ink (p. 175).4 Within such images, intimate details such as facial features are absent, but the 
expressive marks that are present are enough to express what is absent, “invisible” within the 
depiction (Fig. 9):
Fig. 9. ‘Images from the Mustard seed Manual for Painting’, in Gombrich, 1964, p. 79.
Figures, even though painted without eyes, must seem to look; without ears, must seem 
to listen [...]. There are things which ten hundred brushstrokes cannot depict but which 
can be captured by a few simple strokes if they are right. That is truly giving expression 
to the invisible (Gombrich, 1964, pp. 174-175).
Gombrich believed that it is precisely the restricted visual language of Classical Eastern artwork 
that encouraged the beholder to complete the images by arousing their imitative faculty. In such 
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a theory the empty surface is as much a part of the image as the strokes of the brush, since the 
empty space arouses the beholder’s share in the perception of the image. It is this power of 
expectation, rather than conceptual knowledge, Gombrich notes, that moulds what we see in 
life; the ‘expected’, projected image is structured from the beholder’s temperament, personality 
and preferences, as such the experienced familiar is always the starting point in the perception 
of the unfamiliar.
The multi-sensory and psychological dimensions that underpin ‘visual’ perception are at the 
centre of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenolog y of Perception. To Merleau-Ponty, however, the body 
alone is not seen as the core of all of our perceptual and cognitive experience, but is inseparable 
from the world in which it exists, subject and object are intertwined in reciprocal specification 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1963, p. 13). In recognising the reciprocity of object and subject, to which the 
organism both contributes, but is also conditioned by the external environment, Merleau-Ponty 
roots perception itself within behaviour:
Since all movements of the organism are always conditioned by external influences, one 
can, if one wishes, readily treat behaviour as an effect of the Milieu. But in the same way, 
since all the stimulations which the organism receives have in turn been possible only 
by its proceeding movements which have culminated in exposing the receptor organ to 
external influences, one could also say that behaviour is the first cause of all stimulations 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1963, p. 13).
To Merleau-Ponty, the reciprocality of the body in the world supports and maintains the spec-
tacle of ‘vision’. The visual cannot be detached from either the sensing body or the world as a 
system; as such vision cannot be dis-embodied and understood in isolation from the system, as 
the system itself maintains it. The visual is intertwined with the tactile, kinesthetic and temporal 
dimensions of the body. In recognising the embodied nature of visual perception, Merleau-
Ponty is able to shift the ‘cause of stimulation’ within perception from a visual stimulus to the 
behaviour and movement of the body itself:
Thus the form of the excitant is created by the organism itself, by its proper manner of 
offering itself to actions from the outside. […] The environment emerges from the world 
through the actualization or the being of the organism – [granted that] an organism can 
only exist if it succeeds in finding in the world an adequate environment (Merleau-Ponty, 
1963, p. 13).
Merleau-Ponty shifts and underpins perception itself to the movement and behaviour of the 
body, a model of perception in which the environment emerges from the world through the 
very movements and behaviours of the body. The body and world are co-dependent; as such our 
primary way of relating to things is neither purely sensory, reflexive, cognitive or intellectual, 
but rather bodily and behavioral.
Through a synthesis of this literature an [unseen] Modernist eye is always prejudiced by its psy-
chological and multi-sensory experiences. The ‘visual’ is never isolated from the temporality of 
the body that perceives it, the kinesthetic, tactile, aural and olfactory are always present within 
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the experience of the ‘visual’, and as such, present in their absence within the perceived work. The 
‘visual’ is also always conditioned by the psychological, by expectations and by the desires of 
human nature. In realising the reciprocality of subject and object, Merleau-Ponty embodies this 
multi-sensual and psychological ‘visual’ perception within the behaviour of the body in recipro-
cal specification with the environment. The embodied eye functions as a part of and upon the 
presence of bodily behaviour, to construct the ‘visual’ outside of this reciprocal experience. To 
talk of ‘visual’ perception alone, is therefore a construction that privileges the visual over the 
importance of the other sense experience, radically overestimating the importance of the ‘visual’. 
Arnheim’s absence of the non-visual sense world present within the perception of a visual work 
and Gombrich’s notion of the minimal brush strokes enabling ‘invisible’ features of an image to 
be present within perception, are approaches that recognise the multi-sensory, embodied nature 
of perception. Through the minimalism of a multi-sensory experience, through the pictorial, of 
both the Chinese art and the silent film, the multi-sensory world of the senses is always present 
within perception. As such, the technique of minimalism through the ‘visual’ image is a technique 
that directly acknowledges the perceiver’s entire embodied experience, invoking the familiar-
ity of the whole bodily experience within the experience of the perception of the unfamiliar, 
minimal and vague shapes. Uncovering the techniques of unfamiliarity through minimalism at 
work within embodied perception, places these techniques as necessary attributes of the human 
perceptual system itself, in which the unfamiliarity of a ‘visual’ experience is always structured 
by the familiarity of prior embodied experience.
3. The Defamiliarized [unseen] Modernist Eye
The conditions of the embodied eye maintain that the familiarity of embodied experience will 
always remain the starting point, within perception, of the unfamiliar. The unfamiliarity of the 
minimalist nature at the heart of the Hamlet advertising film form can therefore begin to be 
viewed as a tactic to engage the familiarity of the experience of the perceiver. Such techniques 
of ‘defamiliarizing’ an experience lie at the heart of the artistic avant-garde concept of defamil-
iarization, in which minimalism and ambiguity aim to do just this. The concept of defamiliariza-
tion describes a way of thinking characterised by the literary theorist Viktor Shklovsky during 
the early 20th century. The concept came as a method to attack the contemporary Modernist 
theories of the 20th century of the economy of mental effort within the arts (Crawford, 1984). 
Shklovsky aimed to create artistic literary devices that would create the strongest possible per-
ceptual impression on the reader (Crawford, 1984). He understood perception as an “origin, a 
primary (originary) experiencing” (Crawford, 1984, p. 210), and foregrounds perception within 
his model of the arts, in doing so recognises the need to make things unfamiliar, to prolonging 
perception, in order to experience a work’s subjective ‘artfulness’:
[T]he device of art is to make things “unfamiliar”, to increase the difficulty and length 
of their perception, since the perceptual process in art is valuable in itself and must be 
prolonged; art is a way of experiencing the artfulness of an object, the object in art being 
itself unimportant (Shklovsky, 1914, p. 13).
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His notion of estrangement based upon the concept of defamiliarization, aims to make an object 
strange by removing it out of its sphere of habitual recognition (Shklovsky, 1914, p. 6). This is 
achieved within the arts by a variety of means; specifically discussing the estrangement used by 
the Russian writer Leo Tolstoy he notes that “[Tolstoy] does not call a thing by its given name, 
that is, he describes it as if it were perceived for the first time […]. He forgoes the conventional 
names of the various parts of a thing, replaces them instead with the names of corresponding 
parts in other things” (Shklovsky, 1914, p. 6). This device of estrangement, Shklovsky calls the 
“rotation” of an object within its semantic space (like turning a real object in space (Crawford, 
1984), which shifts the object out of its typical associations into a radically different one, es-
tranging the object. Shklovsky’s estrangement relies upon the concept of making strange an 
object or event through describing it from different points of view, or corresponding events, to 
invoke a new perceptual impression.
Shklovsky’s technique of ‘estrangement’ can be traced at work within the assumed ‘visual’ media 
of film through Arnheim’s concept of the ‘indirectness’ of the use of the medium. Applied to 
silent film, this concept works upon the principle of the “artistic use of the delimitation of the 
picture” (Arnheim, 1959, p. 78). Arnheim’s concept of indirectness relies upon a paraphrasing of 
the event through an indirect, or slightly removed, consequence, and the artistic exploration of the 
limits of the pictorial. Describing his technique at work within the literature of Dante, he notes:
When Francesca de Ramini tells how she fell in love with the man with whom she was in 
the habit of reading, and only says “we read no more this day”. Dante thereby indicates 
in-directly, simply by giving the consequences, that on this day they kissed each other 
(Arnheim, 1959, p. 107).
Such a technique describes a situation, rather than attempting to give a concrete action itself 
by using an indirect representation of the event. Returning to Von Sternberg’s The Docks on New 
York (1929), Arnheim shows how this indirectness is seen to function throughout the work. 
Describing a specific scene of a shooting, in which the sound of a gunshot is made visible 
through paraphrasing it through the visual of a sudden rising of a flock of birds (Fig. 11). Arn-
heim notes how such an editing choice is not merely a tactic on the part of the director to deal 
with the silence of the medium, (as it is enough to see the revolver fire, or see a wounded man 
fall (1959, p. 34)), but is an artistic paraphrase, an “indirect representation of an event that is 
strange to it” (1959, p. 107). The spectator, also, does not only infer that the shot has been fired, 
but actually sees something of the quality of the sound itself - the suddenness and the abrupt-
ness given visually, is the exact quality the shot possesses acoustically (Arnheim, 1959, p. 108). 
Instead of giving an audible occurrence itself, the transposition into something visual gives its 
“telling characteristics” (Arnheim, 1959, p. 109) enough to be experienced as present through 
perception. By using an indirect representation of an event (the sound of a gunshot) through a 
material that is indirect to it (visible flock of birds), or, as seen in Dante, by not directly giving 
the action itself but only its consequences, the techniques of indirectness allow the perceiver to 
experience telling characteristics of the event through an indirect transposition of another event.5
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In an example of a different kind, the delimitation of the pictorial through the indirect fram-
ing of a shot is used to estrange the work. In The Docks of New York, Arnheim again discusses 
a scene that purposely ignores the framing of the most important part of the shot, a scene in 
which a woman commits suicide by jumping off a boat (Fig. 10). Arnheim notes how the only 
thing shown within the shot is that of the partial reflection on the quivering surface of the water, 
of a partially framed deck of a boat with the woman standing at first and then jumping over 
board (1959, p. 78). This example demonstrates estrangement through the delivery of a “direct” 
characteristic (of the story of the suicide) through an indirect and unfamiliar view (Arnheim, 
1959, p. 78).6 The camera is placed in such a position that the most important elements of the 
shot, the boat and the woman, do not directly appear at all.
 
Fig. 10-11. The Docks of New York Gun shot; The Docks of New York Suicide.
The utilisation of estrangement within silent film works to actively involve the spectator’s imagi-
nation by paraphrasing an event within the work through indirect representation of an event that 
is strange to it (Arnheim, 1959, p. 107). Describing the event of a gunshot through the image of 
a flock of birds paraphrases the event of the gunshot through this slightly removed event. Such 
a technique visually produces the ‘telling characteristic’ of the sound of a gunshot, instead of 
giving an audible occurrence in itself, as such the transposition into something visual gives its 
characteristic enough to be experienced as present within perception. The indirectness through 
delimitation of the image works through the removal of key elements from the composition, 
composed through an unfamiliar point of view. The ambiguity of the suicide (Fig. 12) estranges 
the event through the minimalism of recognisable elements of the mise-en-scene and through 
the ambiguity created through the reflections of the water.7 Arnheim’s focus upon silent film, 
in particular its artistic potential, demonstrates the defamiliarizing effects within a silent film, 
through estrangement, indirectness and delimitation. The synthesis has revealed three condi-
tions by which defamiliarization may be at work within film: (1) the paraphrasing of one sense 
or event (sound) through an indirect, or slightly removed consequence of another (visual); (2) 
transposing an event through an indirect, and unfamiliar point of view and (3) through the work 
of ambiguity and minimalism of mise-en-scene and composition. Such formal treatments at 
work within an advertising film aim to catch the imagination of the spectator, to enthrall them 
through unusualness, to actively involve their familiarity, to invoke the unseen.
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Epilogue
[The unseen Chaos]
But the spectator, who perhaps might have watched a direct shot of the event with merely 
passing interest, is caught and thrilled by the unusualness of the presentation (Arnheim, 
1959, p. 79).
As Arnheim notes, the techniques of indirectness can catch the attention of a spectator, with 
just a passing interest, with an unusualness that thrills and engages. The contextual literature 
uncovered through the workings of the [unseen] Modernist eye have positioned, through artistic 
techniques of estrangement, the techniques of minimalism and ambiguity as core attributes of 
the human perceptual system, a system which constantly enacts a experiential familiarity. It is 
through this context that the minimalism and ambiguity of the Hamlet Cigars Music Teacher advert 
can be shown to defamiliarize the work, utilising the three conditions of defamiliarization: (1) 
through the work of ambiguity and minimalism of mise-en-scene and composition; (2) the para-
phrasing of one sense or event through an indirect, or slightly removed consequence of another 
and (3) transposing an event through an indirect, and unfamiliar point of view.
 
Fig. 12 - 13. Hamlet Cigars Music Teacher.
The work primarily aims to defamiliarize, through the use of ambiguity and minimalism of 
mise-en-scene, composition and construction. The framing of a consistent fixed straight-on 
point of view (Fig. 12) with minimal camera movement. The mise-en-scene is stripped to its 
bare minimum, using specific props to signify the context of a music lesson, such as a piano, 
metronome, boy and teacher, sparingly to punctuate the setting against a blank set (Fig. 12). 
The acting style is defamiliarized, held back through small gestures and minimal movements; 
the boy’s playing is reduced to a physically tense, stabbing of the keys with his pointed fingers, 
the disdain of the teacher over the boy’s playing is realised predominantly through his static 
posture and facial expression (Fig. 12). Little is given through the mise-en-scene itself, the 
tension between chaos and calm within the work is defined through the structure of the work 
itself and the use of the sound.
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The structure of the work itself, aims to defamiliarize through presenting the minimal pos-
sible construction of its shots, shot types, shot lengths, movements, and rhythms. The entire 
advert consists of eight shots, which utilise only three types of shots. The work uses a single 
repeated pattern of close-up and medium shots that is maintained throughout the entire work. 
This pattern of shot types describes the change from chaos to calm through a change in the 
accompanying shot lengths. The first, chaotic half is constructed from a pattern of small and 
medium length close-up and medium shots. Within the second, calming, half the pace of the 
work changes and is constructed through long and medium length shots through the same use 
of medium and close-up shots (Fig. 13). The shot lengths are constructed to describe the change 
from the chaotic to the calm, and through a single change in a repeated pattern of shot types, 
defamiliarizes the pattern in the second half, describing the tension between chaos and calm.
The minimal mise-en-scene of the work gives little in the way of the presenting of the tension 
between chaos and calm; it is the sound that functions to paraphrase this emotional feeling 
within the work through the aural. The characteristics of the chaotic and physical playing style of 
the young boy in the first half of the work is paraphrased through the sound of the out-of-tune 
notes. The second half characterises the feeling of calm paraphrased through the use of Air on 
a G-string. This tension between the chaos and calm of the sound also works over the image by 
‘estranging’ the experience through an indirect, and unfamiliar sonic experience during the first 
half. The chaotic unfamiliarity of the out-of-tune notes (notes that are ‘estranged’ from Air on 
a G-String itself ) defamiliarizes the work, creating the chaotic anxiety of the first half, before 
eventually leading into the calming familiarity of Bach’s Air on a G-string.
Conclusions: A Very Human Endeavour
The discovery of defamiliarizing techniques within the Hamlet Cigars advertising film is not 
surprising given the conditions of embodied perception outlined throughout this paper. As the 
multi-sensory world of the senses is always present within the perception of ‘visual’ media, this 
specific treatment of the film form aims to catch the imagination of the spectator, to enthrall 
them through unusualness to actively involve their familiarity. The concept of the ‘autonomy of 
the pictorial art’ relied not just upon the autonomy of the purely visual from human experience 
and knowledge, but also on the autonomy of art itself from any other human endeavour. The 
assumption of these techniques as endemic to autonomy of the artistic, as exemplified through 
Greenberg and Arnheim, is challenged through evidence of these techniques permeating 
throughout psychology and studies of perception. Subtly traceable throughout the literature, 
everyday perceptual experiences and ‘visual’ ephemera such as ink blots, images within clouds, 
calligraphic marks, ambiguous doodles and the medium of comics, all work within the parameters 
of defamiliarization. The treatment of advertising forms, from the assumption of an autonomy 
within the arts, subsequently separates artistic practice from other human activities such as the 
psychological sciences and crafts, which undermines not only the contributions through the 
interactions between the practices themselves, but also clouds the very nature of these practices 
– as a part of a very human creative endeavour.
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Notes
1 Endemic to the European funded research project (HERA) ‘Technology Exchange and Flow’ led by Prof. 
dr. Michael Punt, Transtechnology Research, Plymouth University.
2 Arnheim’s discussion is based upon the viewing practices of the cinema event, and the ideology of the 
apparatus. Such events restrict the experience of the media – touching and smelling of painting etc.
3 This minimalism of a whole multi-sensory experience is also utilised through the accompaniment of music 
with the projection of the silent films.
4 Such evidence is also found within the medium of comics, in which the minimal visual style of the comic 
actively involves the reader’s own experience. Scott McCloud presents a multi-sensory notion of ‘closure’ 
in which the visual is supported by the reader’s experience, which constitutes much more than the visual, 
by providing an example of being within a kitchen environment. McCloud notes how we can `hear`  the 
boiling pot, we can almost smell the food being cooked in the kitchen, even feel it or taste it (McCloud, 1993).
5 The structuring of the narrative or expression of a film work through the audio accompaniment is well 
documented (Chion 1994, 1999). Through such evidence, Arnheim may seem to ignore the use of the 
accompaniment of sound with the film event as structuring the visual work, however, his focus lies not 
upon the reduction of a film work to the audiovisual, but upon the concept of the “parallelism of complete 
segregated representations” (1959, pp. 202-205), which argues that the expression through the combination 
of separate means of expression of the work (audio, visual, etc.) lies not in the work itself, but at a ‘second 
layer’ of a higher faculty, that of the of the perception of the spectator. As such, no one media track is privi-
leged in forming the expression, they all combine in the experience of the spectator themselves. Arnheim’s 
focus here is upon the expressive visual track, as such he does not mention any other accompaniment.
6 Such a formal technique was prominent within Russian Constructivist photography of the early 20th century. 
Alexander Rodchenko’s concept of rotation fought against what he called the all too familiar ‘navel’ point 
of view (with the camera resting on the stomach) that had become canonised within amateur photography. 
He aimed to photograph from unusual, unfamiliar and strange points of view; photographing everyday 
objects in everyday situations in ways so long as they remained unrecognised.
7 Such techniques of estrangement through minimalism can be seen within the work of the German play-
wright Bertolt Brecht, the early productions of whom Arnheim attended shortly after he began to write 
critically about film.
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Abstract
This paper reveals how both contemporary and prior views of the nature of the pictorial arts 
since early modernism have been underpinned by the classical concept of mimesis, and as a result 
has brought with it a pre-occupation with both representation and the privileging of the visual. 
Through tracing the concept of mimesis from its Platonic and Aristotelian roots, the paper will 
reveal how the concept permeated the visual arts during early modernism, particularly through 
the work of art historian Aby Warburg. The concept remained dominant within art history until 
the late twentieth century, and still has its lingering grip on the visual within non-representational 
models. In discussing ‘the more than visual’ nature of the pictorial image, the paper draws insight 
from ‘enactivist’ literature; particularly Francisco Varela’s concept of ‘perceptual guidance by 
action’ provides a framework within which to theorise perception as structured by movement and 
action, and as such the whole multi-sensory-motor experience. Providing a theoretical platform 
within which to re-think the pictorial image as a multi-sensory-motor process in which no one 
sense modality is privileged. As such, in offering a speculative theory, the paper maintains, the 
‘enacted pictorial image’ should be theorised as a ‘trace’, not of a visual world of experience, 
but of an entire enacted reality.
Introduction
Since early modernism, the conventional view of art and of art history was one that removed 
art from the stream of lived experience, to treat it as an expression of the imagination of the 
artist, and as such as a symbolic representation of a concrete external reality (Ingold, 2010; 
Malafouris, 2007; Wind, 1983). The questioning of the epistemological role of the pictorial image 
is enjoying a current resurgence within fields dealing with the visual arts, specifically in light 
of contemporary non-representational models of perception and cognition. From attempts to 
understanding the practice of drawing as ‘bringing forth’ of a reality (Cain, 2010), to rethink-
ing paleontological images through its ‘processes’ of becoming (Malafouris, 2007; Ambrose, 
2006). Within the field of anthropology, the symbolic (representational) nature of ‘art’ has been 
strongly contested, instead, taking a pragmatist approach, proposing that we should consider 
the activities of drawing, painting and carving not as a means of representing a world, but of 
revealing or bringing forth a world through a kind of ‘perceptual visual thinking’ (Malafouris, 
2007, p. 299) linked to the sensi-motor engagement of the artist and the world. Such approaches 
maintain that in doing so, the studying of the pictorial image (specifically that of the Palaeolithic 
era) offers radical new epistemic access to the world of visual experience.
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This paper positions itself within this debate, and aims to show that whilst efforts within an-
thropology move away from the underpinning of representation, a further condition remains, 
that of the privileging of the visual. To begin to tackle this issue, the paper will reveal how both 
contemporary and prior views of the pictorial arts since early modernism have been underpinned 
by the concept of mimesis, considered to be the oldest theory of the representational arts, which, 
as I will show, brought with it a pre-occupation with both representation and the privileging of 
the visual. Through tracing the concept of mimesis from its Platonic and Aristotelian roots, the 
paper will reveal how the concept permeated the visual arts during early modernism, pioneered 
by the work of art historian Aby Warburg, and remained until the late twentieth century, and 
still has its lingering grip on the visual within non-representational models. In discussing the 
more than visual nature of the pictorial image, the paper draws insight from ‘enactivist’ litera-
ture; the concept of ‘perceptual guidance by action’ (Varela et al., 2001) provides a framework 
within which to theorise perception as structured by movement and action, and as such the 
whole multi-sensory-motor experience of the artist. Providing a theoretical platform within 
which to re-think this ‘perceptual visual thinking’ as a multi-sensi-motor process in which no 
one sense modality is privileged. As such, in offering a speculative theory, the paper maintains, 
the ‘enacted pictorial image’ should be theorised as a ‘trace’, not of a visual world of experience, 
but of an entire enacted reality of the artist.
1. Imagination: The ‘Visual Mental Image’
As Matthew Potolsky reminds us, the concept of mimesis is considered to be the oldest theory of 
the Western representational arts, which has survived well into the twentieth century (Potolsky, 
2006; Sorbom, 2002). Established during the Classical period in Greece as a means to charac-
terise the epistemological nature of painting, sculpture, poetry, music, dance and theatre as an 
art (Sorbom, 2002), in complete contrast to other forms of human inquiry,1 such as history and 
science, which were seen as a form of universal truth and reason (Potolsky, 2006). In this section 
I will show how the concept of mimesis rests upon two basic epistemological assumptions that 
(1) the mind and world are as separate domains, and (2) the visual nature of human experience.
The nature of mimesis during the Classical period is divided between the thought of Plato and 
Aristotle, and rests upon the core distinction of an artwork as a ‘copy’, ‘imitation’, or ‘similar-
ity’ of an pre-defined external ‘real’ world, through which is drawn a distinction between the 
real (the concrete object) and the mimemata (a painting, sculpture, prose or music), the result of 
the process of mimesis. Both Plato and Aristotle remain faithful to such a dichotomy, however 
they have differing views on the epistemological nature of the imitation itself (Sorbom, 2002; 
Potolsky, 2006). The Platonic model of the image is based upon the concept of an exact copy, 
or ‘mirror image’, of the ‘real’ world (Potolsky, 2006). As such, the Platonic model argues that 
images and artworks are no more than reflections of the world as it is in reality; passive reflec-
tions that require no skill on the part of the artist (pp. 23-24). Such a position on the imaginative 
image, Potolsky notes, leads Plato to see mimesis as a threat to concrete knowledge and reason, 
as any imitation that is said to be knowledge of an object, can only ever be illusory (p. 24), and 
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potentially deceptive. In contrast, Aristotle argues that mimemata, far from being mere ‘mirror 
images’ of reality, have an epistemological value in themselves (pp. 33-38). Rather than merely 
copying, Aristotelian mimesis is linked directly to perception, and seen as simulating, through the 
imagination, as a self-contained ‘heterocosm’ that simulates the ‘real’ world through our ways of 
knowing it. As such, Aristotle’s mimesis is not conceptualised as an exact copy of reality, but as 
a “craft with its own internal laws and aims” (p. 33). Fundamentally, in maintaining mimesis as 
an act of simulation, Aristotle, in contrast to Plato, holds that mimesis is in fact a natural aspect 
of human life, and even a unique source of learning. Aristotle is thus able to maintain that at 
some level each area of knowledge2 is itself an imitation, maintaining that human beings learn 
through the process of imitation itself. Such a move to understanding knowledge as imitation, 
posits mimesis as an active aesthetic process. To Aristotle, the poet (or artist) does not imitate 
reality, but simulates and brings reality into existence through the process of mimesis.
Aristotle’s insistence upon the epistemological value of mimesis, and its inquiry, had a direct 
impact upon the knowledge systems of Greek Culture. Examples of his model of simulation mi-
mesis, which requires the active human imagination, can be traced to permeate throughout the 
Greek allegorical mnemonic and knowledge system, the ‘art of memory’, as studied through the 
work of the anthropologist Frances Yates. It is here that the reliance upon both representation 
and the visual, that underpins mimesis, can be clearly seen as influencing the culture, through 
the system of creating imaginative ‘visual mental images’ from verbal concepts, to aid memory.
The art of memory3 was a memory practice, conceived as a theoretical mnemonic tool for the 
creation and subsequent recollection of ‘visual mental images’ from memory within oral cul-
tures (Curruthers, 2009). The practice relied upon the principle of the translation of a verbal 
concept or object, through the imagination of the user based upon mimetic knowledge, into 
‘visual mental images’ arranged within an fictional, imagined space (Sapir, 2006; Yates, 1966), a 
principle that Frances Yates traces to be influenced by the Aristotelian concepts of knowledge as 
imitation through mimesis. It is here that the underpinning conditions of representation and the 
bias of the ‘visual’ endemic to mimesis, are brought out through this article through the three 
conditions of ‘the art of memory’ system: (1) the translatability of verbal concepts into ‘visual 
mental images’ (Sapir, 2006, p. 85); (2) the necessity of an ‘imaginary fictional place’ in order for 
something to happen, and (3) the disfigurement and unusualness of the ‘visual mental images’ 
of objects to be placed within imaginative fictional places (Yates, 1966, p.19).
Yates describes how Greek memory systems built around the time of Aristotle shared a focus 
upon the importance of the role of the imagination in perception, drawn out through his treatise 
in De-Anima:
The perceptions brought in by the five senses are first treated or worked over by the 
faculty of imagination, and it is the images so formed which become the material of the 
intellectual faculty (Yates, 1966, p. 46).
Here, she maintains not only the importance of the imagination as the intermediary between 
perception and thought, but also within the creation of ‘visual mental images’ that became the 
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very material of the intellect itself. Imagination to Aristotle is pictorial in nature, and as such 
‘the soul never thinks without a mental picture’ (p. 47). This ‘pictorial’ nature of imagination, 
and intellect, is the fundamental founding support for the use of ‘images’ within the Greek art 
of memory system that followed. Yates reveals, by quoting Cicero, how the memory systems, 
based around the time of Aristotle, required a mediation of the non-visual senses through a 
visual image,4 due to the superiority of the visual:
[T]he most complete pictures are formed in our minds of the things that have been con-
veyed to them and imprinted on them by the senses, but that the keenest of all our senses 
is the sense of sight, and that consequently perceptions received by the ears or by reflexion 
can be most easily retained if they are also conveyed to our minds by the mediation of the 
eyes (Cicero, in Yates, 1966, p. 19).
 
Fig. 1. Depictions of an Abbey Memory System (1533). Left: Abbey Memory System. Right: Images used within the 
Abbey Memory System. (Yates, 1966, Fig. 6a, 6b)
Yates reveals that to Aristotle, memory “belongs to the same part of the soul as the imagina-
tion; it is a collection of mental pictures from sense impressions but with a time element added” 
(p. 47). The ‘art of memory’ systems of this period thus required the construction of a ‘visual 
mental image’ from an oral description, in which visual objects are placed within an imagined 
place (Fig. 1). To Yates (p. 23) the ‘art of memory’ systems function upon this privileging of the 
visual within imagination, underscored by two basic principles laid out by Cicero; the rules for 
places and the rules for images. The rules for places require the creation of ‘fictitious places’, 
in contrast to the ‘real’ places5, the rules for images (which are placed within a ‘fictitious place’) 
305
 Woodward • A Monstrous Rhinoceros | 5
rely upon the core concept of making the mnemonic images as striking and unusual as possible 
through their ugliness or deformation, in order to fully awaken the memory during recollection6 
(p. 23). Yates shows how, for Cicero, to remember (for a long periods of time) requires making 
the images unfamiliar, novel, and to visually disfigure7 them in some way within the imagination:
[I]f we set up images of a kind that can adhere longest in memory. And we shall do so 
if we establish similitude’s as striking as possible; if we set up images that are many or 
vague but active; if we assign to them exceptional beauty or singular ugliness […] or if 
we somehow disfigure them (Yates, 1966, p. 26).
The ‘art of memory’ system, underpinned by the Aristotelians concept of mimesis, rests upon 
three key points: (1) the perfect, transparent translatability of verbal concepts into ‘visual mental 
images’ (Sapir, 2006, p. 85). (This does not necessarily mean that there is a resemblance between 
what has to be memorised and its mental image); (2) an absolute necessity of a ‘fictional place’; 
in order for something to happen, the place becomes inseparable from the images themselves 
(Yates, 1966), and (3) the disfigurement and unusualness of the ‘visual mental images’ created in 
order to awaken the memory of them (Yates, 1966). Surveying the Classical concept of mimesis 
and its direct influence upon the ‘visual memory systems’ reveals both a dichotomy between 
mind and world, and a bias toward the visual, pictorial nature of imagination.
Aristotelian mimesis, as simulation, draws a dichotomy between perception (of sense data of the 
real world), and the imagination (of the intellect that simulates or represents the sense data of the 
real world). Mimesis here is a product of the imagination, and so is the ‘mental visual images’ 
it produces. The reliance upon both representation and the visual within the theory of mimesis 
would underpin later thought regarding the epistemological nature of the ‘pictorial image’ 
during a revival of mimesis within art history and anthropology during the modernism of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in which the pictorial image was theorised as a projection 
of an expressive, imaginative, psychological disposition of the artist.
2. Perception: Modernism and the Emotional Mimetic Image
The resurgence of mimesis throughout the late nineteenth century is placed alongside the rise 
of the general interest in empathy within the aesthetics of late nineteenth century modernism 
(Rampley, 2001, p. 124). During this period mimesis takes on a much wider scope being placed 
directly within the category of human perception, within which Robert Vischer’s essay ‘The 
Optical Sense of Form’ was a central text.8 Vischer emphasises the role that emotions and feel-
ings play on our perception of the visible world, maintaining that our “aesthetic response to 
form is at least partially conditioned by the inner psychological life of the percipient” (p. 124). As 
such he argues: “It is quite possible in the sphere of imagination for purely formal phenomena 
to coalesce with other essential features of our humanity. This is the work or achievement of 
our representational or imaginative faculty” (Harrison, 1998, pp. 690). Such an increase in the 
interest of empathy and mimesis within aesthetics takes on a wider scope through the emerging 
field of anthropology (Ramley, 2001, p. 124), particularly applied to the nature of the pictorial 
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image. Predominantly within the work of the art historian Aby Warburg, who in aiming to join 
the psychological with the anthropological,9 recognised the perceptual possibility of mimesis 
(Rampley, 2001) applying it to the study of the pictorial arts, not merely as a product of the 
emotional faculty of the imagination, as Vischer claimed, but within the activity of the physical 
expression of the entire body (Wind, 1983).
In asking the question of how “human and pictorial expressions originate; what are the feel-
ings or points of view, conscious or unconscious, under which they are stored in the archives 
of the memory?” (Gombrich, 1970, p. 222), Warburg applied the concept of mimesis, in order 
to foreground perception in the studying of the pictorial image as a concrete object itself, as 
conditioned by the physical mimetic experience of the body and thus the techniques used.10 
Warburg took on the concept of mimesis to discuss the nature and origins of the ‘visual picto-
rial image’, as being underpinned by the emotions and psychology of the artist who formed 
them, his ‘pathos formula’ expressed his main theory regarding the relationship between what 
he termed the ‘primitive’11 human psyche and the “manipulation of the external chaotic world 
that surrounds” (Efal, 2007, p. 221). To Warburg, any stimulus from the outside world always 
involves, within perception, a projection of a psychologically known ‘visual mental image’:
For any stimulus, be it visual or auditory, a biomorphic cause of a definite and intelligible 
nature is projected which enables the mind to take defensive measures [...] when a door 
creaks in the wind [...] such stimuli arouse anxieties among savages or children who may 
project into such sounds the image of a snarling dog (Gombrich, 1970, p. 217).
For any stimulus, such as a sound, a psychological ‘visual mental image’ is projected for the 
cause of the stimulus. It is such a ‘phobic reflex of cause projection’, Warburg maintained, that 
is always present at the edge of consciousness (Gombrich, 1970, p. 218). It is upon this princi-
ple, of the projection of a psychological ‘visual mental image’, that Warburg’s theories of the 
origins of the pictorial image, as the projection of the psychological ego, are based. Warburg, 
like Vischer, focused upon the psychological and emotional projection of the psyche onto and 
through inanimate objects. However, he differs in that his theories of the ‘pictorial image’ rest 
upon the recognition that man was, as Gombrich claims, first and foremost, a tool using animal, 
who through using tools, was able to widen and extend his ego:
I regard man as a tool-using animal whose activity consists in connecting and separating. 
In this activity he is apt to lose the organic sensation of the ego. The hand permits him to 
manipulate things which, as inanimate objects, lack a nervous system but which neverthe-
less provide a material extension of the ego. [...] there exists indeed a situation in which 
man can become assimilated to something that is not he himself precisely by manipulat-
ing or wearing objects which his bloodstream does not reach (Gombrich, 1970, p. 221).
It is here that Warburg extends mimesis, beyond that of a faculty of the imagination to the 
physical act of manipulating or wearing an object, and is thus able to maintain that man made 
objects and pictorial images are mimetic in origin. To Warburg, mimesis moves beyond an 
imaginative reflection of the active mind and becomes situated within the expressive gestures 
of the experiencing body itself (Wind, 1983, p. 30-32). As such, to Warburg, human muscles 
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themselves serve the purpose of mimetic expression (p. 31), which is always associated with the 
minimum of reflection. In pursuing this move, Warburg was able to suggest that the nature of the 
formation of the pictorial image must be studied “in statu nascendi in the shape of the expressive 
gestures made by the body” (Wind, 1983, p. 30). To Warburg, the ‘style’ of artefacts and images 
are formed in the very expressive gestures of the body that formed them. Using this extended 
theory of mimesis, Warburg was able to trace a clear cycle of the development of the image of the 
Greek Hero Perseus, from the Greek origin to the perversion of that form in a distorting Oriental 
and mediaeval tradition (Fig. 2), through to its restitution in the Renaissance (Gombrich, 1970, 
p. 194). Warburg suggested that at each stage of re-form within these oral cultures, the form of 
Perseus was ‘sterilized’12, stripped of expressive meaning, through verbal descriptions and trans-
lations (becoming a ‘stimulus’ much like the sound of creaking door) and ‘polarized’ or given 
new expressive meaning (the projection of a new mental image – like the snarling dog) through 
new cultural imaginations, which ultimately structured and formed the new visual aesthetic.
Warburg aimed to isolate and study these psychological factors that conditioned the formulation 
of style (Wind, 1983) of the pictorial image throughout different cultures and times. As such he 
believed that “any attempt to detach the image from its relation to religion and poetry, to cult 
and drama, is like cutting off its lifeblood” (p. 25). It is through the studying of the concrete 
object itself, as conditioned by the nature of the techniques and psychology used to make it, that 
Warburg aimed to understand the epistemological nature of the pictorial image, as a projection 
of imaginative, visual and psychological dispositions.
 
Fig. 2. Images from a 15th-century Arabic Magic Manuscript, depicting ‘Persues’ (far right). (Gombrich, 1986, pl. 39)
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3. The Psychologically Charged Image
Such a ‘psychology of the pictorial arts’ remained central to discussions of fields related to the 
visual arts well into the 20th century, and became the focus of discussions of the psychological 
nature of the pictorial image.13 Particularly traced through the work of the art historian Ernst 
Gombrich, these theories inherited the concerns and biases endemic within the traces of mimesis. 
Gombrich’s concept of ‘schema and correction’ can be seen as a direct extension of Warburg’s 
‘pathos formula’. The theory of ‘schema and correction’ rests upon a model of perception that 
Gombrich calls the ‘searchlight theory’14, which emphasises the active role of the living organism, 
with their experiences (schema) in probing and testing (correction) the environment:
It might be said, therefore, that the very process of perception is based on […] the rhythm 
of schema and correction. It is a rhythm which presupposes constant activity on our part in 
making guesses and modifying them in the light of experience (Gombrich, 1964, p. 272).
Gombrich maintains that our perceptions are representational, and are bound within the 
constant activity of the organism, beginning as vague and general, and as we require greater 
clarity through experience, they will become progressively more articulated. He maintains, like 
Warburg, that the ‘familiarity’ of our psychological experience (what he called a ‘schema’) is 
always a frame of reference for the ‘unfamiliar’ experiences of the external world. He applies 
his concept of ‘schema and correction’ to the pictorial image through discussing the activity of 
the artist, within which he argues that “the artist begins, not with his visual impressions of an 
external world, but with his idea or concept” (Gombrich, 1964, p. 62). To Gombrich, we must 
always have a starting point or a standard of comparison “in order to begin that process of 
making and matching and remaking which finally becomes embodied in the finished image” (p. 
321). The artist’s process of depiction works much like a simile in which the process of copying, 
of the ‘motif’ (the concrete thing being depicted) is compared to the artist’s ‘schematic form’ 
(prior experience). He outlines the process of ‘schema and correction’ through the discussion 
of copying an ambiguous shape such as an ink blot:
The draughtsman tries first to classify the blot and fit it into some sort of familiar scheme 
– he will say, for instance, that it is triangular or that it looks like a fish. Having selected 
such a scheme to fit the form approximately, he will proceed to adjust it, noticing for 
instance that the triangle is rounded at the top, or that the fish ends in a pigtail (Gom-
brich, 1964, p. 64).
To Gombrich, the ‘schema’ represents the power of expectation, rather than that of pure 
conceptual knowledge, which moulds and shapes how we understand what we see in life. He 
demonstrated this through the test of ‘serial reproduction’15 (Bartlett, 1995 p. 180), in which 
a series of drawings are produced each depicting a series of transformations from the original 
Egyptian owl to a cat through the serial copying and reproduction from memory (Fig. 3). It is 
around reproduction five that the ‘unfamiliar’ shape, which has no pre-existing category within 
the schema of experience of the subjects, is ‘distorted’ to gradually assume the shape of a pussycat 
(Gombrich, 1964, p. 64). To Gombrich, where the pre-existing category (such as the ambiguous 
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nature of the owl/cat hybrid) is lacking, a ‘distortion’ founded upon the ideas or concepts of the 
artist schema, takes over (p. 64).
 
Fig. 3. Transformation of a Hieroglyph through serial copying. From Bartlett 1995 (Gombrich, 1964, p.64).
Thus to Gombrich, the ‘familiarity’ of our own prior experiences “will always remain the likely 
starting point for the rendering of the unfamiliar” (p. 72). Upon this premise Gombrich maintains 
that an existing representation (based upon the artist’s schema) will always have an influence 
over the artist, even when he strives to record the “truth” (p. 72), which he maintains results in 
“adaptations” of the “motif” which can be seen as “distorted” representations of reality. The 
workings of such an approach become explicit within his reading of Albrecht Dürer’s woodcut 
of a rhinoceros (Fig. 4) from 1577.
Albrecht Dürer had never seen a rhinoceros first hand. When creating his woodcut of a rhi-
noceros, he had to rely upon descriptions and second hand evidence16: a sketch of the animal 
that had been sent to Rome as a present for Pope Leo X and a Portuguese newsletter that was 
sent to Nuremberg playing out the stories of the bitter rivalry between the elephant and rhi-
noceros from Pliny the Elder17 put to test by the King of Portugal (Batrum, 2002, p. 283). It is 
together with these brief sketches and a description from a newsletter that Gombrich suggests 
were used to begin to build up Dürer’s depiction (Gombrich, 1964, pp. 70-71), within which he 
filled in the ‘gaps’ from his own imagination coloured by his own experiences rendering exotic 
beasts and dragons, evident within the details of the image. From the Portuguese descriptions 
of the triumphant fight of the rhinoceros, the creature is given skin like plated armour and 
hard scales covering the legs, it also has a second horn on its back (possibly inherited from the 
stories of Pliny) with a powerful stance (Fig. 4). It is this fusion of prior experience/expectation 
and ‘information’ of the descriptions of a rhinoceros that, for Gombrich, builds up the artist 
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(distorted) depictions of the world.
 
Fig. 4. Albrecht Dürer, Woodcut – Rhinoceros, 1515.
As the literature has shown, through the underpinnings of empathy, mimesis and psychology to 
reading of the pictorial image during Western Modernity, we can read the concerns with both 
representation and the visual that situate the pictorial image: (1) as a product of human percep-
tion and imagination, as a ‘copy’ of an external world; (2) as treated as a ‘visual’ artefact, and (3) 
as no more than an expression of the psychology, emotion and experience of the artist. Such an 
understanding treats perception and the external world as separate epistemological domains, 
as such these images are treated as visual representations of something; an owl, a rhinoceros, 
grounded upon the notion of representation. The Study of Dürer’s Rhinoceros demonstrates 
well the visual bias inherent within such an approach, through the reading of the psychologi-
cally charged and distorted ‘visual features’ such as scales, body armour and dual horns as visual 
representations (or distortions) of actual ‘visual’ features, other non-visual aspects are not con-
sidered. In viewing these images through such a representational model, the epistemological 
status of the image is reduced to a ‘perversion’, ‘deformation’ or even ‘mis-constual’ of a single 
concrete reality, representing the psychological disposition of the artist.
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In aiming to overcome this epistemological dualism inherent within the symbolic readings of 
the psychological models of the pictorial image, anthropologist Tim Ingold (2010, pp. 110-131), 
maintains that in denying the views of Western Modernity and the reliance upon representa-
tion that treat artworks and depictions as an expression of  the imagination of  the artist, what we 
understand as representational art, should “be understood as ways not of  representing the world 
of  immediate experience on a higher, more ‘symbolic’ plane, but of  probing more deeply into it 
and of  discovering the significance that lies therein.” Drawing, carving, painting and depicting, 
to Ingold, are not a matter of  representing a world, they are a process of  “thinking” a world, of  
“bringing forth” or, as will be outlined in the following section, enacting a world. As the paper 
will show, such a move compounds the problems of  representation, but still leaves behind the 
lingering privileging of  the visual.
4. Thinking: The [Visual] Enacted Image
In shifting from theorising the pictorial image from representing to thinking, Ingold (2010, p. 
130-131) maintains that there is no distinction between ecology and art, that there is no distinc-
tion between the “organic provisioning” of the environment and the free play of imagination, 
they are entwined. Ingold suggests that to move away from an understanding of “depictions”18 
as representational, we must better understand the relationships between human beings, animals 
and the land (p. 112). In doing this, the purpose of a ‘depiction’ emerges as not to represent, but 
to reveal, as an activity to reach a deeper levels of knowledge and understanding. As such, Ingold 
maintains that “depictions” are not to be understood as an artistic object for the purpose of 
further reflection, but as an emerging understanding, between body and world,  what could be 
termed as a process of “embodied thinking” (pp. 126-127). He contends that the activities of 
carving and painting should not be seen as modalities of the production of art, instead, ‘art’ 
should be seen as one “peculiar, and historically very specific objectification of the activities of 
painting and carving” (p. 131), that is, of the activity of “perceptual thinking”. In extending In-
gold’s insight, Lamfros Malafouris (2010) suggests that the pictorial image should be approached 
as an activity in itself, whose purpose is not to alter a ‘fixed’ external world, but to bring forth 
a world, making available information as a part of a specific human perceptual experience. As 
such (speaking of the Palaeolithic image), Malafouris focuses upon the ‘activity’ of imaging as 
being ‘brought forth’ from a new process of acting and thinking within the world, as a result of 
a way of perceptual ‘learning’ through ‘probing’ it. Here, images:
[B]efore and beyond representation, they first ‘bring forth’ a new process of acting within 
this world and at the same time as thinking about it. This thinking however, should not 
be understood –at least not in the first instance- as that of ‘higher level’ abstract symbolic 
type. This thinking should be understood in the more basic ‘lower’ sense, namely as a 
new form of active sensi-motor engagement (Malafouris, 2010, p. 295).
In moving beyond the symbolic ‘higher’ level to a ‘lower’ level of a sensi-motor account, two 
implications for his theory of ‘imagery’ emerge: (1) that it enables us to understand seeing and 
perceiving as a form of ‘skillful interactive engagement, as a form of acting in the world’ (p. 295) 
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and (2) it enables us to conceive the role of the (Paleolithic) image as a ‘continuous prosthetic part 
of this probing mechanism and thus a cultural extension of the visual brain’ (p. 295). As such, 
he maintains that the process and act of drawing or painting is an act of bringing forth a world 
through perceptual learning and compounded to visual thinking. Based upon this, Malafouris 
is able to claim that the early Paleolithic cave imagery in fact provide a scaffolding device that 
enables human perception to gradually become aware of itself, or to think, perceptually, through 
the very production of images. He demonstrates such a process through tracing the use of basic 
visual gestalts within early cave art, such as similarity and proximity (Fig. 4), which he sees as 
evidence of ‘bringing forth’ the possibility of new forms of visual thinking by the image-maker, 
through the activity of painting itself. This conception of the ‘activity of imaging’ requires not 
a conception as to what the image means, but rather how it means, investigated through its most 
salient perceptual features. To Malafouris, such evidence suggests that through the process or 
activity of ‘imaging’, the underlying mechanism of human perception itself (of that period) be-
come transformed into an object for perception and contemplation (p. 299); a process of ‘active 
visual thinking’. To Malafouris, the ‘invisible’ gestalt visual patterns he traces throughout the 
visual works offer us a new mode of epistemic access to the visual world of experience, not as 
representing a world, but as a mode of active, ‘visual’ thinking of a world.
 
Fig. 5. Major perceptual Gestalts, Chauvet Cave, France. (Malafouris, 2010, p. 299)
The embodied anthropological perspective of Ingold and Malafouris counters the modern-
ist pre-occupation tied to mimesis in structuring understandings of the pictorial image; that 
of representation. However, the second pre-occupation, the privileging of the visual, is still 
overestimated, we still ‘think’ visually, Malafouris goes as far as to maintain that the pictorial 
313
 Woodward • A Monstrous Rhinoceros | 13
image is for exclusive reflection by visual perception, and that visual images give us epistemic 
access only to visual experiences of the world. The idea of ‘active visual thinking’ a world is 
also a central focus of enacted models of perception and cognition (Varela et al., 2001; Noe, 
2003), however, these models suggest that ‘visual’ perception is guided and structured by the 
movement of the multi-sensory body, as such the ‘activity of imaging’ can move beyond mere 
‘active visual thinking’, to encompass an entire multi-sensory enacted dimension of experience.
 
Fig. 6. Kitchen scene as constructed through the narrative of a comic (from McCloud, 1993, p.89).
‘Perceptual Guidance by action’ (Varela et al., 1993, p. 175) maintains that as all stimulations 
are only possible through movement, as such, what we term ‘visual’ perception is guided by the 
action of the whole multi-sensory body in the world. Thus, objects are not seen by the visual 
extraction of features of a pre existing world, but rather by ‘features’ of the world which are 
enacted by the perceptual guidance of action19 (1993, p. 175), in which what we perceive (in this 
case visually) is structured and guided by the actions and movement of the body. As percep-
tion is guided and structured by the movement of the body coupled with the world, ‘visual’ 
perception is redundant to and structured by the rest of the enacted dimension20, which provide 
a situation in which to theorise the pictorial image within a framework in which no one sense 
modality is privileged. Evidence to support such thought can be found through a number of 
sources; Bahrick and Lickliter (2000, pp. 190-201) show how auditory information redundantly 
supports the visual channel, and as such aids in comprehension and learning. Their ‘Intersen-
sory Redundancy Hypothesis’ claims that visual learning is more efficient when redundantly 
supported by audio experience21. Such multi-sensory structuring of visual experience can also 
be demonstrated through the ‘visual’ media of comics. Scott McCloud (1993, p. 89) notes how 
in perceiving a seemingly ‘visual’ only media, in which no sound, taste or smell is materially 
present, we have no problem in establishing, and experiencing, the multi-sensory context of 
the scene. In discussing a kitchen scene (Fig. 5), he observes that we can almost smell the food 
cooking, hear the boiling pot and egg timer and taste the food, perceptually through the as-
sumed visual only panels.
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With the insights drawn from ‘perceptual guidance by action’ we can theorise an epistemology 
of the pictorial image that does not restrict itself to that of visual experience alone. As we have 
seen, enacted non-representational approaches to the epistemological status of pictorial images 
maintain that, rather than resting an epistemological inquiry upon either perception or a concrete 
reality, that the epistemological status should be placed within the bringing forth, or thinking, 
of a world through the activities of the codependent system of body and world. As bodily ac-
tion does not simply express previously formed mental concepts, bodily actions are a part of 
the activity in which concepts themselves are formed, the process of depiction can be thought 
of in terms of a coming to know, and a subsequent bringing forth of a world, a thinking of a 
world. Thinking is not seen as a ‘visual’ process, but as a multi-sensi-motor process in which 
no one sense modality is privileged. As such, the enacted pictorial image becomes a ‘trace’, not 
of a visual world of experience, but of an entire enacted reality.
Conclusions: A Monstrous Rhinoceros (as from Life)
This paper has shown how in bringing together literature from anthropology, philosophy, cognitive 
science and art history, we can provide a framework in which the nature of, and discussions of, 
the pictorial image can move beyond the two concerns drawn from modernism; representation 
and visual bias, and begin to theorise a status that does not reduce itself to a product of percep-
tion, and does not restrict itself to that of visual experience. Such an approach, at present, will 
be theoretical and speculative, however with further work the intricacies of such an approach 
will become apparent. This paper can suggest, however, that within such an approach, we can 
‘read’ not merely visual gestalts and patterns, but the entire enacted experience of the artist that 
formed it, the entire multi sensory experiences, the culture it is embedded within, the use of 
technologies and the philosophies created and lived by. Such readings could make available for 
reflection an epistemic access to an entire embodied experience. The Enacted Pictorial Image 
as such, is not merely a copy nor a perversion, or an expression of a reality; it is a multi- faceted 
reality itself.
Upon further reflection, a revisiting of Warburg’s approach seems timely in light of the linking 
of ecology to imagination through the work of Malafouris and Ingold, revealing the ‘lifeblood’ 
of a human artefact lying within its relations to practices, technologies, beliefs, ideas and im-
aginations. The analysis of the very multi-sensory, experiential aspects of all of these cultural 
bindings could reveal the deeper roots of the reality that the images and objects brought forth. 
Upon this thought the paper will conclude with a further question: could we read, for example, 
within Dürer’s Rhinoceros the effects of the emergence within the 16th century of experiments 
with technologies of travel and flight, such as parachutes and submarines, on the experiential, 
perceptual and cognitive awareness of the artist through the pronounced physical weight of the 
rhinoceros itself?
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Notes
1 Potolski (2006, p. 18) outlines how mimesis first appeared within Plato’s dialogues as luxurious and un-
necessary, existing only among the Hunters, Workers, Actors and makers of women’s adornments. It is 
defined as secondary and unhealthy to an Ideal state, separating it from the real, rational and essential and 
equated with the emotional and irrational.
2 Aristotle is careful in his distinctions of different kinds of knowledge (Baktir, 2003). He claims that 
there are different kinds of truth that are attached to art and philosophy. Art deals with the aesthetic and 
universal truth, and philosophy with the concrete and absolute truth. Both however, are treated as mimetic.
3 The Greek culture heavily relied upon mnemonic systems known as the ‘art of memory’, which existed 
from the time of the Sophists, through the Middle Ages until the sixteenth century. The ‘art of memory’ is 
a theoretical memory system based upon the use of imaginative narrative structures for the improvement 
of memory, used particularly by orators and poets at the time of Simonides. Frances Yates (1966) traces 
the sources for the art of memory systems from its Latin roots, within Cicero’s De Oratore, through the 
Middle Ages up to the Renaissance.
4 Yates (1966, p. 19) reveals how through the ‘discovery’ of the sense of sight as the strongest of all the senses, 
attributed to Simonides, the art of memory systems rely upon a construction of a ‘visual mental image’.
5 Further conditions for the rules for places can also be seen to rely upon the underpinning of a visual 
bias. Such as a desolate, deserted, solitary place, of a moderate size, not too brightly lit and not too dark 
(Yates, 1966, p. 23).
6 Yates outlines how the rules for images aim to work with the imagination to aid memory by opposing 
the banal though creating visually striking imaginary: “When we see in everyday life things that are petty, 
ordinary, and banal, we generally fail to remember them, because the mind is not being stirred by anything 
novel or marvellous. But if we see or hear something exceptionally base, dishonourable, unusual, great, 
unbelievable, or ridiculous, that we are likely to remember for a long time“ (Yates, 1966, p. 25).
7 It is through such striking and unusual images that memory is helped by “arousing emotional affects”, 
though figures “wearing crowns or purple cloaks, bloodstained or smeared with paint, of human figures 
dramatically engaged in some activity”, creating an unusual and extraordinary imaginary world (Yates, 
1966, p. 23).
8 Vischer’s theories are situated within the prolonged debate between Formalist and Idealist philosophies 
during the late 19th century, within which he distinguishes two different understandings of content, drawn 
from the Formalist and Idealist positions respectively: (1) the objectively given content, which is directly 
presented to us by the object of contemplation in its own right and (2) the subjective content, our own 
psychological life which as percipients we bring into contact with any and every phenomenon capable of 
being grasped aesthetically. In attempting to find a middle ground within the debate, Vischer employed the 
concept of empathy that he maintained could exist both “in the case of aesthetic perception and artistic 
presentation” (Vischer, in Harrison, p. 690).
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9 The joining of the psychological (through empathy) to the anthropological was first outlined within the 
work of Wilhelm Worringer (1908) in his Abstraction and Empathy.
10 Warburg’s positioning of the epistemological within perception is driven by the denial of the formalist 
‘autonomy of the arts’, and its belief in separating the formal artistic object from the context of its forma-
tion (Wind, 1983, pp. 23-24).
11 Warburg’s theory of the pictorial image stems from his research and theories of ‘primitive’ (pre-literate) 
symbolism, primarily evident through his research regarding the Hopi Serpent Ritual.
12 Warburg use of the term ‘Aesthetic Sterilization’ to describe the stripping down of an ‘image’ (mental 
or pictorial) of any belief and prior aesthetic so as to allow another aesthetic based upon new beliefs to be 
created in the imagination. Gombrich (1986, p. 198) notes how this can be best summarised through the 
description of the process of the ars memoria in creating new imaginative images from verbal descriptions: 
“No religion, so long as it is believed, can have that kind of beauty which we find in the Gods of Titian, of 
Botticelli, or of our own romantic poets. To this day you cannot make poetry of that sort out of the Christian 
Heaven and Hell. The Gods must be, as it were, disinfected of belief; the last taint of the sacrifice, and of 
urgent practical interest, the selfish prayer, must be washed away from them, before that other divinity can 
come to light in the imagination.” (C.S Lewis, in Gombrich, 1970, p. 198).
13 Particularly through the work of perceptual psychologists Rudolf Arnheim (1974) and Herman Von 
Helmholtz (1910).
14 His model of perception is an attempt to reorient all the traditional views of the human mind, which were 
based upon what he termed the ‘bucket theory of the mind’. The concept of the mind in which sense-data 
are deposited and processed.
15 An image (an Egyptian hieroglyph) is given to a subject, who must reproduce the image accurately from 
memory. This reproduction is then given to a second subject who also reproduces it from memory.
16 The description of the rhinoceros Dürer inscribed on the top of his woodcut outlines his understanding 
of the beast: “On 1 May 1515 was brought from India to the great and powerful King Emanuel of Portugal 
at Lisbon a live animal called a Rhinoceros. His form is here represented. It has the colour of speckled 
Tortoise and it is covered with thick scales. It is like an elephant in size, but lower on its legs and almost 
invulnerable. It has a strong sharp horn on its nose, which it sharpens on stones. The stupid animal is the 
elephant’s deadly enemy. The elephant is very frightened of it, as when they meet it runs […]. Because the 
animal is so well armed, there is nothing that the elephant can do to it” (Translation of text inscribed with 
Dürer’s Rhinoceros woodcut; Bartrum, 2002, p. 287).
17 Chapter 29 of Pliny’s The Natural History states: At the same games the rhinoceros was also exhibited, 
an animal which has a single horn projecting from the nose; it has been frequently seen since then. This 
too is another natural-born enemy of the elephant. It prepares itself for the combat by sharpening its horn 
against the rocks; and in fighting directs it chiefly against the belly of its adversary, which it knows to be 
the softest part. The two animals are of equal length, but the legs of the rhinoceros are much the shorter: 
317
 Woodward • A Monstrous Rhinoceros | 17
its skin is the colour of box-wood. Cuvier says that this was the single-horned rhinoceros of India. The 
commentators have been at a loss to reconcile this description with the Epigram of Martial, Spect. Ep. 
xxii., where he speaks of the rhinoceros exhibited by Domitian, as having two horns. It has been proved 
that this latter was of the two-horned species, by the medals of that emperor, now in existence. Martial, 
Spect. Ep. ix., seems also to have been acquainted with the single-horned species. That with two horns is 
mentioned by Pausanias as the Æthiopian bull. We learn from modern naturalists, that the two-horned 
species is a native of the southern parts of Africa, while that with one horn is from Asia (Bostock ,1957).
18 Ingold restricts his analysis to the paintings, drawings, carvings and sculptures of a certain peoples 
that are known as ‘hunter-gatherers’ within anthropological literature. Such a people have a very intimate 
relationship with the land and with animals, which stands somewhat in contrast to a Westerner.
19 Varela demonstrates perceptual guidance by action through his discussion of the ‘visual guidance by ac-
tion’ through Held and Hein’s kitten study, in which “Held and Hein raised kittens in the dark and exposed 
them to light only under controlled conditions. A first group of animals were allowed to move around 
normally, but each of them was harnessed to a simple carriage and basket that contained a number of the 
second group of animals. The two groups therefore shared the same visual experience, but the second 
group was entirely passive. When the animals were released after a few weeks of this treatment, the first 
group of kittens behaved normally, but those who had been carried around behaved as if they were blind: 
they bumped into objects and fell over edges”. (Varela, 1993, p. 175).
20 As outlined elsewhere (Woodward, 2010), the non-visual nature of an ‘enacted dimension’ of experience, as 
involving every aspect of possible human experience, in which there exists no division of the sense experience.
21 Bahrick and Lickliter (2000) showed that five-month-old infants could differentiate between two five-
element rhythms (of hammers hitting a surface) when the rhythms were presented bi-modally, (audio and 
video) but showed no evidence of differentiating the rhythms when they were presented uni-modally (video 
only). These studies all agree that auditory information redundantly supports the visual channel, and as 
such aids in comprehension and learning.
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Being Through Painting and Weaving:  
A Brief Commentary on Intuition
Martyn Woodward
martyn.woodward@plymouth.ac.uk
Introduction
This paper represents the most recent attempt 
in an on-going project to formulate an account 
of artistic creation (in relation to the visual ar-
tefact) that leaves behind the prevailing notion 
that the human practitioner works upon, and 
is separate from, an inert material world. This 
idea is seen, in particular, in some of the con-
temporary approaches of psychology (Hodg-
kinson et al., 2008), where creative processes 
such as intuition and inspiration are under-
stood as ‘impulses’ or ‘feelings from within’; 
they are classed as somatic and affective hy-
potheses about the world that occur prior to 
rational thought, encased within the experien-
tial dimension of the human body. Such ac-
counts presuppose a clear boundary between 
the body in which the intuition or inspiration 
is ‘encased’ and the external world out of which 
it forms its hypotheses. 
This model of creativity is embedded within 
particular ‘matter-form’ models of creation, 
such as that of ‘hylomorphism’ (Simondon, 
1992), which have become axiomatic across 
much of Western art and media theory,1 histo-
ry and philosophy.2 This theory maintains that 
an artefact (a statue, for example, or a basket) 
is created by the imposition of a pre-defined 
form (morphe) by the practitioner upon an 
external inert material (hyle). Its creation is 
understood in terms of a design specification 
applied to a material, which can be traced back 
to a pre-designed form in the mind of the hu-
man agent. 
This paper, in contrast, proceeds from the 
claim that the mind cannot be confined to the 
brain or body of the practitioner, as accounts 
of the ‘extended mind’ reveal,3 but extends 
into the wider components and processes of 
the environment, which include that of an en-
ergised matter. As such, what can be termed as 
the ‘inspiration’, ‘impulse’ or indeed ‘intuition’ 
underlying the human creative process cannot 
be fully accounted for by human agency, but 
requires a framework that can encompass a 
more distributed account of human creativity. 
In the attempt to extend the notion of inspira-
tion beyond the body of the practitioner, the 
work of Merleau-Ponty (1964), in particular, 
provides an account of artistic ‘inspiration’ 
that is distributed amongst the wider processes 
and forces of the milieu or environment that 
(in some way) gives rise to the figure depicted. 
Here, the formal, figural qualities of line and 
Prologue
Before you begin to read this paper, take a moment of your time to walk outside. Breathe in the air, 
feel the cold wind enveloping your body, and find a pebble or a rounded stone. Place the stone in front 
of you on your desk and choose a piece of classical music to listen to. Pick up the closest pen to hand, 
hold the stone in the other, and take five minutes to feel the inspiration. Then, make a mark(s) on the 
stone – any mark, anywhere. When finished, place the stone back on your desk, put the pen to one 
side. Leave the music playing if you wish, and continue to read.
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shape cannot be separated from the wider con-
text of the object they are depicting or the ma-
terials being used. Merleau-Ponty reveals that, 
for practitioners such as modern painters, the 
very movement of the line’s generation, of the 
stroke, is bound up in a complex entanglement 
of forces emanating from the body, the materi-
als and the environment in which they work.
Following Merleau-Ponty, this paper moves 
the focus away from the analysis of a pre-
established form imposed upon inert matter 
and focuses upon these distributed processes 
of ‘form-giving’ that give rise to ‘human-made’ 
forms. Through building an account of artistic 
inspiration that reflects upon the actual pro-
cesses of the practices of painting and weaving, 
it provides an alternative account of the human 
(as drawn from the work of Merleau-Ponty, 
1962; 1963; 1964) – one that is reciprocally 
bound to the environment, within which it can 
be situated as a small commentary upon the 
process of artistic intuition.
A distributed inspiration
In his work, Eye and Mind, Merleau-Ponty 
(1964, pp. 178-179) declares that the entire 
history of painting during the modern period, 
including its efforts to detach itself from il-
lusionism in order to acquire its own dimen-
sion,4 always had a metaphysical significance. 
However, this significance is of a different 
order to that accounted for by the idealists in 
the field of the psychology of perception. The 
metaphysical, for Merleau-Ponty, is existential 
– extending out beyond the body and inter-
mingling with the objects of the world. His 
account of mind and inspiration, drawn from 
the arts, is a central tenet of his existential phe-
nomenology; it is most fully articulated in his 
earlier work challenging the psychological ac-
counts of mind that prevailed in the early 20th 
century, which viewed sensation as a reflex of 
external stimuli. 
In The Structure of Behaviour, Merleau-Ponty 
(1963, p. 11-14) builds a model of existential 
‘stimulation’ in which he argues there is no one 
direction of stimuli and response; instead, both 
the milieu and the organism’s perception are 
co-constituted or intermingled, and emerge 
through movement and behaviour:
The properties of the object and the intentions 
of the subject ... are not only intermingled: 
they constitute a new whole. When the eye 
and the ear follow an animal in flight, it is 
impossible to say ‘which started first’ in the 
exchange of stimuli and responses. Since all 
movements of the organism are always condi-
tioned by external influences, one can, if one 
wishes, readily treat behaviour as an effect of 
the milieu. But in the same way, since all the 
stimulations which the organism receives have 
in turn been possible only by its proceeding 
movements which have culminated in expos-
ing the receptor organ to external influences, 
one could also say that behaviour is the first 
cause of all stimulations. Thus the form of the 
excitant is created by the organism itself, by 
its proper manner of offering itself to actions 
from the outside. ... The environment emerges 
from the world through the actualisation or 
the being of the organism – [granted that] 
an organism can only exist if it succeeds in 
finding in the world an adequate environment. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1963, p. 13)
For Merleau-Ponty, the properties of the mi-
lieu (of the object) and the intentions of the 
subject are co-constituted; there is no primacy 
of either world or perception (intention) as 
they are symbiotic and constitute a new ‘whole’ 
or reality, which is seen as emerging from this 
intermingling. As such, he declares that the 
true source of any ‘stimulation’ is movement 
or behaviour – a behaviour that is constituted 
by the co-dependence of organism and milieu. 
Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology 
thus provides an account of the mind of the 
practitioner as not confined by the boundary 
of the skin but extending into, and intermin-
gling with, the objects and bodies that consti-
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tute the milieu, the cause of which is behaviour 
and movement. The effect is the emergence of 
a new reality or ‘whole’.
The painter’s vision is, for Merleau-Ponty 
(1964), not a ‘physical-optical’ view of the out-
side world. The world does not stand before 
the artist as a representation; rather, it is the 
painter to whom the things of the world give 
birth by a sort of concentration or coming-to-
itself through the visible (a coming-to-itself 
that is born from the movements and gestures 
of the artist as they paint) (pp. 179-181). 
This understanding puts an emphasis upon 
the wider processes of how a painting comes 
about, rather than what a painting represents. 
As such, following the writings of modern art-
ists such as Klee and Cezanne,5 the activity of 
painting is seen as a rendering visible of the 
invisible forces that constitute the ‘distributed 
mind’ of the artist – forces and processes of 
mind that are distributed in the environment. 
As Merleau-Ponty (1964, p. 166) declares, the 
mind of the artist goes out beyond the body 
to wander among objects themselves. Built 
upon this distributed model of mind, his de-
scription of the processes of the painter during 
the modern period speaks of ‘inspiration’ in a 
literal sense:
There really is inspiration and expiration of 
Being, respiration in Being, action and passion 
so slightly discernible that it becomes impos-
sible to distinguish between who sees and 
who is seen, who paints and what is painted. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 167) 
Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology 
accounts for a painter’s mind that flows like air 
between the body and the world, between the 
subject and the object, beginning and residing 
in neither; mind cannot be attributed to a sin-
gle body, but is relational between all bodies. 
Merleau-Ponty’s model of mind and painting 
as distributed amongst the processes of a wider 
system points toward an alternative account 
of the human, one that is in part coupled and 
in part symbiotic with the environment. This 
account finds further support within the later 
‘extended mind’ hypotheses of cognitive sci-
ence and anthropology, particularly as devel-
oped by Bateson (2000 [1972]) and Varela and 
Maturana (1979), whose ‘systems theory’ and 
theory of ‘autopoeisis’, respectively, provide an 
alternative model of the human as an organism 
that is coupled with the environment, where 
both mind and environment are emergent, im-
manent, through movement.
The ‘extended mind’ hypothesis
For thinkers such as Bateson (2000 [1972]), 
working within anthropology during the 
1970s, the boundary assumed between organ-
ism and environment (that is, between an ex-
ternal ‘physical’ world and an internal ‘mental’ 
world) is not absolute. “The world of infor-
mation processing is not limited to the skin” 
(Bateson, 2000 [1972], p. 460) and is seen, in 
some cases, as extended within a wider system 
of relations and processes involving the mate-
rial world. For Bateson, who draws an episte-
mology and ontology from cybernetics, when 
seeking to explain the behaviour of man (or 
any other system), the system itself must be 
understood in its totality. In other words, the 
mental characteristics of the system are imma-
nent, not in part, but in the system as a whole 
(p. 316). The mind is seen as immanent within 
a larger system of man plus environment (p. 
317).
As such, Bateson maintains that to fully un-
derstand the mind is to look toward the prac-
titioner as a part of a larger system of relations 
that they are working both with and within. 
This is characterised by his example describing 
the system of processes that comprise a man 
felling a tree with an axe:6
Each stroke of the axe is modified or cor-
rected, according to the shape of the cut 
face of the tree left by the previous stroke. 
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This self-corrective (i.e., mental) process is 
brought about by a total system, tree-eyes-
brain-muscles-axe-stroke-tree; and it is this 
total system that has the characteristics of 
immanent mind. (Bateson, 2000 [1972], p. 317)
For Bateson, the processes involved with the 
constitution of mind (or the mental), such as 
perception and cognition, are brought forth 
through the total system of relations involv-
ing the wider system of the material world. As 
such, he reveals, mind should not be confined 
to a process that exists solely within the bound-
ary of a practitioner’s body, but is, as anthro-
pologist Ingold (2011, pp. 16-19) describes, 
‘leaky’, constituted in part by processes that 
extend within the material world. Bateson be-
lieves that what designates the organism is al-
ways the organism plus environment – that is, 
an organism-environment system, maintained 
through the processes, movements and actions 
that cause the self-corrective (mental) processes 
to be brought forth from within. 
The ‘extended mind’ hypothesis is character-
istically embedded within the concept of ‘au-
topoiesis’ (Varela and Maturana, 1979; 2001). 
This maintains that cognition, perception 
and action emerge together within the rela-
tional, reciprocal system that includes body 
and world. An autopoeitic system is defined 
not by its individual components (as separate 
entities), but by the processes and relations be-
tween the components:
An autopoietic system is organized (defined 
as a unity) as a network of processes of pro-
duction (transformation and destruction) of 
components that through their interactions 
and transformations continuously regenerate 
and realize the network of processes (rela-
tions) that produce them; and constitute it (the 
machine) as a concrete unity in the space in 
which they exist by specifying the topological 
domain of its realization as such a network. 
(Varela and Maturana, 1979, p. 13)
An autopoietic system is understood as a net-
work of components and processes, which 
reciprocally constitute each other. What the 
organism is able to do is structured by the abil-
ities of the organism and its nervous system. 
The environment emerges out of the infinite 
possibilities for action that make up the world. 
For the organism, through its actions, the 
world is limited by what it is able to do and its 
possibilities for action. The enacted environ-
ment in turn limits the possible movements 
and actions, and this restructures the organ-
ism’s own actions, and the system continues. 
Both the organism and the environment are 
enacted (emerge) reciprocally. 
For Varela and Maturana, cognition and per-
ception emerge within the whole system and 
are not confined within a single organism. The 
autopoietic system is brought forth through 
its own organisation, an organisation that “is 
not the material properties of its components, 
but the relations (or processes) between the 
components” (Varela and Maturana, 1979, p. 
7). For Varela and Maturana, as for Bateson, 
mind is neither confined to the brain nor to 
the boundary of a single organism; it is distrib-
uted throughout the whole system of relations 
(including the external world) within the pro-
cesses of the system’s self-organisation.
The accounts of an extended mind outlined 
by Bateson and Varela and Maturana reflect 
the existential phenomenological accounts of 
a ‘distributed inspiration’ exemplified by the 
painters described by Merleau-Ponty: the artist 
never works alone, but is in constant recipro-
cal relationship with the world and the objects 
they are painting. It is by investigating more 
fully these distributed processes made visible 
by the practitioner that this paper will return 
to the concept of ‘intuition’ or ‘inspiration’, 
departing from the conventional psychologi-
cal accounts and proceeding instead from the 
theory, drawn from the arts, of a distributed 
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and extended mind, through a philosophical 
reflection upon the practices of painting and 
weaving.
Painting: lines, forces and movement
In his notebooks, Klee (1964; 1973) reveals 
through his experiments that the processes 
of creativity (the impetus to create) that give 
rise to ‘human-made forms’ are just as much a 
part of the energetic world we inhabit as they 
are of the human body. In reflecting upon his 
own practice of painting and drawing, Klee 
constructs an “elementary theory of creativity” 
(1964, p. 269), in which human subjectivity is 
not the only impetus in the creative process of 
the painter. In focusing his analysis not upon 
the final form of a work, but upon the very 
processes of ‘form-giving’, he was able to real-
ise a theory of creativity that included energies 
external to the human body. For Klee, there is 
always a form-giving process to creativity that 
cannot be accounted for solely by human sub-
jectivity. He demonstrates this through experi-
mentation with what he terms ‘sand figures’ 
– he runs sound waves through layers of sand 
and analyses the forms and figures that emerge 
(fig. 1). Through such experiments, Klee was 
able to speculate that form is not applied to 
a material from the outside by a practitioner, 
but that:
… [f]orm is set by the processes of giving form, 
which is more important than form itself. 
Form must on no account be considered as 
something to be got over with, as a result, as 
an end, but rather as genesis, growth, essence. 
… What is good is form-giving. What is bad 
is form. Form is the end, death. Form-giving is 
movement, action. Form-giving is life. (Klee, 
1964, p. 269)
The shift of focus from a final form to the 
very form-giving processes that give rise to it 
is central to his theory of creativity. For Klee, 
to focus on a final form is to kill the form’s 
very creation, to neglect the true genesis and 
growth of the form; form-giving itself is life. 
Klee’s theory is a precursor of the later rejection 
of ‘hylomorphism’ characterised by Simondon 
(1992).
To frame his theory of creativity based upon 
these distributed form-giving processes, Klee 
(1964) draws an analogy with that of the 
growth of a seed, in which the impetus to grow 
(what he sees as the very act of creation) is not 
limited by an impetus from within the bound-
ary of the organism’s skin. Instead, “a certain 
impetus from without, the relation to earth 
and atmosphere, begets the capacity to grow” 
(p. 29). As he notes, a seed has extensions into 
the earth, water and air (fig. 2). These exten-
sions  are interdependent with the growth of 
the structure of the organism itself, its nutri-
tional and nervous system (p. 31). For Klee, 
there is a mutual reciprocity between the nutri-
tional organs and the environment (the greater 
‘breathing -space’), in that the nutritional 
value and breathing-space of the environment 
will allow the organism’s structure to grow and 
enlarge:
Extensions in the air and space and within 
[the] soil are interdependent, just as in de-
veloped organisms the functions of nutri-
tion and respiration are interdependent. A 
broader nutritional base may give rise to large 
respiratory organs, while greater breathing-
space may enlarge the nutritional organs. 
(Klee, 1964, p. 31)
In turn, the organism’s growth will  depend 
upon a newer nutritional value in the environ-
ment. Thus, the nervous system and its exten-
sions into air and space and within the soil are 
interdependent with the organism’s capacity 
to grow. This concept of ‘organism’ (as in the 
example of the seed) is extended to encom-
pass the environment through external and 
internal energies. Klee uses it as an analogy to 
think about human creativity, in particular the 
growth of drawn and painted form. 
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For Klee, certain types of line (or strokes of 
a painter’s brush) always begin from a point, 
just like a seed, and grow through the im-
pulses (from within and without) that set it in 
motion. As movement is given to the brush, 
from a body within a world, the line is grown 
through this movement, which is enabled and 
impinged upon by energetic relations not only 
within the body (such as emotion and desire), 
but also within the environment (the atmos-
phere and the earth) and the materials used. 
Movement is thus the true generator of form, 
and also the site of agency: “The Primordial 
movement, the agent, is a point that sets itself 
in motion (genesis of form). A line comes into 
being” (Klee, 1964, p. 105).
Form (or figuration) is always the manifesta-
tion of the processes of form-giving within the 
entwining energies that are both resonated by 
the artist and by the material and environment 
in which the artist works. Thus the practice 
Fig. 1. Paul Klee: ‘The Structure and Dynamics of Waves and Vibrations’ (1973, p. 31)
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of painting, for Klee (1964, p. 10), is always 
a form-giving process rather than a represen-
tational one; the strokes of the brush do not 
render the visible (that is, copy a world as seen 
by the artist), but render visible the energies 
and forces of the form-giving processes the art-
ist is involved within. The painted line and the 
stroke (or figuration) are grown within the dis-
tributed and energetic form-giving processes 
that arise from the relationship between the 
body, the material and the environment. 
The notion of figuration as rendering invisible 
energies visible is exactly what Deleuze (2002, 
p. 56), following Klee, claims to be the elemen-
tary task of painting itself. Deleuze recognises 
that for modernist painters such as Millet, 
Cezanne, Bacon and Van Gogh, a common 
notion is described, in that the act of painting 
is (in some respect) the process of capturing 
the energetic forces of the world: for Cezanne, 
painting had the task of “rendering visible the 
folding force of the mountains, the germinat-
ing force of the seed, the thermic force of the 
landscape”, and with Van Gogh, it was a mat-
ter of inventing forces to be rendered, such as 
the forces of the germination of a seed (p. 57). 
For Deleuze, the move toward abstraction and 
the figural7 by modernist painting was an at-
tempt to attain sensation directly – a sensation 
that was related to external forces. For a sensa-
tion to even exist, a force must be exerted on 
the body: 
Force is closely related to sensation: for a sen-
sation to exist, a force must be exerted on a 
body, on a point of the wave. But if force is 
the condition of sensation, it is nonetheless 
not the force that is sensed, since the sensa-
tion ‘gives’ something completely different 
from the forces that condition it. (Deleuze, 
2002, p. 56)
For Deleuze, the ‘forces of the cosmos’, as 
outlined by Klee and Cezanne, are lines or 
threads that exert themselves upon the body 
and penetrate it, resulting in a sensation that 
promotes further action, much like Klee’s 
sand figures. This rendering of force within 
figuration through sensation was exactly what 
he maintains Millet was alluding to when he 
defended his ‘peasant paintings’ from socialist 
Fig. 2. Paul Klee: ‘Earth, Water, Air’ (1970)
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criticism during the late nineteenth century 
(fig. 3). When criticised for painting “peasants 
who were carrying an offertory like a sack of 
potatoes” in a figuration that was reserved for 
the gods, the artist responded by saying that 
“the weight common to the two objects was 
more profound than the figurative distinction” 
(Deleuze, 2002, p. 57). Deleuze claims that, 
as a modern painter, Millet (just like Cezanne 
and Klee) was striving to give a visible existence 
to the seemingly invisible forces of weight and 
gravity, and not merely portraying figurative 
sacks of potatoes or wheelbarrows of manure. 
As revealed through a study of Klee’s work, 
figuration within painting can be understood 
as arresting a much longer and more deeply 
distributed form-giving process that extends 
both into the body and into the world. In de-
scribing the growth of a stroke or line, we can-
not ignore the impulse from the earth, from 
the sea, from the air, from the atmosphere, 
from the body and from the materials used. 
Movement is only possible because of forces 
of resistance, tension and energy that emanate 
from outside the body, as well as the energies 
and forces within; there is an impulse both 
from within and from without that begets the 
growth of form. As lines grow through these 
impinging forces, movement itself is the true 
generator of form. To understand the form 
solely in terms of the final form (as applied to a 
material by a human mind) is to kill the form-
giving processes, the traces of the movement 
that gave rise to it. As Deleuze (2002) reveals, 
sensations, which give rise to figuration, are 
Fig. 3. Jean-Francois Millet: ‘Peasant with Wheelbarrow’ (1848-1852)
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themselves lines – lines that extend both from 
the body and into the environment and vice 
versa. Sensations themselves are ‘lines of force’: 
lines from both the practitioner’s body and the 
environment, which entangle, and which be-
get and enable motion, and generate the move-
ment with which the figurative brush stroke of 
the painter is grown. In such an account, mind 
and inspiration is distributed within the move-
ment beget by the body acting within a world. 
The notion that the painted line is grown, 
born out of the generative nature of movement 
itself, can be extended to thinking about ar-
tefacts and material culture. Anthropologists 
such as Ingold (2011) conceive of artefacts not 
as made, but as grown within a field of distrib-
uted relational forces. Ingold maintains, with 
Simondon and Deleuze, that matter has prop-
erties, tensions, resistances and forces, which 
play a fundamental role in the form-generating 
processes of the artefact through a material en-
gagement8 with the human practitioner. Such 
an account of material engagement is revealed 
in Ingold’s reflections on the form-giving pro-
cesses of weaving a basket.
Weaving: threads, fields and layers
Ingold (2011, p. 215) believes that to read a 
work of art or an artefact entirely in terms of its 
form is to read creativity9 backwards, to start 
from the outcome and to trace it, through a se-
quence of antecedent conditions, to an idea in 
the mind of an agent. Reflecting Klee’s theory, 
he insists that a work of art is not an object 
but a ‘thing’, and the role of the artist is not 
to reproduce a preconceived idea, but to bring 
forth form through joining and following the 
forces and flow of the materials. The ‘creative 
impetus’ of things lies, for Ingold, not in the 
tracing back of a single idea, but in following 
the forward movement10 of the flow of materi-
als that gives rise to things – that is, the form-
giving process itself.
In using the example of weaving a basket as 
a philosophical metaphor for the making of 
artefacts, Ingold (2011) asks whether we can 
really maintain that the basket has been created 
(made) through the imposition of a human de-
sign working on the surface of some raw mate-
rial. Have the forces impacting upon the sur-
face been applied from without (p. 341)? His 
answer is, not exactly. Basketry, he claims, in-
volves the bending and interweaving of many 
fibres that may exert a considerable resistance 
of their own. The basket holds together, and 
assumes a rigid form, precisely because of its 
tensile structure (p. 342). The form of the bas-
ket, for Ingold, is thus the result of the play of 
forces, both internal and external to the mate-
rial that constitutes it. The basket’s form grows 
within a force field that catches the weaver up 
in a reciprocal dialogue. 
Ingold describes the way the movement of the 
practitioner generating material forms is dis-
tributed within the resistances and energies of 
the properties of the material itself as an active 
force – a force that begets the very movement 
that generates the form:
The actual concrete form of the basket … 
does not issue from an idea. It rather comes 
into being through the gradual unfolding 
of the field of forces set up through the ac-
tive and sensuous engagement of practitioner 
and material. This field is neither internal to 
the material nor internal to the practitioner 
(hence external to the material); rather, it cuts 
across the emergent interface between them. 
Effectively, the form of the basket emerges 
through a pattern of skilled movement, and 
it is the rhythmic repetition of that movement 
that gives rise to the regularity of the form. 
(Ingold, 2011, p. 342)
What Ingold (2011, p. 353) refers to as ‘skilled 
movement’11 is, in Bateson’s (2000 [1972]) 
terminology, an immanent property of a total 
field of relations constituted by the presence 
of the organism (the practitioner) in a richly 
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structured environment.12 That is, skill is al-
ways situated within a wider system, or ‘field 
of forces’, which is constituted by both the 
practitioner’s movements and the properties, 
resistances and forces of the material itself that 
beget that movement,13 and which cannot be 
reduced to a single formula. In this respect, In-
gold sees the growth of artefacts as a process of 
‘autopoiesis’ (p. 345) – the self-transformation 
over time of the system of relations within 
which the organism or artefact comes into be-
ing. Consequently, as the human practitioner 
is involved in the same system as the mate-
rial with which they are working, their activ-
ity does not transform that system, but is part 
and parcel of the system’s transformation of 
itself. Just as with the concept of ‘autopeoisis’, 
Ingold’s schema of the creation of human arte-
facts foregrounds the processes that give rise to 
the form –  processes, distributed between the 
material properties and the practitioner, that 
are beget by movement. 
What Ingold makes transparent is that the 
form of the basket cannot be fully accounted 
for by the concept of a human design applied 
to a material. The actual form of the basket 
comes into being through the gradual unfold-
ing of a field of forces created by the active 
engagement between practitioner and mate-
rial: “This field of forces is neither internal to 
the material nor internal to the practitioner 
… rather it cuts across the emergent interface 
between them” (2010, p. 342). The form of 
the basket emerges (or is grown) through a 
pattern of skilled movement that is built up 
gradually over time as the practitioner increas-
ingly comes to terms with the tensions and 
resistances of the material. It is the rhythmic 
repetition of that movement that gives rise to 
the basket’s form. There is no template to work 
from. The developing form itself acts as its own 
template, since each turn of the spiral is made 
by laying the longitudinal fibres along the edge 
formed by the preceding one (p. 345). The ac-
tion has a narrative quality, in the sense that 
every movement, like the line in a story, grows 
rhythmically out of the one before and lays the 
groundwork for the next (p. 347).
As Ingold reveals, much like the painted line, 
the basket’s form grows within a distributed re-
lational force field, within which the weaver is 
caught up in reciprocal dialogue. The develop-
ing form, the movement, acts as its own tem-
plate – what is possible now came from the pre-
vious layer, which sets up a new field of forces 
within which the practitioner can work and 
is caught up in, reciprocally. The artefact (the 
basket), in short, is a crystallisation of move-
ment and activity within a relational field, its 
regularities of form embodying the regularities 
of movement that gave rise to it (p.345). “It 
is within this weave that our projects of mak-
ing, whatever they may be, are formulated 
and come to fruition” (Ingold, 2011, p. 348). 
Whilst we cannot attribute a ‘true’ agency to 
either the practitioner or the material, we can 
say that a possible site of agency (and, as such, 
elements of inspiration, impulse or intuition) 
could be the very movement that gives rise 
to the form, a movement that involves both 
practitioner and material, and both material 
and immaterial dimensions in equal measure, 
a movement within which form is grown as a 
trace of the distributed form-giving processes 
that gave rise to it.
From form to form-giving
Both these conceptions of form-giving main-
tain a common thread – that form is not to 
be understood as a fixed point to be analysed 
from above, but should be seen as the momen-
tary resting of form-giving processes, of lines 
of movement, entangled within lines of energy, 
force and matter. A basket or a paint stroke is 
not, in this sense, an object or an artefact, but 
an ‘entanglement’, and the role of the maker is 
not to reproduce a preconceived idea, but to 
bring forth form through joining and follow-
ing the forces and flow of materials. The origin 
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of form is, then, not a single point of origin, 
but a bundle of lines of movement in coun-
terpoint to the trajectories of the lines of force 
and energy that constitute the world. Form-
giving is a forward movement following the 
flows and trajectories of matter that give rise to 
things – the trajectories of diverse constituents, 
in which the trajectories themselves are just as 
much a part of the emerging form as the form 
itself. In such cases, form – or ‘entanglement’ 
– is constituted by much deeper form-giving 
processes which are distributed along (im)ma-
terial lines or threads of force, energy, proper-
ties, matter and movement, within which the 
practitioner is reciprocally entangled, follow-
ing its trajectory and flow. 
The accounts of creative practice by modern 
painters, philosophers and contemporary an-
thropologists, which recognise the extended 
nature of mind, point to a re-thinking of the 
ontology of human-made forms by departing 
from the analysis of form and the anthropo-
centric account of intuition of conventional 
psychology, and turning instead to an analysis 
of the distributed form-giving processes of the 
generation of form. With painting and weav-
ing, the practitioner always works from within 
the world, not upon it. They do not think 
and feel solely from within the confines of 
the body, but from deep within the flow and 
forces of the world itself, of its lines of forward 
motion, following its trajectory as it becomes. 
As Klee (1964) reveals, the practitioner thinks 
through the very material they are using, from 
within the world that they work within; mind 
flows between the body, earth, sea, air and at-
mosphere. For the weaver, as Ingold (2011) 
shows, neither is the mind above nor nature 
below, they are symbiotic. Mind is in the very 
weave of the surface of the world itself, and as 
such it can be seen as distributed within mat-
ter, forces and processes. 
From distributed mind to distributed 
human
Had I wished to present the man ‘as he is’, 
then I should have had to use such bewilder-
ing confusion of line that pure elementary 
representation would have been out of the 
question. The result would have been vague-
ness beyond recognition. … And anyway, I 
do not wish to represent the man as he is, 
but only as he might be. (Klee, 1964, p. 53)   
Klee’s account of his depiction of the human 
as a bewildering confusion of lines (Fig. 6) is 
underpinned by his conception of the human 
nervous system as that of a seed, interdepend-
ent with its wider milieu – the air, sea and soil. 
This alternative model of the human suggested 
by Klee during the modern period echoes the 
philosophy of Bergson: his ‘process philoso-
phy’ conceived of the human nervous system 
as “[a]n enormous number of threads which 
stretch from the periphery to the center [sic], 
and from the center to the periphery” (1911, 
p. 45), a periphery that, as Klee reveals, also 
extends into the environment.
This extension of the nervous system, and sub-
sequent questioning of the boundary between 
organism and environment, underpins Ingold’s 
account of the human, following thinkers such 
as Hagerstrand (1976) and the biologist von 
Uexkull (2010), which recognises every con-
stituent of the environment – human, animal, 
plant, stone, building – as a continuous trajec-
tory or thread of becoming that is always in 
counterpoint14 to the rest of the ‘tapestry of 
the world’. What is important for Ingold is 
von Uexkull’s notion of the world as a tapes-
try or melody of lines and scores, in which the 
animal and the medium (the environment) are 
co-constituted.15
Ingold (2008) foregrounds von Uexkull’s no-
tion of counterpoint in order to re-think the 
boundary assumed between an organism’s 
nervous system and the environment, conceiv-
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ing the human organism itself as a counter-
point; not as a bounded entity, but as a line 
of becoming, whose very being includes that 
which it is a counterpoint to – the properties 
and energies of the environment. The notion 
of the bounded organism is a consequence of 
what Ingold terms the “logic of inversion” (pp. 
70-72), a maintenance of an axiomatic distinc-
tion between man and nature, commonplace 
within network models across a broad range 
of disciplines.16 This logic of inversion, Ingold 
reveals, turns the trajectories along which life 
is lived17 into boundaries within which life is 
contained; life is thus reduced to an internal 
property of a bounded organism that occupies 
a world rather than inhabiting it (pp. 1797-
1798). Ingold refutes the network model of 
relations by questioning the very need for a 
distinction between the organism (or ‘node’) 
and its line of connection or relation – that is, 
the need for a distinction between the mate-
rial component and the immaterial process of 
relations.18 He maintains that within a network 
model there can be:
… no mutuality without prior separation of 
the elements whose constitution is at issue. 
That is to say, the establishment of relations 
between these elements – whether they be 
organisms, persons or things of any other 
kind – necessarily requires that each is turned 
in upon itself prior to its integration into the 
network. (Ingold, 2011, p. 70)
Crucially, for Ingold, network models of or-
ganisms treat the material ‘node’ (the organ-
ism) separately from its relations within the 
rest of the network (the processes) and, as such, 
logically entail that the organism and its nerv-
ous system are constituted prior to its engage-
ment (or insertion) within the environment. 
Such a logic, he suggests, neglects the diverse 
and distributed counterpoints of von Uexkull’s 
wider ‘tapestry of the world’ by maintaining 
that the material nature of the organism can 
be distinguished from the immaterial processes 
of its relations and interactions with the envi-
ronment.
To undo this inversion, and to recognise fully 
the relational nature of being, is to repudiate 
the distinction between a thing (as matter) 
and their relations (as processes) – that is, to 
recognise that organism and environment are 
always constituted as a relation to each other 
(Ingold, 2011, pp. 69-70). The organism is 
not to be specified genotypically (as a separate 
body) prior to its entry into the environment, 
and conversely, the environment is not to be 
specified as a set of physical constraints, in 
advance of the organisms that arrive to fill it 
(p. 19); they are instead ‘contrapuntal’. Ingold 
conceives of an organism not as a bounded 
entity, but as a bundle of lines; not as a node 
within a network, but as a knot within a tis-
sue of other knots, whose constituent strands 
(or counterpoints), which become tied up with 
other strands, comprise not a network of rela-
tions, but a ‘meshwork’ or tapestry of the envi-
ronment – a meshwork in which Klee’s depic-
tion of man as a bundle of lines finds a further 
resonance.
A brief commentary on intuition
It is within this context that the paper returns 
to the notion of ‘intuition’ as characterised by 
the psychology of perception referred to at the 
beginning. Can we still maintain that intuition 
is an internal hypothesis of an external world? A 
somatic feeling? We can, but only if we accept 
the body as separate from the material world in 
which it works. If, however, we look for ‘intui-
tion’ within the wider distributed meshwork of 
entanglement within which the human practi-
tioner works, we can no longer maintain this 
view. This paper suggests, instead, that a feeling 
of ‘intuition’ should be understood more as the 
‘virtual’ presence of the wider fabric of 
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reality that we are entwined within, the infi-
nite possibilities for action and movement – a 
glimpse of the entangled meshwork we are all 
a part of, a glimpse of something outside of 
our assumed boundary of bodily and material 
existence, a glimpse into the possibilities for ac-
tion and movement, both past and present, a 
glimpse of the entanglement. In this sense, in-
tuition is never merely a hypothesis; rather, it is 
a moment amidst a process embedded within 
the very bringing forth of a reality itself. It is a 
momentary revelation of the bewildering con-
fusion of line that, as Klee remarks, constitutes 
the human entangled within a meshwork of 
material and immaterial processes (fig. 4).
Epilogue
Whilst reflecting upon the content of this paper, return to the stone you marked and placed on your 
desk. Hold it in your hand once more and study the marks you have made. Feel the weight of the stone, 
its shape, its surface, and imagine the resistances that the pencil (or chalk or pen) you used to make the 
marks came up against. Imagine the resistances the pencil (or chalk or pen) itself caused. Remember the 
music you played whilst making the marks, and feel the temperature of the room around you. Study the 
marks in terms of the wider tapestry of forces and materials which begat your movement, and look for 
its traces within the marks you made.
Fig. 4. Paul Klee: ‘Child Ph’ (1933)
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Notes
1 Specifically, the psychology of perception as represented by the work of Arnheim (1959; 1969; 1974), 
Gombrich (1964), a revival of Arnheim’s psychological film theory for application within contemporary 
media and film studies (Higgins, 2011), contemporary film studies dealing with the mimetic and perceptual 
dimensions of film form (Marks, 2002; Sobchack, 2004), and the re-thinking of film theory in terms of 
perception (Elsaesser and Haganer, 2010). 
2 Dominant within much of Western philosophy and thinking since the time of Aristotle, and now a central 
axiom of mainstream modern thinking, the ‘hylomorphic’ (matter-form) model of creation describes a way 
of thinking about the creation of objects (substances) that conforms to the notion of the human mind (and 
the human organism) as autonomous from, and dominant to, the natural external world that the human 
agent works upon as if it were inert or ‘dead’ matter. Such thinking accounts for the generation of a ‘thing’ 
only in terms of the form imposed on inert matter by a productive human agent. Simondon (1986, p. 299) 
argues that, in privileging this anthropocentric model of creativity, the very agency of the matter itself (its 
properties, forces and resistances) that play a part in the actual processes of a thing’s creation (the activity 
of physically making the object, involving the material forces and processes) are neglected and reduced to 
the process of “putting forward, or putting into effect, the already conceived form, from the mind of the 
productive agent”. 
3 Proponents such as Bateson (1979), Varela (1979), Clark (2011) and Thompson (2010) reveal how specific 
processes of the human mind, such as cognition and perception, are external to the body, bound up within 
processes of engagement with a wider system, which includes the material world.
4 Merleau-Ponty eludes here to the model of art history built upon the notion of the ‘autonomy of art’ – that 
is, art as autonomous from human perception and metaphysics. The influential work of Clement Greenberg 
(1960) and his followers helped it become the dominant account of the period.
5 Merleau-Ponty (1964) believed that modernist painters had a sensitivity to such a situation in which the 
processes and activity of painting are caught up within the very processes between the body and the world. 
In citing the painter André Marchand, he notes that the artist is always penetrated by the universe as he 
paints, is always buried by the world he paints, through feelings, sights and sounds (p. 167). For Merleau-
Ponty, the mind of the painter does not lie within the boundary of the body, it is distributed: “[t]he painter 
lives in fascination”, fascinations which, to him, seem to emanate from the things themselves. For the mod-
ern painter, the very gestures most proper to him are not confined to his body, but are a part of the world 
itself. Merleau-Ponty cites Marchand’s (after Klee) recognition of this world: “In a forest, I have felt many 
times over that it was not I who looked at the forest. Some days I felt that the trees were looking at me, were 
speaking to me … I was there, listening … I think that the painter must be penetrated by the universe and 
not want to penetrate it … I expect to be inwardly submerged, buried.“ (Marchand cited in Merleau-Ponty, 
1964, pp. 167-8).
6 This totality of the system Bateson (2000, pp. 317-319) sees as conventionally being eschewed by the com-
monly understood notion of ‘self ’, in which a person may perceive an event they are a part of. A person may 
believe, he claims, that “I cut down the tree”, and that they are the delimited agent which performed an act 
upon a delimited object. However, he says this belief is misleading, it a way of maintaining the separation 
of the internal mental processes from the physical external world. This ‘false belief ’ that Bateson points to is 
outlined further in contemporary anthropology (Malafouris, 2008), in which it is conceived as a conflation 
of the notions of agency and ownership.
7 The formal conventional accounts of modernist art claim that it aimed to escape the clichés of the past by 
focusing upon figuration (how an object is represented by the artist) or abstraction (investigating the essence 
of the medium itself ), in order to either investigate the form of painting imposed by the artist, or the matter 
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of the practice itself.
8 As Klee also reveals, such a materiality has been overlooked for too long in conventional accounts of cre-
ativity, which focus upon the notion of a designed form imposed upon inert matter (Ingold, 2010; 2011).
9 By ‘creativity’ Ingold is referring to a form-giving process acting within a field of forces, which is distrib-
uted in a material engagement between the practitioner and the material world.
10 Ingold builds his notion of ‘forward movement’ upon the work of Deleuze and Guattari, specifically their 
distinction between ‘iteration’ and ‘itineration’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, p. 410). The work of iteration 
is one of reproduction of pre-defined form, whereas a work of itineration is creative, the co-substantiality 
between artisan and material that lies in the trajectory of forward motion.
11 What Ingold describes as ‘skill’ he maintains is a skilled movement that is emergent (not purely implicit, 
not purely learnt), a product of the entire ‘structural history’ of the engagement of practitioner with the 
materials. What is possible through this skilled movement is based upon (but not entirely determined by) 
the structural history of movements and engagements.
12 Ingold (2010, pp. 352-353) returns to Bateson’s model of the axe-man (cf. previous section), in which 
he situates ‘skill’ within a wider system that is as much mental as physical. Thus, it is a property not of the 
individual human body, but of the total field of relations that includes axe, man and tree.
13 Malafouris (2008) offers a further account of material agency within pottery. Here, the potter’s intention-
ality is seen as emergent in the relationship between the material state of the clay that needs moulding, the 
speed of the wheel being turned, and the pressure needed by the potter to pull the pot into shape.
14 For von Uexkull (2010), the rules or properties that constitute the environment can be said to shape, and 
be shaped by, the composition of an organism’s cells – a shaping he sees as a ‘melody’ of development of 
both environment and organism, which expresses, in some way, both the properties of the environment and 
the properties of the organism. Forms (of organisms or environments) are contrapuntal (or plastic), emerg-
ing within multiple semi-independent melodic lines, always as a counterpoint to the entire composition, 
emerging from what is of interest to the organism(s) involved.
15 “Nothing is left to chance in nature. In every instance a very intimate meaning rule joins the animal and 
its medium; they are united in a duet, in which the two partners’ properties are contrapuntally made for 
each other …” (von Uexkull, 2010, p. 100).
16 Ingold (2010) reveals how network images have become commonplace across a broad spectrum of dis-
ciplines, embedded within terms such as the ‘web of life’ in ecology, ‘social networks’ in sociology, and the 
‘agent-object network’ in material culture.
17 Such a trajectory is what Deleuze and Guattari (2004, p. 323) term a ‘line of becoming’, which is not “de-
fined by the points it connects, or by the points that compose it; on the contrary, it passes between points, 
it comes up through the middle, it runs … transversally to the localized relation to distant or contiguous 
points. A point is always a point of origin. But a line of becoming has neither beginning nor end … only 
a middle … A becoming is always in the middle: one can only get in by the middle. A becoming is neither 
one nor two, nor the relation of the two; it is the in-between.”
18 As is evident within Varela autopoietic system, “[t]he organization of the system is not the material prop-
erties of its components, but the relations (or processes) between the components” (Varela and Maturana, 
1979, p. 7), the organism is clearly bounded, in a reciprocal relation to the environment, constituting a 
network of components and relations, of separate material and immaterial domains. 
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An Electrical Deep Time of 
the Modern Imagination
Giovanna Costantini’s article in this issue of L|R|Q 
reveals an holistic voice for contemporary Art-
science, through that of the Japanese artist Hi-
roshi Sugimoto, who traces the emergence of 
human thought over hundreds and thousands of 
years, to an indistinct ‘origin’ which merges with 
time and the universe. With this in mind, Cos-
tantini suggests that over time, human thought 
has become increasingly more detached from 
these indistinct origins, informed by a positivistic-
materialistic world-view, and instead points to a 
more holistic account of human thought, free of 
positivism, in which matter and mind are inclusive, 
co-dependent, interconnected and reciprocal.
Knowledge, within this phenomenal and vitalist 
view, is manifest within a world in which subject 
and object are not separated, knowledge is emer-
gent from, what Costantini terms a “primordial 
sea of being”. Costantini points to an account of 
human history that is both “deep and dynamic”, 
a process of continuous engagement in which 
thought itself is consistently reworked. Within 
Costantini’s vitalist account of Sugimoto’s work, 
such dualisms as nature and culture, earth and 
sky, past and present dissolve. The ‘origins’ that 
Sugimoto seeks are, for Costantini, revealed as 
the very essence of the creative process itself, a 
“vital energy born of the relationship within and 
over time.” A force that Costantini maintains is 
a sustenance that inspires the very fusion of 
contemporary art and science, a “deeper” vitalist 
energy within which both art and science have 
emerged, from a shared primordial sea of being.
The Scientia 2013 call offers a further charter to 
these deeper waters, recognising that “knowledge 
during the period of the Scientific Revolution was 
inherently interdisciplinary, involving complex 
mixtures of fields and objects that had not yet 
been separated into their modern ‘scientific’ hi-
erarchies.” According to Michael Punt this is an 
indication of how the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century became a key moment within which the 
practices of scientific investigation, and that of the 
arts and crafts, were intimately linked through a 
complex and reciprocal entanglement involving 
a co-constructed knowledge. These entangle-
ments are seen by Punt as “performative”, in 
which knowledge does not ‘control’ and frame an 
external world, but is directly engaged with, and 
performed by the actors, along with its ontology. 
This moment during the modern period is sug-
gested to provide a form of “theatrical engage-
ment” which is being re-visited by contemporary 
scientists and philosophers of science with a 
perceived need to engage more with the wider 
spectrum of the arts and popular culture. This 
theatrical engagement offered, however, has a 
much deeper resonance than may be accounted 
for through attempts to fuse art and science cur-
rently realised. Costantini’s “deeper” vitalism finds 
further recognition through the importance of the 
often neglected notion of Deep Time, formulated 
during the eighteenth century, as a fundamental 
aspect of modern thinking, (re)discovering the 
depths of human thinking that lie within the very 
deep structures of the earth.
Media Archeologist Siegfried Zielinski reminds 
us that during the turn of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century, the notion that the earth was 
older than previously believed (as maintained 
through divine accounts) became a core topic 
within the academies (2002, pp. 3-6). For Zielin-
ski, James Hutton’s Theory of the Earth (1778), 
explained a history of the earth that was free of 
a theological dogma, and was conceived not in 
terms of a linear progression but as a dynamic 
cycle of erosion, deposition, consolidation and 
uplifting. As Zielinski describes, for Hutton, the 
earth had a deep time, that ran much deeper than 
the upper crust of the earth, that of granite, and 
extended into the sub-strata below which was 
now seen to co-constitute the upper layer. For 
Zielinski, Hutton’s concept of the earth was as a 
cyclic self-renewing machine, without beginning 
or end, constituted by matter and energy flows.
The construction of a deep time to the earth 
brought a further implication for the very role and 
notion of the human itself. Shryock and Smail 
(2009) suggest in their re-thinking of modern 
historiography, the subsequent emergence of 
Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species by 
Means of Natural Selection (1859) brought about 
a drastic change in the sense of the role of the 
human within the universe (pp. 26-27). The ev-
olutionary approach of Darwin, they suggest, 
resulted in a new sense of human history, in 
which the human’s role was no longer seen as 
essential and permanent, the human itself had 
a deep time: a deeper relation to the very envi-
ronment in which they are situated. The human 
was now implicated within, and impacted upon, 
by distributed (and non-human) determinants.
For this deep time to figure more fully within an 
account of human history, Smail suggests that 
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methods and narratives were needed that could 
triangulate between agents and materials, meth-
ods that could not be fully supported within the 
models of human cognition, which stressed the 
rational rather than relational, held at the time 
(pp. 30-31). The maintenance of a materialist 
account of history during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century could not fully support the 
emergence of deep time—the immaterial, ener-
getic and relational aspects—as such, Shryock 
and Smail offer a re-assessment of deep time’s 
implications for both the human and human his-
tory by utilising a more contemporary distributed 
account of cognition and the human drawn from 
anthropology. What Shryock and Smail alert us 
to is an under-realised aspect of eighteenth and 
nineteenth century (modern) thought, that of deep 
time itself, that runs a lot deeper within human 
cognition, imagination and creativity than has 
been accounted for within conventional materialist 
accounts of history. A deep time that alludes to a 
model of mind, and of the human, which is itself 
distributed amongst much wider determinants 
than may have been accounted for.
This anthropological re-imagining of the mod-
ern period offers a re-assessment of the ac-
tivities of artists and scientists, which begins to 
recognise the wider distributed aspects of their 
collaborations, themselves within the energies 
and flows of Hutton’s account of the earth, that 
have determining roles to play upon the human. 
Whereas Costantini and Punt recognise the wider, 
distributed aspects of Artscience across many 
brains, imaginations and experiences, the sug-
gested recovery of Aby Warburg’s pathosformula 
(Punt) brings a pathosformula which is in part co-
constituted within the wider deep time relations 
of the earth itself. Situating Warburg’s thinking 
back within the emergence of Deep Time dur-
ing the modern period, as Smail and Zielinski 
suggest within the work of Charles Darwin and 
James Hutton, points not just to the nuances of 
the collaboration between discrete practices such 
as craft and science; the engineering precision 
required for scientific repeatability, but to the 
‘deeper’, distributed elements of the wider pathos-
formula of the time that both craft and science 
fundamentally share, to the wider dimensions of 
reality not entirely that of the human.
Such ‘deep time’ aspects of the modern era are 
becoming more increasingly acknowledged, such 
as the emergence of electricity; Morus’ Currents 
From the Underworld, Electricity and the Tech-
nology of Display in Early Victorian England, and 
Benz’s The Theology of Electricity: On the En-
counter and Explanation of Theology and Science 
in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. 
These accounts provide access to the deeper 
determining aspects of electricity upon the dis-
tributed pathosformula that the arts, crafts and 
sciences can be said to share and emerge from 
within, as Paolo Bertucci uncovers (2006), the 
emergence of electricity brought with it a differ-
ent order of the natural world, which includes the 
human. Costantini’s own reference of Faraday’s 
Cage as a guide for Artscience, points not only to 
the conductivity of the entwined metal bars that 
share the electrical current but also to the condi-
tions of the behaviour of electricity upon the very 
construction of the cage itself. To understand the 
deeply entangled and intimate relations between 
art and science more fully for a contemporary 
re-evaluation, is then not to begin from the ma-
terial (and co-operative) engagements between 
diverse peoples as a site of origin, but to begin 
by situating both scientific and artistic practice 
themselves within the distributed, and deeper, 
pathosformula of the period—a pathosformula 
that is in part constituted by the emergence of 
electricity. The re-instating of the pathosformula 
within the deep time relations of the earth provide 
a meshwork to further develop the more holistic 
accounts of human thought, free of positivistic 
and materialistic world-views, a further voice for 
contemporary Artscience.
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Artifacts, Entanglements & 
Deep History: A Reflection 
on the Sublime in Art and 
Science 
The emergence of deep history is shaping a con-
temporary concern with the origins of the human 
and its artifacts, beyond a reliance upon the writ-
ten word of the (more shallow) past, which has 
formed a somewhat materialist history constituted 
by persons and things. Instead of a reliance upon 
documentary written evidence, a deep history at-
tempts to re-instate the ‘pre-history’ of the written 
word – a genealogical and archeological history 
- through the traces of human consciousness left 
within human made artifacts, which themselves 
become containers for meanings and social re-
lations (Shryock and Smail, 2011). Shryock and 
Smail insist that materials, just as the written 
word, contain traces of human kinship relations 
and exchanges. Seen within fossils, tools, pic-
tures, household items, ecological change and 
genetic variation, these traces thus ‘document’ 
a deep history of the human mind, that extends 
into the material world. Such a reading of a deep 
history of the human through artifacts, may give 
evidence for an imaginary dimension of human 
desire (Punt, 2000), and by extension human 
perception, which opens up a deep history of the 
human beyond that of an axiomatic materialism.
Such a deep history would comprise a symbiotic 
treatment of material and immaterial - (im)mate-
rial - dimensions of human experience, engaging 
within a world that itself is comprised of materi-
als, forces and energies. Manuel DeLanda’s 
non-linear geological history provides a useful 
guide, documenting the deep geological time 
and energy flows, which change speeds and 
momentarily harden to form the very crusts and 
landmarks of the environment (2000). Makers, 
such as designers and painters, have been sen-
sitive to such an (im)material symbiosis through 
their practices. The painter Paul Klee’s elemen-
tary theory of creativity recognised that form 
is always “set by the processes of giving form” 
(1964, p. 269), that energies and forces which 
are external to the practitioner, the properties 
of the materials used, beget movement and al-
low forms, such as painted lines and strokes, to 
emerge or grow. Such form-giving processes 
of growth involve not merely a single ‘human’ 
agent’s intentions, but as contemporary stud-
ies in material culture have recognised, the very 
material properties, tensions, and resistances of 
matter itself (Ingold, 2010).
These (im)material form-giving processes of ma-
terial engagement comprise, as the time geogra-
pher Torsten Hagerstrand termed, the texture of 
the world, a “Tapestry of Nature which history is 
weaving” (1976, p. 332), in which every constitu-
ent of the environment – human, animal, plant, 
stone, building - has (and is) a continuous tra-
jectory (or thread) of becoming in counter-point 
to the rest of the tapestry. As the constituents 
move through time they encounter one another, 
and the trajectories of these diverse constituents 
are bundled together in diverse combinations of 
entanglements or knots. The Human, for Hager-
strand, as well as the human artifact, is always a 
counterpoint to trajectories constantly becoming, 
and as such is constituted by these trajectories 
just as much as their own threads of life. The 
origins that a deep history alert us to are, thus, 
not be found through an analysis of the traces 
left captured within the object themselves, but 
through the tracing of the form-giving process 
and trajectories that leave the traces.
Such thinkers concerned with this ‘materiality’ of 
form-giving maintain that the origins of human 
made tools, pictures or artifacts, are not to be 
traced backwards - from the outcome through a 
sequence of antecedent conditions, to an idea 
in the mind of an agent, but forwards - in rec-
ognising that the maker’s role is to bring forth 
form through joining and following the forces 
and flows of materials themselves (Ingold, 2010). 
The ‘creative origin’ of an artefact lies, not in the 
tracing backwards to a single idea down a net-
work of relations, but in the tracing of the forward 
movement, of the entanglements, following the 
flows of materials that give rise to things - the 
trajectories of diverse constituents, a tapestry 
or a meshwork.
An artifact is not, in this sense, an object (in dis-
tinction from a subject), or a ‘thing’ (as distinct 
from, but impacting upon humans), but is brought 
forth - is an entanglement of the joining and fol-
lowing of forces and flows of materials (Ingold, 
2010). The origin of form is then not a single point 
of origin, but an entanglement of lines of move-
ment in counter-point, the form-giving process 
itself. To trace a deep history of the distributed 
human through artifacts, then, is a question of 
tracing not an origin, but the form-giving proc-
esses - the trajectories of which the artifact is a 
counterpoint - the meshwork behind materials 
such as tools and pictures. Such a move could 
reveal a model of the human in which the (im)ma-
terial nature of the meshwork, with the properties 
and energy flows of the material world, acts as 
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an extension of human agency. Human desire, 
as much as a desire of the materials themselves, 
play out through degrees of resistance, depend-
ency and engagement.
This (im)material meshwork of entanglements 
could constitute the very sublime experiences 
revealed by the preceding editorials, the “thrills 
of connection to a larger reality” (Malina) which 
come with the thrill of discovery, leading to a 
“feeling that there is something more to an ex-
perience than what is expressed or grasped at 
that point” (Sarukkai), a “fascination with the in-
finite unknown” (Punt). Such a feeling, however, 
could describe not an internal bodily affect, but 
could comprise a momentary reveal of the distrib-
uted entanglement of the human within a wider 
meshwork, which comprises the very fabric of 
the larger reality. Situated within this meshwork 
we could suggest that Science doesn’t neces-
sarily deal with the altogether different world of 
instrumentation to that of the human senses that 
may be believed. Nor to that of the artist. Rather, 
Scientific instruments- just like fossils, tools and 
household items- could be seen themselves as a 
material trace of kinshipping, of desire, cognition 
and imagination (Drayson, 2011), entangled within 
the meshwork of the world. As the presence of 
the sublime within the disciplines of science and 
art could reveal the very connecting fabric of their 
interwoven nature, the sublime itself could be 
a key (or a thread pick) to unraveling this deep 
inter-woven tapestry of reality. A historiography 
of the human, and by counterpoint - of disciplines 
themselves, could be achieved through the very 
deep history of the artifacts, knots, entanglements 
and meshworks that give them form.
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